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The chapters in this volume are papers that were presented at a Colloquium
organized in Madrid, Spain 14–16 October 2004 by the Societé Universitaire
Européenne de Recherches Financières (SUERF) in cooperation with IESE
Business School and in association with Banco de España. The theme of the
Colloquium was ‘Competition and Profitability in European Financial Services:
Strategic, Systemic and Policy Issues’. The first four chapters are keynote
speeches that cover strategic and organizational issues, financial stability issues,
regulatory capital requirements and macroeconomic perspectives. Chapter 5 is
the 2004 Marjolin Lecture concerning patterns of payments in the United States
compared with Europe.
The remaining eleven chapters are papers presented in one of the three
Commissions of the Colloquium. They deal with banking efficiency, economies
of scale and scope in financial institutions, privatization of banks, changing
technology, pricing strategies, competition, the impact of internet banking and the
connection between business cycles, asset price fluctuations, monetary policy and
banking risks.
In Chapter 1, Jordi Canals, IESE Business School, looks at the strategic and
organizational challenges that must be faced by banks in Europe. He considers
the task of European bankers to be very demanding. The implementation of
the European single market in financial services is still far from being complete.
American banks are on average more efficient and profitable. Economic
prospects in Europe look gloomy. Banks in Europe are in a transformation
process, but the process is slow. Financial margins have been declining between
1999 and 2003. Banks are diversifying from traditional intermediation and
interest-based transactions to fee-based financial transactions. Universal banks
seem to show some advantages over more focused banks but they are complex
organizations from a managerial perspective. According to the author, European
banks have to tackle the challenge of closing the performance gap in relation to
US banks if they want to make sure that they have the control of their own destiny
in their hands. They must renew their strategies. Organic growth requires innovation,
marketing capabilities and customer service, qualities that many European banks
do not excel at. European banks must also rethink their international strategy and
modernize their organizational design. Control systems and risk management,
Introduction
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conflicts of interest within universal banks and other governance issues must be
dealt with.
Chapter 2 is the keynote speech given by Jaime Caruana, Governor of Banco
de España and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
According to the governor, there is broad consensus among economists that
financial systems have become more vulnerable to financial instability in recent
years. This is due to the increased sophistication and complexity of business
structures and of the products offered, the greater degree of internationalization
and a strong increase in competition. In its work on Basel II, the Committee has
taken into consideration the need of a broad approach to foster financial stability.
Implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policies is important. So is an
appropriate institutional framework including a solid legal structure. The ‘Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ (1997) establishes a sound foundation
of supervisory, legal and accounting systems. Commercial banks carry responsi-
bility for the development of measures linking the risks they face with the appro-
priate level of capital they should maintain. Supervisors should design and
implement incentives-based systems to promote sound and prudent management.
Basel II is a major step forward. Traditional banking supervision must be
complemented by a more risk-focused analysis. Risk management must be based
on a strong foundation of corporate governance. Capital and provisioning policies
should be set with an appropriate time horizon that allows at least a full business
cycle to be considered. Counter-cyclical elements should be introduced. Banks
should be advised to build up capital and provisions during good times in order
to be well prepared to face times of difficulty. Basel II provides an appropriate
comprehensive framework for managing financial stability.
The keynote speech by Malcolm Knight, General Manager of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) is presented in Chapter 3. The author argues
that the fundamental transformation of the financial industry over the past
three decades has driven a significant transformation in the nature of financial
risk. The financial industry has gained enormously in richness, depth and variety.
Financial activity now represents a much larger share of aggregate economic
activity than it did twenty or thirty years ago. At the same time, financial markets
have become much more tightly interconnected. Consequently, the management
of financial risk has become a more important aspect of economic activity. The
new financial instruments have enhanced our ability to dissect a complex risk into
its simpler components. Risks can be transferred easily among the market
participants. The roles of financial markets and financial institutions have
become more complementary. The endogenous component of risk has become
more prominent. Firms should therefore develop techniques that uncover
vulnerabilities which emerge from the endogeneity of risk. Supervisory authori-
ties should aim at more consistency in their treatment of financial risk across
sectors. Macroprudential analysis should supplement the more traditional
microprudential focus. Authorities should support the application of a common
set of reporting standards focused not only on the profitability of firms but also
on their risk profiles.
2 Morten Balling
Ballin-Intro.qxd  13/12/05  12:57 PM  Page 2$ 
+ + 
$ 
Chapter 4 is the keynote speech by Josef Christl, Executive Director of the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The author looks at financial regulation in the
spirit of ‘regulatory skepticism’. One cannot assume from the outset that financial
stability is something that can be delivered by just switching the right regulatory
buttons. It should be made clear what financial regulation is trying to achieve.
The nature of market failures should be clearly understood. Since financial crises
have often been caused by macroeconomic shocks, macroeconomic aspects
should be given more consideration. Imbalances that may trigger a crisis may
build up under booming economic conditions. Risks may therefore to a large
extent be endogenous. Regulators should monitor the build up of imbalances.
Capital adequacy rules can limit excessive risk taking by banks and act as a buffer
against insolvency crises. Financial stability reviews published by central banks
can contribute to a coordination of expectations. Correlated bank exposures and
credit interlinkages lie at the heart of systemic risk. Quantitative models of risk
assessment should be adapted to the financial system as a whole.
Chapter 5 is the 2004 Marjolin Lecture, given by Anthony M. Santomero,
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The author describes the
differences in the origins and evolution of payment structures between the United
States and Europe. Europeans use cash roughly twice as much as do Americans.
In Europe, half of all non-cash retail payments are made through a Giro system
and only about 15 per cent by check. In the United States, it is almost exactly the
reverse. Payment cards account for the remainder of retail payments. European
central banks encouraged the use of Giro systems. In the early 1970s, the Fed
introduced the Automated Clearing House (ACH), but unlike the European Giro,
ACH has not developed into the dominant form of electronic payment. It was the
credit card that proved most instrumental in moving US payments from paper to
electronics. The author expects retail payments in the United States to continue
moving away from paper cheques towards electronic instruments, including credit
cards, debit cards, ACH and emerging vehicles such as prepaid cards. The
American Central Bank is committed to working to improve the reliability and
efficiency of the current generation of payment vehicles. At the same time, it
works to foster innovation and to support the next generation of payment vehicles.
There seems to be an emerging trend for the US and the European Union (EU)
payment systems to converge. The United States and Europe will look more alike,
although the two continents will get there from very different starting points.
In Chapter 6, Marko Komak and Peter Zajc (University of Ljubljana) estimate
the East/West banking efficiency gap and its dynamics in the 1996–2003 period.
They compare the cost efficiency of banks in the 10 new EU member countries
and 5 old EU member countries. The authors apply a stochastic cost frontier
approach. Data is drawn from the financial statements of individual banks
provided by the FITCH/IBCA BankScope Database. In their model, bank pro-
duction depends on labour, funds and physical capital as inputs. Banking services
provided are proxied by total loans, other earning assets and total deposits.
Results are presented as average efficiency scores for individual countries and
groups of countries that form sub-regions within the EU. It turns out that the
Introduction 3
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average efficiency score is the highest for Cyprus and Malta and the lowest
for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Baltic countries. The dynamic part
of the analysis shows that the East/West efficiency gap has been gradually
narrowing.
In Chapter 7, Martin T. Bohl and Olena Havrylchyk (European University
Viadrina Frankfurt an der Oder) together with Dirk Schiereck (European Business
School, Oestrich-Winkel, Germany) look at the wealth effects of fifty-one Polish
bank acquisitions by foreign investors between 1996 and 2002. In 1998, a new act
on banking came into force that removed all restrictions for the entry of foreign
banks. The following transformation of the ownership of Polish banks has been
dramatic. At the end of 2002, 14 out of 15 banks listed on the Warsaw Stock
Exchange had foreign majority shareholders. The authors apply Thomson
Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database for an event study. They find
that the shareholders of target banks experienced positive abnormal returns over
the event window. Also shareholders of non/participating banks experienced
some positive returns.
In Chapter 8, David B. Humphrey (Florida State University) and Santiago
Carbó Valverde and Rafael Lopez del Paso (University of Granada) study the
impact of the increasing use of electronic payments and automatic teller machines
(ATMs) on cost efficiency in banking. They demonstrate that the shift to new
technology has been associated with significant reductions in operating cost as a
per cent of bank asset value during the 1990s. The share of non-cash transactions
that are electronic rose from 1992 to 2000 and the number of bank employees per
10,000 inhabitants declined in most of the European countries. They perform an
empirical analysis of the operating costs at Spanish savings and commercial
banks over the period 1992–2000. The new technology has significantly
contributed to a reduction of operating costs in the Spanish banking system.
In Chapter 9, Santiago Carbó Valverde and Francisco Rodríguez Fernández
(University of Granada and FUNCAS) analyse the effects of changes in bank
specialization and diversification on pricing strategies and the evolution of bank
margins. They study a sample of 19,322 European banks during 1994–2001.
Financial innovation and changes in financial intermediation activities have
altered the income structure of European banks significantly. Interest margins
have declined while the importance of fees has increased. The authors apply a
multi-product framework to study the determinants of bank margins. They
incorporate the effects of specialization-diversification options beyond lending
and deposit taking. The authors find that both market power and risk parameters
alter bank margins when introducing financial innovations. Specialization and
bank margins are significantly related. Output diversification permits banks to
increase their revenues and obtain higher market power. Fee income may com-
pensate, somehow, lower interest margins that result from stronger competition in
traditional markets.
Chapter 10 by Michael Koetter (Utrecht School of Economics) on bank
efficiency and mis-specified input prices was awarded the 2004 Marjolin Prize
for the best contribution to the Colloquium by an author below the age of forty.
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The author applies stochastic frontier analysis and compares the effects of
alternative input price specifications on the measurement of bank efficiency. In
his models, banks produce loans, securities and off/balance sheet activities by
means of borrowed funds, labour and fixed assets. Banks are assumed to minimize
costs when producing a given output bundle conditional on available equity.
The empirical analysis is based on data concerning German banks. Numbers are
obtained from the FITCH/IBCD BankScope Database. He estimates cost and
profit efficiency with several different model specifications. It is shown that
efficiency estimates are affected by alternative input price specifications. The
influence is higher on cost efficiency than on profit efficiency. A certain East-
effect is documented. There are significant efficiency differences between banks
in East and West Germany but the differences are declining through time.
Regional information is, however, still important.
In Chapter 11, Wim Boonstra and Johannes M. Groeneveld (Rabobank) study
the competitive conditions in the highly concentrated Dutch banking sector.
Analyses based on the so-called Structure–Conduct–Performance (SCP) paradigm
try to establish a link between market structure, behaviour of banks and
profitability. Concentration is seen as a market situation that makes superior bank
performance possible. In contrast, the efficiency hypothesis postulates that
efficient banks are able to increase their market share due to their higher prof-
itability. As a consequence of superior performance, the degree of concentration
increases. The authors find existing studies on competition and concentration in
European banking typically based on concentration figures at the macro level
unsatisfactory. Instead, they look at C5-ratios and Herfindahl–Hirschman indices
(HHI) in individual sub-markets and argue that competition may be more intense
than the macro figures suggest. One should also include the competitive implica-
tions of structural developments in the distribution of financial services, entrance
of new independent intermediaries and new technology. Due to improved internet
access, bank customers are increasingly shopping for the best bargains for each
product and service. Increasing transparency makes it difficult for banks to cross-
subsidize individual products. They conclude that the degree of concentration in
a specific banking market is not a reliable proxy for the intensity of competition.
The key issue in banking has little to do with ‘too big to fail’ but with ‘too small
to survive’ instead.
In Chapter 12, Jean Dermine (INSEAD) argues for a balanced view in the
sense that strategic management in banking should define both short-term and
long-term financial goals and ensure an acceptable degree of diversification.
Value-based management should achieve the maximization of both short-term
and long-term economic profits. The difficulty of finding a delicate balance is
illustrated by the Lloyds TSB (Trustees Savings Bank) case. In the years after
1983, Lloyds TSB demonstrated brilliant performance. After 1999, a more
difficult environment and an increasing focus on cost cutting contributed to a
share price decline as the market seemed to be questioning the sources of future
growth. The company’s diversification policy seemed to work well in the early
1990s. Nordea AB is also analysed in the chapter as an interesting example of a
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cross-border merger in which the management plan to move to a single corporate
structure as a ‘European Company’. At the end of the chapter, the author returns
to the trade-off between short- and long-term corporate objectives and between
focus versus diversification. In both respects, the ‘in medio virtus’ is to be highly
recommended.
Chapter 13 is a paper by Javier Delgado, Ignacio Hernando and Maria J. Nieto
(Banco de España). The authors analyse what they call ‘primarily internet banks’
compared to traditional banks. Most banks use a combination of branches and the
internet for delivery of services to their customers. The number of bank cus-
tomers using online facilities is increasing worldwide. The authors attempt to
identify and estimate the magnitude of technology based scale and learning
effects of banks that heavily rely on new technology in their business model.
Primarily Internet banks show significant technology based scale economies
arising from their ability to control operational expenses more efficiently than the
new traditional banks. Internet banking penetration varies across countries. The
Scandinavian countries have the highest levels of Internet banking use. The prof-
itability of European Internet banks was negative on average over the period
1994–2002 due to high costs of website development and promotion. The authors
apply data from BankScope. In the empirical analysis they distinguish between
primarily Internet banks, small established traditional banks and newly chartered
banks. The profitability of primarily Internet banks is so far significantly lower
than that of newly chartered traditional banks. Primarily Internet banks show,
however, significant scale economies in terms of Return on Assets (ROA) and
Return on Equity (ROE).
In Chapter 14, Rudi Vander Vennet and Olivier De Jonghe (Ghent University)
and Lieven Baele (Tilburg University) look at the relationship between business
cycles and bank risks. They investigate how bank health is related to the economic
conditions in which they operate. After a review of theories concerning asymmetric
information, agency costs, changing incentives and monetary policy transmission
channels, the authors carry out an empirical study based on a sample of 280 listed
European banks. Together, the banks in the sample account for more than 80 per
cent of the total assets in the European banking industry. Accounting data is
retrieved from the BankScope database maintained by FITCH/IBCA/Bureau Van
Dijk. Capital adequacy, degree of diversification, type of institution and other
characteristics are used to reveal specific strengths or weaknesses of banks when
they are confronted with an economic slowdown. The authors find that bank returns
and risks differ considerably across countries, that commercial banks and financial
conglomerates fare less well in the economic downturn (2000–2003) than tradi-
tional intermediaries such as savings banks. Market-based return and risk measures
support the conjecture that diversified banks were hit much harder in the economic
slowdown than their more specialized peers. The stock market does not view
diversification as universally better than focused banking. Capital adequacy, on the
other hand, clearly has a positive effect on the risk profile of banks.
Chapter 15 is a paper by John P. Calverley (American Express Bank). The
author explores the implications of housing bubbles and high household debt for
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monetary policy and for bank profitability. It is documented that rapid rises in
house prices are a widespread phenomenon among the industrial countries.
Analysis based on 1974–2002 data suggests that house prices have become
unusually high compared with historical levels, in relation to both earnings and
rents. Alongside the rise in house prices there has been a rise in household debt.
The household debt-income ratio has risen. The rise in household debt burdens
suggests that consumers may be more sensitive to higher interest rates than in the
past. The sensitivity depends, however, on the relative importance of respectively
floating rate mortgages (the rule in the United Kingdom) and fixed rate mortgages
(the rule in the United States). The author discusses imposition of loan-to-value
ratios, property exposure limits on bank lending and counter-cyclical provisioning
rules as alternatives to monetary policy. All in all, he expects that handling of
housing pricing problems will play a major role in monetary policy and the course
of the economy in the years to come.
In Chapter 16, Philipp Hartmann, Simone Manganelli and Cyril Monnet
(European Central Bank (ECB)) report on the scope, the findings and initiatives
of the ECB-CFS (Centre for Financial Studies) Research Network on ‘Capital
Markets and Financial Integration in Europe’. The Network aims at measuring
and monitoring the degree of European integration in each financial market and
at stimulating policy-relevant research concerning the current and future structure
and integration of the financial system in Europe and its international linkages
with the United States and Japan. High priority topics are bank competition and
the geographical scope of banking, international portfolio choices and asset
market linkages between Europe, the United States and Japan, European bond
markets and securities settlement systems. A crucial research theme is the effects
of the implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan from 1999 on the
development and integration of financial markets. Other important topics on
the research agenda of the Network are the enlargement of the EU and the impact
that financial integration and financial system development may have on
financial stability and economic growth.
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In the early 1990s, European banks seemed to be in big trouble. The creation of
the European Single Market in 1992, the collapse of the European Monetary
System, the economic slowdown, the deregulation in financial markets and the
emergence of new competitors were factors that created a sense of uncertainty –
in some cases, even panic – among many European banks. However, most banks
have survived, banking restructuring has been implemented in several countries
and most banks are in a stronger position than in the early 1990s.
Many European banks have reinvented themselves by redefining their strategy,
designing new organizational forms, launching innovative services and entering
into new businesses. We have also seen in Europe the emergence of new universal
banks, with a strong diversification strategy away from traditional retail banking,
like Deutsche Bank or HSBC, and the creation of stronger regional banks, like
Barclays, BBVA or Santander Group.
Nevertheless, the future of European banking looks uncertain. The implemen-
tation of the European single market in financial services is still far from being
completed, which means that, in some segments of the financial services industry,
national markets are still isolated, fragmented and somehow protected from
external competitors.
Although the competitive positioning of many European banks has improved
over the past few years, their comparison with the financial performance of US
banks does not look particularly good. US banks, on average, are more efficient
and profitable in using capital than European banks. On top of this, their market
value is not only bigger, but also price–earning ratios are higher in US banking.
One may argue that because European banks are not very profitable, US banks
will not want to increase their business or acquire banks in Europe. But the right
argument may be the opposite: precisely because many European banks
underperform US banks, there is room for efficiency gains in this industry if
better managed and financially stronger banks – in this case, US banks – take over
less efficient ones.
The banking system depends very heavily on the state of the economy. With eco-
nomic prospects in Europe so gloomy and no perspectives of acceleration in the
growth rate, banks may have a hard time in generating revenue growth over the next
few years. Moreover, Japanese banks seem to be back and we will see in the near
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future the emergence of banking giants in China. Certainly, scale is not the key factor
for long-term survival in banking, but many European banks may be in the brink of
being absorbed, unless they think about consolidation and, more important, change
the way of running the business which today has become somehow obsolete.
Retail banking in several European countries is still organized the old way
(Belaisch et al., 2001), with a heavy cost structure, not very intense price compe-
tition, slow innovation and poor customer service. In many ways, European banking
does have the same competitive shape as some other European industries about
ten years ago. The difference is that the pace of change in banking has been
slower than in other industries. Regulation mixed up with political interference
and the slow process of implementing the European single market are important
explanations for the slow transformation of banking in Europe. But many US
and a few European banks have been changing very quickly (see Canals, 2003),
showing a possible way out. It seems clear that efficiency will drive the worst
performers out of the market.
This paper discusses some strategic and organizational challenges that
European banks are facing today. It is structured as follows: we will offer first an
overview of some features of the European banking industry; next, we will
analyse some major challenges that European banks will face in the next few
years: closing the performance gap with US banks, fostering strategic renewal,
managing organizational complexity and improving corporate governance.
1.1 Banking: the European landscape
1.1.1 Profitability
Table 1.1 offers an overview of the evolution of net interest margins between 1999
and 2003 for the United States, Japan and some key European countries.
Financial margins have fallen since 1999 in all the countries considered. The US
banking system still outperforms the rest of countries by far. In Europe, only
Spain gets close to the US banking system. France and Germany are left behind
and seem unable to offer products innovative enough to maintain the financial
margin.
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Table 1.1 Banks’ profitability as a percentage of total average assets (net interest margin %)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
United States 3.34 3.22 3.11 3.11 2.99
Japan 1.14 1.07 1.01 1.00 0.55
UK 2.30 2.21 2.04 1.96 1.82
Germany 0.95 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.79
France 1.14 0.94 0.65 0.75 0.91
Spain 2.62 2.63 2.92 2.72 2.38
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
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The profitability measured on average assets has also declined in all countries
except in Spain, as shown in Table 1.2. Nevertheless, the US banking system
shows a return on assets far above any other country. Spain and the United
Kingdom, the next countries after the United States, show a return on assets 40%
smaller than US banks. The case of German and Japanese banks is really bad,
although Japanese banks seem to be slowly recovering.
The efficiency ratio – or cost–income ratio (CI) – is another way of looking at
the efficiency of the banking industry. Table 1.3 shows the change in this ratio
between 2003 and 1998 for the top twenty banks in terms of market capitalization
at the end of 2003. US banks are the most efficient ones, with ratios of about 50%
or less. The superior performance of US banks has to do not only with their cost
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Table 1.2 Banks’profitability as a percentage of total average assets (pre-tax profits %)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
United States 2.17 1.79 1.52 1.71 2.04
Japan 0.42 0.37 0.69 0.45 0.07
UK 1.43 1.53 1.24 1.08 1.22
Germany 0.43 0.55 0.14 0.05 0.20
France 0.69 0.83 0.67 0.46 0.58
Spain 1.21 1.33 1.20 1.05 1.27
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Table 1.3 Top 20 world banks cost/income ratio (%)
1998 2003
1 Citigroup 76.79 52.50
2 Bank of America 67.36 53.13
3 HSBC Holdings 54.87 47.93
4 Wells Fargo & Co. 70.04 60.16
5 Royal Bank of Scotland 50.65 55.07
6 UBS 78.43 75.43
7 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 80.98 68.03
8 Wachovia 55.78 66.41
9 Barclays 65.47 58.44
10 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 102.14 72.44
11 Bank One 67.86 60.31
12 BNP Paribas 68.14 62.90
13 US Bancorp 53.78 44.77
14 Banco Santander Central Hispano 69.58 63.10
15 Mizuho Financial Group 129.48 64.02
16 HBOS 40.40 45.69
17 Deutsche Bank 78.10 81.81
18 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 62.44 56.77
19 Lloyds TSB 46.32 52.21
20 Credit Suisse 72.89 70.46
Source: The Banker.
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efficiency, but also with their ability to generate higher absolute revenue, stronger
than the ability of European banks.
Market valuation highlights how different US and European banks perform and
the gap in scale that is dividing banks on both sides of the Atlantic. Table 1.4
shows the top twenty banks in the world in terms of market capitalization
(December 2003), with Citigroup far away from the rest of banks and only one
European bank, HSBC, getting close to the second US bank, Bank of America.
Strategic and organizational challenges 11




2 Bank of America 170,586
3 HSBC Holdings 163,667
4 Wells Fargo & Co. 98,570
5 Royal Bank of Scotland 95,759
6 UBS 86,663
7 JP Morgan Chase & Co. 77,716
8 Wachovia 61,694
9 Barclays 57,471
10 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 57,225
11 Bank One 54,889
12 BNP Paribas 54,562
13 US Bancorp 52,880
14 Banco Santander Central Hispano 51,362
15 Mizuho Financial Group 50,496
16 HBOS 50,351
17 Deutsche Bank 46,217
18 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 45,583
19 Lloyds TSB 45,013
20 Credit Suisse 42,194
Source: The Banker.
Table 1.5 Market concentration (%)a
1997 2003




United Kingdom 47 41
Italy 25 27
Spain 47 55
Source: Bank for International Settlements.
Note
a Top five banks’ assets as a percentage of all banks’
assets.
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Moreover, the potential for market concentration in the United States is still
high, which means that the average scale of top banks in the United States can
become bigger. Table 1.5 shows the market concentration index for seven coun-
tries in 1997 and 2003. The increase in the concentration levels is generalized.
But Germany, the United States and Italy are the laggards. It is more difficult to
see more European banks buying US banks than US banks entering more aggres-
sively into Europe. Both trends – further consolidation in the United States
and the opening up of European banking to the rest of the world – are good oppor-
tunities for US banks and a threat for European banks.
1.1.2 Growth and diversification
The average scale of banks has substantially increased over the past years in Europe
and the United States (see Berger et al., 1999). Table 1.6 shows the top twenty banks
in terms of total assets in 2003 and their size in 1999. This increase is remarkable.
Banking growth has been driven mainly by mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and
the diversification process of banks away from retail activities to corporate banking,
asset management, capital markets transactions and advisory services.
The increasing importance of financial markets in the Western world has
attracted many retail banks to capital markets, setting up new advisory, investment
banking, trading and research units or acquiring other firms. The anecdotal
evidence of this trend is clear. Deustche Bank acquired Bankers Trust; Dresdner
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Table 1.6 Top 20 world banks total assets ($M)
1999 2003
1 Citigroup 716,937 1,264,032
2 Crédit Agricole Groupe 441,524 1,105,378
3 HSBC Holdings 569,139 1,034,216
4 Bank of America Corp 632,574 736,445
5 JP Morgan Chase & Co 406,105 770,912
6 Mizuho Financial Group 428,804 1,285,471
7 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 678,244 974,950
8 Royal Bank of Scotland 146,307 806,207
9 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 507,959 950,448
10 BNP Paribas 701,853 988,982
11 HBOS 222,795 650,721
12 Deutsche Bank 843,761 1,014,845
13 Barclays Bank 398,825 791,292
14 Wells Fargo & Co 218,102 387,798
15 Rabobank Group 282,514 509,352
16 Bank One Corp 269,425 326,563
17 ING Bank 351,211 684,004
18 UBS 613,637 1,120,543
19 Wachovia Corporation 67,353 401,032
20 ABN AMRO Bank 459,994 667,636
Source: The Banker.
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Bank acquired Kleinwort Bentson; Citigroup acquired Schroders; ING acquired
Barings; Crédit Suisse acquired Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette; UBS and SBC
merged; Chase Manhattan acquired JP Morgan. The evolution of non-interest
income as a percentage of gross income in the European Union (EU) is clear. In
the 1980s, this ratio was less than 25% in most EU countries; in 2000, it was
about 40% in the Eurozone countries (Canals, 2003). This ratio is not the only
indicator of diversification, but shows in a simple way how much banks are going
away from traditional intermediation and interest-based transactions to fees-based
financial transactions. This means that banks are not only changing the nature of
their activities as financial intermediaries, but also the type of capability they
need to develop to bolster their competitive advantage.
Moreover, this diversification process of many European banks is not only a
reaction against low revenue growth in some traditional banking activities, but
also the belief that the universal banking model, with a holding company and
several business units competing in different segments of the financial services
industry, is the pathway to the future.
Universal banks seem to show some advantages over more focused banks (see
Saunders and Walter, 1994; Canals, 1997). The first is the potential to exploit
linkages among the bank’s business units and, in particular, the advantage of
cross-selling of financial services. The opportunities for cross-selling seem to
be important in retail banking, asset management, investment funds and insur-
ance. Nevertheless, the volume of cross-selling does not increase as quickly as
some banks would wish, for a variety of reasons. First, a bank may not offer the
best set of financial services and its competitive advantage in cross-selling may
be weak. Second, rivalry in each segment makes competition very tough for
universal banks, and specialists may be more efficient. Third, the universal banks’
internal organization does not always create an efficient coordination between the
business units selling different types of financial services from the clients’ point
of view. Fourth, the distribution system of universal banks has become increasingly
specialized and segmented; the creation of special branches for high-income
individuals or special networks for serving the corporate market reflect this trend.
This means that fragmentation of distribution channels may play against the
integration of financial services that cross selling requires.
The second potential advantage for universal banks is the diversification of the
sources of earnings and the prevention of the risk of substitution. This risk
consists of the threat of innovation that comes from new financial services or
alternative distribution channels. The emergence of new products such as invest-
ment funds or new distribution channels, such as Internet banking, makes this
threat evident. Some banks’ senior managers also argue that the diversification of
earnings may increase earnings’ stability. This may be true only in those activities
in which earnings tend to be stable themselves – for example, they come from
recurrent activities – but not in the cases of those activities – like capital markets –
which are not. However, from a strategic point of view, what really reduces the
risk of substitution is innovation. In this respect, universal banks do not have in
fact a clear advantage over specialized banks.
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Universal banks may enjoy another advantage: the offer of ‘a one-stop shop’ by
becoming exclusive providers of a wide range of financial services to individu-
als, families and firms. Firms may be edging towards dealing with a smaller number
of banks. However, it is less obvious that a single bank can be superior to others
in providing all of the financial services that companies might require. In Europe,
some universal banks with a strong corporate banking presence have a leading
role in lending. However, it is more difficult for them to compete with US invest-
ment banks in advisory functions, mergers or acquisitions. Their problem lies not
so much in the size of the market, as in the fact that US banks have an extensive
experience and developed unique capabilities in deal-making.
However appealing the advantages of universal banks might be, the problems
and challenges that they involve are also relevant. These are extremely complex
organizations from a managerial perspective, with specific coordination and
compensations problems stemming from the fact that they are the umbrella under
which sometimes very different business units operate. Universal banks also
generate conflicts of interests, with different business units – investment banking,
lending, advisory services, etc. – fighting for their sources of revenue.
From a profitability viewpoint, there is no evidence that universal banks –
diversified financial services firms – are more profitable than focused banks. On
the contrary, profitable banks may be big and small ones, depending also on the
industry conditions in each country and, eventually, on the quality of management
of each bank.
Nevertheless, even if the evidence does not fully support the vision of universal
banks, there is no doubt that they are shaping financial institutions today in the
European landscape.
1.2 European banks: main challenges and risks
Taking into account the competitive and financial position of European banks in
the beginning of the 1990s, their evolution over the past ten years has been a
reasonable success for many of them. Nevertheless, this industry is clouded by
internal challenges and competitive threats. It is difficult to predict which specific
pathway its evolution will follow, but it is true that this industry has not gone
through a strong restructuring process as other European industries, and the room
for efficiency improvement is still significant.
In this section, we will discuss four major challenges that European banks will
have to tackle over the next few years, because their survival depends very much
on their success in overcoming more intense competition for clients and markets:
closing the performance gap with US banks, fostering strategic renewal,
managing organization complexity and improving corporate governance.
1.2.1 Closing the performance gap
As seen in the previous section, European banks’ profitability has declined over
the past few years – see Tables 1.1 and 1.2 – with some notable exceptions. And US
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banks are, by far, still more profitable than European banks. This generates a
performance gap, an asymmetry between banks on both sides of the Atlantic as
highlighted earlier. European banks have to tackle the challenge of closing this gap
as they want to make sure that they have control of their destiny in their hands.
A deeper explanation for financial performance in European banking is the
lack of economic growth and the low potential for growth revenue in many
areas of financial services. Slow growth plays into the hands of cost cutting,
which becomes the undisputable tool to improve performance in Europe,
since European banking has still higher fixed costs and CI ratios. However impor-
tant it may be, cost cutting is neither a guarantee of long-term survival and
success, nor a signal of revitalizing banks’ strategies which is what many banks
actually need.
Investment in technology has declined over the past three years, but it will
come back in banking and will give those banks that invest smartly in technology
a more effective weapon to lower operational costs. Unfortunately, many banks
have turned their back on technology after the bubble burst in 2001–2002, but
there are many successful examples of how technology can help manage banking
operations more efficiently.
A direct outcome of the lower banking profitability in Europe is that the
European banks’ market value is smaller than that of US banks. This lower
valuation, in combination with the sheer size of some US banks, transforms them
into potential and powerful bidders in European banking. European banks will not
be in control of their future unless they can reduce this performance gap.
What are the generic options for European banks in order to close this gap?
Three generic approaches have been followed. The first is looking for more
efficiency through cost restructuring (Berger and Mester, 1997). The second is
downsizing and assets sell-off of those units, which the current management
cannot run well and that absorb too much capital in an inefficient way. Finally, a
restructuring of the portfolio that include both asset disposal and investment in
new business.
These generic approaches could be useful in some instances, but do not resolve
the underlying problems of European banks. The reason is simple. The return on
assets of any company is the difference between revenue and expenses, over total
assets. The problem with the three approaches described previously is that they
may be good at cutting costs and refocusing banks away from marginal business,
but not good enough for the real challenge that banks have to go through in order
to improve long-term performance.
Figure 1.1 shows the arguments. Banks can reduce expenses and improve their
return on equity; or sell assets, in order to improve their rate of return on assets.
Nevertheless, these are not sustainable policies in the long term, since there is a
limit to cutting expenses or how far a bank can proceed with asset disposal.
Unless banks make an effort to boost revenue growth in the long term and use
capital more efficiently, it will be impossible to close the performance gap that
separates US banks from European banks. The growth challenge is the next issue
to be discussed.
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Concern about banks’ market value has focused the attention of senior managers
inside and outside the banking industry. Nevertheless, this approach is essentially
flawed, since the share price should be the outcome, not the driver, of a good
business strategy. There is a sense of despair about the market value of some
European banks, with a significant asset size, in particular, when they compare
their valuation vis-à-vis US banks’ valuations. However, this uneasiness is useless
because there is not the same sense of urgency about rethinking banking
strategies, or considering the deeper, underlying factors that drive market value in
the long term. Rediscovering the meaning of strategy in banking is critical if
banks want to focus on long-term growth.
And the banking landscape for growth will become more difficult in the
following years. Revenues in some traditional business segments are flat. Rivalry
will become more intense, with savings banks and other financial services firms
different from banks offering new, innovative savings products and advisory
services. Many indicators seem to suggest that customers in banking are not
particularly loyal to their banks and switching costs are more of an unwanted
chain around customers than the outcome of excellent bank service. Finally, in
Europe economic growth has been disappointing over the past decade and, unfor-
tunately, it does not seem that its prospects may change in the near future. In this
landscape, financial services will not grow dramatically unless banks offer some
innovative services.
Strategic renewal in banking includes several dimensions. The first is the con-
viction about the importance of generating organic growth as opposed to acquisi-
tions. The reason is that acquisitions generate instant growth, but not necessarily
sustainable growth. Moreover, acquisitions absorb the focus of top managers for
too long, at the expense of customer service and product innovation (Houston
et al., 2001). And organic growth requires innovation, marketing capabilities and
customer service, qualities that many European banks do not excel at. Moreover,
they have very rarely been the first priority among senior managers of banks.
The second dimension is commercial execution. Banks are not the best
customer-friendly firms. The levels of customer retention are not extremely high in
banking. At a time when all types of companies in a variety of industries – including
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Figure 1.1 Return on equity (ROE).
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retailing or airlines – are fighting for customer loyalty in different ways, many
banks seem to be way behind this effort to captivate the minds, hearts and wallets
of their customers.
The third dimension for strategy renewal in banking is rethinking international
strategy. Banking in Europe, with some exceptions, is still a national industry.
Even banks that have a strong presence outside the home country do not have a
clear international strategy. Many banks have been opportunistic in international
strategy in the sense of capturing good opportunities, rather than thinking what
international strategy could make sense for them in the long term. The question
about which countries a bank should operate in to improve its positioning and
guarantee long-term success has been replaced by whether a target could fit into
the bank’s current portfolio of business. There is nothing wrong in using oppor-
tunities well. The wrong approach consists of focusing only on opportunities and
disdaining strategic thinking. Some questions like the countries where a bank can
compete in, which competitive advantages it should have in each country or how
to transfer resources or capabilities from the centre to the national subsidiaries are
key questions to be answered by a solid international strategy.
Another key strategic issue for banks is how much diversification they can
afford to achieve. In the past few years, the trend towards diversification in banking
has been inexorable, driven by the slow growth in some traditional areas and the
attractiveness of bigger growth potential in others. Nevertheless, there is a limit
to what a bank can efficiently accomplish in its diversification process.
The lack of focus in a diversified bank is real and the risk of losing or diluting
its competitive advantage over too many activities if a bank does not have the
right managerial capabilities may be too high. Herding behaviour is not only
a driving factor in financial markets, but also in business strategy, and the
banking industry has shown many examples of cloned strategies. The trend
towards diversification in banking has been very strong, but the performance of
some diversified banks has also been disappointing. And it is far from clear that
diversified banks are more profitable than focused, specialized banks.
1.2.3 Organizational complexity
Many industries have gone through dramatic changes in their organizational
design over the past decades. The automobile industry has adopted the lean
manufacturing system first developed by Toyota, a new revolutionary approach to
assembling cars. Retailing has also experienced a dramatic change, with new
formats and outlets emerging and old ones decaying. Is the organizational change
in banking over the past few years enough to cope with future challenges?
The answer is no. Many European banks are still organized as they were ten or
twenty years ago, while their business has changed dramatically and they have
also been trying to change their strategy. However, a new strategy should be
supported by a new organizational design. Otherwise, the new strategy will fail.
There are four basic reasons to foster thinking on how banks have to approach
their organizational design in the next few years. The first is that there is not yet
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an integrated European market for financial services at the retail level. Banks
have to deal with customers who have different needs, show different patterns of
behaviour and different financial cultures regarding payments systems or specific
products. And regulation in Europe is still a national affair. The need to have local
strategies for each country is more demanding than in other industries. And, at the
same time, banks need to have an international strategy. Moreover, they have to
profit from international strategies, by developing synergies, sharing some
resources, deploying some capabilities and capturing new learning opportunities.
Organizing banks around this diversity of dimensions is particularly complex, and
few banks are pleased with what they have in place today.
The second reason is that even those banks with clear international strategies
have an organizational design that does not reflect their international scope.
International activities are not integrated in the banks’ structure and systems in a
coherent way. Still, many banks display organizational charts showing the different
business units – retail, corporate, advisory services, etc. – and the international
division. The latter also reproduces many of the domestic business units.
Coordination problems between different areas arise systematically.
The third reason is that banks are diversified organizations with different business
units. Each unit has different competitive dynamics, requires different professional
profiles, involves different performance assessment processes and needs different
resources. The return on investment is also different, which creates problems in
terms of resource allocation, performance assessment and compensation systems.
The fourth reason is outsourcing. The integration of new countries into the
world economy, with a highly educated population and lower salaries, will open
up new possibilities for the relocation of certain activities from Europe to Latin
America and Asia. This is a trend that manufacturing firms have been trying to
shape and adapt to, but is still a recent challenge for European banks. Only
technology and back office work have been outsourced over the past few years.
Nevertheless, we will see a more intense shift of activities, towards emerging
countries with sophisticated professional skills in the next few years, including
activities such as financial analysis, research and advisory services.
There are no simple solutions to those challenges. Nevertheless, it is clear that
banks are today multi-business firms and they need to adopt a corporate strategy
which is consistent with this reality. Business strategy deals with how a firm
competes in an industry. Corporate strategy deals with how a diversified firm
with several business units creates advantages for each unit, allocates and shares
resources among units, coordinates policies and activities and develops synergies.
In a nutshell, corporate strategy must show unequivocally that diversified banks
make sense and have a higher value than the mere sum of their parts.
In general, European banks have been good at developing new business strate-
gies, but they have to face the transformation into multi-business firms and develop
an integrated, coherent corporate strategy. This includes the design of policies that
could enhance revenues across units by sharing resources, best practices or people,
or become more efficient by using joint resources better. And it requires the
definition of the role of the corporate centre in managing the diversified bank.
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Change in banks’ management requires boards of directors that are ready to exert
a leadership role in steering banks towards the future and making their long-term
survival possible. Banks’ boards face today some of the same challenges as
boards in other industries. But banking presents some specific issues that make
their governance particular.
The first is control systems and risk management. Any company can be
afflicted by bad risk management. In the case of banking, this is a particularly
serious threat, since risk is not only at the heart of the long-term survival of banks,
but is also a basic pillar of financial stability for a country.
The discussion on risk management highlights the complexity of managing in
an industry with a strong regulatory framework that, at the same time, no longer
enjoys the protection of regulated prices or limited competition. On the contrary,
the strong and cold winds of rivalry are blowing in the banking industry and
creating new threats to established banks. The pressure to generate revenue
growth may push some banks over the border of prudent lending operations,
hence making risk management more complex (see Canals, 2003). In this context
delineated by clear regulatory rules and stronger rivalry, boards of directors need
new competencies to understand the technical issues about regulation and, at the
same time, to manage innovation in a prudent way, but also need to get ahead of
competitors.
The second specific governance issue is conflicts of interest within universal
banks. Some universal banks have an advantage over investment banks because
they can advise customers on some operations such as mergers, acquisitions,
alliances or initial public offerings (IPOs), and lend them money as well. However,
there is a conflict of interest for any universal bank: how much risk in lending
money to a customer should be taken up with the prospect of a lucrative fee-based
income from advisory services offered to the same customer. Even if universal
banks may not be covering corporate lending losses through their investment
banking operations, it is certainly a situation where a conflict of interest may arise.
Banks’ boards need to be not only prudent but also very transparent about the
relationship between advisory services and lending. This means dismantling
one of the strong arguments in support of the cross-selling hypothesis. Otherwise,
customers, investors and regulators may view this strategy suspiciously.
The third governance area for banks’ boards of directors is the relationship
between the board and the executive committee. A superficial approach would
suggest that this is not a special case in banking, since other companies in other
industries face the same challenge. Nevertheless, in industries more intensive in
knowledge and sophisticated concepts and techniques – and banking is one of
them, particularly in capital markets and risk management operations – boards
run the risk of being overshadowed by executive committees that not only know
more about the firm and its specific technical issues, but also know how to handle
financial tools, concepts and valuation techniques really difficult to grasp by non-
experts. As banks become more sophisticated financial institutions, developing
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more specialized and complex financial instruments and products, boards of
directors should have the technical knowledge and competence to be able to use
those concepts properly and provide a contrasting view to the proposals of the
executive committee. In a nutshell, the board should supervise those operations in
an efficient way, but it will not be up to this challenge unless its members do have
the right technical background to exert supervision in a competent way.
A final governance issue is that banks are becoming more international, with
operations in different countries and continents. But it seems that many boards in
European banks are still dominated by members from the same country of origin
as the bank. This observation leads to two implications. The first is that boards of
directors should increasingly reflect international diversity if they want to be
ready to provide a useful supervisory role and help project the bank into the
future. The second dimension is that regulation in Europe is still a national affair.
This explains why banks need to have board members with a deep knowledge of
financial services, but also aware of the specific dimensions of the business and
regulation in the different countries where banks operate.
As we pointed out earlier, European banks are more international than ever.
Their international strategy may be a sound way to face the challenge of increased
competition at home. Nevertheless, it should be supported by an organizational
design that takes into account the role of each national subsidiary and the
corporate centre, and how they complement each other by sharing resources and
transferring competencies. And a solid international strategy should be super-
vised by a board that understands and can make a good judgement about complex
financial operations and the specific risk attached to those operations in some
particular countries.
1.3 Some final reflections
European banks today are in much better shape than they were ten years ago.
Their transformation has been remarkable, not only adapting to the new realities
of the European single market, but also transforming themselves into more
sophisticated firms, with better management and the aspiration to operate in
different countries outside the home market.
Nevertheless, European banks face a serious threat: their financial perfor-
mance is poorer than US banks’ performance, their scale is smaller and the
European single market for financial services is still plagued with many barriers
that make the goal of pan-European banking a distant objective. This threat gets
more intense because it operates simultaneously with two other important forces:
the emergence of new Asian financial giants and the gloomy state of the European
economy which does not expect spectacular growth over the next few years. In
this complex context, European banks run the risk of being overtaken by US
banks or becoming less attractive to investors in the financial services industry.
It is true that European banking has a few very strong performers, like Royal
Bank of Scotland, BBVA, Santander or HSBC. Nevertheless, the laggards
outnumber them.
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Banks’ long-term survival in Europe requires that their boards of directors
and top managers tackle, simultaneously, four basic challenges: closing the
performance gap with US banks, developing strategies that foster revenue growth,
designing organizations that make sense amid the increasing complexity of
banking operations – in particularly, international operations and, finally, putting
in place boards of directors with the knowledge, wisdom and experience to
understand the complexities of banking operations and the specific realities of
banking in the different countries and regions where the banks operate.
None of the previous challenges is specific to the banking industry. But it is
true that banking has become more complex and the combination of increasing
financial innovation in sophisticated products, geographical diversity and tougher
regulatory contexts makes the job of board members and senior managers more
demanding. There are several European banks that are already tackling – and
apparently, successfully – those challenges. Europe needs a strong banking
industry and it is in the interest of Europe to have solid banks that are able to stave
off the competitive, financial and organizational risks that banking faces in
the twenty-first century.
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It is a pleasure for me to be here with you today. The Bank of Spain is also proud
to participate in this 25th SUERF Colloquium and to support the IESE Business
School in its organization.
One of the main missions of SUERF is to foster an appropriate climate for the
analysis and study of monetary and financial issues. At its twenty-fifth gathering,
the SUERF Colloquium will once again contribute to this. The success of this
meeting is largely ensured thanks to the participation of top academics and
researchers from various universities, central banks and other institutions from
around the world.
A look at the proposed programme shows that the studies to be submitted
to the three working Commissions will be of great interest, and the fact that
these have been pre-selected and reviewed guarantees their high quality. The areas
on which the Commissions will focus are very important for the banking indus-
try. Perhaps more in line with the subject of the third area (macro-policy and
financial stability), I will be setting out my views on the role that capital
regulation and, more broadly, prudential regulation play in promoting financial
stability.
As you all know, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published
the text of Basel II in June 2004. The text is the result of the Committee’s
work over the past six years, during which time it has benefited greatly from
the support of industry, supervisors, central banks and academics from around
the globe.
The driver of this effort has been the well-documented changes in the environment
in which banks, particularly the most sophisticated ones, now operate. These
changes have meant that the 1988 Accord is no longer fully satisfactory. Under
the leadership of my predecessor as Chairman of the Committee, Bill
McDonough, we initiated a process of change which goes beyond the mere refor-
mulation of a rule to maintain a specific level of capital. As a result, together with
leading institutions worldwide, supervisors began exploring ways to incorporate
more sensitive measures of risk into the capital framework, the final objective
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In the presentation of the new capital framework, in June 2004, Jean-Claude
Trichet, Chairman of the G10 group of central bank governors and President of
the European Central Bank (ECB), stressed this objective when he underlined
that Basel II ‘will enhance banks’ safety and soundness, strengthen the stability
of the financial system as a whole, and improve the financial sector’s ability to
serve as a source for sustainable growth for the broader economy’.
Questions that naturally arise from this statement are how will Basel II foster
financial stability? In what way is Basel II different? My intention today is to
offer you an answer to these questions.
In a nutshell, I think that the new capital framework represents a significant
step towards achieving a more comprehensive and risk sensitive supervisory
approach.
Basel II is much more than just setting better minimum quantitative capital
requirements. It is about establishing incentive-based approaches to risk and
capital adequacy management, within a comprehensive framework of three
mutually supporting pillars. In my view, the combination of better risk management,
a stronger capital structure and improved transparency standards in the banking
system can significantly improve financial stability.
From a different perspective, Basel II represents the recognition of the progress
made by banks in recent times to develop and improve their risk management and
measurement systems. It is also an encouragement to continue this work. It
represents an unparalleled opportunity for banks to improve their capital strate-
gies and risk management systems. Likewise, it offers supervisors an opportunity
to enhance co-operation and implementation consistency, to align supervision
more closely with sound current industry practices and to foster the dialogue with
the industry.
I would like to develop and organize these ideas around ten points. Through
them I will summarize some of the elements that are incorporated into Basel II.
Thanks to these elements, Basel II will be a more efficient regulation than its
predecessor, the 1988 Accord, and will contribute to bringing about a stronger and
more stable financial system. Nevertheless, I would like to begin my reflections
by sharing with you a prior consideration, that is the need to think about financial
stability in a broad sense.
2.2 Prior consideration, financial stability:
a broad concept
In recent years, central banks, supervisors, international agencies and academics
from all over the world have paid particular attention to financial stability.
Increasingly, policymakers are recognizing that financial stability is a public good
much like price stability. All of us have long understood the benefits of price
stability and the need for sound monetary policy in the pursuit of sustained
economic growth.
Even if we do not have as comprehensive a framework for financial stability as
we do for price stability, in recent years, we have learned more about the concurrent
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need for a stable financial system. That includes the need for businesses and
consumers to have access to credit on fair and reasonable terms through all stages
of the business cycle so that they can build and grow. We need an efficient and
resilient payments system to maintain the flow of funds through the economy
at all times. We need financial markets that remain active, liquid and trusted
regardless of events in the economy.
Given the unique positions of banks at the crossroads of businesses and
consumers in every economy – and their special role as intermediaries of credit
to both – nothing threatens financial stability more than the presence of poorly
managed and poorly capitalized banking institutions.
The crises that a large number of countries have undergone in recent years have
highlighted the complex linkages between the real sector and the financial sector
and the risk that the latter may amplify the imbalances or shocks generated in
other sectors of the economy. This is becoming even more important due to the
evolution of financial systems over recent decades, characterized – against a
background of technological progress – by the increasing sophistication and com-
plexity of business structures and of the products offered, by a greater degree of
internationalization and by a strong increase in competition, among other factors.
While this evolution has been beneficial for the development of more efficient
financial systems capable of providing greater benefits to the economy as a
whole, it is no less true that new risks have arisen and that the probability of
contagion has increased.
As a result of the increasing interest in financial stability, important contribu-
tions in this area have been achieved. For instance, the work made by the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS) and its Managing Director, Malcolm D.
Knight has been notable. These studies reveal some important facts about
financial stability that must be taken into account.
Financial instability may reveal itself, first, via excessive volatility in asset
prices, which can move substantially away from the value which, in principle,
their fundamentals would warrant. In such cases, the correction of these
deviations in some markets may occur abruptly and significantly disturb the real
economy. To be sure, a certain degree of volatility in asset prices is simply the
reflection of the normal workings of markets. Likewise, poor results posted by a
specific financial institution, and even its bankruptcy, may simply be a conse-
quence of its poor management, without systemic implications. However, finan-
cial instability can be very costly if it is on such a scale as to cause harm to the
real economy.
Studies concur in pointing to a set of factors which may prompt instability:
inflationary processes, currency crises, sharp corrections in financial or real-estate
asset prices, payment-system failures and the malfunctioning of financial
intermediaries, among others.
All these considerations allow us to draw a conclusion which, while obvious,
is nonetheless relevant: the achievement of financial stability must be based on
a broad range of tools which we should all seek to strengthen.
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Furthermore, in my view, regulation and prudential supervision, in addition
to their initial aim of avoiding systemic crisis and safeguarding the solvency of
individual institutions, should pay increasing attention to a combination of micro
and macro factors to achieve greater financial stability. This latter concept is
undoubtedly wider, and includes resilience in the face of external shocks and
the capacity to contribute to the proper functioning of the economy in various
circumstances.
The New Basel Accord will seek greater financial stability through several
mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms were already present in the 1988 Accord –
such as setting minimum quantitative capital requirements and a level playing
field. But in my presentation of the ten points, I want to focus on what I see as
innovations of the new Accord. Let me mention two of the most important ones:
to encourage improvements in banks’ internal risk-management processes and to
promote greater co-operation and co-ordination among supervisors across
jurisdictions.
2.3 Elements constituting Basel II
2.3.1 Basel II builds on existing arrangements,
preconditions and foundations
Before analysing the key elements which will allow Basel II to promote a more
resilient financial system, the central topic of my speech today, I should stress
the fact that the Committee has developed its work by taking into consideration
the need for a broad approach to fostering financial stability. In fact, the
Committee has stressed that if Basel II aims to be a successful framework, it must
be built on a series of preconditions and on the foundations of a sound supervi-
sory system. To achieve the benefits, we must ensure that the foundation for Basel
II is ready first.
With respect to preconditions, there is a set of issues that should be considered.
First, I think there is a broad consensus among all of us about the importance
of promoting the implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policies. Nobody
has any doubts today about the need to promote price stability. However, this is not
a sufficient condition for ensuring financial stability, and even from the macro-
economic standpoint, other measures are needed to strengthen it.
These include, for instance, fiscal discipline, and the design of exchange rate
policies that ensure the consistency of the chosen exchange rate system with
domestic policies, and that restrict vulnerabilities associated with exchange rate
instability in the different sectors of the economy. Macroeconomic policies must
also be consistent and sustainable over time. Indeed, unstable macroeconomic
settings are one of the main causes of excessive volatility on securities markets.
Second, an appropriate institutional framework is also needed. In particular, a
set of mercantile and civil laws must be in place to safeguard agents’ property
rights, along with a legal and judicial structure that provides legal certainty.
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Moreover, it will be necessary to consider microeconomic aspects related to
payment-system and market structures.
For example, in designing payment-systems it is possible to pursue different
strategies so as to reduce the inherent risks. The options range from systems based
on the gross settlement of transactions in real-time to others entailing net
multilateral settlement. In any event, avoiding the risks associated with payment-
systems entails introducing incentives so that agents operating via such systems
control their exposures more effectively, and reducing, through different mechanisms,
the risk of a failed operation spreading through and endangering the whole
system. On the securities markets, institutional developments seeking to limit
situations of instability are also important.
Allow me to conclude this brief review, which is not intended to be exhaustive,
of the preconditions on which Basel II must be built, with just a word about the
so-called safety net. As banking business depends essentially on agents’ trust in
intermediaries, and given that the latter are highly sensitive to contagion
processes, various institutional arrangements have been put in place in numerous
countries in an attempt to limit this risk.
The role of central banks as lenders of last resort is a good example of this,
inasmuch as they act as guardians when extremely serious liquidity problems with
potentially systemic effects occur. Another example of this type of institutional
arrangement is deposit insurance, which offers depositors a certain degree of
coverage, so as to avoid the sudden withdrawal of their funds.
Both mechanisms, however, have a serious drawback: they increase moral
hazard problems. The solution most countries have adopted is to introduce
formulas capable of mitigating the associated moral hazard problem. For
instance, central banks may operate under a certain degree of constructive
ambiguity, and deposits are not usually guaranteed in their entirety.
As stated earlier, there is also a need for a sound supervisory system. This
includes having the ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’
published by the Basel Committee in 1997. These principles are based on the best
banking practices identified around the world, and they play a key role in the
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) of international agencies.
The core principles include the provisions on operational autonomy of the
supervisory authority, adequate supervisory resources, regulatory and remedial
powers, and a sufficient legal framework. Likewise, sound accounting and
provisioning standards are critical to ensure that the capital ratios – however
calculated – reflect the bank’s ability to absorb losses. Establishing a solid
foundation of sound supervisory, legal and accounting systems is an essential
requirement for the successful implementation of Basel II.
2.3.2 Incentives-based system
Let me now turn to two of the key innovations of Basel II, that are very much
interrelated. The new capital framework is an incentives-based system and it is
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a risk-based framework. By creating the right set of market-friendly incentives to
improve risk management, Basel II offers the opportunity to ensure that supervision
and regulation take a forward-looking view on risk, that they remain up-to-date
with sound practices in the industry and that our supervisory framework
motivates responsible risk-taking and prudent behaviour in our markets.
Over the past sixteen years, the methodologies for measuring and managing
risk have evolved in ways that the architects of the 1988 Accord could not have
anticipated. Improvements in technology and telecommunications have changed
the speed at which banks collect and analyse data on their exposures. The explo-
sive growth in the markets for securitized assets and credit derivatives have
offered banks new ways to manage and transfer credit risk. And a new discipline
in risk management is emerging – namely, operational risk management –
through which banks are quantifying in an increasingly reliable manner the risk
of losses stemming from failures in internal processes or systems, or from
damage caused by an external disruption.
I am convinced that, by creating incentives for banks to understand both their
risks and rewards, and to improve their processes for managing both, Basel II will
help to promote banks’ efficiency and resilience, thereby strengthening the
stability of the financial sector.
In fact, Basel II introduces a wide range of incentives which are incorporated
through a broad set of elements. Indeed, these elements are an integral part of
each of the three pillars on which Basel II is structured.
Pillar 1, to the extent that it promotes a closer link between capital require-
ments and risk, creates explicit incentives for banks to move ahead in improving
their risk measurement techniques. What is more, it allows banks to use their own
measurement models, making for a closer approximation to the practices they
actually use. Undoubtedly, this is an added incentive to improve risk measurement
methods.
Regarding the incentives introduced by Pillar 1, in addition to capital-related
incentives, I should like to stress that banks are encouraged to make the provi-
sions that are appropriate for them. To achieve this, banks will have to compare
their measurement of expected losses, based on their Internal Ratings Based
(IRB) models, with the specific and general provisions they have made. If
this comparison shows that provisions are lower than the estimated expected
losses, there will be a deduction from capital. If, on the contrary, the provisions
are greater than the estimated expected losses, the surplus will be recognized as
Tier 2 capital.
Pillar 1 also includes an explicit obligation relating to capital requirements for
operational risk. This confirms the importance of the type of risk which, though
it was only marginally considered until relatively recently, has proved to be the
cause of substantial problems for banks on more than one occasion. Accordingly,
the inclusion of capital requirements for operational risk introduces the appropriate
incentives so that banks may move – as some started to do some time ago – towards
improving the methods available for measuring this type of risk. The Committee is
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aware that much remains to be done in this area, and that is why it has opted for
a flexible approach with room for the in-house models developed by banks.
Pillar 2, namely supervisory review, also includes incentive systems which
contribute to promoting better risk management. First, it places the responsibility
for considering all other risks not explicitly envisaged in Pillar 1 with banks
themselves. As a result, clear incentives are set so that, on determining the overall
level of capital to be maintained, this set of additional risks may be identified and
taken into consideration.
In my view, however, Pillar 2 introduces the biggest incentives for prudent
behaviour by banks, since it is conducive to a frank dialogue between banks and
supervisors. This is possible because it entrusts supervisors not only with review
of the bank’s calculation methods, but also of whether the bank’s level of solvency
is adequate in terms of the risks assumed and of the systems in place for their
management.
Finally, Pillar 3 also introduces incentives for bank managers to act prudently.
It is through this pillar that Basel II recognizes the necessary role of market
discipline. Insofar as the markets reward well-managed banks, and punish those
acting imprudently, incentives for proper conduct will be reinforced.
On the basis of this acknowledgement, Basel II seeks to ensure that
transparency regarding the risk profile of a bank is conducive to more effective
market discipline. Under Pillar 3, then, banks are responsible for publishing,
within a reasonable timeframe, quantitative and qualitative information to enable
financial market participants to make these assessments. The information
reported by banks must not only be reliable, but also relevant and based on
generally accepted valuation principles.
2.3.3 Risk-based framework
Today, banks can assume risk positions or incorporate new, complex products that
may dramatically and rapidly alter their financial position much more quickly
than in the past. This means that it is necessary for supervisors to place a greater
emphasis on anticipating problems.
For this reason, traditional banking supervision must be complemented by a
more risk-focused analysis. I say complemented, because this type of review still
has an important role to play, particularly in assessing asset quality and ensuring
proper provisioning and risk-concentration policies.
Traditional analysis should therefore be supplemented by an approach that
focuses on identification of the risks to which the bank is exposed and assessment
of its capacity to manage them. That requires deeper knowledge of the governance,
the organization, the strategies and policies applied by managers, and the risk
control and management systems implemented. Also, the relationship with the
supervised bank should be increasingly based on a close dialogue. In this setting,
on-site inspections will continue to play a key role, but the supervisory review
will involve much more than simply checking the bank’s accounts. Basel II
clearly opts for a risk-based supervisory approach.
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I have mentioned throughout my speech today that Basel II will improve risk
measurement techniques, but it is much more than numbers. In fact, it provides
the correct incentives for banks to strengthen the structures and processes through
which they assess and manage their risk exposures.
Despite the significant progress made in the banking industry in the use of
models and new technologies, banks still depend largely on risk managers’ expert
judgement. Quantifying risk involves making assumptions and judgements. And
no model, and no software package, no matter how sophisticated, can ever replace
the skills of a trained, experienced and conscientious risk manager. Such judgement
should be reinforced, however, with the best possible information, techniques and
tools for processing that information. To the extent that risk assessment and con-
trol methods become more formalized and rigorous, this will lessen the likelihood
of bad decisions being made. It will also contribute to the prompt detection of
errors and deviations from targets, allowing banks to implement corrective
measures at an early stage.
Risk management, as the Committee has long recognized, must be based on a
strong foundation of corporate governance. For this reason, the Committee has
stressed the importance of bank managers’ commitment to the development and
implementation of high corporate governance standards.
All these considerations justified the inclusion in Basel II of a wide range of
elements that reinforce effective implementation of solid corporate governance
standards. We have included provisions on the need for boards and senior
management to understand the nature and level of the risks that their banks are
exposed to, to set the bank’s tolerance to these risks, to ensure that strong risk
management and internal controls are adopted throughout the organization, and
to ensure that they themselves continue to be appropriately informed about the
risks being taken on.
To ensure that the designed structure is appropriate to achieve the aforementioned
goals, Basel II also stresses the need for external controls. It is the Board’s respon-
sibility to decide on the most suitable connection between external and internal
control systems.
2.3.5 Clear bank and supervisory responsibilities
Basel II’s focus on strong process controls re-affirms that the onus for responsible
risk-taking lies with a bank’s management. Banks are responsible for the imple-
mentation of more professional and transparent risk management and
measurement systems. This includes, among other things, the establishment of
strategies, policies and procedures that allow banks to identify and understand the
risks they face, and to assess their exposures.
Banks’ responsibilities also include the development of measures linking
the risks they face with the appropriate level of capital they should maintain.
In other words, banks should design an appropriate capital policy, including the
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need to adopt a strategy that allows them to keep the appropriate amount of
capital over time.
Supervisory responsibilities are also well defined. Perhaps the main mission
facing regulators and supervisors today is to design measures that induce healthy
and prudent behaviour by managers. These incentives should be capable not only
of complementing those provided by markets, but also of reinforcing them. This
task should not involve imposing an unnecessary burden. An excessive degree of
interventionism introducing organizational barriers that hamper financial innova-
tion must also be avoided. Furthermore, supervisors should evaluate policies
considering not only their benefits but also their costs.
It is for supervisors to determine whether the bank’s assessment of the risks
associated with its operations and the level of solvency is appropriate. To do this,
it is necessary to consider the validity of the processes used to determine the cap-
ital needed and the appropriateness of the models employed. Further, supervisors
must consider whether the level of solvency is reviewed and controlled by
the bank’s senior staff, whether management is conducted in a sufficiently able
and professional manner, and whether the systems in place for measuring and
controlling risks are appropriate.
The responsibility of supervisors also includes promoting a level playing field.
That is to say, in the application of capital rules there should be a sufficient degree
of consistency across different jurisdictions. This requires, as you can imagine,
co-operation, information exchange and co-ordination among supervisors all
around the world.
2.3.6 Appropriate time horizon and counter-cyclical elements
The sound and stable functioning of banks requires an additional consideration.
Namely, risk-management decisions, capital and provisioning policies should be
set with an appropriate time horizon that allows at least a full business cycle to be
considered and avoids excessive emphasis on the short term when assessing risks.
The aim is not to promote the uniformity of time horizons, a rather undesirable
characteristic in a financial system, but to encourage managers to consider how
risk determinants alter over the cycle and in conditions of stress.
One of the fundamental tenets of risk management is that banks need to create
provisions to absorb expected losses and to have sufficient capital to absorb
unexpected losses. Accordingly, capital and provisions are an essential part of any
supervisory framework. I believe Basel II reinforces the need to implement sound
policies in both areas. Moreover, the design of Basel II has also included various
instruments that help promote the consideration of an appropriate time horizon by
bank managers. This has been achieved through different elements.
In Pillar 1, for example, certain risk factors on which the models for calculating
requirements are based draw on long-term averages (the Probability of Default
(PD), Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD)). Also, in the
design of internal rating systems, it is required that these use relatively long-time
horizons. Pillar 2, for its part, incorporates stress test analyses. Hence, when
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banks assess the capital they need, they must consider a whole range of scenarios
taking into account past experience and current conditions, with an emphasis on
stress scenarios.
A final general remark on this point is that, in designing any kind of regula-
tions that affect the behaviour of financial institutions, there is a lot of merit
in considering how to introduce counter-cyclical elements, compatible with
good risk-management practices, which could limit, to some extent, bank
managers’ typically pro-cyclical behaviour. That is to say, from the standpoint of
prudential policy it seems reasonable that banks be advised to build up capital and
provisions during good times in order to be well prepared to face times of
difficulty. In my view, this argument is fully consistent with the fact that, as expe-
rience shows, risks actually increase during cyclical upturns, but materialize in
hard times.
2.3.7 Comprehensive approach
A supervisory approach that seeks to meet the demands imposed by modern
circumstances must be comprehensive, drawing on the different tools which are
available and combining them in an optimal way. In particular, the collaboration
of the markets is enormously important today. Minority shareholders, depositors
and debt-holders should have the capacity to evaluate banks, rewarding those that
are well managed.
All the elements mentioned, along with additional ones, are held together by
the three pillars. Basel II has been designed with a markedly comprehensive
character and, in this respect, the three pillars are expected to act in conjunction,
reinforcing and complementing one another.
I have sometimes explained this joint action using a simile related to portfolio
selection theory. Pillar 1 can be understood as emphasizing the adoption of rules.
Pillar 2 relies to a greater extent on discretion when determining the requirements
of a bank. Pillar 3 adopts a market discipline approach. Each of these approaches
to regulation: rules, discretion and market discipline, individually has merits, but
also limitations. One might say that Basel II seeks a kind of ‘efficient frontier’ of
policy approaches through the three pillars. Each pillar provides something that
the other two cannot. Each is essential to achieving our overall objective of financial
stability. The combination of the three approaches provides greater benefits than
the sole consideration of any one of the three.
The comprehensive nature of Basel II, however, goes beyond the combined
action of the three pillars. As I have indicated, a broad range of risks is covered,
not only due to the inclusion of operational risk, but also to the need to consider
all those not explicitly taken into account in Pillar 1. Moreover, special consid-
eration has been given to the fact that there are increasingly complex transactions
which need to be appropriately included. Perhaps the most illustrative example
here is the treatment of asset securitization. Nor should one fail to mention that
numerous risk-mitigation techniques have been incorporated with a view to
achieving a greater approximation between economic and regulatory capital.
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I have referred throughout my speech to the notable evolution of banking systems
in recent decades. All of us will agree that today it is possible to observe, among
other things, greater business sophistication, a greater degree of internationalization
and stronger competition in financial markets. This situation of permanent
change will continue in the near future, since the industry we seek to regulate and
supervise is essentially dynamic. Accordingly, the supervisory model must be
flexible and must have the capacity to evolve with time.
The new framework is intended to be a more forward-looking approach to capital
supervision, and certainly the Committee intends to keep Basel II up-to-date with
changes in risk management in the industry. We must continue to monitor indus-
try developments to make sure that Basel II reflects sound practices. Banking
supervisors face the challenge of responding meaningfully to these trends without
curbing financial innovation. We intend to do so in part by continuing to cultivate
a dialogue with industry participants, other supervisors, academics and
researchers in the coming months and years.
In fact, the Committee has already begun its work in various areas. One con-
cerns the treatment of ‘double default’, the situation that arises when a borrower
and a guarantor both default on the same obligation. We are likewise undertaking
similar work on another technical area, namely a joint project with the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on various issues
related to trading activities.
Over the longer term, the Committee intends to discuss risk-management
practices that aim to quantify measures of risk and economic capital, the so-called
full credit risk models. Leading institutions have invested substantial resources in
modelling credit risk, something that Basel II stops short of recognizing for
regulatory capital requirements. We recognize the need to continue discussing
such practices with banks and we intend to use Basel II as a means of developing
experience in the performance of models.
The Committee will continue this discussion with a view to potentially allowing
the greater use of credit risk modelling for regulatory capital purposes in the
future and working towards the recognition of diversification effects. These
discussions will focus on addressing concerns such as those regarding the relia-
bility, comparability, validation and competitive equity that might arise when
greater recognition of full credit risk modelling is permitted.
2.3.9 Consistency through co-operation
Finally, one of the main changes that financial systems have undergone has been
their growing internationalization. The increasing scope and complexity of
banking groups and financial markets are additional challenges that all of us
must take into account. This is why it is necessary today to increase the degree of
co-operation between the supervisors of different jurisdictions. Combining
the necessary supervision at the local level in the host country with effective
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supervision at the consolidated level in the home country effectively requires
greater co-operation, more thorough information-exchange, and better knowl-
edge of financial instruments and links within financial groups.
Basel II is intended to promote a more level playing field for internationally
active banks. We want banks to focus on managing their risks rather than managing
the demands of different supervisors. The task is extremely difficult because there
are differences in legal systems, market practices and business environments in
each country. In fact, we cannot and should not expect to create perfect uniformity
across all jurisdictions. One of the most important principles underpinning
Basel II is the recognition of diversity.
All the foregoing is recognized in Basel II. Moreover, the successful imple-
mentation of Basel II requires the promotion of co-operation among supervisors,
in order to prevent them adopting very different sets of expectations for banks and
interpretations of the minimum requirements.
The Committee set up the so-called Accord Implementation Group (AIG) in
late 2001, which seeks to identify and strengthen the mechanisms that may help
further international co-operation between banking supervisors. The role of the
AIG has become even more important now that the Basel II implementation
phase has begun.
I do not intend to enter into the details of the work of the AIG, but let me
remind you that we have published a set of high-level principles on cross-border
implementation. In addition to these principles, the AIG is currently undertaking
a number of ‘real case’ studies. Such studies have proven to be an important
means for improving our understanding of the kind of practical enhanced
arrangements and supervisory plans of home and host jurisdictions that are
crucial to the effective implementation of Basel II.
2.3.10 Conclusions: the necessary mix of
macro and micro perspectives
To conclude, let me insist on an additional general principle that I think supervision
should be built on, which I mentioned earlier. Supervision needs to consider a
broader analysis of the vulnerabilities internal and external to the banking sector,
including the necessary macroeconomic and institutional elements, and those
relating to the stability of the financial markets on which banks operate. Basel II
recognizes the importance of a combination of micro and macro factors for
achieving greater financial stability.
Macro factors must be taken into account because many financial crises
have not stemmed from shocks arising in the financial sector, but rather from
macroeconomic causes.
Equally important, the Basel Committee believes that if banks are adequately
capitalized, well managed and risks are correctly assessed within the appropriate
time horizon, their behaviour will be more stable and they will be better equipped
to face periods of financial difficulty.
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What is more, when banks have the proper incentives to manage risks
appropriately and maintain sufficient capital based on such risks, the financial
sector will become more resilient and better able to promote sustainable growth.
I am absolutely convinced that Basel II is an important step forward in this
direction. Indeed, I think that it appropriately recognizes and promotes macro and
micro elements as the proper means of fostering financial stability.
Thank you very much for your attention.
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I am very pleased to address this Colloquium. The relationship between the BIS
and SUERF goes far back in time and has been a very fruitful one. For many
years now SUERF has promoted research in money and finance, topics that – not
surprisingly – are close to our hearts at the BIS. Moreover SUERF, inspired by its
pan-European charter, has adopted an international point of view in approaching
these issues – one that is attentive to both the similarities and the differences in
national experiences. This has made SUERF’s contribution particularly appealing
to an organisation such as the BIS, because our mandate is to promote interna-
tional cooperation and mutual understanding among national policymakers,
especially within the central banking and supervisory communities.
The theme of this Colloquium is competition in financial services. Sometimes
this is interpreted narrowly, as having to do with the interactions of players
within a single sector of the financial industry. Today, I would like to take a
broader perspective and explore the implications of changes in the financial
industry as a whole for the nature of financial risk and for how to deal with it.
My focus will be very much on the interactions between the various segments
of the industry in general, and between markets and financial institutions in
particular.
I will argue that the fundamental transformation of the financial industry
over the past three decades, of which we are all keenly aware, has driven a sig-
nificant transformation in the nature of financial risk. I will stress, in particular,
how this transformation has resulted in a tighter interaction between different
types of risk and the increased prominence of what has been called the ‘endoge-
nous’ component of financial risk, namely the component that is associated with
the impact of the collective actions of market participants on the underlying
determinants of risk itself. And although market participants and prudential
authorities have been adjusting admirably to these fundamental changes, there is
still considerable scope for improvement, and a number of questions remain
unanswered.
The structure of my remarks is the following. First, I will briefly recall the main
features of the transformation of the financial industry and explore in more detail
the associated profound transformation that has been occurring in the nature of
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financial risk itself. I will then consider the implications of these deep changes in
the financial system for market participants and for prudential authorities, tracing
the progress made and the areas that call for greater attention.
3.1 A transformed financial landscape alters 
the nature of risk
By now it is well known that the financial system has undergone a profound
transformation over the past three decades, driven by the combined impact of
liberalisation and technological innovation. The result has been what might be
termed the ‘let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom’ phenomenon. Long gone is the exces-
sive segmentation of different compartments of the financial system that was
induced by extensive regulation. And the industry has gained enormously in
richness, depth and variety. Just think of the myriad of new financial instruments
that has developed, partly in the wake of breakthroughs in pricing theory and
advances in computing technologies.
The impact of these trends on the financial landscape has been profound and
multifaceted. For present purposes, however, let me focus on just two aspects:
size and interconnectedness.
First, the size of the financial sphere of our economies has increased tremendously
along different dimensions. Financial activity now represents a much larger share
of aggregate economic activity than it did 20 or 30 years ago, regardless of how
it is measured. This is true in terms of inputs, such as employment and capital, in
terms of outputs, such as the ratio of credit to GDP, and above all in terms of
turnover. As you know, monthly global turnover in the main asset classes far
exceeds yearly global GDP. Within financial services, traded instruments have
greatly outgrown traditional non-traded ones, such as loans or deposits. This is
sometimes described, somewhat misleadingly, as financial markets having grown
at the expense of financial institutions. Think, for instance, of the extraordinary
expansion of derivatives, including more recently credit derivatives, and of asset-
backed securities. Furthermore, individual financial institutions have also grown
impressively in size. In the industrial countries, successive waves of consolidation
have been creating a small group of dominant firms domestically and, more
importantly, at a global level.
My second observation is that the different facets of financial activity have
become much more tightly interconnected, as evident in two complementary
trends. On the one hand, we have witnessed a broadening of the range of players
engaged in the same type of financial activity. And on the other hand, the surge
in cross-border activity has heightened the role of non-residents in domestic
markets in many countries. With securitisation and the development of secondary
markets, portfolio investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds,
have diversified into areas that used to be the exclusive domain of credit originators,
notably banks. Likewise, there are few substantive differences between the
activities of the proprietary desks of the larger commercial and investment banks
and those of smaller, independent institutional investors such as hedge funds and
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private equity financiers. We have also witnessed a broadening of the range of
activities performed by any given player. Think, for instance, of the growth of
conglomerates, or of the much more diversified investment portfolios of some
institutional investors and, via mutual funds, of households themselves.
Another way of describing some of these changes is to say that, somewhat
paradoxically, even as the financial system has become more diverse, we have
witnessed greater convergence: between financial institutions and capital
markets; among different types of financial institutions; and among different
national jurisdictions.
What are the implications of these structural trends for the transformation of
financial risk? Let me focus on four of them: the nexus with the real economy, the
interaction between different types of risk, the relative roles of markets and
institutions, and the link between the measurement of value and the measurement
of risk.
First, uncontroversially, the management of financial risk has become a more
important aspect of economic activity. This also means that problems in the finan-
cial system, if and when they emerge, can have larger consequences for the real
economy than they did in the past. The message has been hammered home by the
costs of the financial crises that have occurred in both industrial and emerging
market countries over the past two decades. Not surprisingly, addressing financial
instability has become a major policy concern, both nationally and internationally.
Second, more subtly, there is a sense in which the nature of financial risk has
become at once purer and more complex. Financial risk has become purer
because the myriad of new financial instruments, tailored to the needs of a
broader set of investors, has enhanced our ability to dissect a complex risk into its
simpler components. Derivatives, for instance, target specific forms of risk; first
market risk and, more recently, credit risk. Likewise, collateralised debt obliga-
tions (CDOs) slice and dice the risks in the underlying portfolios so as to make
them more attractive to particular investors. As a result, more efficient risk transfer
mechanisms allow a closer matching between the risk-bearing capacity of players
and the types of risk they take on. By the same token, the old analysis of risk that
was structured around traditional business lines has become increasingly irrelevant.
In other words, the similarities in underlying risks are becoming more apparent,
regardless of the type of financial firm incurring them.
In this changed environment, financial risk has become more complex, for
several reasons. For one, the deconstruction process does not eliminate risk, it sim-
ply transforms it and transfers it among economic agents. Risk is deconstructed to
be reassembled in different packages and distributed among different holders. For
instance, derivative instruments that originally targeted market risk resulted, as a
by-product, in a pyramiding of counterparty risk that required separate management.
More fundamentally, we now realise that as the management of risk increasingly
comes to depend on mitigation techniques based on instruments that are traded in
markets, elements that are extraneous to the parties directly involved in a trans-
action have a stronger influence on the risks incurred through it. For example, in
an ordinary bank loan, credit risk depends exclusively on the financial standing
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of the borrower. By contrast, counterparty risk in a market transaction depends
fundamentally on market conditions, such as liquidity and volatility, which are
well beyond the control of the two parties to the contract. In this way, the vast
development of risk transfer markets in recent years has strengthened the nexus
between the different types of risk and the prices charged for bearing these risks.
But the opaque layering of direct and indirect links through the markets also
profoundly complicates the assessment of the true underlying risks.
Third, for much the same reasons and contrary to conventional wisdom, the
roles of financial markets and financial institutions have become more comple-
mentary. At first sight this may appear counterintuitive. After all, the conventional
classification of financial systems distinguishes between those where intermediation
takes place mostly on the balance sheet of institutions and those where financing
through capital market transactions is more pervasive. Institution-based systems
put more emphasis on the ability of intermediaries to extract and utilise information
about borrowers by leveraging close and long-term relationships. Transactions-
based systems are founded on the ability of the market mechanism to distil the
diversity in investors’ views into a single price; they emphasise transparency of
information and arm’s-length relationships. Clearly, there are large benefits for
economies that combine effectively both intermediation channels. The ability to
switch smoothly between balance sheet financing and market-based financing
contributes to the robustness of a financial system and improves its ability to deal
with strain. Think, for instance, of the resilience exhibited by the US financial
system in the early 1990s as one of the two channels of finance – commercial
banks – experienced difficulties.
At the same time, the greater complementarity between these two forms of
intermediation should not be overlooked. On the one hand, institutions rely more
and more on markets for their funding, for their investments and, crucially, for the
management of risks. Continued market liquidity is essential in this context. On
the other hand, markets rely more and more on institutions for their liquidity,
drawing on market-making services and backstop credit lines. Globally, the
ongoing consolidation in the financial sector has created a smaller number of
very large financial firms that are engaged in both types of intermediation. But
financial conglomerates that combine commercial and investment banking
operations, insurance and brokering services raise potential concentration risks
for the financial system, despite apparent diversification of intermediation
channels. In these large, internationally active financial institutions, a common
capital base underpins on-balance sheet intermediation, capital market services
and market-making functions. By the same token, losses in one activity can put
pressure on the entire firm, affecting its activities in other areas.
Fourth, arguably the interaction between the determination of value and the
drivers of risk has become tighter, or at least more clearly visible. This is not simply
because market participants, in determining valuations, have become more opera-
tionally aware of the importance of risk assessments and the willingness to take on
risk. Think, for instance, of the growing use of risk-adjusted returns as a basis for
evaluating performance and allocating capital. More fundamentally, what is
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sometimes referred to as the ‘endogenous’ component of risk has become more
prominent. This is the component that reflects the impact of the collective actions
of market participants on the ultimate drivers of risk themselves, such as asset
prices and system-wide leverage. While this endogenous component of risk has
always existed, it has arguably become more visible as a result of several factors.
One is the relaxation of aggregate financing constraints associated with financial
liberalisation. Another is the much larger role played by markets, with prices tele-
scoping the impact of the changing collective assessments and attitudes towards
risk. A third is the increasing common component of asset prices that results from
the greater interconnectedness of the financial system, as exemplified by the closer
co-movement of returns across different asset classes, especially in times of stress.
This endogeneity is natural – it is part of the physiology of the financial system.
At times, though, it may have undesirable side effects and result in financial
distress. For example, lending booms can boost economic activity and asset
prices to unsustainable levels, sowing the seeds of subsequent instability.
Likewise, if a large number of financial market participants assume that markets
will remain liquid even under collective selling pressure, they could be induced
to overextend their position-taking, thus generating the very pressures that would
cause markets to become illiquid. From this perspective, financial distress reflects
the unwinding of financial imbalances that have gradually built up over time.
This type of behaviour can be collectively dysfunctional. And it is especially
hard to address because it can be fully consistent with individually rational behav-
iour. It is, for instance, consistent with the short horizons that are inherent in
contractual arrangements designed to address informational asymmetries
between providers and users of funds, such as arrangements for the frequent and
regular assessment of third-party asset managers’ performance. Concerns with
underperformance in the short term may numb the contrarian instincts of
investors and push them to seek safety in numbers. Likewise, the impact of the
rational retrenchment of individual investors and market-makers in reaction to
spikes in market volatility or losses can trigger a self-propelling spiral of selling,
market price declines and evaporating liquidity. Tighter financing constraints at
those times can exacerbate distress further. These mechanisms were quite
prominent, for instance, in the market turbulence following the Russian default
and the long-term capital management (LTCM) crisis of 1998.
3.2 Implications for market participants
The structural changes I have just discussed have had a profound impact on the
way market participants measure and manage financial risk. Risk management
has now become a core activity for financial firms, with much more resources
devoted to it at all levels of an enterprise. More specifically, its transformation has
largely mirrored that of the broader environment. Let me briefly review three
changes and highlight areas where further work is desirable.
First, companies have increasingly focused on the management of risk on a
firm-wide basis. The general principle is that similar risks should be measured
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and managed in a similar way across the firm, irrespective of their location. This
process has been encouraged by the gradual emergence of a ‘common risk
language’, cutting across traditional distinctions along functional lines. In
the process, the financial industry is reconciling differences in methods and
frameworks reflecting historical and institutional factors. After all, the value-at-risk
measures that are common in banking and the stochastic asset-liability techniques
that are common in insurance are, conceptually, the same sort of tool; they differ
primarily with respect to the instruments that are included in the analysis and the
horizon used for assessing risk. As a recent Joint Forum report has concluded, this
natural and welcome trend is unmistakable, although it still has a long way to go.
Second, firms have adopted a more holistic approach to risk management, taking
into account the interactions between different types of risk. The long-term ideal
would be a fully integrated treatment of risk, based on a common metric. Here
again, the trend is unmistakable but the challenge is truly daunting. Current
measurement technology is just not sufficiently advanced. In line with trends in
the development of markets, the process has advanced furthest in the integration
of market risk and credit risk; it is at best incipient for other categories of risk, not
least for liquidity risk. Arguably, stress testing is the only concrete tool available
that allows firms to analyse the joint impact of the broader set of risks in a mean-
ingful way. This practice should be encouraged and developed further. Indeed,
investors should be demanding more information about the outcomes of firms’
stress tests as part of their due diligence analysis.
Third, the area that remains largely unexplored is the treatment of the ‘endoge-
nous’component of risk. This raises questions with regard to both risk measurement
and risk management.
As regards measurement, stress tests can of course help here too: they are a way
of describing scenarios where the interaction between market participants’
responses to risk and the evolution of that risk can be mapped out, however
crudely. I would argue, nevertheless, that firms should devote more resources to
two additional tasks. One is developing techniques that uncover vulnerabilities
which emerge from the endogeneity of risk. Of course here I am referring to the
signs of overextension that can herald subsequent distress. Work in this area,
including at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), has met with some
success in identifying leading indicators of banking crises at business cycle fre-
quencies, on the basis of simple proxies for ‘excessive’ credit and asset price
expansion. One may wonder whether similar indicators might also be possible for
signs of pending market distress, as occurred during autumn 1998. Perhaps such
indicators could be based on measures of excessive compression of spreads and
some indirect measures of market leverage. Another task is to seek to disentangle
more purposefully the impact of changes in risk assessments from that of changes
in the market’s risk appetite when evaluating risk using the information embedded
in asset prices. Many commonly used measures of risk, such as those derived
from equity prices and credit spreads, are likely to be contaminated by time-varying
risk appetite. This introduces an extraneous element that can lull participants into
a false sense of security, because it is precisely high risk appetite that can sow the
seeds of subsequent problems.
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As regards risk management, the challenge is even more daunting. Addressing
it clashes with the incentive structures that are at the root of the problem.
Admittedly, even here some progress seems to have been made. For instance, a
recent survey conducted by the BIS-based Committee on the Global Financial
System (CGFS) suggests that, since the events of autumn 1998, some key market
participants have become less inclined to respond automatically to risk-limit
violations because they now have a better awareness and understanding of the
strategic interdependencies among players, and the impacts on market prices. This
is an area that, by its very nature, falls naturally within the remit of prudential
authorities, whose task is precisely that of internalising such externalities.
3.3 Implications for prudential authorities 
and standard setters
To a considerable extent, the implications of the changing nature of financial risk
for prudential authorities mirror those for the private sector. In the limited time
that remains, let me briefly highlight four points: the need for consistency in the
treatment of risk across sectors; the need to strengthen the macroprudential
orientation of prudential frameworks; the need to improve their incentive
compatibility; and the need to promote a financial reporting framework that is
fully consistent with best practice in risk management.
First, the wide-ranging convergence process in the financial industry naturally
calls for greater consistency in the supervisory treatment of financial risk across
sectors, be they geographical jurisdictions or functional segments of the industry.
Greater consistency of prudential rules enhances the efficiency of the financial
system by removing any distortions embedded in the policy framework, notably
by promoting a level playing field and reducing the scope for regulatory
arbitrage. As you are well aware, substantial progress has been made here.
Across geographical jurisdictions, progress is most advanced in banking, less
so in insurance. Across functional lines, it has clearly proceeded much further
within national jurisdictions, not least helped by the increasingly common prac-
tice of consolidating financial sector supervision into a single agency. At the same
time, some steps have also been taken internationally. Witness the work of the
Joint Forum, which brings together representatives of the international regulatory
authorities in banking, securities and insurance. Increasingly, the benefits to
prudential authorities from developing a common view are becoming evident.
Second, improving the safeguards against instability for a financial system that
is larger and more interconnected, and where the endogenous component of risk
is more prominent, naturally calls for a strengthening of the macroprudential
orientation of prudential frameworks. After all, it is now well accepted that a
system-wide perspective and a focus on the endogenous component of risk are
precisely the distinguishing features of such an approach. This ‘macro’ orientation
requires a shift away from the notion that the stability of the system is simply a
consequence of the soundness of its individual components. It involves the same
shift in focus that a stock analyst is required to make in order to become a port-
folio manager. In evaluating financial system vulnerabilities, a macroprudential
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approach would focus on the commonality in the risk exposures of the different
segments of the financial system. In calibrating policy instruments, it would
stress the need to establish cushions as financial imbalances build up, in order to
give more scope to run them down as the imbalances unwind. This would act as
a kind of self-equilibrating mechanism. The logic is analogous to that of calling
for fiscal consolidation in good times to allow an effective counter-cyclical fiscal
policy in bad times.
By now, the importance of the macroprudential perspective as a complement to
the more traditional microprudential focus is widely recognised. As a result, steps
have been taken to put it into practice. For instance, as regards the task of identi-
fying vulnerabilities, macroprudential analysis is now routinely carried out in
various forums, including the IMF and the World Bank, the Financial Stability
Forum and the CGFS; and, of course, in many national jurisdictions. As regards
the calibration of policy instruments, too, there are signs of a keener awareness.
In banking, for instance, one such illustration is the various adjustments that were
made to Basel II, at least partly with a view to addressing concerns about
procyclicality. And banking supervisors here in Spain have gone one step further,
by adopting statistical provisioning in loan accounting. This provides a long-term
anchor to loan provisioning that is independent of the state of the business cycle.
Efforts to strengthen the macroprudential perspective should be pursued further,
but they may well need to await the development of additional analytical tools to
help measurement and calibration.
Third, in a highly interconnected and innovative financial system the prudential
framework should work as far as possible with private incentives. This means
empowering, rather than numbing, the natural incentive of market participants to
instil discipline. And it means avoiding the imposition of rules that do not meet the
‘use test’ by firms. An excessively prescriptive approach is an invitation for
regulatory arbitrage and for practices that respect the letter of the standards but
violate their spirit. Hence the major efforts by regulators to develop standards in
close cooperation and consultation with the regulated communities in the private
sector, to stress the adequacy of risk management processes and to strengthen
disclosures. These are all welcome trends that should be encouraged further.
Fourth, the financial convergence process has put a premium on a common set
of financial reporting standards; hence the current efforts of international
accounting standard setters to put one in place. This is a worthy goal that has
profound implications for the financial system and for financial risk. The measure-
ment of value for accounting purposes has a first-order effect on the behaviour of
financial institutions and their risk management, given the intimate link between
valuations and risk. The stakes are high. And at the same time, the process of
establishing such standards has brought to the fore significant differences of
views between accounting standard setters on the one hand, and prudential
authorities on the other. It is important that these differences be reconciled.
I wanted to flag this issue because of its importance, although I know full well
that I cannot do it justice in my remarks today. In a recent speech to the
International Conference of Banking Supervisors, I have discussed the key
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ingredients of the debate and offered a sketch of a possible solution. Here, let me
simply make three points. First, it seems desirable to think of the ultimate goal of
any such reconciliation as establishing a set of accounting rules that seek to por-
tray the best approximation to an ‘unbiased’ and comprehensive picture of the
financial condition of firms while prudential regulators seek to instil the desired
degree of prudence in their behaviour on the basis of that portrayal. This would
mean avoiding reliance on deliberately conservative estimates of value as a means
of establishing safety cushions. Second, the portrayal of the financial condition of
a firm should cover not just its profitability, cash flows and balance sheet, as it
does today, but also its risk profile, including some indication of the margin of
error surrounding point estimates. This is an area where prudential authorities have
taken the lead, by encouraging greater risk disclosure by regulated firms. Finally,
it is essential that at all stages during the transition towards this long-run goal, the
prudential authorities are in a position to redress any adverse implications which
changes in accounting standards that are desirable in the long term may have for
the safety and soundness of regulated financial intermediaries over the near to
medium term. In other words, the transition should be properly coordinated. It is
my hope, and my expectation, that the dialogue between prudential supervisors
and accounting authorities will intensify and become more institutionalised.
* * *
In closing, let me summarise the key message. I have argued that the trends in the
financial system have brought about a transformation in the nature of financial
risk. These trends have put a premium on the links and interactions between dif-
ferent types of risk, largely reflecting a tighter relationship between financial
institutions and financial markets. This transformation requires adapting risk
management both at the level of individual firms and in the financial system as a
whole. Essential dimensions of this adaptation are greater consistency in the treat-
ment of similar types of risk, greater analysis of the interaction between different
types of risk and a keener recognition of the endogenous component of risk.
Progress has been made in many of these dimensions, but there is clearly scope
for further improvements.
The academic community can play an important role in supporting and shaping
this adaptation. More research is needed in understanding the interactions
between different types of risk and the way they, in turn, are shaped by the
structure of markets and institutions. The same is true for the analysis of
the mechanisms that underpin the endogeneity of financial risk. And ways need
to be found to turn this greater understanding into operational solutions. These are
not easy questions and they often require skills that transcend disciplinary bound-
aries. Policymakers are eagerly awaiting the answers. I certainly hope that
researchers’ inquiring and agile minds will seek to provide them.
Thank you.
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Many economic policy debates during the past two decades have been guided
by a principle that could be characterized as “regulatory skepticism.” This skep-
ticism has its roots in historic experience with the limits of economic policy
and the daily experience with tight constraints policymakers have to face in a
globalized world. This general skepticism has affected some areas in economics
more than others. Financial regulation is an issue that has been relatively unaf-
fected. It is a widely held conventional wisdom that the financial system has to
be firmly embedded in quite an extensive regulatory framework, and debates
seem to revolve around details of this framework rather than focus on the principle
itself.
This general attitude to financial regulation is of course rooted in historic
experience of episodes of financial crises and the difficulties to deal with them
as well as in insights from a huge body of research in economics and finance. We
know that the costs of financial instability can be huge and affect a large number
of people.
Nevertheless it might be worthwhile to take the occasion of this lecture to have
a look at financial regulation in the spirit of regulatory skepticism. Regulators
always have to be careful not to represent special interests and to devise policies
that promote these special interests in the name of the common goal “financial
stability.”
For these reasons, clear ideas about what exactly financial regulation aims to
achieve and the analysis of the exact mechanisms by which certain regulatory
policies are supposed to work are essential. In particular, this requires pinning
down as precisely as possible the nature of market failures which regulatory
intervention tries to correct. Furthermore, it is important to consider not only the
direct but also the indirect consequences of financial regulation.
Given the fundamental role of the financial system in directing funds from
households to productive investments of firms and in allocating and sharing risks,
the indirect consequences of regulation are most likely to occur in the form of
repercussions for the economy as a whole. These repercussions have to be
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To be honest, I will not be able to provide a definite – sometimes not even a
preliminary – answer. I will raise some issues concerning financial regulation that
deserve consideration and perhaps further critical assessment. In particular, I
want to argue by way of examples that macroeconomic aspects should be given
more consideration in the design and the practice of financial regulation.
Having said this I should point out that the regulatory community and
academia have recently discussed numerous arguments and thoughts in this
direction. I am therefore not raising new issues but rather trying to contribute
to an ongoing discussion. I hope that this discussion will ultimately result in a
better understanding of the possibilities as well as the limits of financial
regulation.
4.2 What is the problem?
When we look at financial crises we experienced in the past, nearly all of them
were caused by large macroeconomic shocks: huge hikes in interest rates,
extreme exchange rate and stock market movements or recessionary dynamics in
general. This observation is important because it suggests that the exposure to
these risk factors lies at the heart of the problem of financial instability and
systemic crises.
Emphasizing the link between financial instability and adverse macro-
economic developments might seem obvious to most of you. However, it is
worthwhile to point out that much of the economic literature on banking crises
and bank runs drawing on an influential paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
has taken a different perspective. The focus in this literature has been on the
dynamics of an event that starts somewhere in the banking system with the 
failure of a single institution and then affects other institutions through various
contagion channels, such as information effects, or through direct interbank credit
links.
The macroeconomic perspective suggested earlier hints to the other source of
financial instability. Financial institutions may have correlated exposures, and an
adverse economic shock may directly result in simultaneous failures. Research
recently undertaken at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Bank of
England has shown that quantitatively correlated exposures dominate the contagion
problem by a huge margin as a source of systemic risk, providing evidence for the
casual observation made previously.
Looking at the problem from this perspective does, of course, not provide us
with an answer to the question how these exposures to macroeconomic risk
factors are built up and whether this is something that regulatory policy can and
should deal with. Here the story has to be augmented by further considerations in
particular by a time dimension.
Borio (2003) described a stylized pattern of a financial cycle as it had repeatedly
been observed in the past, notwithstanding the many differences between
individual crises with respect to the different patterns of vulnerability as well as
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with respect to the triggering events. The build-up of imbalances that trigger a crisis
usually starts under booming economic conditions. This boom is accompanied by
a climate of overly optimistic risk assessment, the gradual weakening of financing
and credit constraints and rising asset prices – in particular those of property and
real estate. In this climate financial and real imbalances build up. At some point
an essentially unpredictable trigger like an asset price drop or the interruption of
an investment boom causes a sudden rundown of financial buffers, and once these
buffers are exhausted and the contraction exceeds a certain threshold, a full-scale
financial crisis occurs.
This stylized story has some essential features which are worthwhile to
emphasize here. First we see a dynamic interaction between the financial system
and the real economy over time during the build-up of the crises. Therefore, rather
than the cross-section perspective, the intertemporal perspective, which looks at
a set of institutions at a single point in time, is essential. Common exposures to
interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and the business cycle in general play a
dominant role. Much of the build-up of the crises occurs on the asset side of a
bank’s balance sheet, whereas the liability side plays its main role in the unfolding
and triggering of the crises.
Maybe less obvious but nevertheless important is the fact that the build-up of
a crisis through the dynamic, intertemporal interaction between the financial
system and the real economy suggests that the risks are to a large extent endoge-
nous. They both influence and are themselves influenced by the behavior of people
in the financial system. This feedback mechanism should be taken into account
when policy measures are designed. Again, it may be obvious to most of you
familiar with the day-to-day reality of the financial system. I emphasize it
because many of the quantitative state-of-the-art risk assessment models we use
in analyzing financial risks rely on the assumption that financial risks are driven
by an exogenous random process, which influences the behavior of financial
market participants but itself is not influenced by their behavior. These models
therefore assume away the feedback mechanism between behavior and risk, which
plays such an important role in the reality of financial markets, in particular in
situations of crises and distress.
Having sketched a stylized picture of financial instability and having pointed
out the main features characterizing it, we may ask what the role of a regulator in
all of this is. We have learned from the past that the triggering event is essentially
unpredictable and diverse. It is furthermore beyond the control of any particular
individual, even of such institutions as financial regulators and central banks.
Their potential role seems to be connected to the dynamic problem of the build-up
of imbalances and the monitoring and early understanding of the emergence of a
crisis situation rather than to the triggering event itself.
Still the question is what the exact nature of the problem in the build-up of
crises is. I think we can identify two different problems. One is a fairly straight-
forward externality problem. Financial market participants may have an incentive
to take more risks than a socially optimal risk allocation would require because in
their plans they take into account only the individual costs of their decisions but
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not the social costs that occur in a situation of financial distress. Yet it is of course
not fully clear what the exact reason may be that market prices do not reflect
the full costs of taking risky decisions. Given one believes the externality story
the problem of the regulator is to implement an optimal risk allocation by suitable
policy instruments. In practice, this is of course not exactly a neat textbook
problem and requires considerable judgment and practical expertise. The second
problem seems to be a coordination problem. The feedback from behavior to the
build-up of risk and back to behavior can lead to a coordination problem: it is
individually rational to act on the overly optimistic risk assessment as long as
everybody else does but again the social optimum might lie elsewhere. Many
such situations are discussed abstractly in game theory. Here the role of the
regulator becomes one of supporting coordination on a sustainable equilibrium
of behavior.
The challenging problem in all cases is to deal with the characteristic feedback
loop where actions of financial market participants influence financial risks and
these risks feed back on actions and so on. This feedback loop lies at the heart of
the problem why regulatory instruments may have macroeconomic consequences.
4.3 Regulatory policy and macroeconomic 
consequences
Financial regulation encompasses both markets and financial institutions, most
importantly banks. In the area of markets, financial regulation mainly concen-
trates on providing a legal framework (a set of rules) that facilitates the market
exchange of financial instruments. From an abstract viewpoint, financial
contracts are promises to exchange goods or money between different points in
time and across different possible future states of the world. This very nature of
financial contracts brings along a host of incentive, enforcement, and information
problems, which create a direct need for this legal infrastructure. If we pass on
to financial institutions, regulation often interferes directly with the decisions
that can be taken by economic agents, like restrictions on asset holdings and com-
petition or restrictions on the capital structure of banks. Thus, these regulatory
measures interfere with the feedback loop between behavior and financial risks
discussed earlier and are therefore notoriously hard to assess.
The regulatory instrument that has been given most attention during the past
decade, certainly, is capital adequacy for banks. It is the regulatory instrument
most frequently discussed in the context of financial stability as well as concerning
its macroeconomic consequences. It thus perhaps serves as a good example to
discuss some of the more general issues that I want to raise here.
Usually, the following two arguments are given in favor of capital adequacy:
first, it is seen as an instrument limiting excessive risk taking by bank owners
with limited liability and, thus, promoting optimal risk sharing between bank
owners and depositors. Second, capital adequacy regulation is often viewed as a
buffer against insolvency crises, limiting the costs of financial distress by reduc-
ing the probability of insolvency of banks. It is the hope of regulators that capital
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adequacy provides a safeguard against a systemic crisis, the widespread
breakdown of financial intermediation.
In the context of the stylized facts of the build-up of crises and the given
dynamics, these arguments focus on the cross-sectional rather than on the
intertemporal aspect of risk. The idea that a bank that holds more equity has larger
buffers against the risks it is exposed to does not relate directly to the dynamic
story of how equity may be optimally adjusted over time.
The cross-sectional view has also shaped the big recent changes to capital
adequacy in the Basel II framework. In an effort to improve risk sensitivity, the
new framework stipulates that minimum capital for a given portfolio changes
with its perceived riskiness as measured by external or internal ratings. This is a
big reform step that leads to a much better relative risk assessment across institu-
tions at a given point in time. Without doubt, this reform is a milestone that will
substantially improve risk management and risk awareness.
One of the discussions in the run-up to the New Basel Capital Accord
concerned the macroeconomic implications of capital requirements if they are set
independently of macroeconomic conditions. The arguments that have been
raised have been based mostly on an intertemporal perspective and mainly
concerned the endogenous nature of financial risks.
The basic argument is plain and straightforward. When the economy is hit by a
recession enterprises’ debt service is impaired. The reduction in bank profits – in
absence of compensating issues of outside equity or reduction in dividends – leads
to a reduction in bank equity. No matter how sophisticated the cross-sectional
capital regulation is calibrated this decline in bank equity must result in reduc-
tions in bank lending. This in turn reduces business investments and exacerbates
the shock to aggregate demand. Thus, in an intertemporal context the regulation
that boosts individual buffers at the bank level acts as a potential crises amplifier
at the system level through the macroeconomic consequences of the regulatory
instrument. Clearly, if we take the stylized story of financial crises and crisis
dynamics seriously the intertemporal aspects of risk are perhaps not yet suffi-
ciently taken into account. The previous analysis of crisis dynamics implies
that the adjustment of capital over time requires as much attention as the 
cross-sectional aspects that are now taken into account in a very detailed and
sophisticated way.
Let me now – as a second example – turn to the problem of coordinating
expectations. The coordination problem arises when in a climate of overly
optimistic risk assessment it might be optimal for each individual to respond by
equally overly optimistic assessments as long as everybody else holds excessively
optimistic views about the economic environment. Here the dynamics of expecta-
tions have a potentially huge impact on financial cycles with repercussions for the
macroeconomic environment. Expert risk assessments by institutions in charge of
financial stability, such as central banks and supervisors, act as potentially important
coordination devices and can contribute to coordinating expectations to realistic
and well-founded risk assessments. Exactly these aspects are the motivation for
many central banks to publish financial stability reports.
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We have seen that led by the Basel process, impressive progress in quantitative
risk assessment models and in the skillful use of these techniques by supervisors
and regulatory institutions in charge of financial stability has been taking place.
The difficulty of many of these techniques so far is that they are devised for
individual banking institutions and not for the system as a whole. To capture
systemic risk, it is however, decisive to take a system perspective. Elsinger et al.
(2002) and, in a recent paper, Elsinger et al. (2005) demonstrate that an individ-
ual institution approach that ignores correlations and interlinkages – as many
quantitative risk assessment models do – does indeed underestimate systemic
events of bank insolvencies by a considerable margin.
I think that regulatory institutions in charge of maintaining financial stability
can contribute a great deal to coordinate expectations on realistic risk assessments
by devising credible and good quantitative models that are able to capture risk at
the level of the banking system. Such contributions can establish a beneficial
link between regulatory supervision and financial stability. If they smoothen
expectation-driven financial cycles, a positive impact on macroeconomic
stabilization can be established. If such models can be run at regular intervals
with a continuous updating of information risk assessment over time may also be
improved.
4.4 Conclusions
So let me conclude. I have taken the viewpoint of a regulatory skeptic to point out
some of the particular challenges financial regulation has to face. In an attempt
to pin down the major reasons why we might want regulatory intervention in the
first place I have identified an externality problem and a coordination problem.
Both problems are intimately connected to the dynamic nature of financial
instability. Both problems mainly materialize in the dynamics and the build-up of
financial and real imbalances, which then suddenly unfold, triggered by an essen-
tially unpredictable event. The dynamics are so intricate because the major
risks are endogenously driven by a feedback from macroeconomic conditions to
behavior and back to macroeconomic conditions.
I have argued using the example of capital adequacy regulation that this instru-
ment is very finely tuned to considerations of relative risk at a particular point in
time and less so to the intertemporal aspects, which is where the externality prob-
lem kicks in. Thus further explorations to include the intertemporal aspects and
therefore to design the instrument with a stronger focus on its macroeconomic
consequences may be useful.
I have also pointed out the usefulness of quantitative models of risk assessment
for coordinating expectations about financial developments. A shortcoming of many
of these models is that they are geared very much toward individual institutions
rather than to the system as a whole and may therefore perform poorly in the assess-
ment of systemic events. If these improvements can be successfully accomplished a
reform of supervisory monitoring may be achieved that has a beneficial role in
coordinating expectations and in supporting financial and macroeconomic stability.
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Overall I think we have to strive for progress with respect to both the regulatory
instruments that we use as well as the quantitative models we rely on in making
our assessments. Thus with respect to financial stability we have to aspire to
a state that has already been reached by monetary analysis. Here the policy
instrument is clearly defined. The decisions are supported by a host of canonical
quantitative models, which are built on a combination of theory, practical
relevance, and empirical fit. The impact and feedback mechanisms of policy are
fairly well understood and relatively uncontroversial.
There is no principal reason to assume that financial stability analysis and
financial regulation will not arrive at a similar state of theoretical and practical
knowledge in the future. The tremendous progress that has been made in the past
two decades gives reason for such optimism. To foster this progress we will
however need considerable further effort in research and a constant attempt to
review current policy practice. I think that this conference and the activities of
SUERF provide an excellent and valuable contribution to this ambitious goal.
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Good morning. It is a pleasure to be here and a great honor to present this year’s
Marjolin lecture and prize. I thank you for the invitation and the opportunity to
share some of my perspectives with you today.
As we bring the colloquium to a close this morning, we can reflect on the many
ideas and challenges presented by the changing landscape of European financial
services that have been discussed during our sessions. In preparing my lecture
for the colloquium, I thought I could best contribute to the events of the past
several days by offering you my commentary – as a career academic and current
US central banker – on some changes taking place in the financial services
industry “across the pond.” Specifically, I thought I might use my time with
you today to discuss what is happening in the US payments system. I believe
you will find the changes occurring there interesting in their own right and as a
point of comparison and contrast with what is happening in the European
payments arena.
As anyone who knows the sector would readily admit, the origins and evolu-
tion of payments structures on our two continents could not be more different.
Now, however, we are beginning to see signs that our two systems are starting
to converge. We are both moving toward more electronic payment services
through a number of vehicles. What we are experiencing is two systems that
started out quite differently converging toward similar future systems. On the
United States side, the pattern of payments is indeed evolving – some might say
it is experiencing a radical change. America’s paper-based payments system is
giving way to a new realm of electronic payments vehicles – a transition that
has already occurred in Europe. Indeed, there has been quite a bit of diversity in
the forms of payments used in the United States. However, as is typical in this
area, change has been, and will be, greatly affected by our financial history and
its legacy systems.
This presents our central bank with many challenges, because unlike most central
banks in Europe, the Federal Reserve is not only a regulator but also a service
provider. We have been a vital part of the retail payments system since our founding
over ninety years ago. From its inception, the Federal Reserve has had a dual role
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as the central bank charged with ensuring the integrity of the payments system
and as a participant in its evolution.
Over time, the Fed’s role in payments and that of European central banks are
likely to converge as well. It is expected that the Fed’s role in paper processing
will diminish over time as checks recede in both absolute volume and relative
importance in our retail payments system. As this occurs, it will further our
resemblance to the central banks of Europe. Over time, both the Fed and
European central banks will concentrate more of their efforts on their services on
large dollar gross settlement, with TARGET 2 likely following the evolution of
Fedwire.
So, with that prologue, I would like to spend my time with you today sharing
my thoughts on payments concentrating on three issues:
● the current status of the US payments infrastructure vis à vis Europe’s,
● how the roots and evolution of the US payment system differ from that of
Europe,
● and finally, the likely future path of the US payment system and the Fed’s role
in it, with an emphasis on how we are likely to resemble Europe and how we
will be different.
5.2 The current state of payments technology in 
the United States
Historically, Americans and Europeans have long relied on an entirely different
mix of payments vehicles. For example, Europeans use cash roughly twice as
much as Americans.
However, looking at our noncash transactions gives evidence of where our
differences truly lie. In Europe, half of all noncash retail payments are made
through a Giro system and only about 15 percent are made by check. In the United
States, it is almost exactly the reverse. Half of all noncash retail payments are made
by paper check and less than 10 percent are made through our automated clearing
house (ACH), which is the American version of a Giro system.1
The dominance of the Giro in Europe and of the check in the United States is
a long-standing feature of our respective payment systems. The history of how
this dominance evolved is interesting and instructive, as I will elaborate in just
a minute.
Payment cards account for the remainder of retail payments. Here there are
similarities and differences between Europe and the United States. The similarities
are in our use of debit cards. Debit cards, a relatively recent innovation, have
caught on quickly both in Europe and in the United States, and now account for
about a quarter of noncash retail payments in both places. The differences are in
our use of credit cards. Credit cards have long been an important payment vehicle
in the United States, and at present account for about a quarter of noncash retail
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payments there. In Europe, credit cards are used less frequently – in fewer than
10 percent of transactions, though I would note that Europeans’ use of credit cards
has picked up in recent years.2
The long-standing success of the credit card in the United States, and the rapid
rise of the debit card in both Europe and the United States, are also interesting
and instructive stories.
But first, let’s begin with the story of the Giro and the check.
5.2.1 The European structure
To understand the dominance of the Giro in Europe and the check in the United
States we have to go back about 100 years to the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century. At that time, European banks did not provide routine payment
services. They served primarily as merchant banks and as private banks for
wealthy individuals.
In the late 1800s, local post offices began establishing postal Giro systems as
a convenient way for common people to deposit savings and later evolved to allow
them to remit and receive payments. The system was successful in that it allowed
every post office savings account holder to make and receive payments both
locally and nationally. This revolutionary achievement rendered noncash payment
transactions accessible to large sectors of the population.
Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, European banks sought to broaden their business
lines to encompass the mass market as a way to expand their deposit base to fund
loans. This meant providing routine payments services to customers, and so bank
Giro systems were created to handle the volume.
This evolution occurred relatively smoothly and rapidly as a result of Europe’s
concentrated banking industry – a few banks operating nationwide, cooperating
closely with each other.
At the same time, European governments wanted to establish payment sys-
tems that minimized costs and maximized access. The advent of technological
advances created such opportunities through electronification. When technology
made it economical to replace paper Giros with electronic Giros, European
governments pushed for the transition, and the concentration of the payments
system in the hands of the postal service and a few national banks made it rela-
tively easy to accomplish. Because of its Giro system, Europe had, or could 
easily set up, centralized accounts for credit transfers. In short, European central
banks encouraged – and in some cases, mandated – the use of electronic Giro
systems.
5.2.2 The US structure
In contrast, the US payments system evolved quite differently from Europe’s.
Historically, US banks tended to provide services – including payments services – to
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the broad spectrum of people and businesses. On the loan side, commercial banks
focused on commercial and industrial lending, but they took deposit balances from
all economic strata.
In early America, the geographical expanse of the country encouraged a frag-
mented system where state banks issued their own notes. Entry into the banking
business was relatively easy, but bank branching was very restricted. Banks were
prohibited from branching outside their home state, and in many states, branching
was restricted still further. As a consequence, a region would be served by a
relatively large number of banks, but there were no banks operating nationwide.
To effect transactions, people paid one another with paper checks drawn on
their bank or paper currency notes issued by their bank. The banks would then
clear these checks and notes among themselves.
With so many individual banks spread out across such a big country, and banks
clearing paper instruments among themselves, effecting transactions outside the
local area was cumbersome. When someone received a bank check or a bank note
as payment and deposited it at his bank, the bank would discount the instrument’s
value based on the cost of presenting it to the “drawn on” bank for payment and
some assessment of the creditworthiness of the “drawn on” bank. The farther
away the bank, the less familiar its financial condition and the greater the trans-
portation cost associated with clearing the instrument, and so the greater the dis-
count tended to be. So a merchant in Kansas City, Missouri, accepting as payment
a check drawn on a bank in Allentown, Pennsylvania, knew he would be credited
with less than the face or par value of the check and would have to consult with
his bank to find out how much less. Obviously, this was a payment system
inimical to the growth of national commerce.
By the turn of the twentieth century, it was clear that the United States needed
a more well-integrated national payment system. Indeed, one of the main reasons
Congress established the Federal Reserve System back in 1913 was to create a
national clearing system in which checks could exchange at par value. To achieve
this, the Federal Reserve offered check clearing services free of charge to banks
that joined the Fed System.
However, the Fed did not become the sole provider of check clearing services,
despite offering its services for free. First of all, not all banks chose to join the
Fed System, primarily because of some of the regulatory implications. In addition,
large correspondent banks offered smaller respondent banks an array of “bankers’
bank services” including check clearing, and banks could take advantage of local
and national clearing house arrangements.
Nonetheless, the Fed established a large market presence, providing a baseline
level of national check clearing services accessible to all banks, large and small,
anywhere in the country. Thus, the Fed contributed to the viability of both the
paper check and the small community bank.
In the 1960s and 1970s, US banks and the Fed applied advances in computing
technology to check processing, increasing the efficiency of their operations.
Banks found the paper check payments business to be profitable, and consumers
were quite comfortable and confident in the use of checks.
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In short, checks were the dominant form of noncash payment, and there was
little momentum for change in the US payments system. One might argue that
bank Giro systems, which were arising in Europe at the time, would have
increased the efficiency of the payments system even more. Yet with so many banks
in the United States – all serving local markets – developing the legal framework,
industry standards, and institutional arrangements necessary to establish such a
payments network nationally would have been a daunting task. And in any case,
American banks are forbidden under antitrust law to work together.
The Fed itself introduced its version of an electronic Giro system in the early
1970s. We call it our automated clearing house, or Fed ACH. Fed ACH has met
with some success.
However, unlike the European Giro, ACH has not developed into the dominant
form of electronic payment, in part, because, traditionally, only banks – not
individuals – could initiate ACH payments. This made the ACH practical only for
companies engaged in batch-processing a large number of payments, such as
payroll disbursement.
In a typical transaction, a firm would forward to its bank an electronic file
containing payments to be made from the firm’s account. The bank would then
initiate the ACH transactions by sending the file to the Fed, which would transfer
funds from the bank’s account to the accounts of the various payees’ banks, and
then notify them of the account holders to be credited.
I will add that a relatively recent variant allows large organizations to collect
regular payments using the ACH. A typical transaction of this nature would
involve individual customers’ authorizing their bank to make ACH payments
directly to a firm – perhaps their utility company or mortgage company – on a
recurring basis.
5.3 Cards drive changes in US payments
While Fed ACH saw some success as a means to effect electronic payments, it
was the credit card that proved most instrumental in moving US payments from
paper to electronics. The credit card actually was the first electronic payments
instrument to emerge in the United States. Credit cards were introduced in the
1950s, and their use grew rapidly over the next three decades.
5.3.1 Credit cards
Not coincidently, the US credit card infrastructure looks a lot like the European
banking system. There are relatively few major card associations. They operate
nationwide. And they are not subject to the antitrust laws that prohibited collab-
oration among US banks. In fact, the credit card associations benefited from
some early antitrust rulings against banks.
In the 1990s, when the tech boom made information processing and telecom-
munications more powerful and less expensive, the credit card associations were
well positioned to take full advantage of these developments. Low-cost telecom
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has made real-time, point-of-service verification of cardholders and their credit
status widespread, speeding transactions and curtailing fraud. Of significance for
the future, this technology has made the credit card a viable means of payment for
e-commerce.
5.3.2 Debit cards
After the credit card, the debit card is the second most popular electronic instrument
for making retail payments in the United States today. The debit card arrived on
the scene relatively recently – during the 1980s – in both the United States and
Europe. But since its arrival, growth in usage has been dramatic.
In Europe, the debit card emerged as an evolution of banks’ automatic teller
machine (ATM) systems. Instead of using their card to withdraw cash from an
ATM to pay merchants, bank customers simply present their card to the
merchants and their bank account is debited directly.
This same progression occurred in the United States, too. But in the United
States, the credit card networks responded with debit card products of their own.
Visa and MasterCard already had an infrastructure in place for processing credit
card transactions at the point of sale. They leveraged this infrastructure to
establish offline debit card networks. Indeed, in the United States, these so-called
“signature” debit cards are proving at least as popular as ATM, or “PIN-based,”
debit cards.
Signature debit cards now account for about two-thirds of the total of debit
transactions at the moment, so it could be said that they are even more popular
than their PIN counterparts. However, PIN-based debits are growing a bit faster
than signature.
In any case, debit cards in general seem to be leading the migration away from
cash and checks and toward electronic payments in the United States. This trend
is substantiated by the Survey of Consumer Finances, sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors and compiled by the Research Department at the
Philadelphia Fed.
The survey indicates that fewer than 18 percent of households used debit
cards in 1995. But by 2001, nearly half of all households were using them. Not
coincidentally, the survey also divulged a substantial reduction in the use of cash
over the same period.
The growing popularity of debit cards in the United States seems to be part of
a broader phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, debit cards have caught on just as
quickly in Europe. In fact, recently, for the first time ever, Visa’s global debit sales
volume surpassed its credit sales volume.3
5.4 The future of the US retail payments system
By now, I hope I have given you some perspective on the current state of US retail
payments and the evolutionary process that brought Americans there.
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Looking ahead, retail payments in the United States will continue moving away
from cash and paper checks toward electronic instruments, including credit cards,
debit cards, ACH, and emerging vehicles such as prepaid cards.
Though roughly half of our noncash payments are still being made by paper
check, the tide has turned. In fact, recent research by the Federal Reserve shows
check usage peaked in the mid-1990s and has been declining steadily ever since.
So paper checks are not only losing market share, they are actually declining in
volume and have been for about a decade.
The share of retail transactions handled by cards will continue to grow in the
United States, particularly at the point of sale. Debit cards have made particularly
deep inroads in the realm of “micropayments” – purchases under $20. According
to a survey by MasterCard International, debit cards now account for about one-
third of all micropayments, a 61 percent increase over 2001.4 And Visa claims to
have authorized 82 percent more payments at quick-service restaurants between
January and July of this year than during the same time period last year.5 Here we
see debit transactions replacing cash, since the survey indicated a substantial drop
in cash micropayments.
Several big-name fast-food chains are promoting greater use of payment cards
at their restaurants. (It undoubtedly has not escaped their attention that customers
spend, on average, over 50 percent more when they pay with a card rather than
cash.6) This movement has tremendous upside potential. Last year, consumers
used their cards to make purchases of $6.5 billion at fast-food restaurants, and
that was with only 10 percent of such restaurants accepting cards.7
Into the future, organizations other than banks will expand their role in the
payments system, especially retailers themselves. As a result of recent legal action
brought by WalMart against US card companies, retailers now appreciate the
costs and benefits associated with alternative payment processing arrangements
and will weigh in to protect their interests going forward. As you may know,
WalMart, the largest retailer in the United States, along with other merchants,
balked at the idea of accepting signature debit cards – and their associated fees –
without the right to negotiation. They sued US bank credit card associations, pre-
vailing in a good portion of their efforts. Their settlement eliminated the “honor
all cards” rule, effectively allowing merchants to decline signature debit products
without jeopardizing their ability to accept credit products or PIN debit cards.
In short, I expect keen competition among card providers, and aggressive
marketing by both card providers and merchants, to increase the speed with which
cards replace paper for point-of-sale transactions in the United States.
How quickly US consumers move from paper to electronics, when it comes to
bill paying, is an interesting question. The speed and scope of that transition
depend on the evolution of our payments system.
As I mentioned earlier, our ACH system has not been as successful as your Giro
systems. But things may be changing. Financial institutions are finding innovative
new uses for ACH, spanning a broad range of retail transactions and shifting
substantial volumes to this system, primarily at the expense of check volume.
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The most important of these innovations is accounts receivable check (ARC)
conversion. Large organizations that receive paper checks from customers as
remittance for retail payments are now scanning the checks to digitally capture
their relevant payment information. The companies can then use this information
to create an electronic file, which is then transmitted to an ACH payments
provider – usually the Fed – for processing. In some cases, even individual mer-
chants who accept customer checks at the point-of-sale can use the information
on the check to generate an electronic file. That file is then sent to the merchant’s
bank for processing through the ACH.
Conversion to ACH is helping to streamline payments initiated by check, even
when the paper check would follow. It is also being used to process one-time
payments initiated via the Internet.
As the owner/operator of the Fed ACH system, the Federal Reserve has been
working to ensure its ACH system is equipped to accommodate changes in
volumes and the nature of payments, even as these applications proliferate. As in
check processing, the Fed is not the sole provider of ACH. Though the Federal
Reserve network currently originates about two-thirds of all ACH payments
volume, we are also seeing growth among private-sector ACH networks. Indeed,
as ACH continues to gain acceptance as a payment vehicle, its products and
marketing will evolve so as to make it more attractive and accessible to individuals
and businesses.
5.5 Managing the transition
So, the private sector is shifting retail payments in the United States away from
paper-based instruments and toward electronic ones. But history tells us that
people’s payment habits change only gradually. When people are comfortable
with, and confident in, a payment structure, they are reluctant to give it up. As a
result, the paper check is likely to be with us for some time.
In the meantime, the Fed has been trying to take full advantage of the efficiencies
afforded by electronic processing of payments initiated by paper check in the
interest of maximizing the efficiency of the payment system. Thus, the Fed is
doing what it can to foster check truncation and electronification at as early a
stage as possible in the payment process.
The Fed is now well positioned to pursue this objective. Two pieces of
legislation have set the stage. One is a law that has been on the books for
nearly twenty-five years now: the Monetary Control Act of 1980. The second was
passed just a year ago and goes into effect this month: The Check Clearing for
the 21st Century Act, commonly called Check 21. Let me explain the significance
of each.
Recall that when the Fed began its check processing operations, it provided the
service at no charge to its member banks. The Monetary Control Act of 1980
changed all that. It required the Fed to offer its payments services to all banks at
prices fully reflecting the Fed’s costs of production including imputed profits.
This change established a marketplace incentive for the Fed and its private-sector
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competitors in check processing to maximize the efficiency of their check
processing operations.
The second piece of legislation, Check 21, adds an important new dimension
to the competitive drive for greater efficiency in check processing. The essence
of the new law is that it makes the facsimile of a check created from an electronic
image serve as the legal equivalent of the check itself. In doing so, it eliminates
a significant legal barrier to check truncation and electronification of the
check processing. A collecting bank can soon create an electronic image of a
check, transmit the image to the paying bank’s location, and then present the
paying bank with a paper reproduction or with the electronic image itself.
The hope and expectation is that gradually more and more paying banks will
prefer the image itself.
Accepting images for both deposit and presentment eliminates back office
capture of the check as well as the inconvenience of physical transportation.
Indeed, under the new Check 21 legislation, it will become even easier to move
toward a more electronic check process because banks will be provided with
additional options for processing image-based payments.
As a provider of financial services, we have been actively engaged in bringing
a whole array of image products to market to take advantage of the capability of
image clearing. We have established an image archive for electronic items; we
have enhanced our ability to produce facsimile checks; and we have extended
clearing times to encourage the use of the new image technology that the act
allows. In short, the Fed is introducing new services that will enable banks to take
full advantage of Check 21.
How fast will the transition occur? It is our best guess that the industry will be
slow to embrace the new capabilities that the law permits. We must also consider
the possibility that making check processing more efficient will actually extend
the life of the waning check. In any case, the Federal Reserve Banks’ financial
services division is committed to working with the industry to ensure a smooth
transition.
5.6 The challenge to the Fed
With the evolution of the payments system in the United States accelerating, the
Federal Reserve must make some major adjustments to its payments services as
the changing payments system alters its role. Nonetheless, the Fed is committed
to working to improve the reliability and efficiency of the current generation of
payments vehicles, even as it works to foster innovation and to support the next
generation of payments vehicles. Both commitments are equally important during
this period of transition.
With this dual commitment in mind, we continue to fulfill our traditional role as
payments processor even while we support the move to our new electronic clear-
ing environment. Striking the right balance between these two seemingly divergent
goals is a challenge. Nonetheless, the Fed has begun implementing a strategy that
includes key elements to help us successfully meet both commitments.
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The Fed has recently announced a program of “aggressive electronification”
of retail payments in the United States. This push toward electronics will help
facilitate Check 21 and quicken the transition to an all-electronic world. The Fed
is also investing heavily in technologies that enable electronification. In addition,
as check volumes decline the pressure has been on to find new processing
efficiencies. The transition will not be easy, particularly for the Federal Reserve
System.
The Fed currently clears about one-third of all checks written in the
United States. As check volumes have declined, the Fed has had to consolidate its
operations, closing down processing sites where appropriate. Nonetheless, it has
attempted to maintain reasonable service levels nationally by re-routing checks to
nearby sites.
So that you can see the scale of this effort, I will note that two years ago
the Fed had forty-five check processing sites. By early 2006 we will be down to
twenty-three. This downsizing to match costs and revenues helps us fulfill our tra-
ditional role of payments processor while at the same time maintaining efficiency
in this new environment.
Such a radical transformation within our financial services division is made
necessary by law. As I mentioned earlier, the Monetary Control Act mandated that
we set prices on our services to fully recover our costs. At the same time, we are
required to adjust our portfolio of services to correspond to the clearing needs of
the industry. As such, the aggregate decline in volume in this volume-based
service creates a substantial challenge to the System. And achieving full cost
recovery will become more challenging for us as the volume of check usage
continues to decline.
Nonetheless, by setting prices that reflect the low cost of electronic check
processing relative to paper the Fed will allow, indeed encourage, the market to
drive checks toward electronics. In addition, we will continue to develop our
capabilities and expand our electronics capacity to respond to the market’s evolu-
tion and consumers’ needs. The impact of these changes and those that follow will
ultimately transform the US payments system and enable a radical restructuring
of its service capabilities.
5.7 A word about wholesale payments
Before closing, let me say just a few words about our wholesale payments
operation. Aside from its role in supporting retail payments, or small-dollar
transactions systems, the Fed has long had a role in facilitating wholesale, or large
dollar, transactions. As you are no doubt aware, Fedwire is the Fed’s real-time
wholesale payments operation. It is used to transfer both funds and securities.
Fedwire transactions typically involve large value, time-critical payments, such as
payments for the settlement of interbank purchases and sales of federal funds, or
securities or real estate transactions.
Fedwire first went into operation back in 1918. Its operations have evolved
with advances in technology and the integration of financial markets. The Fed has
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recently centralized Fedwire operations from all twelve Reserve Banks to our
New York Bank – with both a hot and a cold backup.
Now, a parallel process seems to be in motion in Europe. The initiative known
as TARGET 2 will likely consolidate European central banks’ wire transfer
operations. As in the case of Fedwire, this standardized processing platform will
reduce costs through economies of scale and improve flexibility of wholesale
payments.
5.8 Conclusion
By way of summary, let me suggest that my discussion today had several goals.
First among them was to review and explain the state of payments technology in
the United States to you, my colleagues who come from a different tradition and
institutional structure. There is a reason for most things, and the roots of our
payment systems are found in our different banking structures and different
perceptions of appropriate regulation.
Yours is a system of few large banks that can easily be regulated into a
centralized world – first with near-universal Giro accounts and soon with an
electronic world of more centralized clearing.
In the United States, markets and consumers led us to a multiplicity of banks and
a payments system that has been paper intensive. In the United States this is chang-
ing, as cards are replacing checks, and electronic clearing is truncating the maze of
paper that fills our post offices. Indeed, it seems the US payments system is mov-
ing toward convergence with the European model. Our progress, while promising,
occurs largely in fits and starts. The United States is a large nation with many
providers, much complexity, and a philosophy of market-based solutions.
This has presented challenges for the Federal Reserve as a provider of financial
services. It has necessitated restructurings, plant closings, and difficult decisions
that most central banks in Europe have been spared. Yet, by law, we are charged
with the dual role of a regulator seeking to maintain the stability and efficiency
of the payments system and a provider of payment services. At times, these roles
present different challenges. This is one of those times.
Nonetheless, as payments technology moves forward in the United States, our
payments system will continue to change as evolutionary forces generate new
innovations in payments and new ways to deliver them. In some ways we will look
more like the European system even as our two payments systems move to the
next generation of payments. We will look more alike, although we will get there
from a very different starting point.
Thank you.
Notes
1 Data from Bank for International Settlements, cited in Statistics on Payment and
Settlement Systems in Selected Countries, March 2004 (Figures for 2002), prepared by
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Group of Ten Countries.
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5 W. A. Lee, “CEO confident as Visa posts more records,” American Banker, August 5, 2004.
6 Data from source cited in Note 5.
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The processes of liberalisation, globalisation and integration have dramatically
changed the banking landscape around the world. In Europe, two key develop-
ments have affected and altered the banking environment. First, in the European
Union (EU) the Second Banking Directive opened up the banking sectors of all
EU member-countries to other EU banks. The introduction of the Economic and
Monetary Union in 1999 contributed to a large and transparent common banking
sector. Second, the transition of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
from centrally planned economies to market economies, which commenced in the
late 1980s, crucially changed the banking sectors of these countries. In fact, one
could argue that in the pre-transition period they did not have a banking system
at all, or at least it was a monobank system in which the central banks performed
some commercial banking functions. Consequently, the efficiency of banks in
CEE countries was initially very poor and had to be improved so that the banking
sector could perform its role adequately.
Emerging from these developments is the question of the efficiency discrep-
ancy between banks in EU-14 banking sectors and banks in CEE countries. Very
little research has been done (e.g. Weill, 2003) to investigate the size of the
efficiency gap between Western and Eastern European banking sectors in the
1990s, when the transition processes in CEE countries were at full speed, and in
the run-up to the EU enlargement in 2004. Along these lines, the objective of
this chapter is to estimate the cost efficiency of banks in ten new EU member-
countries (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and four old EU member-countries (Austria,
Belgium, Germany, Italy) during the 1996–2003 period.1 Cost efficiency provides
information on how close (or far) a bank’s costs are from a best-practice bank’s
costs. It is estimated using a common frontier, thus allowing us to compare
efficiency estimates across countries and to examine the development of the 
East-West efficiency gap over the sample period.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we give an overview of
the literature. The discussion of the latter is organised along two lines: bank effi-
ciency studies for CEE countries and cross-country studies of bank efficiency.
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The next section sketches out the theory of efficiency measurement. This is
followed by a discussion of the theoretical foundations and design of the empiri-
cal estimation used in our analysis. Finally, our estimation results for cost efficiency
are presented. The chapter concludes with a comment on the results.
6.2 Overview of bank efficiency studies
Some studies on the performance of banks focus on a presentation of financial
ratios and an analysis of scale and scope economies.2 Molyneux et al. (1996)
noted that there are other aspects of efficiency such as technical and allocative
efficiency. These two components of efficiency were first identified by Farrell
(1957). The concept of X-efficiency encompasses both allocative and technical
efficiency.3 X-efficiency was introduced by Leibenstein (1966) and basically
reflects the differences in managerial ability to control costs or maximise profits
(Molyneux et al., 1996).
The dominance of X-inefficiency over scale and scope inefficiency in banking
has been recognised for quite some time, but researchers have only recently
turned their attention to studying X-inefficiency. This new area or direction of
research has brought about several approaches and methods of analysis.
Molyneux et al. (1996) indicated that there is no agreement on how to measure
and model X-inefficiency. The key issue is how to measure or determine the
efficiency frontier. Farrell (1957) proposed that the efficiency frontier can be esti-
mated from sample data applying either a non-parametric or a parametric
approach. The most widely used non-parametric estimation technique is the data
envelopment analysis (DEA), while the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and
the distribution-free approach (DFA) are the most commonly used parametric
techniques.
Berger and Mester (1997) in their article ‘Inside the black box: what explains
differences in the efficiencies of financial institutions?’ give a very informative
synopsis of the elements of efficiency measurement (efficiency concept, mea-
surement technique and functional form) and analyse the sources of differences
in efficiencies across banks. They find that, in general, the choice of measure-
ment technique and functional form does not make a substantial difference when
determining the average efficiency of the banking sector or the ranking of
individual banks.
Although the body of literature on bank efficiency is substantial, it is heavily
geared towards studies of US banks, followed by European banks in a distant
second place. There are only a few studies on bank efficiency in less developed
countries. CEE countries have so far not received much attention. Another area of
bank efficiency research that still has not been intensively explored is bank
efficiency across countries. In their survey, Berger and Humphrey (1997) merely
list five inter-country comparisons at the time of their study. They note that 
cross-country studies are difficult to perform and interpret because: (1) regulatory
and economic environments differ between countries; and (2) there are differ-
ences in the quality of banking services between countries that are difficult to
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account for. The first cross-country study was the 1993 comparative analysis of
bank efficiency in Finland, Norway and Sweden by Berg et al. (1993). They found
Swedish banks to be the most efficient within the pooled sample.
As to CEE economies, at least four studies need to be mentioned here. The first
is the 2002 working paper ‘Determinants of Commercial Bank Performance
in Transition: An Application of Data Envelopment Analysis’ by Grigorian and
Manole (2002). They estimate bank efficiency using the DEA technique.
Their sample is quite heterogeneous, that is, it includes countries at substantially
different development levels. They divide the countries included in the study into
three groups: Central Europe, South-East Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States. Overall, banks from Central Europe are found to be the most
efficient.
The second study is the recent working paper Efficiency of Banks: Recent
Evidence From the Transition Economies of Europe 1993–2000 by Yildirim and
Philippatos (2002). They use both the SFA and the DFA approach to estimate
bank efficiency for twelve CEE countries, as well as efficiency correlates for
the banking sectors in this group of countries. The estimated inefficiencies were
found to be significant, with respective average cost-efficiency levels for
12 countries of 72 and 76 per cent according to the DFA and SFA. However,
the relatively large number of countries in the sample suggests the sample is quite
heterogeneous, meaning it encompasses more advanced economies which
recently obtained EU membership as well as economies that still need to make
significant progress in order to draw near development levels that are common
in the EU.
Third, a recent paper by Bonin et al. (2004) focuses on evaluating bank
efficiency and identifying relevant efficiency correlates in transition countries,
with focus on the efficiency-ownership relationship. The authors applied
stochastic frontier estimation procedures to banks in 11 transition countries.
The results provided by Bonin et al. (2004) indicate that private ownership is, by
itself, insufficient to ensure bank efficiency in transition countries because no
statistically significant evidence of an adverse effect of government ownership
relative to private domestic ownership was found. Foreign-owned banks turn out
to be more cost efficient than other banks and they also provide better services,
particularly if they have a strategic foreign owner.
A study by Weill (2003) represents an attempt of a direct comparison of
the banking efficiency in Western and Eastern European countries. Weill’s
research provides evidence on the existence of an efficiency gap between Western
and Eastern banks, which is mainly caused by differences in managerial
performance, whereas environmental and risk preference effects did not turn to
be important. As indicated by the author, further research in this area is needed,
not only on the existence of the efficiency gap but also on the evolution of
efficiency and its explanations. In that sense this chapter can be considered as
work in that direction, since we extend the investigation period for three more
years, and include in the analysis the entire set of transition countries that entered
EU in 2004.
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The concept of efficiency measurement assumes that the production function of
the fully efficient firm or firms is known. Since this is not the case in practice,
one has to estimate the production function. A number of different techniques are
used to estimate efficiency. Farrell (1957) proposed that the production function
can be estimated from sample data applying either a non-parametric (mathematical
programming) or a parametric (econometric) approach.4
The two most commonly used non-parametric efficiency estimation techniques
are the DEA and the free disposable hull (FDH), the latter being a special case of
DEA. DEA is a linear programming technique where the DEA frontier is
constructed as piecewise linear combinations connecting a set of best-practice
observations (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Non-parametric techniques have some
drawbacks. They focus on technological optimisation rather than economic opti-
misation. Since they ignore prices, they only provide information on technical
efficiency and ignore allocative efficiency. Non-parametric techniques generally
do not allow for random error in the data, that is, they do not consider measure-
ment error and luck as factors affecting efficiency estimates (Berger and Mester,
1997). Thus, any deviation from the frontier is assumed to reflect inefficiency. If
there were any measurement errors, they would be reflected in a change of
measured efficiency. Moreover, as pointed out by Berger and Humphrey (1997)
any of these errors in one of the banks on the efficient frontier may change the
measured efficiency of all banks. On the other hand, DEA does not require an
explicit specification of the functional form of the underlying production function
and thus imposes less structure on the frontier.
The three main parametric techniques are the SFA, the DFA and the thick
frontier approach (TFA). These methods focus on the difference or distance from
the best-practice bank (efficient frontier), that is, this distance reflects the ineffi-
ciency effect ui. For example, if costs are higher than those of the best-practice
bank, then the bank is cost inefficient. The key characteristic of parametric
techniques is that they a priori impose a rule (assumption) for how random errors
can be separated from inefficiency. Thus, they make an arbitrary distinction
between randomness and inefficiency, which is the main drawback and criticism
of parametric techniques (Schure and Wagenvoort, 1999). Estimation techniques
differ in the way they handle the composite error term vi  ui, that is, in the way
they disentangle the inefficiency term ui from the random error term vi. In the
empirical part given here we apply the SFA technique, which is based on the
assumption that the random error vi is symmetrically distributed (normal distrib-
ution) and that the inefficiency term ui follows an asymmetric (one-sided)
distribution (truncated normal distribution).
6.4 Stochastic frontier estimation technique
There is a general distinction between deterministic and stochastic frontier produc-
tion functions (Kaparakis et al., 1994). The main drawback of the deterministic
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frontier is that it does not account for measurement errors and statistical noise
problems, thus all deviations from the frontier are assumed to reflect inefficiency
(Coelli et al., 1998). This can seriously distort the measurement of efficiency. The
stochastic frontier production function avoids some of the problems associated
with the deterministic frontier. Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen and van den
Broeck (1977) independently proposed a stochastic frontier function with a
composite error term, which allows the production function to vary stochastically:
yi = xi   ei i = 1 , . . . , N (6.1)
where yi is the logarithm of the maximum output obtainable from xi, xi is a vector
of logarithms of inputs used by the i-th firm,  is the unknown parameter vector
to be estimated and ei is the error term.
The error term ei is composed of two parts:
ei = vi  ui i = 1 , . . . , N (6.2)
where vi is the measurement error and other random factors, ui is the
inefficiency component. The vi component captures the statistical noise, that is,
measurement error and other random or uncontrollable factors. Aigner et al.
(1977) assumed that vi is independently and identically distributed normal ran-
dom variable with mean zero and a constant variance, that is, vi ~ i.i.d. N(0, 2v).
The ui component is a non-negative random variable accounting for technical
inefficiency in the production of firms. It measures technical inefficiency in the
sense that it measures the shortfall of output from its maximal possible
value given by the stochastic frontier xi  vi (Jondrow et al., 1982). This short-
fall or, more generally, these deviations from the frontier are due to factors that
are under the control of management, as opposed to vi, which is not under
management control (Chang et al., 1998). ui is distributed either i.i.d exponential
or half-normal.
The main shortcoming of the SFA is the a priori distributional assumption of
ui. This assumption is necessary in order to use the maximum likelihood method
to solve for the parameters. In general, the stochastic frontier model can be esti-
mated by using corrected ordinary least squares (OLS), but maximum likelihood
is asymptotically more efficient. In our estimation, we apply the maximum
likelihood method.
The mean of the distribution of the ui (the mean technical inefficiency) is easy
to compute. One simply calculates the average of ei estimates, and the statistical
noise component vi averages out. Computing technical inefficiency for individual
firms is more demanding. The decomposition of the error term into its two
components, vi and ui, remained unresolved until Jondrow et al. (1982) proposed
how to calculate the observation (bank) specific estimates of inefficiency conditional
on the estimate of the error term ei. The best predictor for ui is the conditional
expectation of ui given the value of ei  vi  ui. The predictor for efficiency is
obtained by subtracting the inefficiency from one.
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Battese and Coelli (1988) showed that the best predictor of technical efficiency,
exp(ui), is obtained by using
(6.3)
where (.) is the cumulative density function of a standard normal random
variable, , 2 is the variance of ui
and 2v is the variance of vi.
6.5 Cost efficiency model
The technical efficiency concept based on a production function is easily modi-
fied and extended to measure bank cost efficiency. Cost efficiency is derived
from the cost function. It provides information on how close (or far) a bank’s
costs are from a best-practice bank’s costs, producing the same output in the same
conditions. In other words, cost efficiency reflects the position of a particular
bank relative to the cost frontier. A stochastic cost frontier is presented here,
where C(.) is a suitable functional form.
ln ci  C(yi, wi; )  vi  ui i  1, 2, . . . , N
where ci is the observed cost of production for the ith firm, yi is the logarithm of
the output quantity, wi is a vector of logarithms of input prices,  is a vector
of unknown parameters to be estimated, vi is the random error and ui is the
non-negative cost inefficiency effect.
Note that the inefficiency factor ui is added because the cost frontier represents
minimum costs (Coelli et al., 1998).5 The random error vi accounts for measure-
ment errors and other random factors. The inefficiency factor incorporates both
technical inefficiency (i.e. employing too many of the inputs) and allocative inef-
ficiency (i.e. failures to react optimally to changes in relative prices of inputs)
(Berger and Mester, 1997). The random error and the inefficiency term are
assumed to be multiplicatively separable from the cost frontier. Efficiency mea-
surement techniques differ in how they separate the composite error term vi  ui,
that is, how they distinguish the inefficiency term from the random error.
We use panel data on banks from Central and Eastern Europe and the model
by Battese and Coelli (1992) to estimate cost efficiency. They proposed a sto-
chastic frontier model with time-varying inefficiency effects. The model can be
written as
ln (yit)  xit  vit  uit i  1, 2, . . . , N; t  1, 2, . . . , T (6.4)
where yit is the output of ith firm in the tth time period, xit is a K-vector of values
of logarithms of inputs and other appropriate variables associated with the suitable
functional form,  is a K-vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, vit are
A is the(1  )2S,   2/2S, 2S  2  2V
E[exp(ui)i] 
1  (A  i /A)
1  (i /A)
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random errors assumed to be i.i.d. N(0, 2v) independent of uit and uit are technical
inefficiency effects.
Different distributions of uit have been assumed for this panel data model (see
Coelli et al., 1998, for a short overview of the evolution of this model). The model
permits unbalanced panel data and uit is assumed to be an exponential function of
time, involving only one unknown parameter,
uit  {exp[ (t  T )]}ui i  1, 2, . . . , N; t  1, 2, . . . , T (6.5)
where ui is assumed to be i.i.d. generalised truncated normal random variable and
 eta is an unknown scalar parameter to be estimated.
In period T (i.e. t  T), the exponential function exp[(tT)] has a value of one
and thus the ui is the technical inefficiency for the ith firm in the last period of
the panel. Inefficiency effects in all previous periods of the panel are the product
of the technical inefficiency for the ith firm in the last period of the panel and the
value of the exponential function exp [(tT)]. The value of the exponential
function is determined by the parameter eta () and the number of periods in the
panel. Inefficiency effects can decrease, remain constant or increase as time
increases, that is,   0,   0 and   0, respectively. This specification of inef-
ficiency effects implies that the ranking of firms according to the magnitude of
their technical inefficiency effects is the same in all time periods. Thus, this
model cannot accommodate the situation where an initially relatively inefficient
firm becomes relatively more efficient (a change in relative ranking) in subsequent
periods (Coelli et al., 1998).
6.6 Data
The analysis covers eight CEE countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – advanced transition countries –
and Malta and Cyprus, all being new EU members. We also included four old EU
countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy). Although there are differences
between the banking sectors of these countries, they nevertheless form a rela-
tively homogeneous group. In particular, preparations for EU membership and
membership itself saw the installation of the common EU legislative framework
and common regulation standards. This allows us to perform an efficiency analysis
and compare estimated efficiencies across countries.
To construct the sample, we used information drawn from the financial statements
of individual banks provided by the Fitch/IBCA’s BankScope Database.
Fitch/IBCA collects data from balance sheets, income statements and other
relevant notes in audited annual reports. To ensure consistency, only data for
commercial banks in the unconsolidated format were used. Data, expressed in euros,
were collected for the 1996–2003 period and corrected for inflation in order to
ensure comparability (see Table 6.2 for descriptive statistics of the data).
Mathieson and Roldos (2001) indicated three important characteristics of the
BankScope Database. First, its comprehensive coverage as BankScope has data
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on banks accounting for around 90 per cent of total bank assets in each country.
Second, comparability – the data-collection process is based on separate data
templates for each country to accommodate different reporting and accounting
standards. Fitch/IBCA adjusts the collected data for country specificities and
presents them in a so-called global format, that is, a globally standardised form
for presenting bank data. Thus, BankScope Database is comparable across banks
and across countries, that is, it allows cross-country comparisons (Claessens
et al., 2001). Third, BankScope provides balance sheet data for individual banks,
which are usually not available from other sources.
In specifying input prices and outputs of the cost function, we follow the
intermediation approach as suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977). Three inputs
(labour, funds and physical capital) are used to produce three outputs (loans, other
earning assets and deposits) (Table 6.1). The three inputs reflect the three key
groups of inputs in the bank production process: bank personnel and the
management expertise necessary for the provision of bank services (labour),
funds collected on the liabilities side ( funds), and offices, branches and computer
hardware ( physical capital ).
BankScope does not provide data on the price of labour (w1) directly, that is,
there is no information on the number of employees to enable the construction of
the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees as the unit price of
labour. Instead, we use the ratio of personnel expenses over total assets, which is a
common approach in bank efficiency studies based on BankScope (Yildirim and
Philippatos, 2002). Price of funds (w2) was constructed as the ratio of interest
expenses over funding. Price of physical capital (w3) also cannot be directly taken
from BankScope and was constructed as depreciation over fixed assets. The three
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Table 6.1 Input and output variables
Variable Name Description
Dependent C Total cost Sum of labour, interest, physical capital
variables and other costs
Input w1 Price of labour Personnel expenses over total assets
prices w2 Price of funds Interest expenses over the sum of 
deposits, other funding
w3 Price of physical Depreciation over fixed assets
capital
Output y1 Total loans Sum of short- and long-term loans,
quantities mortgages and other
y2 Other earning Sum of total securities, deposits with 
assets banks and equity investments
y3 Total deposits Sum of demand and savings deposits,
deposited by bank and non-bank 
depositors
Other z Equity capital Total amount of equity capital
variables
Source: Authors.
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outputs, loans, other earning assets and deposits are proxies for banking services
provided. Total loans ( y1) is the total customer loans item from BankScope. Other
earning assets ( y2) is the sum of total securities, deposits with banks and equity
investments. Total deposits ( y3) is the sum of demand and savings deposits held by
bank and non-bank depositors. The dependent variable, total cost (C), is the sum of
total operating expenses and interest expenses. Equity capital (z) is the amount of
bank equity that reflects both the size and riskiness of banking operations. Table 6.2
presents descriptive statistics of dependent variables, inputs and output for cost.
Following Berger and Mester (1997), cost and input prices were normalised by
the price of labour in order to impose homogeneity. Cost and output quantities
were normalised by equity to control for potential heteroscedasticity. Large banks
have much larger costs (and profits) than smaller banks, thus their random errors
would have substantially larger variances if no normalisation were performed.
However, ratios of costs to equity vary much less across banks of different sizes.
As the inefficiency terms are derived from the (composite) random error, the
variance of the inefficiency term might be strongly influenced by bank size if it
were not for the normalisation by equity. Normalisation also allows the model
a more economic interpretation.
The sample of banks is not constant, that is, we do not require a bank to have
existed throughout the sample period for it to be included in the sample. Thus, in
the unbalanced panel the number of banks across years varies for all countries. In
Table 6.3 we summarise the number of banks included in the sample in specific
years and across sub-regions. The largest group represent banks from the EU-4
countries and the smallest one banks from Cyprus and Malta, but we decided
for this type of segmentation in order to assure the homogeneity across groups.
For the last year of the observation period (2003) the number of banks drops sub-
stantially in all sub-regions due to data incompleteness in BankScope Database.
This might be also reflected in the efficiency estimates for year 2003, so results
for this year should be interpreted cautiously.
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables, inputs and outputs for cost
Variable Units Mean SD CV
Total assets EUR mil 6,350 32,190 5.07
Total loans EUR mil 3,194 15,767 4.94
Total other earning assets EUR mil 2,746 14,904 5.43
Total deposits EUR mil 4,385 23,021 5.25
Price of labour % 1.85 2.58 1.40
Price of funds % 13.18 245.07 18.59
Price of physical capital % 2.70 38.78 14.38
Total cost EUR mil 380 1,666 4.38
Total equity EUR mil 323 1,334 4.13
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note
Figures in EUR million are in 2003 prices.




In order to be able to make a cross-country comparison of cost efficiency, we
employ a common frontier function by pooling the data set of all banks compris-
ing all countries included in the analysis. The cross-country frontier function in
the form of a translog function was estimated for the 1996–2003 period by using
an unbalanced panel data set on an annual basis.
The translog functional form was specified as follows:
(6.6)
where C is total cost, yk is the kth output, wi is the ith input price, z is the equity
capital, v is measurement error term and u is the inefficiency term.
The duality theorem requires the cost function to be linearly homogeneous in
input prices and for the second-order parameters to be symmetric (Altunbas et al.,
2001).6 Therefore, the following restrictions apply to the parameters of the cost
function:
The maximum likelihood method was applied for estimation. The inefficiency
effects are incorporated in the error term. The error term in a stochastic cost fron-
tier model is assumed to have two components. One component is assumed to
have a symmetric distribution (measurement error, vit) and the other is assumed
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Table 6.3 Number of banks across sub-regions
Region 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
EU-4 countries 458 475 464 457 447 453 417 206
CEE-5 countries 126 128 110 113 117 103 91 29
Baltic countries 36 39 33 33 34 34 34 25
Cyprus and Malta 16 19 22 19 21 20 19 7
Total 636 661 629 622 619 610 561 267
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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to have a strictly non-negative distribution (inefficiency term, uit). The estimation
technique we use is based on the Battese and Coelli (1992) parameterisation of
time effects in the inefficiency term and accordingly the inefficiency term is mod-
elled as a truncated-normal random variable multiplied by a specific function of
time. The idiosyncratic error term is assumed to have a normal distribution. As is
always the case when implementing frontier estimation techniques, the efficiency
score acquired from the frontier function measures the efficiency of a specific
bank relative to the best-practice or most efficient bank.7
Since the aim of our work is not to investigate the reasons underlying cost
efficiencies within individual banks but to find evidence of the existence or inex-
istence of a cost-efficiency gap in EU banking markets, we present the results as
average efficiency scores for individual countries and groups of countries that
form sub-regions within the EU.
In the process of constructing the cost function, when we were altering the nor-
malisation of cost and input prices (normalisation with personnel cost vs.
normalisation with other operating costs) and when we were assessing specifica-
tions with three vs. four product variables, we ended up with a three-product cost
frontier function (loans, other earning assets, deposits), normalised with person-
nel cost as a preferred cost function. The inclusion of off-balance-sheet items as
a fourth product variable turned out to significantly reduce the total number of
observations, whereas the normalisations with personnel costs increased the
number of statistically significant coefficients.
We report selected summary statistics of the estimated translog function in
Table 6.4. The parameters  and 2u represent the distributions parameters of the
inefficiency effects, parameter  is the decay parameter in modelling the ineffi-
ciency effects uit  exp{[t  Ti]}ui as in Battese and Coelli (1992) and indicates
the time dynamics of measured inefficiencies. Parameter  indicates the propor-
tion of the variance in disturbance that is due to inefficiency,   2u/(2v  2u).
The  value is high and shows that inefficiency variation is more important than
any stochastic variation in the frontier itself.
The average efficiency scores calculated for the entire sample of
countries/banks and for three EU sub-regions (the EU-4 group, the CEE and
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Table 6.4 Selected estimation results for the








  2u /(2v  2u) 0.999 0.0000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Baltic countries group and Cyprus and Malta) are reported in Table 6.5. The
average efficiency score for every specific group of countries for each year is
obtained as a weighted average of individual banks’ efficiency scores, where the
relative importance of the total assets of specific banks is used as a weight for
the bank. We consider the weighting approach to be essential for the correct
interpretation of the average efficiency results for specific sub-regions.
The calculated average efficiency scores indicate that the average efficiency of
the entire sample of banks for the entire period was 0.824, meaning that banks
were, on average, only 82.4 per cent efficient and could reduce their costs by
21 per cent. As one can see in Table 6.5 the average efficiency score differs
among regions, the highest being for Cyprus and Malta (91.8 per cent efficient
banks) and the lowest for CEE and Baltic countries (78.6 per cent). The differences
in efficiency scores proved to be statistically significant at p  0.05. Although the
efficiency scores vary in time the rankings between all three regions remain
unchanged. Time dynamics statistics are reported later in this section.
The measured variability reported in Table 6.5 demonstrates the differing vari-
ability of efficiency scores in specific regions. While the coefficient of variation
(CV) for the entire sample amounts to 0.182 (standard deviation SD  0.15),
the CV statistics for CEE and Baltic countries do not exceed 0.15 (SD  0.111).
The CV statistics for Cyprus and Malta even lie below 0.10 (SD  0.067). The
highest efficiency variability among all three regions is estimated for the EU-4
group (CV  0.184 and SD  0.152) which might, at least partially, also be a
consequence of the large number and great diversity of banks from that region
included in the analysis.
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Table 6.5 Average efficiency scores for the entire sample of banks, EU-4 countries, CEE
and Baltic countries, and Cyprus and Malta in the 1996–2003 period
Year Entire sample EU-4 CEE and Baltic Cyprus and Malta
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
efficiency err. of efficiency err. of efficiency err. of efficiency err. of 
score mean score mean score mean score mean
1996 0.830 0.0065 0.832 0.0077 0.763 0.0108 0.939 0.0055
1997 0.825 0.0065 0.826 0.0078 0.768 0.0100 0.933 0.0087
1998 0.841 0.0072 0.844 0.0088 0.760 0.0114 0.933 0.0077
1999 0.834 0.0075 0.835 0.0091 0.792 0.0110 0.929 0.0048
2000 0.813 0.0075 0.813 0.0095 0.807 0.0099 0.918 0.0137
2001 0.812 0.0076 0.813 0.0093 0.784 0.0110 0.915 0.0158
2002 0.830 0.0080 0.831 0.0098 0.794 0.0105 0.905 0.0243
2003 0.795 0.0158 0.793 0.0199 0.813 0.0112 0.908 0.0390
Total 0.824 0.0028 0.826 0.0034 0.786 0.0039 0.918 0.0061
Variability SD CV SD CV SD CV SD CV
measures
1996/2003 0.150 0.182 0.152 0.184 0.111 0.141 0.062 0.067
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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As shown in Table 6.6, the variability of efficiency scores differs widely among
the countries included in the sample. The lowest efficiency variability was recorded
for Cyprus (CV  0.033) and the highest, somewhat surprisingly, in the case of
Austria (CV  0.229). The latter could be a result of greater diversity of Austrian
commercial banks in terms of their size and variety of operations. However, it
seems that efficiency levels are not strongly related to efficiency variability.
The average efficiency results for other countries do not reveal any surprising
findings. In the EU-4 group only Italian banks (efficiency  0.777) turned out to be
substantially less efficient than most banks in other EU-4 peer countries. Among
fourteen banking sectors included in the analysis, the banking sectors of Cyprus and
Malta clearly stand out by their superior efficiency since their average efficiency
reaches 91.5 per cent in the case of Cyprus and 92.1 per cent in the case of Malta.
Obviously, these two countries have banking sectors that are more advanced than the
banking sectors of CEE and Baltic countries even though they joined the EU
together. However, a more detailed analysis would be necessary in order to isolate
the factors making these two countries’ banking sectors superior in cost efficiency,
both in comparison with CEE and Baltic countries, and relative to old EU members.
Another important aspect of bank efficiency studies that needs to be addressed
is the time dynamics of banking efficiency. The time varying decay model
developed by Battese and Coelli (1992) models inefficiency effects as:
uit  exp{[(t  Ti)]}ui. The estimated  coefficient provides information on
the time dynamics of inefficiency effects. When   0, the degree of inefficiency
is decreasing over time and when   0, the degree of inefficiency is increasing
over time. For the purpose of  coefficients estimations for specific regions, we
estimated a cost frontier function for each region separately. The estimated 
coefficients are presented in Table 6.7. The  coefficients for the entire sample,
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Table 6.6 Average efficiency scores and statistics for individual countries
Region Country Mean SD Std. err. N Max. Min. CV
efficiency of mean
Baltic Estonia 0.751 0.0424 0.0065 47 0.899 0.500 0.0564
Latvia 0.747 0.0552 0.0068 67 0.935 0.502 0.0738
Lithuania 0.675 0.0761 0.0064 147 0.962 0.521 0.1126
CEE-5 Czech R. 0.659 0.0766 0.0070 127 0.915 0.352 0.1162
Hungary 0.788 0.0923 0.0106 77 0.950 0.615 0.1171
Poland 0.877 0.0385 0.0026 236 0.973 0.570 0.0439
Slovenia 0.830 0.0542 0.0061 84 0.969 0.622 0.0653
Slovakia 0.765 0.1132 0.0117 98 0.905 0.036 0.1479
CY&MT Cyprus 0.915 0.0306 0.0043 54 0.967 0.798 0.0335
Malta 0.921 0.0782 0.0107 54 0.955 0.427 0.0848
EU-4 Austria 0.835 0.1909 0.0135 214 0.956 0.073 0.2286
Belgium 0.853 0.1424 0.0102 225 0.963 0.213 0.1669
Germany 0.840 0.1412 0.0045 1,061 0.970 0.163 0.1681
Italy 0.777 0.1597 0.0063 713 0.971 0.196 0.2055
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Ballin-06.qxd  7/2/06  10:13 PM  Page 75 $ 
+ + 
$ 
for EU-4 countries and for Cyprus and Malta are negative, indicating increasing
average bank inefficiencies for the entire sample and both sub-regions. However,
none of the estimated coefficients turns out to be statistically significant, mean-
ing that any conclusions about time dynamics are unreliable. On the contrary, the
estimated coefficient for CEE and Baltic countries proved to be positive and
statistically significant at p  0.01, indicating that average banking efficiency in
this group of countries improved in the 1996–2003 period. Keeping in mind that
we estimated separate efficiency frontiers for each region separately, that is, a
positive  indicates increasing cost efficiency in the respective region and does
not per se allow a comparison to another region, the results might suggest that
the improved average cost efficiency in CEE and Baltic countries, as a result of
profound banking reforms and the adoption of the EU banking regulation, has
contributed to the narrowing of the East–West efficiency gap.
6.8 Conclusions
The banking sectors of new EU members, that is, countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, have undergone a remarkable transformation over the last 15 years. They
have adopted the common EU legislation and regulation, and become integrated
into the EU’s banking sector. Banks in Central and Eastern Europe benefited from
their extensive privatisation and restructuring processes. Nevertheless, keeping
in mind their starting point in the late 1980s it remains unclear how successful
banks from the new EU member-countries have been in closing the efficiency gap
vis-à-vis the old EU states.
This paper’s aim was to shed light on the dynamics of the East-West bank
efficiency gap. We applied the standard efficiency measurement methodology to
estimate the average cost efficiency for selected countries and geographical
regions. We used the stochastic frontier approach and the Battese and Coelli (1992)
specification of the technical efficiency model with a truncated-normal distribu-
tion of efficiency effects and a time varying decay model. Data was obtained from
the BankScope Database for 10 new and 4 old EU member-countries. The unbal-
anced panel covers the 1996–2003 period. As expected, the results confirm the
existence of an East–West efficiency gap since banks in the old EU countries
proved, on average, to be significantly more cost efficient (82.6 per cent efficient)
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Table 6.7 Time dynamics of banking efficiency in the entire sample and three sub-regions
within the EU for the 1996–2003 period
Region  coefficient SE z p|z| Log likelihood
EU-4 0.0041 0.0048 0.84 0.40 89.8495
CEE & Baltic 0.0535 0.0128 4.18 0.00 5.5397
Cyprus & Malta 0.3132 0.2016 1.55 0.12 63.4700
Entire sample 0.0023 0.0047 0.49 0.62 72.9981
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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than their counterparts in CEE and Baltic countries (78.6 per cent efficient). The
analysis of time dynamics showed that average bank inefficiency in CEE and
Baltic countries decreased over the entire period (  0.0535 at p  0.01),
whereas statistically significant changes in the time dynamics of the average
efficiency of EU-4 banks were not confirmed. This seems to indicate that the
East-West efficiency gap has been gradually narrowing. It is likely that this
process will continue in the future until a complete or at least a high degree of
convergence in average bank efficiency is achieved.
Our results provide an interesting insight into the efficiency gap in the enlarged
EU. Nevertheless, there is still ample scope for further research. The robustness
of the results could be checked by applying other parametric and/or non-
parametric methodologies. One could include a set of correlates to help explain
the different factors driving changes in bank efficiency. In particular, it would
be interesting to explore the role of foreign ownership and its impact on cost
efficiency across countries in the sample. Finally, one could extend the analysis
to include profit efficiency.
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Notes
1 The expression ‘New EU member-countries’ refers to those countries which joined the
EU on 1 May 2004, while the expression ‘Old EU member-countries’ refers to all the
other EU countries.
2 DeYoung (1997, p. 21) noted that ‘accounting-based expense ratios can be misleading
and that statistics-based efficient cost frontier approaches, although far from flawless,
often provide more accurate estimates of cost efficiency’.
3 The terms X-efficiency and simply efficiency are not used consistently in the literature,
nor in this paper. They both refer to frontier efficiency.
4 See Bauer et al. (1998) for a discussion of parametric and non-parametric estimation
techniques.
5 The production frontier represents maximum output and ui is subtracted from it.
6 The duality theorem states that any concept defined in terms of the properties of the
production function has a dual definition in terms of the properties of the cost function
and vice versa. See Varian (1992) for more details.
7 Cost efficiency can take values between zero and one. For example, a bank with cost
efficiency of 0.80 is 80 per cent efficient. In other words, the bank could improve its
cost efficiency, that is, reduce its costs, by 25 per cent. The bank’s cost inefficiency is
10.80  0.20.
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Similar to other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Poland
opened its banking market for foreign participants in 1998. The removal of entry
barriers has caused a 53 per cent increase in assets controlled by foreign banks in just
two years, with about 70 per cent of total banking assets under foreign ownership in
2000. At the end of 2002, 14 out of 15 banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange
had foreign majority shareholders. This rapid transfer of ownership rights lets us
focus on the benefits of allowing foreign banks’ entry into transition countries.
Despite the profound changes in the Eastern European banking sector, there has
been little empirical research in this field so far. Only three capital markets oriented
studies shed any light on (Western) European banking mergers and acquisitions
(Tourani-Rad and Van Beek (1999); Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000); Beitel et al.
(2004)), together with some efficiency- and performance-oriented analyses (e.g.
Altunbas et al. (1996); Molyneux et al. (1996); Vander Vennet (1996)). However,
the empirical evidence presented in these studies faces two important differences to
our sample. First, we focus on a transition country where the banking industry is by
far not as developed as in Western Europe, the home countries of the acquiring
banks. Second, the transactions are privatization deals. Contrary to all other studies
cited earlier the main seller of bank stocks in Poland is the Polish state who could
interfere in the privatization process itself and even exert influence on the gover-
nance of already privatized banks, decreasing the benefits of foreign ownership.
Privatizing banks via trade sales to foreign investors might not only effect the
value of the acquired bank targets but also influence the shareholder wealth of rival
bank owners in the same market. Especially, the announcement effects on rival
returns are not clear. On the one hand, negative returns might occur because rivals
can loose market shares to more efficient foreign banks. On the other hand, there
is a probability of efficiency spill-over effects with possible improvements of the
cost–income ratios for domestic banks and also an anticipation of future takeover
premia.
7 Foreign acquisitions and
industry wealth effects of
privatization
Evidence from the Polish banking
industry
Martin T. Bohl, Olena Havrylchyk and 
Dirk Schiereck
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To uncover the effects of privatization to foreign investors, we study a new data
set of fifty-one acquisitions of foreign banks between 1996 and 2002 relying on
robust event study methodology that includes very recent data. First, we analyse
the shareholder wealth effects of the Polish bank targets around the announce-
ment date of acquisitions. Next, we look for shareholder wealth effects for the
non-participating rival banks in the Polish bank market and present wealth
effects for the remaining domestic banks (Bessler and Murtagh (2002)). Poland is
the most interesting country to look for capital market reactions because the
Warsaw Stock Exchange hosts the largest number of listed banks in CEE.1
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 describes
potential costs and benefits for the banks acquired by foreign investors and for the
non-participating banks. In Section 7.3 we describe the trends in foreign bank
ownership on the Polish banking market. These sections should serve as a back-
ground for the discussion that follows. Section 7.4 presents the data and the
methodology, and Section 7.5 provides empirical results of the investigation.
Finally, Section 7.6 draws some conclusions.
7.2 Potential wealth effects from foreign bank ownership
Recently, some studies analyse the value generated to target companies’ share-
holders by the announcement of acquisitions involving foreign European firms.
For example, Danbolt (2004) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) present
evidence for positive share price reactions of acquisition targets being higher for
cross-border transactions than for domestic ones, however, the differences are
either not significant or disappear when other factors are controlled for.
Additionally, a few studies that measure the stock price reaction of target banks
to foreign acquisitions in Europe (Tourani-Rad and Van Beek (1999), Cybo-Ottone
and Murgia (2000), Beitel et al. (2004)) report evidence in favour of wealth
effects that are higher for targets in cross-border deals.
These studies rely on the traditional merger framework. The seller is assumed
to be a diffuse shareholder group and unable to influence the behaviour after
acquisition. However, the results might be different when the seller is the govern-
ment, as it is the case in Poland. Governments can influence the company after
privatization through economic policy, retaining some ownership or by setting
privatization conditions, such as limiting post-privatization lay-offs (Uhlenbruck
and de Castro (2000)). Campa and Hernando (2004) show that acquisitions in
industries that had previously been under government control or that are still
heavily regulated generate lower value than Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As)
announcements in unregulated industries. Additionally, their findings indicate
that this difference is significant when the acquirer is a foreign firm and when the
merger takes place in a financial industry.
The literature discussed earlier focuses on developed countries in Europe, but
we are not aware of any event study that analyses the capital market reaction to
foreign acquisitions in CEE. However, we can rely on the findings of X-efficiency
studies that identify a number of advantages of foreign ownership for banking
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institutions in transition countries where it replaces state ownership.2 In this case
foreign owners enhance banks’ efficiency by reducing the importance of directed
credit and introducing better risk management practices, bringing access to
cheaper resources and streamlining banking operations. A number of authors
measure relative efficiency of foreign and domestic banks in transition countries
and find that foreign banks enjoy higher efficiency than their domestic peers
(Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Grigorian and Manole (2002), Isik and Hassan
(2002), Hasan and Marton (2003)). Claessens et al. (2001) find that foreign banks
in transition countries tend to have lower overhead costs and loan loss provisions
and higher profits than domestic banks.
The impact of foreign banks’ entry on the remaining domestic banks is even
less clear. It is usually assumed that foreign banks spur competition and thus ren-
der domestic banking markets more efficient. Claessens et al. (2001) demonstrate
that for most countries higher foreign ownership is associated with a reduction of
costs and net interest margins for domestically owned banks. Domestic banks also
benefit from spill-over effects by copying from foreign banks’ new financial prac-
tices and modern techniques. There is also evidence that foreign banks positively
improve regulation and supervision of banking markets in their host countries.
However, the benefits from higher foreign bank ownership for the remaining
domestic banks might not materialize immediately. In fact, Claessens et al.
(2001) find that profitability of domestic bank falls after the entry of foreign
banks. This highlights the risks for domestic banks, which can suffer from the lower
charter value and be forced to pursue riskier activities in order to compete with
their foreign counterparts. Lensink and Hermes (2004) show that after the entry
of foreign banks, domestic banks in developing countries with inefficient banking
systems experience initially higher costs because they have to invest in modern
technology, training personnel, etc.
Additionally, we can also expect positive abnormal returns for the non-
participating banks that would be consistent with the market power hypothesis,
which states that the consolidation of the banking market gives the remaining
banks more market power in setting prices on retail financial services (Berger
et al. (2000)). This is very relevant for the Polish banking market, because foreign
bank ownership spurred its consolidation. The number of banks in Poland
decreased from 83 institutions in 1997 to 59 in 2002, which happened mainly due
to 28 mergers that took place during this period. Consolidation was often directly
caused by foreign ownership because foreign owners decided to merge two insti-
tutions that were under their control. Additionally, many domestic banks chose to
merge in response to the growing competition pressure from foreign banks.
Alternatively, the positive reaction of non-participating banks could be driven
by the stock behaviour of the remaining domestic banks. When Polish authorities
agreed to liberalize foreign banks’ entry, there was a great interest from foreign
investors in acquiring domestic banks. Thus, the announcements of foreign acqui-
sitions were good news also for non-participating domestic bank shareholders,
because they could anticipate the interest of foreign investors in their institutions
as well.
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7.3 The Polish banking system
Foreign banks were allowed to purchase controlling stakes in Polish banks
relatively late in comparison to other CEE countries. When privatization started
in 1993, foreign banks were entitled only to minority shares whereas controlling
stakes remained with the treasury. In 1998 a new Act on Banking came into force,
which removed all restrictions for foreign banks. The concept of privatization
changed as well and the government started to seek reputable foreign banks in
order to collect large privatization revenues. The high minimum capital requirement
of five million European Currency Units (ECUs) accelerated the involvement of
foreign banks, since domestic banks could not raise such large amounts of money
on the local market.
In Section 7.2 we argued that state involvement in governance of privatized
banks could diminish wealth effects for shareholders of target banks. Bonin and
Wachtel (1999) describe the privatization process in Poland and conclude that
multiple policy objectives delayed the transfer of control to independent
investors. In certain cases, even when the government retained only a minority
share of a bank, it was able to exert pressure. To illustrate this, we can consider
the privatization of Bank Handlowy, where the sale contract included a number of
restrictions, such as a limit on the disposal of shares by core investors. Moreover,
in 1999 the government decided to use its 25 per cent non-voting share to recap-
italize the Polish state insurance company, but did not inform the bank management
before the transaction was reported in the press.
Despite these difficulties, the importance of foreign banks in the Polish banking
market increased as can be seen from the measures in Table 7.1. The year 1998
was the turning point in terms of foreign ownership of Polish banks. Even though
the share of assets and capital controlled by foreign investors has not changed
significantly during this year, the value of foreign acquisitions grew ten times in
comparison with the previous year. Just two years later, in 2000, 15 out of 16
banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange had already foreign majority owner-
ship and the share of assets controlled by foreigners grew from about 17 per cent
in 1998 to about 70 per cent in 2000.
Foreign banks pursued two strategies in acquiring Polish banks during the pri-
vatization process. A number of banks (Citibank, Bank Austria Creditanstalt,
Bayerische Hypovereinsbank) first established Greenfield Operations in the form
of subsidiaries, then acquired Polish institutions and finally merged subsidiaries
with the domestic banks they controlled. Other institutes (Commerzbank, KBC,
Allied Irish Bank) acquired Polish banks without prior presence on the Polish
banking market.
Since our methodology allows us to analyse the impact of foreign ownership
only on listed banks, it is necessary to consider the role that they play in the Polish
banking industry. As can be seen from Table 7.1, the number of listed institutions
and their share in total banking assets, loans and deposits increased almost
continuously since 1996 and in 2002 fourteen listed banks accounted for about
66 per cent of total assets. It is noteworthy that listed institutions differ significantly
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from unlisted banks in terms of shares controlled by foreign and small investors,
as well as by the Treasury. For example, in 2002 foreign investors owned about
75.1 per cent of listed banks stocks, whereas only about 63.2 per cent of unlisted
banks stocks were owned by foreigners. Small investors and the Treasury con-
trolled 19.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent of listed banks stocks, as well as 10.0 per cent
and 17.3 per cent of the stocks of unlisted institutions.
7.4 Data and methodology
To identify foreign bank acquisitions in Poland between 1996 and 2002 we
use Thomson Financial SDC (Securities Data Company – M&A Database).
Bloomberg only provides data for deals back to 1997. To verify data we use
additional press research in the Financial Times. Data on returns on individual
equities, market capitalization and the WIG index are directly provided by the
Warsaw Stock Exchange. Transactions are selected according to the following
criteria: first, the transaction was announced between 1 January 1996 and 31
December 2002. Second, the bidder was a non-Polish bank.3 Third, the target was
an exchange listed Polish bank. Fourth, the transaction had been closed (the deal
status is ‘completed’). Both, the target firms and the rivals were listed on the
Warsaw Stock Exchange for at least 170 trading days prior to the announcement
and 20 days (i.e. one month) after the announcement of a transaction. The data are
summarized in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2 shows the fifty-one transactions. The total volume exceeds 
US$5 billions. The average transaction value is worth about US$160 millions,
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Table 7.1 Summary statistics of the Polish banking structure
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of commercial banks 81 83 83 77 74 71 59
of which foreign-owned banks 25 29 31 39 47 48 45
Number of listed banks 11 14 16 16 16 16 15
of which foreign 5 5 5 9 15 15 14
Assets controlled by 13.7 15.3 16.6 47.2 69.5 69.2 67.4
foreign banks (in %)
Capital controlled by 20.9 24 24.7 50.2 77.6 80.2 77.8
foreign banks (in %)
Share of listed banks in the total
banking market in terms of
Loans 22.9 39.5 54.2 58.8 58.5 67.2 68.4
Total assets 20.0 35.3 52.1 55.1 58.1 65.6 65.8
Deposits 19.0 31.9 48.4 52.7 56.3 65.3 64.5
Value of analysed acquisition 68.7 123.4 1,229.4 1,588.1 1,173.2 786.9 148.7
deals in mil. US$
Notes
The number of commercial banks does not include banks declared bankrupt or under liquidation.
Cooperative banks are also excluded. The numbers were sourced from National Bank of Poland (1998,
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).
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ranging from US$2.3 millions to US$1.4 billions.4 The average share that was
acquired by foreign investors is about 55 per cent and the median about 31 per
cent. Therefore, we are able to analyse whether the size of a transaction has any
additional wealth effect. We can assume that the target stock price reaction would
be more significant when a larger share is acquired and thus a foreign bank
assumes control over the target.
Table 7.2 Summary of cross-border M&A transactions
Target name Acquirer name Value Number
(mil. US$) of deals
Bank Handlowy SA Commerzbank AG n.a. 2
Bank Handlowy SA Citibank NA 1,023.34 5
Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy SA AIB Group 65.95 1
Bank Przemyslowo Handlowy SA Bayerische 1,420.22 6
Hypovereinsbank
Bank Rozwoju Eksportu SA Commerzbank AG n.a. 3
Wielkopolski Bank Kredytowy SA Allied Irish Bank 179.22 3
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA Investor Group 1,047.58 3
Bank Inicjatyw Gospodarczych SA Merrill Lynch n.a. 1
International
Bank Komunalny SA Nordbanken AB 8.93 1
Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA Skandinaviska 73.18 3
Enskilda Banken
Bank Amerykanski w Polsce SA Banque Bruxelles n.a. 1
Lambert SA
Bank Amerykanski w Polsce SA Bayerische Landesbank 2.32 1
Bank Amerykanski w Polsce SA DG Bank 67.12 1
Bank Amerykanski w Polsce SA DZ Bank AG 11.54 1
Bank Wspolpracy Regionalnej SA Deutsche Bank AG 59.58 2
Pierwszy Polko-Amerykanski Generale de Banque SA 3.5 1
Bank SA
Pierwszy Polko-Amerykanski Fortis AG 89.11 2
Bank SA
Kredyt Bank SA EBRD 5.35 1
Kredyt Bank SA Kredietbank NV 3.94 2
Kredyt Bank PBI SA KBC Bancassurance 575.09 5
Holding NV
Kredyt Bank PBI SA Banco Espirito Santo n.a. 1
Powszechny Bank Kredytowy SA Bank Austria AG 111.25 3







Source: Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database.
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In order to estimate the wealth effect of foreign acquisitions for shareholders of
Polish banks we perform an event study. Due to the fact that some stocks were infre-
quently traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, the traditional market model would
produce beta coefficients, which would be biased downwards. Therefore, following
Dimson (1979) we rely on the aggregated coefficient method and regress observed
bank stock returns on preceding, synchronous and subsequent market returns:
(7.1)
where Rit is the return for the bank stock i at date t, and Mt  k is the market return
on the benchmark for the day t  k. The model parameters i and ik are
estimated for each stock separately with ordinary least squares (OLS). As market
benchmark we employ the WIG index. We have chosen 150 days prior to the event
window as our estimation period.5
As can be seen from formula (7.1), the traditional market model is augmented
by lagged and leading terms of the market return. At first, we included five
lagged and five leading market terms, however, only the three lagged and one
leading term turned out to be statistically significant and produced the highest 2.
Hence, we have decided on this specification. It is noteworthy that when we add
non-synchronous market terms, the 2 rises from 22 per cent to 31 per cent showing
that Dimson’s method has higher explanatory power than the conventional market
model.
Abnormal returns are computed using the following formula:
(7.2)
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each stock over the
following event windows: [20, 0], [10, 0], [5, 0], [2, 0], [1, 0], [0, 0],
[1, 1], [2, 2], [5, 5], [10, 10], [20, 20]. Further, we average the CARs
for all stocks and test whether CAR is different from zero using the J1 test statistic
suggested by Campbell et al. (1997). We estimate the long-term impact of
announcements by relying on CARs for the [100, 100] event window.
In addition to the analysis of the impact of foreign acquisition announcements
on target banks, we apply the same methodology to investigate the effect of
increased foreign participation on the banking industry as a whole. For this pur-
pose, we study CARs around announcement dates for the two bank indexes. An
index consisting of all institutions (domestic and foreign) that do not participate
in crossborder M&As at this moment, and an index consisting of the remaining
domestic banks. Of course, the number of domestic banks included in the index
declined during the analysed period since almost all listed banks were acquired
by foreign owners.6
After estimating the cumulative abnormal returns, we take our analysis a step
further and investigate which factors have an effect on them. First, we expect that
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abnormal returns will be higher when foreign investors gain control over a bank,
allowing them to embark on the necessary reorganization. Second, large institu-
tions may be more difficult to restructure and thus their size, measured by the
market capitalization, would have a negative impact on abnormal returns. To test
these two hypotheses, we estimate the following regression:
(7.3)
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal returns of a bank i, Sharei the share of a
transaction’s value in the capitalization of a bank i and Capitalizationi the logarithm
of the capitalization of a bank stock i on the Warsaw Stock Exchange on the last
day of the month prior to foreign acquisition. Dt , t  1996, . . . , 2002 are year
dummies.
7.5 Empirical findings
7.5.1 Stock market’s reaction to announcements
Figure 7.1 reports CARs for 41 days surrounding the announcement of foreign
acquisition and Table 7.3 the corresponding estimation results. The findings are
reported separately for three groups of banks, namely (1) for target banks, (2) all
other banks that have not participated in acquisitions and (3) the remaining
domestic banks. As can be seen from Figure 7.1 and Table 7.3 the shareholders of
target banks experienced positive abnormal returns of 3.64 per cent over the
41 days event window. The results are consistent with other studies that analyse
cross-border M&As and find a positive reaction of targets to foreign acquisitions.
However, the magnitude of our results is smaller than those reported by other
studies. For example, Beitel et al. (2004) show that the average CARs over the
3 days event period [1, 1] equals 7.22 per cent (compared to our 2.84 per cent)
for international target banks acquired by West European banks. This difference
may result from different corporate governance structures in our data set, namely
CARi  i  1Sharei  2Capitalizationi  3tDt  i,
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from the fact that we have the state as one remaining (minority) shareholder after
the transaction and that we included all deals in our analysis regardless of their
size and the acquired share. We can assume that deals that involve the transfer of
control to foreign owners should be greeted by higher abnormal returns. We will
investigate this issue further in the second subsection.
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Table 7.3 Estimation results on cumulative abnormal returns (41 days event window)
CAR in % J1 SD in % Positive Negative
A. Target banks
[20, 0] 4.05*** 13.71 12.15 32 19
[10, 0] 2.81*** 17.83 8.94 30 21
[5, 0] 3.17*** 35.95 7.79 31 20
[2, 0] 1.76*** 41.51 5.86 31 20
[1, 0] 1.15*** 20.68 5.25 29 22
[0, 0] 1.40*** 29.93 4.61 28 23
[1, 1] 2.84*** 46.72 7.69 31 20
[2, 2] 3.23*** 33.74 10.22 30 21
[5, 5] 3.86*** 21.91 11.62 31 20
[10, 10] 3.05*** 6.57 14.90 31 20
[20, 20] 3.64*** 5.05 18.21 32 19
B. All other banks
[20, 0] 0.47*** 7.03 0.59 27 24
[10, 0] 0.04*** 8.66 0.29 24 27
[5, 0] 0.04*** 15.13 0.15 22 29
[2, 0] 0.01*** 43.23 0.08 19 32
[1, 0] 0.16*** 70.89 0.05 22 29
[0, 0] 0.13*** 110.74 0.02 22 29
[1, 1] 0.24*** 80.59 0.07 21 30
[2, 2] 0.07*** 48.72 0.13 20 31
[5, 5] 0.08*** 13.49 0.29 26 25
[10, 10] 0.33*** 9.77 0.60 25 26
[20, 20] 0.92*** 4.14 1.30 28 23
C. Remaining domestic banks
[20, 0] 0.66** 2.62 0.70 25 17
[10, 0] 0.10 0.52 0.34 22 20
[5, 0] 0.64*** 33.92 0.18 22 20
[2, 0] 0.32*** 17.98 0.09 18 24
[1, 0] 0.38*** 57.65 0.06 21 21
[0, 0] 0.24*** 51.23 0.03 21 19
[1, 1] 0.48*** 64.13 0.09 20 22
[2, 2] 0.43*** 17.31 0.15 20 21
[5, 5] 0.82*** 26.43 0.34 26 15
[10, 10] 0.56*** 10.00 0.70 25 15
[20, 20] 2.08*** 9.07 1.52 28 14
Notes
This table shows the results for the regression equations (7.1) and (7.2). The table reports cumulative
abnormal returns, J1 statistics, SD of returns, and the number of positive and negative abnormal
returns. To calculate abnormal returns we relied on the aggregated coefficient method which we
applied to the estimation period of 150 days prior to the 41 days event window. **, *** denote results
are significant at the 95% and 99% level, respectively.
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Our results show that the announcements were already anticipated by the market.
The CARs for 20 days prior to acquisitions [20, 0] are about 4 per cent and are
higher than those for the [20, 20] event period. Figure 7.1 shows that CARs of
target banks increase by 6 per cent, then fall by approximately 2 per cent and
stabilize at around 4 per cent. The anticipation of acquisitions is a common
finding in the literature and was reported by numerous other M&A studies
(e.g. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000)).
In the next step following Bessler and Murtagh (2002), we estimate CARs for
the non-participating banks for the 41 days surrounding the announcement date.
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7.3. We find that the shareholders
of non-participating banks also experience positive abnormal returns that equal
about 1 per cent, which is consistent with the market power hypothesis. To test
whether the remaining domestic banks might anticipate the acquisitions, we
separately investigate their reaction and the results are presented in Panel C
of Table 7.3. As expected, we observe positive and significant CARs of around
2 per cent in the 41 days event window, which is higher than the results for all
other non-participating banks. Interestingly, abnormal returns calculated for
smaller event windows are often negative.
With respect to political and legal changes we study whether the market reac-
tions changed significantly since 1998, when restrictions on foreign ownership
were repealed. At an early stage of transition many privatization deals were char-
acterized by delays and a persistent involvement of the State Treasury in the gov-
ernance of privatized banks (Abarbanell and Bonin (1997)). Therefore, we would
expect that earlier transactions created less value for shareholders. To investigate
this aspect, we calculate CARs separately for deals conducted before and after
1998 and test the hypothesis whether the differences between them equal zero.
The results are presented in Table 7.4. When looking at the test statistics no def-
inite conclusions can be drawn from the results. The findings are mixed and are
highly sensitive to the chosen event window.
To analyse the long-term wealth effects of foreign acquisitions, we calculate
abnormal returns for 201 days surrounding the announcement date. The findings
are reported in Figure 7.1 and Table 7.5. CARs for the target banks peaked at
10 per cent just following the announcement, but have shown only 2.3 per cent
increase in the long-run. The shareholders of all non-participating banks have
observed negative CARs. However, these results are driven by rival foreign banks
since the remaining domestic banks exhibit slightly positive abnormal returns
over the long time period. Because none of the long-term results are statistically
significant, they should be treated with caution.
7.5.2 Regression analysis
Table 7.6 documents the results of the regression equation (7.3) to investigate the
determinants of the CARs. Using CARs over different event windows as the depen-
dent variable we provide a check of robustness. The regressions are run with and
without year dummies in order to reflect the changes during the analysed time period.
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Table 7.4 CARs for transactions announced before 1998 and after 1998
Before 1998 After 1998 t-statistics
A. Target banks
[20, 0] 2.38 4.46 0.74
[10, 0] 2.65 2.85 0.14
[5, 0] 1.56 3.56 2.71***
[2, 0] 0.77 2.01 3.32***
[1, 0] 0.17 1.48 6.43***
[0, 0] 1.10 1.47 2.99***
[1, 1] 2.42 2.95 1.30
[2, 2] 4.12 3.02 1.65
[5, 5] 4.48 3.71 0.53
[10, 10] 7.50 1.97 1.95*
[20, 20] 4.76 3.37 0.23
B. All other banks
[20, 0] 2.34 0.03 2.63***
[10, 0] 1.38 0.22 3.59***
[5, 0] 0.50 0.13 2.72***
[2, 0] 0.12 0.01 1.11
[1, 0] 0.35 0.10 3.34***
[0, 0] 0.77 0.03 21.07***
[1, 1] 0.01 0.29 2.44**
[2, 2] 0.99 0.30 6.66***
[5, 5] 1.13 0.34 3.28***
[10, 10] 0.73 0.50 1.35
[20, 20] 3.43 0.34 1.54
C. Remaining domestic banks
[20, 0] 0.05 0.88 1.03
[10, 0] 0.34 0.24 1.33
[5, 0] 0.34 0.73 1.69*
[2, 0] 0.76 0.19 5.14***
[1, 0] 1.02 0.18 11.36***
[0, 0] 0.65 0.12 14.54***
[1, 1] 0.89 0.36 4.74***
[2, 2] 0.72 0.34 1.97*
[5, 5] 1.30 0.66 1.45
[10, 10] 2.25 0.03 2.45**
[20, 20] 3.59 1.62 1.02
Notes
This table shows the results for the regression equations (7.1) and (7.2). The table reports cumulative
abnormal returns separately for transactions that took place before and after 1998. To calculate abnor-
mal returns we relied on the aggregated coefficient method which we applied to the estimation period
of 150 days prior to the 41 days event window. The third column presents t-statistics for the null
hypothesis that the difference between cumulative abnormal returns before and after 1998 equals zero.
*, **, *** denote results are significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively.
The results show that the larger the share of the acquired capital, the higher the
wealth effect enjoyed by shareholders of target banks. The results are statistically
significant at least at the 10 per cent confidence level for the event windows [5, 5],
[2, 2], [1, 1], [5, 0], [2, 0], [0, 0] and insignificant for the other event
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windows. This finding confirms the expectation that the benefits of foreign own-
ership can only materialize when a foreign bank has full control over an acquired
institution. Very large banks, on the other hand, can be very difficult to restruc-
ture and thus we can anticipate smaller wealth enhancements for large institu-
tions. As can be observed from the findings in Table 7.6, the size of a target bank,
measured by its market capitalization, is negatively related to market valuation of
the deal, confirming this prediction.
7.6 Conclusions
In 1998, the regulation of financial markets in Poland was liberalized allowing
foreign banks to enter without any restrictions. In this paper, we investigate the
stock market valuation of foreign acquisitions of Polish banks between 1996 and
2002. In our study, the focus lies not only on the reaction of target bank stocks,
but we also measure abnormal returns for the non-participating banks. The novel
aspect of this study is the focus on the reaction of the remaining domestic banks
to foreign acquisitions of their peers.
Our results as shown in Figure 7.3 indicate that foreign acquisitions created
wealth for participating banks in the short-run. The shareholders of target banks
experienced an almost 4 per cent increase in the stock value during 41 days sur-
rounding the announcement date. It is noteworthy that deals where large shares
had been transferred into foreign control exhibited significantly higher abnormal
returns. The long-term effects were also positive albeit not significant. Thus, the
shareholders of target banks anticipated that foreign owners would render
acquired banks more profitable, confirming the hypothesis that foreign bank
ownership in transition countries adds value. This finding is in line with the
results produced by numerous studies employing other methodologies
Table 7.5 Estimation results on cumulative abnormal returns (201 days event window)
CAR in % J1 SD in % Positive Negative
Target banks
[100, 100] 2.30 0.81 39.65 22 26
Other banks
[100, 100] 2.82 0.95 19.38 23 28
Remaining domestic banks
[100, 100] 1.60 1.15 26.37 20 21
Notes
This table shows the results of an event study analysing the reaction of forty-eight Polish banks to
being acquired by foreign investors. Three banks were excluded from the analysis because their stocks
were not listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange 351 days prior to the event day. Additionally, the reac-
tion of other banks and the remaining domestic banks is reported. The table reports cumulative abnor-
mal returns, J1 statistics, SD of returns, and the number of positive and negative abnormal returns. To
calculate abnormal returns we relied on the aggregated coefficient method which we applied to the
estimation period of 150 days prior to the 201 days event window.
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(Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Claessens et al. (2001), Grigorian and Manole
(2002), Isik and Hassan (2002), Hasan and Marton (2003)).
When foreign acquisitions were announced, the shares of non-participating
banks also experienced positive wealth effects in the short-run. The effect was
much higher for the non-participating domestic banks, indicating that their share-
holders anticipated foreign acquisition of the remaining domestic institutions.
This could also explain why there was a significant price increase for the
participating banks prior to announcements.
Notes
1 As of April 2004, there were 14 bank stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. For
comparison, 3 and 10 bank stocks were listed on the stock exchanges in Prague and
Budapest, respectively.
2 Interestingly, the efficiency literature on developed countries gives the opposite results.
Foreign banks that enter already developed banking markets perform worse than their
domestic counterparts due to additional costs of overcoming informational asymmetries.
3 All transactions are included when a Polish bank was acquired by foreign investors,
regardless of transaction volume. We cannot compare the results of foreign acquisitions
with domestic ones, because only one listed bank was acquired by a domestic investor:
Bank Rozwoju Eksportu SA tookover Polski Bank Rozwoju SA in 1998.
4 Beitel et al. (2004) and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) analyse M&As of banks in
Europe and observe an average transaction value of US$3.3 and 1.61 billions, respec-
tively. However, they only include transactions that exceed US$100 millions and when
a change in control of the target took place. If we exclude from our sample deals that lie
below the threshold of US$100 millions, the average transaction value rises from about
US$160 to 390 millions.
5 We tried a number of longer estimation windows as well. The results do not change sub-
stantially. However, the fit of the model is better when shorter estimation windows are used.
6 The only Polish listed bank that is still domestically owned is Bank Ochrony Srodowiska
SA. The bank is controlled by the National Fund for Environmental Protection and




























Target banks Other banks Remaining domestic banks
Figure 7.2 Cumulative abnormal returns for target and other banks (41 days event window).
Ballin-07.qxd  7/2/06  10:19 PM  Page 93 $ 
+ + 
$ 
regional environmental funds, but even it has a foreign investor, Sweden’s
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB, which bought 32.1 per cent of bank’s shares in
2000.
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Of the numerous technical changes in banking, two stand out as having a large
impact on operating costs. These are the expanded use of automatic teller
machines (ATMs) to supplement and replace expensive branch offices in deliver-
ing an important subset of depositor services and the concurrent substitution of
lower cost electronic payments for paper-based transactions. Both of these newer
banking technologies intensively use computers and telecommunication facilities
and have benefited from cost reductions and efficiency improvements in these
important inputs. Our purpose is to quantify the overall effect these newer bank-
ing technologies in service delivery and payment method have had on banking
costs. We also illustrate the portion of the overall cost change attributed to
expanded ATM use versus the shift to electronic payments. This is implemented
using a statistical model relating operating costs to certain physical characteris-
tics of service delivery and payment levels and mix for Spanish savings and
commercial banks over 1992–2000.
The usual approach for identifying cost savings from technical change in
banking has been to specify a time-specific indicator variable or, less often, tie
technical change to the use of certain inputs (e.g. less labor and more capital). Our
approach is quite different. Instead of relying on a time dummy or presuming that
technical advances are embodied in or augment the use of certain inputs, we
relate operating expenses to five characteristics of banking service output that
reflect known differences in cost. As the service mix shifts to these lower cost
characteristics, unit operating expenses should fall and reflect the savings associ-
ated with the spread of new technology within the industry. By specifying five
output characteristics associated with technical change we are able to not only
provide an overall estimate of the cost savings from new technology versus
scale effects, but also show more clearly how these various components have
contributed to this change.
In what follows, Section 8.2 provides background on how service delivery
methods and use of different payment instruments have changed over the past
8 Electronic payments and
ATMs
Changing technology and cost
efficiency in banking
Santiago Carbó Valverde, David B. Humphrey
and Rafael Lopez del Paso
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decade in eleven Euro-using countries (which include Spain) plus the United
Kingdom. Our cost model is specified in Section 8.3. Although we rely on a
composite cost function for our analysis (Pulley and Braunstein, 1992; Pulley and
Humphrey, 1993), we demonstrate the robustness of our results by specifying and
estimating the more commonly used translog and Fourier cost models.
Section 8.4 presents and discusses our estimates of the cost effect of new
technology for both savings and commercial banks in Spain. We find that banks
have apparently saved 37 percent in unit (or average) operating cost between 1992
and 2000 which translates into 4.5 billion euros for the banking system as a
whole. As larger institutions have progressed further in shifting from branch
offices to ATMs for dispensing cash and also process higher volumes of lower
cost electronic payments, these institutions have benefited the most from the
reduction in unit operating expenses. Section 8.5 notes our translog and Fourier
cost function results, illustrating the robustness of our composite cost model,
while Section 8.6 summarizes our main conclusions. Since the same service
delivery and payment trends shown to have benefited Spain are observed for
other European countries, it is likely that similar gains may have occurred in these
countries as well.
8.2 Changes in service delivery and payment mix
All European countries (including Spain) deliver banking services using ATMs as
well as branch offices and have provided electronic as well as paper-based pay-
ment methods. While the mix of these delivery and payment methods often differs
markedly among countries, all have consistently expanded the supply of ATMs
relative to branches and have increased the share of non-cash transactions which
are electronic. For the services they deliver, ATMs are considerably cheaper than
branches and an electronic payment only costs about one-third to one-half as
much as a paper-based transaction. Thus it is not surprising to find that the shift
to ATMs and electronic payments appears to be associated with significant
reductions in operating cost as a percent of bank asset value during the 1990s.
Indeed, Table 8.1 suggests that this has been the case for eleven Euro-using
countries in Europe plus the United Kingdom.1
ATMs and branch offices generate labor and capital costs associated with
service delivery or front office expenses. The rapid expansion of ATMs in Europe
indicates that, for the range of services provided (cash withdrawal, account trans-
fer, balance inquiry), ATMs have replaced the traditional banking office for a
large and growing segment of depositors. Evidence of this shift can be seen in
Table 8.1 (row 1) which shows that the ratio of ATMs to branch offices rose by
110 percent during the 1990s.2 While the number of branch offices used to deliver
banking services can differ considerably across countries, this primarily reflects
differences in the average size of banking offices in a country.3 Regardless of the
number of branches or their average size, the number of bank employees per
10,000 inhabitants fell in all but Germany and the United Kingdom during the
Electronic payments and ATMs 97
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1990s, suggest that ATM use has conserved on bank labor costs as well as capi-
tal.4 Another major contributor to banking costs is associated with the number and
mix of payment transactions. Payments have to be processed and debited/credited
to accounts and so generate the vast majority of back office capital (including
computer) and labor expenses. As seen in Table 8.1 (row 2), the number of non-
cash (check, giro, card) transactions per person (POP) per year has risen from 97
in 1992 to 136 in 2000, a 40 percent increase.5 Importantly, it is also seen that the
share of non-cash transactions that are electronic, and thus cheaper to process, has
also risen by 41 percent so that by 2000 fully 79 percent of all non-cash transac-
tions were electronic. Electronic debit card or giro payments for point-of-sale
transactions, consumer bill payments, and employee disbursement are typically
cheaper than their paper-based alternatives (a check or paper giro transaction). For
these types of transactions survey information and cost estimates suggest that an
electronic payment costs only one-third to one-half as much as a comparable
paper-based transaction (Flatraaker and Robinson, 1995; Wells, 1996; Humphrey
et al., 2001; Humphrey et al., 2003).6 The large expansion of ATMs relative to
branch offices combined with the shift to electronic payments would be expected
to lower bank unit operating costs. As shown in the fourth row of Table 8.1, this
seems to be the case. Operating costs as a percent of asset value fell by 21 percent
over 1992–2000 for the eleven Euro-using countries plus the United Kingdom.7
For Spain, the operating cost ratio reduction has been 37 percent.8 In what follows,
we attempt to determine the effect on operating cost of the shift to electronic
payments and ATM use in Spain. This requires a statistical analysis which relates
savings and commercial bank operating costs to bank-specific information on
ATMs, branch offices, labor, and capital input prices, as well as national informa-
tion on the transaction volume of different types of payment instruments.
8.3 Using output characteristics to determine 
cost effects of technical change and scale
Costs in banking are primarily incurred by providing payment processing, deposit
safekeeping, cash access, and loan initiation and monitoring services through
98 Carbó Valverde, Humphrey and Lopez del Paso
Table 8.1 Service delivery, payment, and operating cost in Euroland  UK (1992–1999)
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 %
change
ATM/branch office 0.62 0.76 0.93 1.12 1.30 110
Non-cash/POP 97 105 112 125 136 40
Ele/non-cash 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.75 0.79 41
OC/TA 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 21
Spain OC/TA 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.022 0.019 37
Sources: OECD, European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of Spain, and own calculations.
Note
Ele Electronic payments; POP per person.
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a geographically diversified set of general and specialized branch offices as well
as ATMs. While deposit safekeeping and loan services are specific to branch
offices, ATMs substitute with branches for cash withdrawal, balance inquiry, and
account transfer services. Some initial payment processing may occur at branch
offices but most is incurred in separate dedicated facilities associated with the
bank or outsourced to non-bank processors.9 All of these services involve labor,
physical capital, and materials operating expenses and our purpose is to determine
statistically the association of operating costs to the processing of check, giro, and
card payment transactions as well as the use of ATMs and branch offices. Interest
rates on deposits and loans do not really affect the production of payment services
and ATMs but can influence the tradeoff between the use of branch offices to
collect (lower cost) deposit funds and sell/service mutual funds relative to (more
expensive) interbank purchased monies over the interest rate cycle. For Spain, this
effect is minor: the aggregate ratio of produced deposits plus mutual funds to
assets was very stable over 1992–2000 consistent with little substitution.
The common approach taken in academic studies regarding technical change
does not directly measure the actual flow of payment or other banking services as
we try to do here. Rather, it is assumed that this service flow is proportional to the
value of the stock of bank deposits, securities, and loans in the balance sheet.
Inferences on how costs may vary from changing technology and scale of opera-
tion are obtained by relating total operating and interest expenses across banks
and over time to the value of their deposits, loans, and security holdings (or some
other combination of balance sheet positions). As information does not normally
exist regarding the adoption of specific technical and other cost-saving innova-
tions in banking, the default is to assume that unknown technical change occurs
linearly (or quadratically) with the passage of time and/or is somehow associated
with (embodied in) the value of particular inputs.
Our approach directly relates bank operating (not interest) costs to measurable
physical characteristics of banking output associated with service delivery and
payment processing levels and mix.10 This achieves two goals. First, the number
of bank branches (BR) and ATMs – but not necessarily their mix – is directly
associated with the size of a bank and its capital and materials operating cost as
is the number – but not necessarily the mix – of transactions being processed on
behalf of bank customers. When mix is constant and technology is not improved,
levels of these activities reflect bank size and hence scale economies.11 Second,
changes in the mix of ATMs to branches or in the mix of electronic to paper-based
transactions over time, along with improvements in their associated technology,
represent an alternative and more specific way to identify the cost effect of
technical change in banking.12
8.3.1 A composite cost function
Our data consist of an unbalanced panel of ninety-three commercial and savings
banks over 1992–2000 in Spain observed at six-month intervals (giving 1,541
observations).13 Bank-specific information on operating cost, numbers of ATMs,
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branch offices, and labor and capital input prices were combined with aggregate
(national) data on the number of check, giro, and card payments and used in a
non-linear, functionally separable, composite cost function.14 The composite
model can approximate better the scope-type joint cost effects that are associated
with altering how banking services are delivered and how payments are
processed. This is because the level of banking output in a composite function is
not in logs, although input prices are. By keeping output in absolutes, we specify
a direct relationship between output and operating costs that is likely more accu-
rate – for prediction purposes when one or more outputs are small – than if the
log of output is related to the log of operating cost.15 As well, by specifying the
log of input prices, it is possible to impose the theoretical condition of linear
homogeneity in input prices in estimation.16
The composite cost function (8.1), in its output/input price separable quadratic
form, is estimated jointly with n1 cost share equations. The Box-Cox (1964)
transformation is represented by a superscripted parameter in parenthesis ()
where
(8.1)
where OC is the total operating expenses, composed of labor, capital, and
materials costs;17 Qi, j i, j are the five output characteristics composed of two
service delivery alternatives – ATM and BR – along with three payment pro-
cessing alternatives – the number of checks (CHECK), giro payments (GIRO),
and debit and credit card transactions (CARD).18 Service delivery data are avail-
able by bank but payment transactions data are not (so data for all banks are used
instead). In (8.1), Q  Q  1; Pk,m k, m are the two input prices referring to the
average labor cost per employee and an approximation to the price of physical
capital and materials represented by capital depreciation expenditures divided
by the value of physical capital; and Sk is the cost shares for the labor input (the
capital/materials input share is deleted to avoid singularity).
It is expected that operating costs not directly associated with the mode of
service delivery or type of payment will be represented in the intercept term.
The composite function is non-linear and is estimated iteratively. Following
Pulley and Braunstein (1992), let D  0 and GM  1 be the geometric mean of
 Sk  k  
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   
2
k1



































 OC()  f ()(Q, ln  P)
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operating cost OC, then the separable quadratic form of the composite model is
estimated from the pseudo model (8.2):19
(8.2)
8.3.2 Alternative translog and Fourier cost functions
To illustrate the robustness of our results, we also estimate translog and Fourier
cost functions. A translog function may generate biased results, compared to the
composite form, when levels of some outputs are small and outputs are speci-
fied in logs. Even so, as these two additional functions are often used in cost
analyses, it is useful to compare their results with those from our composite
form.
The translog cost function (8.3) is estimated jointly with n1 cost share
equations:
(8.3)
where the variables have been defined.
The Fourier form we use adds sin and cos terms to the translog cost function.
As our main concern is to allow for greater flexibility in the local identification
of output effects on operating costs, the sin and cos terms are applied to the out-
put (Q) measure. The Fourier form is a globally flexible approximation since the
respective sin and cos terms are mutually orthogonal over the [0, 2] interval.
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The Fourier function (8.4) is estimated jointly with the cost shares:
(8.4)
The new terms are ln Q*  ln Q · YQ + ZQ, YQ  (0.8 · 2)/(max ln Q  min
ln Q ), ZQ  0.2  min ln Q · YQ, and   3.141593. . . , so that ln Q* is essentially
expressed in radians.20
8.4 Cost effects from changes in service delivery and
payment levels and mix
8.4.1 Composite function results
Predicted unit operating cost from the composite function for ninety-three
savings and commercial banks over 1992–2000 is shown in Figure 8.1.21 While
the levels and mix of ATMs, branch offices, and check, giro, and card payment
volumes are allowed to vary, input prices are held constant at their mean values.
As  in the composite form is 0.20, the estimated model is closer to a specification
which includes the log of output as well as input prices (when   0.0) than it is
to a specification with output in absolutes and prices in logs (when   1.0).22
Even so, the estimated model is significantly different from either of these
alternatives since  is significantly different from zero or one.23
The curve fitted to the scattergram in Figure 8.1 is a cubic spline and illustrates
how unit operating cost generally varies by bank asset size over time.24 This fig-
ure combines both technical change (time-series) and scale (cross-section) effects
associated with front office service delivery and back office payment processing
cost changes. The distinction between technical change (a shift in the unit oper-
ating cost curve between years) and scale effects (moving along a unit operating
cost curve for a single year) is illustrated in Figure 8.2. Here separate predicted
unit operating cost curves are shown for 1992, 1996, and 2000. Scale economies
exist since unit cost falls as (the log of) asset size increases on the X-axis. As
well, the operating cost curves shift down over time showing that unit operating
 Sk  k  
2
m1
k, m ln Pm  
5
i1
i, k ln Qi
  nnn  sin(ln Q
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n  ln Q
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expenses are falling as technical change progresses with the substitution of ATMs
for branch offices, the replacement of checks (and cash) with giro and card elec-
tronic payments, and technological improvements associated with all five of these
output characteristics.
Looking at all banks together where unit operating cost reflects the ratio of the
sum of predicted operating expense across all banks divided by the sum of
observed asset values, this aggregate ratio is 0.033, 0.023, and 0.018, respectively,
for 1992, 1996, and 2000 in Figure 8.2 indicating a predicted 45 percent reduction.25
This is very similar to the observed ratios in Table 8.1 for Spain (0.030, 0.024,
Electronic payments and ATMs 103








Figure 8.1 Predicted unit operating cost by log of asset value: 1992–2000 in euros
(composite function – input prices held constant at the mean value).











Figure 8.2 Predicted unit operating cost by log of asset value: three separate years – 1992,
1996, 2000 in euros (composite function – input prices held constant at their
mean value).
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and 0.019) which indicated that for the Spanish banking system as a whole, unit
operating cost has fallen by 37 percent over 1992–2000.26 Since total bank
operating cost in 1992 was 12.1 billion euros, this suggests that operating
expenses would have been 4.5 billion euros (0.37 times 12.1 billion euros) higher
in 2000 than they were if there were no technical change or scale effects to reduce
operating costs from their ratio to assets in 1992. This savings equals 0.7 percent
of GDP in 2000 and is equivalent to having unit operating cost at banks fall by
4 percent a year due to changes in service delivery and payment costs.27
8.4.2 Service delivery costs: ATMs and branch offices
Predicted service delivery costs represent operating expenses associated with
installed ATMs and branch offices, holding check, giro, and card payment volumes
and input prices constant at their mean values. These predicted delivery expenses,
expressed as a ratio to total assets for each bank, fell by 45 percent between 1992
and 2000.28 Internal estimates from a confidential industry source indicate that an
additional ATM costs around 27,500 euros whereas an additional branch costs
112,500 euros. In our sample, the number of ATMs expanded by 142 percent (rising
from 17,300 in 1992 to 41,800 in 2000) while the number of branch offices grew
by 22 percent (expanding from 28,200 to 34,300). Thus most of the reduction in the
service delivery cost to asset ratio is due to using more ATMs relative to branches.
The extent to which this cost ratio falls as the ratio of ATMs to branch offices
rises is shown in Figure 8.3. The average ATM/branch ratio rose from 0.6 in 1992
to 1.2 in 2000. Reference to Figure 8.3 indicates that unit costs may continue to
fall up to the point where the ATM/branch ratio approaches 2.0. Thus there seems
to be additional scope for further operating cost to asset ratio reductions with a
higher ratio of ATMs to branch offices in the future.
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Figure 8.3 Predicted delivery cost to asset ratio by ATM/branch ratio: 1992–2000
(composite function – input prices and all payment volumes held constant at
their mean values).
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The relative importance of changes in delivery costs versus payment expenses
over 1992–2000 can be illustrated by looking at the level of operating cost, rather
than its ratio to assets. If only ATMs and branch offices had changed from 1992
going forward to 2000 (i.e. holding payment transactions and input prices at their
1992 levels), then the rise in predicted operating cost from delivery expenses
alone is 2.7 billion euros. However, doing the same for payment transactions (i.e.
holding ATMs, branches, and input prices at their 1992 levels), results in a fall
in predicted operating cost from payment activities alone of 1.9 billion euros.
Finally, letting only input prices change after 1992 raises operating costs by 2.4
billion euros.29 Overall, this suggests that the observed rise in total operating
expenses was pretty much equally driven by the rise in input prices (where the aver-
age price of labor rose by 40 percent) as it was from the expansion of ATMs and
branch offices. Although the volume of our three payment instruments rose by
64 percent, the joint effect of payment scale economies and the shift to cheaper
electronic payments seemingly led to an absolute reduction in total payment costs.30
8.4.3 Processing costs: check, giro, and card transactions
Predicted payment processing costs represent operating expenses associated with the
level and composition of check, giro, and card transactions, holding ATMs, branch
offices, and input prices constant at their mean values. These predicted payment
costs, divided by the total number of check, giro, and card transactions made
each year, give unit payment costs that fall both over time (top of Figure 8.4) and by
total payment volume (bottom of Figure 8.4). Predicted unit payment cost fell by
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Figure 8.4 Predicted unit payment costs by year: 1992–2000 in euros (composite
function – input prices, ATMs, and branch offices held constant at their mean
values) and predicted unit payment costs by payment volume (composite
function – same variables held constant).








Number of payment transactions 
Ballin-08.qxd  13/12/05  12:50 PM  Page 105 $ 
+ + 
$ 
48 percent between 1992 and 2000.31 Not all payment costs are falling. Indeed, the
reduction in unit payment expense seen in Figure 8.4 is composed of rising check
average costs and falling giro and card average costs over time. These changes are
seen in Figure 8.5 where the level of predicted unit cost for check, giro, and card
transactions have been “normalized” at their mean to reflect internal industry esti-
mates of the level of average cost for each of these payment instruments. As a result,
and only in this case, both the levels and the changes shown in Figure 8.5 are likely
good approximations to cost accounting values – if such values existed – for these
three payment instruments. According to confidential industry sources, the average
cost of a check is 0.275 euros, a giro transaction is 0.0775 euros, and a card payment
is 0.075 euros. These values were used to adjust or normalize the level of the
curves shown in Figure 8.5 and suggest that an electronic giro (card) payment costs
28 percent (27 percent) as much as a check. This corresponds to limited survey infor-
mation available for other countries (Humphrey et al., 2003) and to more detailed
cost information available for Norway (Gresvik and Øwre, 2002).
Over 1992–2000, giro and card payments expanded by 85 percent and 81 percent,
respectively, while checks fell by 17 percent. As a result, the share of checks in
all non-cash payment transactions fell from 0.19 in 1992 to only 0.10 in 2000.
Giro transactions accounted for a 0.56 share in 2000 while cards were 0.34. Scale
economies in the processing of electronic giro and debit card payments help
explain the reduction in the average per transaction payment expenses in
Figures 8.4 and 8.5 while the scale benefit works in reverse (to offset some of this
benefit) as the number of checks processed falls.
8.5 Translog and Fourier function results
The operating cost results using the easier to estimate translog model (8.3) are
very close to those presented earlier for the composite cost function. Indeed,
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Figure 8.5 Approximate check, card, and giro average cost in euros: per transaction over
1992–2000.
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Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for the composite form – showing predicted unit operating
cost over 1992–2000 by bank asset size and for three years separately – are so
close to those using the translog that it is difficult to tell them apart.
Consequently, the predicted change in the operating cost to asset ratio between
1992 and 2000 was 45 percent for the composite form and 37 percent with
the translog. Changes in predicted unit delivery and payment expenses over
1992–2000 were also within a few percentage points of each other.32
The Fourier cost model (8.4) adds sin and cos terms for the five output char-
acteristics to the standard translog form. The purpose is to capture more than just
the quadratic nonlinearity which would be captured with the translog specifica-
tion. Since bank-specific data are available for ATM and branch offices in our
panel data set, so that for these two output characteristics we have both cross-
section and time-series variation, the Fourier form may improve the fit compared
to the translog form. However, no country has publicly available bank-specific
data on the volumes of check, giro, and card transactions. Thus our payment data
have no cross-section variation, only time-series variation at the national level. As
payment volumes experience low variance over time, it turns out that the qua-
dratic specification in the translog portion of the Fourier form is sufficient to
locally identify all of the nonlinearity in these data. For this reason, all the para-
meters specified in the full Fourier model in (8.4) could not be estimated and the
cos and sin terms in the final estimated model only refer to two (ATMs and
branch offices) rather than the full five output characteristics.33
The main differences in our results for the Fourier form, compared to the
composite, are for the smallest and largest banks, not for the average bank. The
simplest way to see this is to compare Figure 8.6, which illustrates predicted unit
operating cost for 1992, 1996, and 2000 using the Fourier form, with Figure 8.2,
which shows the same three cost curves for the composite function. While the
middle segments of these two figures which reflect the average bank are largely
congruent, the large operating cost scale economies for the smallest banks shown
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Figure 8.6 Predicted unit operating cost by log of asset value: three separate years – 1992, 1996,
2000 in euros (Fourier function – input prices held constant at their mean values).
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for the composite (or translog) form are considerably smaller when the Fourier
form is used. As well, the slight scale diseconomies evident for the largest banks
in 1992 with the composite (or translog) form are shown as constant unit cost
with the Fourier form in that year. Even so, these differences have little effect
on the predicted changes in unit operating cost between 1992 and 2000.
With the composite form, the change in the predicted operating cost to asset ratio
was 45 percent while with the Fourier model it was 46 percent, with similarly
close correspondence for changes in unit delivery and payment costs. In sum, the
results presented here for the composite function seem to be robust to the use of
alternative cost function forms.
8.6 Summary and conclusions
Two common trends among banking systems in developed countries have had a
large impact on operating cost, and hence on service level and price, to users. One
trend has been the expansion of lower cost and more convenient ATMs, relative
to branch offices, to deliver cash, account transfer, and balance inquiry services
to depositors. A second trend has been the ongoing replacement of paper-based
payment instruments (checks and paper giro payments) with lower cost electronic
alternatives (debit cards and electronic giro payments). Indeed, these five banking
output characteristics related to service delivery and payment (and deposit
account) processing make up the bulk of bank operating costs.34
The effect on cost from these five activities incorporates both changing technology
and scale influences. A statistical model based on these output characteristics
relates operating cost to service delivery and payment levels and mix to determine
how changes in these characteristics have affected operating costs at Spanish savings
and commercial banks over 1992–2000. We find that the average Spanish bank
has apparently saved 37 percent in unit (or average) operating cost between 1992
and 2000, or about 4.5 billion euros for the banking system as a whole (0.7 percent
of GDP in 2000). As larger institutions have progressed further in shifting from
branch offices to ATMs for dispensing cash and also process higher volumes of
lower cost electronic payments, these institutions have benefited the most from
the associated reduction in unit operating expenses. In determining the average
effect on operating cost from changes in service delivery methods and the level
and mix of payment volumes, it does not matter much whether a composite,
translog, or Fourier cost model is used (although for very small and very large
banks there are some differences).
With respect to the future, it appears that if ATMs were expanded further
(relative to branch offices) additional operating cost could be saved. At present,
the ATM/branch ratio is 1.2 but costs appear to continue to fall for institutions
with ratios up to around 2.0. It is also evident that additional operating expense
could be saved with a further shift to electronic payments since they generally
only cost one-third to one-half as much as its paper-based non-cash alternative. It
would not be surprising if similar savings in operating cost were found in other
European countries (or even the United States) as these countries have often
experienced similar changes in service delivery and payment composition.
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8A.1 Appendix: parameter estimates for 
the composite cost function
Number of observations  1541. Log likelihood  1552.14. Standard Errors
computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix (Robust-White). Durbin-
Watson  1.953. Likelihood ratio tests of setting the eleven parameters associated
with ATM and branch variables, or the fifteen parameters associated with check,
giro, and card payment transactions, equal to zero were 2ln   3873 and 25.7,
respectively. The ATM and branch variables varied by bank and over time and were
significant at the 0.01 level while the three payment transaction variables were sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level. Payment data by bank are not available in any country so
these data only vary over time, which accounts for their lower significance level.
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Notes
1 All ratios in Table 8.1 treat the twelve countries as if they were a single entity (i.e. they
are the sum of the numerator divided by the sum of the denominator). To make the
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value data in the table comparable across countries, the OECD translated domestic
currency values into euros using exchange rates so that changes over time here can
differ from national data in domestic currency units. Due to insufficient data, Greece –
a more recent Euro-using country – could not be included.
2 During this period, the number of branch offices per 10,000 inhabitants in different
Euro-using countries and the United Kingdom either grew slowly or fell. Since any
reduction in the number of banking offices was slight, the primary reason for the rise
in the ATM/branch ratio was the rapid rise in ATMs.
3 For example, Spain provides 9 to 10 offices per 10,000 inhabitants while Germany,
France, Italy, and Portugal provide only 4 to 5. The offset to providing many offices is
that there were only around 6 workers per banking office in Spain, which is less than
half the 12 to 13 workers per office in Portugal and Italy and about a third as many
workers in France (15) or Germany (18).
4 The reduction in workers per 10,000 of population over 1992–2000 was around 5 percent
for Spain, Italy, and Portugal with 12 percent for France, and 39 percent for Finland.
5 While the trend is upward, the levels of non-cash use across countries can be quite
different. The total number of non-cash transactions per person ranges at the lower end
from 42 to 84 payments a year for Italy, Spain, and Portugal while at the higher end it
is 156–178 annually for the United Kingdom Finland, Germany, and France.
6 This is largely due to the fact that electronic payments experience greater scale
economies than paper-based transactions (since the fixed cost component is much
more important than the variable one). In addition, advances in computer and
telecommunications technology have lowered the absolute cost of processing electronic
payments at all scales of operation.
7 Specifically, the reductions were 17 percent for Italy, 19 percent for Germany, 38 percent
for the United Kingdom and 42 percent for Finland. Reductions close to 25 percent were
experienced for France and Portugal.
8 OECD data would show a smaller change in this ratio due to the variation in the
peseta/ecu exchange rate used to translate earlier data in domestic currency units into
euros and because of coverage differences (i.e. OECD data includes credit co-operatives,
leasing companies, and other credit institutions). Our values in pesetas prior to the
adoption of the euro were translated into euros using the fixed conversion rate of
1.0 euro  Pta 166.386 and so are unbiased from changes in exchange rates before the
adoption of the euro.
9 The initial contact for consumer and some business loans typically involves a
customer’s local branch office but further processing of loan documents, loan origina-
tion, and monitoring services are often handled by larger and more specialized
branches or dedicated loan production offices in centralized locations in larger cities.
10 The service delivery and payment functions are largely separable. The primary
interaction would be consumers and businesses depositing (a declining number of)
checks at a BR and, on a one-time basis, filling out documents to pay recurring bills
by electronic giro or applying for a debit/credit card. After establishing a giro account,
bill payments occur automatically, as do all card payments, without branch or ATM
intervention unless problems arise.
11 The number of branch offices is a good proxy for the stock of loans outstanding,
deposits raised, or value of total assets as the R2s here all range from 0.78 to 0.79.
12 To circumvent the impossibility of separating technical change from scale effects with
only time-series data, it has been common practice to use panel data so that the cross-
section component identifies scale while the time-series component identifies technical
change. Note that in addition to cross-section and time-series components in our panel
data set, we use differences in level and mix to assist in the decomposition between
technical change and scale.
13 The panel includes all savings banks, all but the very smallest commercial banks
(which were excluded due mostly to missing ATM data), but no co-operative banks
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(who also had missing data). This accounts for 77 percent (80 percent) of all assets
(operating cost) in the Spanish banking system in 1992 and 92 percent (90 percent) in
2000. The excluded co-operative banks only account for five percentage points of the
banking system’s operating costs while the excluded commercial banks account for the
remaining five percentage points in 2000.
14 Use of a balanced panel by (a) backward aggregation of merging institutions before
they actually merge or (b) including only acquiring banks could have biased our
results. With (a), combining data on banks before they merge and realize possibly
lower costs associated with their larger post-merger size would tend to understate scale
benefits in pre-merger years. With (b), the sample would exclude acquired banks
before they merged and distort measured cost/payment volume relationships over time.
For these reasons we use an unbalanced panel.
15 As illustrated in Pulley and Braunstein (1992), this can occur when one or more
outputs are less than 5–10 percent of total output. This occurs for ATMs (as a percent
of ATMs plus branches) for some banks early in our sample and for checks (as a per-
cent of check, giro, and card transactions) for some later years.
16 A similar function (Constant Elasticity of Substitution, CES-quadratic) was used by Röller
(1990) to determine scope effects of local and long-distance telephone costs for the Bell
System while Pulley and Humphrey (1993) used a composite form to assess the cost effects
of separating risky loan assets from deposit liabilities into two separate banks, funding the
former with uninsured CDs (certificates of deposit) and investing the latter in safe assets.
17 OC is in nominal terms. The specification of bank-specific input prices accounts
for inflation effects on costs more accurately than use of standard inflation indicators
(e.g. cost-of-living index or GDP deflator).
18 Giro transfers are typically electronic in Spain and debit cards accounted for about
55 per cent of all card transactions (a share that only rises about 1 percentage point a year).
19 Pulley and Braunstein (1992) note that it is generally not feasible to estimate both 0
and 0 intercepts. As we are more interested in output than input prices, and on the
basis of fit, we set 0  0 and retain 0 in estimation.
20 See Mitchell and Onvural (1996) and Berger and Mester (1997). Our Fourier specifi-
cation follows Berger and Mester.
21 Unit operating cost is the ratio of operating cost to asset value and is a measure of aver-
age operating cost.
22 The estimated parameters of the composite function underlying this figure are
presented in an Appendix. Likelihood ratio tests of setting the eleven parameters asso-
ciated with ATM and branch variables, or the fifteen parameters associated with check,
giro, and card payment transactions, equal to zero were 2 ln   3873 and 25.7,
respectively. The ATM and branch variables varied by bank and over time and were
significant at the 0.01 level while the three payment transaction variables were signif-
icant at the 0.05 level. Payment data by bank are not available in any country so these
data only vary over time, which accounts for their lower significance level.
23 For more on these two alternative specifications which depend on the value of , see
Pulley and Braunstein (1992) or Pulley and Humphrey (1993).
24 Bank size on the X-axis is indicated by the natural log of asset value. Taking the log
improves comparability among the numerous smaller and less numerous very large
banks. As ATMs and the production functions for processing payments are essentially
identical across types of financial institutions, use of a single cost function covering
both savings and commercial banks is justified. This accords well with our purpose of
illustrating the efficiency gains from the shift to ATMs and electronic payments for the
entire banking sector (rather than a subset of the industry).
25 The aggregate ratio gives a larger weight to larger banks that typically have lower unit
operating cost.
26 If some of the decline in the operating cost/asset ratio is due to banks substituting
purchased funds (which generate interest costs) for produced deposits or servicing 
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off-balance sheet mutual funds (which generate operating expenses), then we should
see a reduction in the ratio of produced deposits (demand, savings, and time deposits)
plus mutual funds to assets over 1992–2000. As this ratio rises slightly from 78.0 percent
in 1992 to 79.5 percent in 2000, the reduction in the operating cost/asset ratio is attributed
to cost effects.
27 The 12.1 billion euro figure is the sum of operating cost for all banks in Spain in 1992
reported to the Bank of Spain. GDP in 1992 was 609.3 billion euros.
28 If the ratio of delivery expenses to asset value were observed in the raw data (as total
operating costs are), this ratio would be similar to a measure of average delivery cost
per euro of assets. However, as noted by Baumol et al. (1982), in a multiproduct cost
function where output characteristics are not fully functionally separable, it is not pos-
sible to determine accurately the level of average cost. This is because the predicted
value of delivery expenses, for example, will include the mean values of input prices
as well as check, giro, and card expenses. While this does not affect our ability to deter-
mine changes in delivery costs over 1992–2000, it does artificially raise the level of
predicted delivery expenses.
29 As these three operating cost categories are not fully functionally separable from one
another, they will not add up to the change in actual or predicted overall operating costs
over this period when two of the three cost categories are being successively held con-
stant at their level in 1992.
30 Although total observed operating expenses rose by 63 percent, total assets expanded
by 161 percent (so the ratio of operating cost to assets fell by 37 percent).
31 Again, the predicted unit cost here is not a standard measure of average cost. In addi-
tion to the predicted cost of three payment instruments, the mean cost of ATMs, branch
offices, and input prices are also included. This raises the level but does not affect the
predicted changes over 1992–2000.
32 The strong correspondence between the translog and composite results is not unex-
pected since  in the composite form is 0.20, indicating that this estimated model is
closer to a translog specification which includes the log of output as well as input
prices (as would be the case if   0.0).
33 As the sin and cos terms for three output characteristics (check, giro, and card trans-
actions) could not be estimated, all of the single and double summations shown in (8.4)
are over two output characteristics (ATMs and branches), not five.
34 While banks also provide loan origination and monitoring services, asset liquidity
management with security holdings, and trust and safekeeping services, these are
performed using branch offices (an included variable) and the labor input compo-
nent is small relative to that associated with deposit service delivery and payment
activities.
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During the last two decades, financial innovation has evolved rapidly and banking
systems have experienced substantial changes in both their business and income
structure. The banking firm has become more complex and diversification, risk
management and higher participation in capital markets have happened to be
some of the main pillars of modern financial intermediation. Within this context,
it appears to be relevant to study how financial innovation has affected bank
strategies and, in particular, bank margins.1 There are three important factors that
should be taken into account in this analysis:
1 Regulation has determined, to a large extent, the importance of the impact of
financial innovation on bank margins. There are significant differences across
countries in terms of the activities that banks have been permitted to undertake.2
2 Changes in both bank production technologies and bank income structure are
strongly related and there are various strategies that result from combining
multiproduct technologies that may affect bank margins significantly. In this
context, Allen and Santomero (2001) suggest that empirical and theoretical
models should develop dynamic approaches, which explain both the need
and reality of financial innovation, since there has been a fundamental shift
in the nature of intermediation that affects competition and bank margins.
Moreover, the intertemporal behaviour of bank margins is expected to pose
important implications for aggregate risk on financial activities (intertemporal
rate smoothing vs. cross-sectional risk sharing hypotheses).
3 The framework of the analysis of bank margins should depart from
traditional models that only consider interest margins. There is a need to
incorporate a broader definition of bank margins, according to the evolution
of financial innovation. The seminal model of Ho and Saunders (1981) has
been the reference framework for most empirical analyses on the determi-
nants of bank margins. However, this model relies only on interest margins.
Lerner (1981) discussed the Ho–Saunders model and suggests that the insights
that arise from recognizing that a (multi-output) production function exists
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requires a more comprehensive analysis of bank margins. Several contributions
of the so-called ‘New Empirical Industrial Organization’ (NEIO) suggest that
there are potential estimation biases associated with the use of accounting
margins and, in particular, when using firm-level data and multi-output produc-
tion technologies (Bresnahan, 1989, p. 1013; Schmalensee, 1989, p. 961). In
this context, Shaffer (2004) indicates that price to marginal costs margins should
be employed in order to test bank conduct directly and to compare these with
the outcomes obtained using accounting margins. In particular, the use of the
Lerner index – defined as ‘(price-marginal costs)/price’ seems to be an
appropriate (direct) measure of margins and competitive behaviour.
This paper analyses the relationship between bank margins – using both account-
ing and NEIO margins – and changes in production technologies related to finan-
cial innovations in European banking during 1994–2001. The paper is divided into
five sections following this introduction. Section 9.2 offers some background by
reviewing the main changes in banks’ income structure in Europe. The theoretical
setting of the study is presented in Section 9.3, incorporating a multiproduct frame-
work. The results of previous empirical studies investigating the determinants of
bank margins are also presented in this section including the effects of specialization/
diversification patterns and related changes in intertemporal vs. cross-sectional risk
behaviour. Section 9.4 presents the methodology and data of an empirical analysis
on the determinants of traditional and non-traditional bank margins on a sample of
seven European countries: Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United
Kingdom and Sweden. A dynamic panel data approach is employed to account for
the endogeneity of bank margins. Additional empirical evidence is provided on the
effects of changes in bank margins on the intertemporal smoothing or cross-section
nature of risk in financial intermediation activities. Section 9.5 shows the main
results of the empirical exercise. The paper ends with a brief summary of the main
conclusions and policy implications in Section 9.6.
9.2 Financial innovation and income 
structure in Europe
Competitive pressures have led to an intense financial innovation process in
banking all over the world during the last two decades. First of all, the number of
competitors – not only within the banking sector but also from other financial
intermediaries – has enlarged considerably. As shown in Table 9.1 – which offers
aggregate information for 1997, 2000 and 2002 in the European Union (EU) – the
traditional intermediation activities (loans of credit institutions as a percentage of
GDP) are still growing rapidly. However, the assets of mutual funds and insurance
companies are growing at a faster pace. It should be noted, however, that
the so-called ‘broad banking’ regulatory environment has permitted banks to take
control of activities such as mutual and pension funds or insurance in many
European countries. At the same time, financial intermediaries have increased
their interaction with capital markets and non-financial sector investments.
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As a result of these trends, changes in financial intermediation activities have
also altered EU banks’ income structure significantly.3 As for traditional activities –
lending and deposit-taking – the economic and financial integration in the con-
text of a single monetary policy, together with financial liberalization, have
resulted in significantly lower average interest rates. As a consequence, interest
margins fell as a percentage of total assets. However, the increasing importance
of fees and other non-interest income has largely compensated the competitive
pressures on interest margins. As shown in Figure 9.1, interest margins still
account for more than 60 per cent of total income in 2002 although fees already
represented one-third of total European banks’ revenues. Specialization patterns
of banks will likely determine the scope of these changes in income structure. As
observed in Figure 9.1, while small local banks still remain specialized in tradi-
tional activities, diversification augments with size and, consequently, income
diversification increases too.
9.3 Bank margins and broad banking
9.3.1 A multi-output theoretical setting
The Ho–Saunders model relies on pure intermediation activities (deposits-
taking and lending). In order to show the impact of non-traditional activities – fee
income and market-based activities – a multi-product framework is employed.
The model is adopted from Allen (1988), who applied her analysis to two types
of loans. We modify this model to assume that bank portfolio is composed of
loans (L) and non-traditional assets (N) – including other earning assets different
from loans and other fee income activities – along with deposits (D).
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Interest margin Fees Other operating revenue Other income
Figure 9.1 EU Banks’ income structure as a percentage of total income (December 2002).
Source: European Central Bank (2000).
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In the Ho–Saunders model, the spread is the difference between lending and
deposits rates (rL  rD) that equals the provision of immediacy of liquidity
services (a  b). In our multi-product framework, banks have two alternatives:
(1) they may set prices on loans relative to deposits so that immediacy fees are bL
and a, respectively; (2) they may also set prices on non-traditional activities
relative to deposits rates so that non-traditional and immediacy fees are, respec-
tively, bN and a. Therefore, the interest margin will equal a  bL and the absolute
margin on bank activities will equal a  bL  bN. As in the Ho–Saunders
model, all product transaction sizes are equal to the same transaction size, Q, for
all customers and the fees (a, bL and bN) are assumed to remain fixed over time.
The deposit supply, the loan demand and the non-traditional business demand are
assumed to be linear functions. The key element that determines risk in traditional
activities is the stochastic arrival of a loan relative to deposits demand. In the
multi-output perspective, non-traditional activities are presented as an alternative
to loans so that risk (and market power) may be compensated or exacerbated. This
should be an empirical hypothesis itself. Considering interactions between loans
and non-traditional outputs, the probabilities of selling a loan ((bL)), receiving a




where , L, N, , 	L, 	N  0. As shown in equation (9.1) the probability of sell-
ing a loan is inversely related to immediacy fees on loans (bL) and positively
related to fees charged in non-traditional activities (bN). Similarly, the probability
of selling a non-traditional product in (9.3) decreases with higher fees in these
activities (bN), although it increases with higher fees on loans (bL).  is the slope
of the deposit supply and output (L or N) demand functions of banks.
In order to analyse the profit-maximizing behaviour of banks in this
framework, the Taylor expansion series are applied to obtain the expected utility
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The end-of-period wealth (Y) is a function of stochastic base wealth ( ),




where ry is discount rate of bank wealth, is the stochastic component of bank





Expected utility of bank wealth is a linear combination of equations (9.4) to (9.6):
(9.13)




Therefore, the interest spread between loans and deposits is:








42bNNL  1  RI2Q
Eu(w̃)
bN
 (9.6)  (  bN  LbL)u(w0)Q  L(9.4)  0
Eu(w̃)
a
 (9.5)  (  a)u(w0)Q  0
Eu(w̃)
bL
 (9.4)  (  bL  NbN)u(w0)Q  N(9.6)  0























Y  (1  r
y
)Y0  z̃YY0
C  (1  r)C0
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and the spread between non-traditional outputs and deposits is:
(9.18)
where R  U/U is the measure of absolute risk aversion of the Ho–
Saunders model. As shown by Allen (1988), the only difference between
the Ho–Saunders model and the multi-output solution is last term. If
in (9.17), the introduction of non-traditional
activities reduces interest margins. At the same time, if 
in (9.18), the introduction of non-traditional activities
along with loans increases bank revenues beyond interest margins. These results
will also depend on cross-elasticity of demand across bank products (	N and 	L in
equations (9.1) and (9.3). Therefore, it seems to be convenient to empirically eval-
uate if diversification towards non-traditional activities may increase or decrease
bank margins by altering risk or market power.
9.3.2 Empirical applications: review and reassessment
Two main approaches have been followed in the analysis of bank (interest)
margins: the (static) micro-model of the banking firm (Zarruck, 1989; Wong,
1997) and the (dynamic) intermediation/dealership approach (Ho and Saunders,
1981). Both models follow an Industrial Organization (IO) perspective and
analyse the effects of risk and market structure on interest margins.
These models are empirically implemented by including variables that proxy
competitive conditions and risk. Several studies have also included different
sources of (interest, liquidity and credit) risk, as well as the influence of factors
such as solvency regulations or operating efficiency (Angbazo, 1997; Saunders
and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004). The reduced-
form empirical equation that explains interest margins (INTMG) in these models
can be described as:
(9.19)
where Sit(.) is a vector of the determinants of the pure spread (market power and
risk variables), Xit(.) is a vector of other bank-specific variables (efficiency,
solvency) and it is the error term.
Both the intermediation/dealership approach and the micro-model of the banking
firm rely solely on INTMG. This assumption implies that the underlying bank
business is lending and deposit-taking exclusively. However, the evolution of
financial innovation requires a wider framework to study the determinants
of bank margins. Additionally, contributions from the NEIO suggest the use of
direct tests of firm conduct as the Lerner index for two main reasons. First, this
measure avoids potential bias associated with the use of accounting measures,
such as the INTMG. Second, since marginal costs in the Lerner index can be
INTMGit  f(Sit(.), Xit, it)
	N)  1]  RI
2Q  0
2bN[(	L/
2bN[(	N/	L)  1]  RI2Q 0
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estimated directly from the production function, the multi-output nature of banks
is then captured.
As opposed to equation (9.19), in the empirical analysis of the determinants of
bank margins within a multi-output (broad banking) environment, the issue of
specialization/diversification plays an important role. Changes in bank production
technologies may affect both the pure spread (market structure and risk) parame-
ters as well as other variables that proxy the competitive behaviour of banks (such
as efficiency).
Therefore, we extend the reduced-form empirical equation shown in (9.19) to
incorporate the effects of specialization/diversification options beyond lending
and deposit-taking:
(9.20)
MGit is a bank margin definition in a broad sense (not only INTMG but also
direct margins such as the Lerner index); Sit(.) is a vector of the determinants
of the pure spread (market power and risk variables); Xit(.) is a vector of other
bank-specific variables (efficiency, solvency); SDit, is a vector of bank output
specialization/diversification strategies showing the structure of bank’s assets
portfolio; OCit, is a vector of other control variables such as changes in economic
activity or in regulation; and it is the error term.
At this point, we survey the empirical evidence found in previous studies on the
various factors that explain bank margins. As for the determinants of the pure
spread (Sit(.)), most of the studies rely on a Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration
index (HHI) to analyse the relationship between prices and market power. As
opposed to the assumptions of the Structure–Conduct–Performance (SCP) hypoth-
esis, many studies have not supported the hypothesis that prices and market power
rise with concentration (i.e. Gilbert, 1984; Hannan, 1991; Berger, 1995).
The multi-output nature of the banking firm brings on a wide range of bundling
strategies. With bundling, prices of all products are set jointly considering the
competitive conditions on each one of the market segments where the bank oper-
ates. This is the case of bank deposits, which are often found as a loss-leader
product. Loss-leader behaviour implies that rates and fees on deposits are lower
than their implicit price, so that mark-ups on deposits are negative (Vives, 2001).
Petersen and Rajan (1995) indicate that loss-leader behaviour may affect not only
deposits but also certain types of loans to attract demand to other types of
loans. All things considered, the objective appears to be to generate long-term
relationships and cross-selling opportunities.
Regarding the different sources of risk, the links between diversification and risk
(and its impact on bank margins) have been directly or indirectly considered in
recent studies that find a reduction on credit, liquidity and interest risk as a result
of output diversification (Gallo et al., 1996; Angbazo, 1997; Siems and Clark,
1997; Wong, 1997; Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).
Other bank-specific factors (Xit), such as efficiency and solvency, can also
affect banks’ income structure significantly. However, the relationship between
MGit  f (Sit(.), Xit, SDit, OCit, it)
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operating efficiency and margins remain unclear. On the one hand, specialization
may imply higher operating efficiency (driven by a reduction in transaction
costs). This may result in lower margins if banks reduce prices along with costs
(Siems and Clark, 1997; Rogers and Sinkey, 1999). On the other hand, as noted
by Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004) for the European banking system,
specialized banks exhibit higher unit costs on average so that margins and
efficiency may be lower with specialization. Regulatory pressures on capital have
been found to represent a premium on bank prices and to widen margins
(Angbazo, 1997; Wong, 1997; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).
The innovative vector in the equation of bank margins is SDit, which states for
output technology specialization/diversification variables. As shown earlier, we
expect a close relationship between business and income diversification levels.
Finally, the vector OCit refers to other control variables such as economic
conditions or regulation. Changes in business cycle and different degrees of lib-
eralization may result in significant differences on bank margins across countries
and regions (Jayaratne and Strahan,1997; Carbo et al., 2003).
9.3.3 Bank margins and aggregate risk behaviour
Changes in banks margins may also have important implications for processes
such as changes in households’ financial portfolios, the interaction between
financial intermediaries and capital markets, or the extent to which differences
between bank-based and market-based financial systems still apply. In this con-
text, there are two main macroeconomic hypotheses related to banks’ margins that
affect aggregate risk in financial markets. The first one is the hypothesis of cross-
sectional risk sharing, which states that intermediaries transfer risk from certain
agents to others although aggregate risk does not change. The alternative hypothesis
is the so-called intertemporal risk smoothing, which states that banks may benefit
from long-term relationships when households’ portfolios are not so dynamic and
most of the financial savings are invested in deposits. Banks may then take advan-
tage of their relatively large liquidity holdings to offer lower rates on loans during
downturns and compensate this with higher loan rates – relative to market rates –
during upturns. Therefore, aggregate risk decreases with intertemporal smoothing
(Allen and Gale, 1994, 1996; Berlin and Mester, 1999). Allen and Santomero
(2001) maintain that bank-based financial systems have traditionally benefited
from intertemporal smoothing while cross-sectional risk sharing has dominated
market-based financial systems.
Regulation and financial structure might then explain differences in bank
intermediation across countries. In any event, it should be taken into account that
many financial systems labelled as ‘bank-based’ have experienced a substantial
growth of financial markets in recent years along with an increasing interaction
between intermediaries and capital market activities. Therefore, differences in the
activities undertaken by financial intermediaries across countries are progressively
blurring and the distinction between bank-based and market-based models or
cross-sectional risk sharing and intertemporal rate smoothing is no longer clear
(Scholtens, 1999; Barth et al., 2000).
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9.4 Empirical methodology and data
In this section, we undertake the empirical analysis for a representative sample of
banks from seven European countries – Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy,
United Kingdom and Sweden – during 1994–2001. The two main empirical aims:
1 To estimate the determinants of bank margins employing a traditional
measure of interest margins (the loan to deposits rate spread) and a broader
measure of bank margins following the NEIO perspective (the Lerner index).
2 To test the hypothesis of intertemporal rate smoothing vs. the hypothesis of
cross-sectional risk sharing by analysing the relationship between the loan to
market rate spread and the evolution of the GDP.
9.4.1 The determinants of banks’ margins: a dynamic
panel data approach
A dynamic panel data approach is employed to study the determinants of bank mar-
gins in European banking. At this point, it should be noted that our theoretical
model follows a dynamic approach where banks need to match the random deposit
supply function and the random demand of lending and non-traditional activities
across periods. The maximization of bank wealth considers both initial and end-of-
period information. Therefore, endogeneity may affect bank margins significantly.
The empirical implementation of the reduced-form equation in (9.20) results in:
(9.21)
where MGit states, alternatively, for the loan to deposit rate spread (SPREAD) –
as a pure intermediation margin – and the Lerner index (LERNER) – as a broader
banking margin and a measure of market power. Endogeneity is considered since
margins in period t  1 (MGit1) are expected to affect margins in period t. The
vectors of the determinants of the pure spread Sit(.); other bank-specific factors
(Xit); output technology specialization/diversification variables (SDit) and other
macroeconomic environment control variables (OCit) are also included, while i
is the individual unobservable effect. Endogeneity requires a simultaneous equa-
tions estimation framework. In order to avoid estimation bias with panel data and
dynamic variables, we follow the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized method
of moments (GMM) procedure. Two simultaneous equations are estimated, one
with first-differenced variables and another one in levels. There are two sets of
simultaneous equations to be estimated:
(9.22)
 (i,t  i,t1) (OCi,t  OCi,t1)
 	(SDi,t  SDi,t1)
 (Xi,t  Xi,t1) (Si,t  Si,t1) 
 SPREADi,t  SPREADi,t1  (SPREADi,t1  SPREADi,t2)
MGit  MGit1  Sit (.)  Xit,  SDit  OCit  i  it
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The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM procedure requires the use of appropriate
instruments. The instruments for the equations in differences are the one-lagged
explanatory (including the lagged dependent) variables. The lagged first-differenced
explanatory variables are the appropriate instruments for the equations in levels.
Country-specific dummies were also included to account for unobservable effects
across countries.
Although there might be correlation between the explanatory variables in
levels and the individual effects, these effects are not necessarily correlated with







where y represents any of the dependent variables (SPREAD, LERNER). The
consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments. A
Sargan test for restrictions overidentifcation is employed. The null hypothesis in
this test is that the instrumental variables and the residuals are not correlated.
9.4.2 An evaluation of aggregate risk behaviour in
intermediation activities
We also analyse loan pricing behaviour relative to interbank market interest rates
(three-months rate) in order to test the hypothesis of intertemporal rate smooth-
ing vs. the hypothesis of cross-sectional risk sharing. In this context, the loan to
(interbank) market rate spread (LMSPR) is related to the evolution of the GDP
and the rest of the pure spread and bank-specific variables. Using the same
E[OCi,ts  OCi,ts1(i  i,t)]  0,  s  1
E[SDi,ts  SDi,ts1(i  i,t)]  0,  s  1
E[Xi,ts  Xi,ts1(i  i,t)]  0,  s  1
E[Si,ts  Si,ts1(i  i,t)]  0,  s  1
E[yi,ts  yi,ts1(i  i,t)]  0,  s  1
  OCi,t  i  i,t
 LERNERi,t  LERNERi,t1  Si,t  Xi,t  SDi,t
 (i,t  i,t1) (OCi,t  OCi,t1)
 (SDi,t  SDi,t1)
 (Xi,t  Xi,t1) (Si,t  Si,t1) 
 LERNERi,t  LERNERi,t1  (LERNERi,t1  LERNERi,t2)
  OCi,t  i  i,t
 SPREADi,t  SPREADi,t1  Si,t  Xi,t  SDi,t
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Two main hypotheses are then tested:
● Hypothesis H0: If   0, the LMSPR increases when GDP grows. Therefore,
an intertemporal rate smoothing behaviour will be expected.
● Hypothesis H1: If   0, the LMSPR decreases when GDP grows and a
cross-sectional risk sharing behaviour will be expected.
9.4.3 Data
The sample consists of 19,322 European banks (annual observations) from
Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden using
Bureau Van Dijk-Bankscope Database information between 1994 and 2001.
Sample composition is shown in Table 9.2. The panel is unbalanced due to mergers
and acquisitions during the period. Five sets of empirical variables are employed:
1 Dependent variables:
– SPREAD: Loan to deposits rate spread. It is the difference between the
price of loans – computed as the ratio ‘interest income/loans’ and the
price of deposits – computed as the ratio ‘interest expense/deposits’.
– LERNER: The ratio ‘(price of total assets-marginal costs)/price of total
assets’. The price of total assets is computed as the ratio ‘total (interest
and non-interest) revenue/(total assets and off-balance sheet activities’.5
LMSPRi,t  LMSPRi,t1  Si,t  Xi,t  GDPi,t  i  i,t
 (GDPi,t  GDPi,t1)  (i,t  i,t1)
 (Xi,t  Xi,t1) (Si,t  Si,t1) 
 LMSPRi,t  LMSPRi,t1  (LMSPRi,t1  LMSPRi,t2)
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Table 9.2 Sample composition by country and year
Total France German Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden UK
1994 2,098 345 1,265 216 36 148 14 74
1995 2,284 350 1,372 244 47 153 18 100
1996 2,434 350 1,445 262 51 186 19 121
1997 2,512 345 1,476 296 49 200 17 129
1998 2,549 337 1,508 314 46 191 20 133
1999 2,579 372 1,480 343 48 183 24 129
2000 2,541 361 1,440 362 42 179 25 132
2001 2,325 335 1,288 345 33 181 25 118
Period 19,322 2,795 11,274 2,382 352 1,421 162 936
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Marginal costs are estimated using a single output (for the sum of total
assets and off-balance sheet activities) translog cost function with three
inputs (deposits, labour and physical capital). The functional form of the
translog specification is shown in Appendix A.
– LMSPR: is the spread between bank loan rates and the interbank market
(three months) rate.
2 Determinants of the pure spread ((Sit(.)):
– HHI: Herfindhal–Hirschman index computed from banks total assets in
national markets. According to the traditional SCP hypothesis, concen-
tration and banks margins will be positively related. However, this rela-
tionship may be influenced by third variables and margins can be found
to be negatively affected by concentration (see, for example, Cetorelli
and Gambera, 2002).
– Liquidity risk: As a proxy for liquidity risk we employ the ratio ‘liquid
assets/short-term funding’. Liquidity risk is expected to affect bank
margins positively (Angbazo, 1997).
– Interest rate risk: computed as the difference between the interbank mar-
ket (three months) rate and the interest rate of customer deposits. Interest
risk increases bank interest margins (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000).
3 Other bank-specific variables (Xit):
– Inefficiency: Computed as the ratio ‘operating costs/gross income’.
Higher operating inefficiency imply higher operating costs. Therefore,
we expect that those banks experiencing higher costs will increase prices
to a larger extent, so that inefficiency will result in higher margins.
– Capital to assets ratio: A proxy of banks’ solvency computed as the ratio
‘capital and reserves/total assets’. Capital requirements represent a pre-
mium on bank margins (Berger, 1995). Therefore, a positive relationship
between this variable and bank margins is expected.
4 Specialization/diversification variables (SDit):
– Lending/total assets: Customer and interbank loans as a ratio of total
assets. As specialization in traditional activities increases, efficiency on
these activities may increase and, therefore, banks might offer lower
(interest) margins.
– Deposits/total liabilities: Total deposits as a ratio of total liabilities. As
shown previously, the relationship between deposits-taking specializa-
tion and bank margins may be either negative – if deposits are not a loss-
leader product – or positive – if deposits are loss-leader products that
permit to operate with larger interest margins.
– Other earning assets/total assets: Total earning assets different from
loans as a ratio of total assets. Contrary to the loan to assets ratio, a
higher value of this ratio will imply a higher diversification towards fee-
income and/or market-based activities. Therefore, bank margins should
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increase as a result of higher income diversification and higher market
power.
– Loan commitments/total assets: Total loan commitments (credit cards
and lines of credit) as a ratio of total assets. Although these activities are
considered as non-traditional, they represent an off-balance sheet expan-
sion of lending activities. Therefore, as the level of loan commitments
increases, the specialization/efficiency effect on lending activities will
be larger and interest margins will be expected to fall.
– Fee-based activities (Boyd–Gertler estimator as a ratio of total assets):
The Boyd and Gertler (1994) estimator is a proxy of bank fee-based
activities which is directly comparable with balance sheet assets. It is
computed as ([fee income/(total revenuefee income)] · total bank
assets). Higher levels of fee-income activities will represent higher
income diversification towards non-traditional activities. Higher market
power is associated with fee-based activities and, as a result, an increase
of bank margins will also be expected.
– ATMs/branches: A proxy of technical change in delivery channels. The
ratio is computed using national data on banks’ ATMs and branches. As
this variable grows, banks are expected to reduce their unit operating
costs and increase fee-income from the use of these services. As a
consequence, bank margins will be expected to enlarge.
5 Other control variables (OCit):6
– GDP: GDP, in constant 1995 US dollars. The relationship between bank
margins and growth will depend on the correlation between prices, costs
and the business cycle. Economic growth is negatively related to bank
prices and costs although the extent to which these variables can be
affected may be significantly different so that the net effect on margins
cannot be clearly determined (Carbo et al., 2003).
All the variables were computed using Bureau Van Dijk-Bankscope Database
information except interbank market rates (International Financial Statistics,
International Monetary Fund), ATMs and branches (Blue Book, European Central
Bank) and GDP (World Development Indicators, World Bank).
The summary statistics – mean and standard deviation – of the posited
variables are shown in Tables 9.3a (over time) and 9.3b (by country).
9.5 Main results
9.5.1 Determinants of the loan to deposit rate spread
The results of the estimations, where the loan to deposits rate spread (SPREAD) is
the dependent variable, are shown in Table 9.4. The lagged SPREAD variable in the
right-hand-side is positive and significant in all cases, showing the relevance of
accounting for endogenity in these equations. As for the determinants of pure
Pricing strategies 127




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9.3b Summary statistics: means of the posited variables by country (Standard
deviation in parenthesis)
Variable Germany Spain France Netherlands Italy United Sweden
Kingdom
Loan to deposit rate 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.09
spread (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Lerner index(1) 0.35 0.38 0.27 0.26 0.37 0.33 0.29
(0.12) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06)
Loan to market rate 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.06
spread (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
HHI 0.12 0.55 0.47 0.16 0.45 0.24 0.20
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Liquidity risk 0.29 0.21 0.15 0.35 0.41 0.34 0.33
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Interest rate risk 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Inefficiency 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.56 0.68 0.59 0.62
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07)
Capital/total assets 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
(0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
Lending/total assets 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.70
(0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
Deposits/total 0.87 0.85 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.66
liabilities (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
Other earning assets/ 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.30
total assets (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Loan commitments/ 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.33 0.35
total assets (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Fee-based activities 0.047 0.047 0.056 0.053 0.040 0.045 0.049
(Boyd–Gertler (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
estimator as a ratio 
of total assets)
ATMs/branches 1.06 1.17 1.10 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.12
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
GDP (€ billion) 1.92 0.53 1.28 0.35 1.05 1.18 0.21
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
spreads, the HHI is negatively and significantly related to SPREAD, suggesting that
higher concentration is related to lower interest margins. This is in line with recent
evidence that has found that margins and concentration are not necessarily posi-
tively related and that interest margins may be even lower in more concentrated
markets (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002). However, both liquidity and interest rate
risk measures are found to augment loan to deposits rate spreads significantly.
Operating inefficiency is also positively and significantly related to the loan to
deposits rate spreads, since banks with higher costs apparently tend to operate
with higher margins. As predicted, the capital to assets ratio – which is also
positively and significantly related to interest margins – represents a premium on
bank margins due to pressures of solvency regulations on bank lending activities.
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As for the specialization/diversification variables, the coefficient of the ratio
‘loans to total assets’ is negatively and significantly related to SPREAD, suggesting
that those banks specialized in lending can offer lower bank margins (higher
efficiency). However, deposit-taking specialization seems to rise spreads. This
behaviour supports the hypothesis of a loss-leader behaviour in traditional inter-
mediation activities with banks assuming higher costs on deposits and compen-
sating it with higher interest margins or larger loan transactions. Regarding
non-traditional activities, the relative weight of other earning assets is found to
affect SPREAD positively which, in turn, indicates that more diversified banks
operate with higher interest margins in lending/deposit-taking activities com-
pared to specialized banks. However, innovations related to traditional activities –
such as loan commitments – are found to be negatively and significantly related
to loan to deposits rate spreads, suggesting that lending relationships may permit
banks to operate with lower interest margins and compensate this with fees from
other activities such as credit cards or loan commitments. As for the effect of the
evolution of GDP, banks are found to reduce interest margins during the upturns
following the evolution of market interest rates.
For simplicity purposes, the results by country are not shown although
they were in line with those in Table 9.4.7 Additionally, due to the fact that
German banks account for almost 60 per cent of the number of observations,
we also undertook the same empirical analysis removing the German institu-
tions from the sample for robustness purposes. These results are shown in
Appendix B (Table 9B.1) and are clearly in line with those obtained for the
entire sample.
9.5.2 Determinants of the Lerner index
The introduction of a direct measure of banks margins – the Lerner index – produces
some interesting results (Table 9.5) compared to the outcomes obtained when
employing SPREAD as the dependent variable.8 First of all, neither the
concentration variable (HHI) nor the liquidity risk measure are found to affect
LERNER significantly, a result that is in line with Maudos and Fernandez de
Guevara (2004). However, interest rate risk is significant, since both prices
and marginal costs are clearly affected by the evolution of market interest
rates. Interestingly, inefficiency is negatively and significantly related to
LERNER, suggesting that market power may decrease with higher bank operating
inefficiency.
As opposed to the case of SPREAD, a higher ratio of loans to total assets seems
to be positively and significantly related to LERNER, while market power
decreases with a higher level of deposits over total liabilities. This result supports
the hypothesis of loss-leader behaviour in intermediation activities since the negative
effect of deposits specialization on bank margins can potentially be compensated
with higher market power in lending activities. Other variables such as the weight
of other earning assets (different from loans), the variable that relates the
Boyd–Gertler estimator to total assets, the level of loan commitments and the
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relative substitution of branches for ATMs are also positively and significantly
related to LERNER. These results are not surprising, since all these variables rep-
resent higher income from fees resulting from innovations. Overall, European
banks have apparently found that new sources of market power in fee-earning
activities tend to face increasing competition in traditional business. Therefore, as
shown in equations (9.17) and (9.18), diversification towards non-traditional
products may raise bank margins by increasing market power.
According to the previous results, a tentative interpretation is the existence of,
at least, two different playing fields in European banks’ margin strategies. First of
all, although competition has increased in traditional activities – with interest
margins falling in recent years – banks apparently can take advantage of deposits
to enjoy higher loan interest margins (loss-leader behaviour). At a second stage,
those banks that diversify their assets portfolio to a larger extent may also benefit
from the lower level of competition – higher market power – in fee-earning
activities.
Although it is difficult to obtain information on prices and costs of fee-earning
activities, we can, at least, provide additional evidence on the loss-leader behav-
iour in traditional activities. Using the same single output translog function used
to estimate marginal costs on total assets, we estimate marginal costs of loans and
deposits by taking these two activities as the output in the translog functional
form. The mark-up of loan (deposits) prices relative to their marginal costs is
then computed to explore the evolution of the margins of each one of these activ-
ities9 during 1994–2001. The summary of the results is presented in Figure 9.2 for
the whole sample and by country. In all cases, there seems to be evidence of
loss-leader behaviour since mark-ups on deposits were found to be negative while
mark-ups on loans are positive and higher on average.
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Mark-up loans Mark-up deposits
Figure 9.2 Mark-up of loans and deposits in the European banking sectors (1994–2001).
Source: Own estimations.




The results by country when the Lerner index is the dependent variable are not
shown for simplicity. These results remain quite similar to those obtained for the
whole sample. We also run these tests removing German institutions from the
sample for robustness purposes (Appendix B, Table 9B.2) and the results are in
line with those obtained for the entire sample.
9.5.3 Intertemporal rate smoothing vs. cross-sectional 
risk-sharing
The results of the equations, where the LMSPR is the dependent variable, are
shown in Table 9.6. At this point, it appears to be convenient to report the results
across countries since there are potential differences in banks’ aggregate risk
behaviour depending on the bank-based or market-based structure of their finan-
cial systems (Allen and Santomero, 2001).
The coefficient of the GDP variable is found to be negative and significant
for the whole sample as well as in the cases of Germany, Spain, Italy and
Sweden. Therefore, intertemporal rate smoothing hypothesis does not seem to
apply in European banking during 1994–2001. This result appears to be more
in line with the hypothesis that cross-sectional risk sharing seems to dominate
in European banking. Banks tend to reduce (increase) the spread between
loan and interbank market rates during the upturns (downturns). These
results remain quite similar when taking the GDP variable in second- or third-
differences, which suggests that cross-sectional risk sharing behaviour persists
over time.10
9.6 Conclusions
This paper studies the relationship between financial innovation and bank
margins in Europe. Using a multi-output model where prices on loans, deposits
and other non-traditional activities are set simultaneously, we find that both
market power and risk parameters alter bank margins when introducing financial
innovations.
Empirical tests are implemented for a sample of 19,322 banks European – from
Germany, Spain, France, Netherlands, Italy, United Kingdom and Sweden – to
analyse the determinants of bank margins during 1994–2001. Both the loan
to deposit rate spread – as the conventional approach to bank margins – and the
Lerner index – as a more direct and broader measure of banks margins – are
employed as dependent variables. The results suggest that specialization and bank
margins are significantly related although these relationships can be only
observed when considering a broader definition of bank margins (the Lerner
index). Output diversification permits banks to increase their revenues and obtain
higher market power. In particular, non-interest (fee) income may ‘compensate’,
somehow, lower interest margins that result from stronger competition in
traditional markets.
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Additional evidence is provided on the effects of these changes in financial
innovation on aggregate bank risk behaviour. There appears to be no evidence of
intertemporal rate (risk) smoothing advantages, which has been the conventional
wisdom hypothesis for European banking for a long time (Allen and Santomero,
2001). Cross-sectional risk sharing has apparently become the most plausible
hypothesis in most European banking systems. Recent shifts in household
and firms’ financial portfolios towards market-based investment products
appear to help explain these changes. Banks customers seem to value a broader
range of services beyond lending and deposit activities and diversify their finan-
cial wealth by investing in shares, mutual or pension funds and insurance
products, among other alternatives. In any event, further research is needed in the
context of changes in European financial structure, the related transformations in
the financial decisions of the private sector and the effects of both on banks’
performance.
9A.1 Appendix A
Marginal costs are computed using a single output (for the sum of total assets and
off-balance sheet items) translog cost function with two cost share equations over
1994–2001:




where the standard symmetry, summation and cross-equation restrictions are
imposed and ln TC is the log of total operating and interest cost; ln Q is the log
of the value of total assets (an indicator of total banking output); ln Ri is the log
of each one of the three input prices (deposit and other funding interest rate, aver-
age price of labour and the average price of physical capital); SH1 and SH2 are the
cost share equations of deposit and other funding interest expense and labour
cost share (the cost share of physical capital is excluded); t is a time dummy
reflecting the effects of technical change on costs over time.
SH2  12Q  2  22ln R2  12ln R1  (  22  12)R3  2kt
SH1  11Q  1  11ln R1  12ln R2  (  11  12)R3  1kt
 1ttln R1  2tt ln R2  3tt ln R3  
ln R2(ln R3) (  11  12)ln R1(ln R3)  (12  22)
  12 ln R1(ln R2) [(11  12)  (12  22)ln R3
2]]
  12[11 ln R12  22 ln R22 (1  1  2)(ln R3)





21t[t]2  1tQ t  Q(ln R1)
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Notes
1 In this chapter, we focus on net prices as pricing behaviour. That is why we analyse
bank margins instead of analysing only prices.
2 Barth et al. (2000) have shown the existence of multiple restrictions and prohibitions
for US banks in activities such as brokerage, distribution of mutual and pension funds
or investment in industrial or other bank participations until 1999 with the advent of
the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act and the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. Contrarily,
many European countries have enjoyed the so-called ‘broad banking’ during the
last two decades. Therefore, these regulatory differences should have important
implications for bank margins and competition.
3 See ECB (2000) for a comprehensive analysis of changes in EU banks’ income
structure.
4 Second order conditions are negligible since Y is an efficient portfolio (Ho and
Saunders, 1981).
5 In this estimation, off-balance sheet items include loan commitments and guarantees.
These activities are included in order to account for traditional and non-traditional
output in the estimation of marginal costs.
6 An additional control (dummy) variable was employed taking the value 0 for bank-
based financial systems – France, Germany, Spain, Italy – and 1 for market-based
financial systems – Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom. However, the
distinction between bank-based and market-based financial system was not found to be
relevant for any of the tests used in this chapter.
7 These results are available upon request.
8 Additionally, we employed gross income as a broader accounting measure of bank
margins. Since gross margin includes revenues from fees and market investments, the
mix of activities associated with the production function is wider than in the case of
SPREAD. However, estimation bias problems are also likely to be larger when using
gross income. Unfortunately, this was true in our case and the results were significantly
less robust than in the case of SPREAD. Among the specialization variables, only the
Boyd–Gertler fee-income specialization ratio was found to be statistically significant,
which, in turn, underlines the logic importance of fees in generating gross income.
These results are not shown for simplicity although they are available upon request to
the authors.
9 Loan prices are computed as the ratio of interest income to total loans. Estimating
the mark-up on deposits is difficult since the price of deposit services is implicit,
not explicit. The implicit price that depositors pay is taken to be the difference
between the average market interest rate minus the average rate they earned on their
deposits which gives the implied price for this period. This implied price approximates
what depositors could potentially have earned on their deposits minus what they did
actually earn. This difference effectively represents an indirect or implicit price for the
depositor services they consume. The alternative would be for banks to pay a market
rate on deposits and assess direct fees for the full cost of each depositor service
supplied.
10 Financial innovation and changes in regulation have made it more difficult to distinguish
between bank-based and market-based financial systems during the 1990s (Scholtens,
1999).
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Since its introduction by Aigner et al. (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and
Meeusen and van der Broeck (1977) stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) has received
increasing attention in the literature as a methodology to measure a single firm’s
efficiency. Much of this popularity results from the opportunity offered to the
researcher to rank individual firms, to obtain average industry efficiency and to
identify best and worst practice (Coelli et al., 1998). From a regulatory perspective,
these are appealing features of SFA in order to gather information on bank stability
in times when bank industries around the world undergo significant changes. For
practitioners, the methodology provides interesting orientation as to which banks
might serve as a role model (see, for example, Molyneux et al., 1997).
Already Berger and Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies from more than
20 countries. At the core of most of these applications rests the specification of a
cost or profit function under the assumption of perfect input markets. The error
term is assumed to be composed of both white noise and inefficiency. By means
of maximum-likelihood techniques a best-practise frontier is estimated, relative to
which all firms in the sample are compared. For each firm the error term is
decomposed. Firms deviate to varying degrees from this frontier according to the
estimated inefficiency. Most of these studies examine US banking markets.1
Owing to the improved availability of bank-level data studies for European countries
become increasingly available.2
But despite the frequent use of SFA the vast majority of studies share a potential
specification error, as noted by Mountain and Thomas (1999). Efficiency is
benchmarked against a cost or profit function. Both are derived from a cost min-
imisation or profit maximisation problem that is based on the assumption of perfect
input markets. Hence, the prices a bank faces to purchase inputs should be deter-
mined exogenously in the respective market. Instead, most studies employ each
bank’s price individually. Factor payments are divided by employed production
factors.3 Implicitly, one assumes that banks possess market power.
In our view the assumption of perfect competition does not entail a specification
error per se. After all, especially in German banks which are numerous, transaction
and information cost declined steadily with technological advances, and market





Ballin-10.qxd  22/12/05  11:40 AM  Page 142 $ 
+ + 
$ 
concentration is among the lowest in Europe. Alternative theoretical approaches
such as oligopoly or even monopoly models do not seem appropriate.
Therefore, we understand the misspecification problem raised by Mountain
and Thomas (1999) to be primarily a measurement problem of input prices. The
purpose of this Chapter is to assess the magnitude and direction of this measure-
ment error. We suggest to employ alternative market confinements upon which
banks compete for inputs.4 Bank input prices are calculated based according to
market definitions. We then compare efficiency estimates using endogenous input
prices with results from the employment of exogenously determined prices to
gain insight into the relevance of this mis-measurement issue.
To do so the remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. The next section
briefly reviews German efficiency studies and related literature on how to tackle
the problem of mis-measured input prices. Section 10.3 introduces the method-
ology to measure cost and alternative profit efficiency (CE and PE). Section 10.4
elaborates on the data used in this study. Section 10.5 presents and discusses our
results. Section 10.6 concludes.
10.2 Literature
We begin this section by introducing the available evidence on German bank
efficiency studies. Next, we review studies that approach the pitfalls when
measuring input prices.
10.2.1 German efficiency studies
Despite the important role of banks in Germany’s financial system (see, for
example, ECB (2002), Bikker and Haaf (2002) or Hackethal (2004)) it is some-
what surprising that evidence on German bank efficiency remains scarce. We are
aware of four studies, of which only the most recent one by Altunbas et al. (2001)
employs fairly current data in order to examine PE and CE between 1989 and
1998. Distinguishing between banks of different size and ownership, the authors
study systematic differences between efficiency scores. They find that cost
inefficiencies are higher for commercial institutes and large banks. In total, inef-
ficiencies amount to 17 per cent for the banking sector as a whole. The ability of
banks to realise potential profits is even worse, as average profit inefficiency
amounts to 20 per cent.
Three studies focusing on cooperative banks in Bavaria are Lang and Welzel
(1996, 1998a,b). The authors use data collected from a non-commercial database. In
sum, these three studies find improving CE during the early 1990s, resulting in
average CEs of around 7 per cent. Also, their evidence suggests that smaller cooper-
atives perform better than larger cooperatives and that mergers between low
efficiency targets and better performing ones increase overall efficiency. The authors
carefully note, however, that their results only apply to the sector of cooperative
banks in general and to those located in the state of Bavaria in particular. Apparently,
regional and ownership differences prohibit a generalisation of their results.
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10.2.2 Alternative SFA studies
The results available for German banking suggest that marked efficiency differences
exist between banks of different sectors, size and region. However, according to
Mountain and Thomas (1999) the heterogeneity in efficiency scores might to
some extent also result from the use of wrongly measured input prices. They
suggest two possible ways to improve the reliability of results. First, to account
for the fact that banks operate in different regional markets and therefore to use
additional information about market characteristics when constructing the
frontier. Second, to choose alternative ways to specify input prices. Accordingly,
two strands developed in the efficiency literature to tackle the issue.
The first approach continues to fit the frontier to bank-specific prices but takes
into account market differences by conditioning the efficient frontier on environ-
mental factors, such as demographic or regulatory information. A number of US
studies tackled the issue along these lines and compared, for example, state and
federal efficiency scores. Mester (1997) finds that average efficiency scores are
lower when measured against a federal frontier compared to efficiency measured
against state specific frontiers. Berger and Humphrey (1992) control for system-
atic differences between output demand and input prices across states by devel-
oping and applying a thick-frontier approach (TFA). DeYoung (1998) controls for
differences between states regarding regulation and environmental differences.
All of these studies find that accounting for state specific factors affects effi-
ciency estimates. One might suspect that this is primarily due to different regula-
tory regimes across US states during the 1990s. Consequently, the relevance for
a European banking market with single banking licenses and little differences in
regulation would be small. However, a recent study on European banking under-
lines the importance of economic characteristics other than regulation between
different European countries. In a study on CE of European commercial banks,
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002) review ten countries. They employ ten different
non-regulatory variables in a data envelopment analysis (DEA).5 The efficiency
results from their complete model increase starkly compared to their model
excluding the environmental factors. In the case of Germany for example, this
increase in performance is around 30 per cent. The authors conclude that account-
ing for different market characteristics is important and yields improved effi-
ciency scores. Further evidence on the existence of regional markets even within
small European countries is provided by a study of Bos and Kool (2004). Another
study by Bos and Schmiedel (2003) applies a so-called metafrontier approach to
envelope country specific frontiers with a common European frontier to compare
efficiency scores across different markets. Their findings also support the
conclusion that efficiency scores from a common frontier tend to underestimate
individual firm’s efficiency. In sum, by correcting for banks operating on
different markets efficiency scores tend to improve.
A second approach tackles the problem of how to measure input prices in a
perfect competition specification more directly. It follows the suggestion of
Mountain and Thomas (1999) to specify input prices per input market. The only
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study we are aware of that pursues this approach is Berger and Mester (2003).
Using data on US banks of three cross-sections in 1984, 1991 and 1997 they
derive prices per geographical market. For each bank they calculate the average
price faced as an average of all other banks in that particular market, weighted by
it’s market share. Thereby, they avoid to violate the assumption of perfect markets
by using for each bank a price determined exogenously, namely by it’s competitors
in the respective market. As their study focuses on static and dynamic sources of
cost, profit and alternative PE changes, the authors do not provide a comparison
with traditionally specified input prices.
This discussion shows that the issue of potentially mis-measured input prices
is related to the existence of different markets on which banks operate. Some
studies try to adjust the frontier by including additional environmental information.
However, only one study seems to exist that extends along the lines suggested by
Mountain and Thomas (1999), namely to use input prices on the basis of regional
data. We want to fill this gap with our application of SFA to an extended data set
created for German banks.
10.3 Methodology
In order to compare the effects of alternative input price specifications we rely to a
large extent on standard approaches to efficiency analysis. By altering only one
element of the specification we limit changes in efficiency to changes in input price
specification and exclude effects for example due to environmental variables. Along
these lines this section presents our methodology to measure efficiency against both
a cost and alternative profit frontier. We start by defining variables used and briefly
introduce the theoretical models underlying most SFA applications. Next, the empir-
ical specification and how to measure CE and alternative PE is presented. Finally,
we introduce our measures of input prices according to a benchmark model and
three alternative market definitions to measure exogenous input prices.
10.3.1 Theoretical models in SFA
We follow the intermediation approach suggested by Sealy and Lindley (1977) to
model bank production. The main task of a bank is to channel funds from savers
to investors.6 We follow the literature and define three outputs. The first output
captures total loans, y1, provided. Next, banks are modelled to produce securities,
y2. Due to the growing importance of off-balance sheet (OBS) business we also
specify total OBS activities as a third output, y3 (see, for example, Jagtiani and
Khanthavit (1996) and Clark and Siems (2002)). A bank uses three production
factors to produce these outputs, total borrowed funds, x1, labour, x2 and fixed
assets, x3. For these input factors the bank faces an input price vector of wi, where
i indexes the input used. In transforming inputs into outputs we account for
the role of equity, z, as an alternative source to fund outputs and as an indicator
of different risk-preferences among bank managers (Hughes and Mester, 1993).
Hence, the transformation function of the banking firm is depicted by T(y, x, z).
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In sum, we model a bank to minimise cost to produce a given output bundle
conditional on available equity, z. As the dependent variable we employ total
operating cost, TOC, for the cost minimisation problem and profits before tax,
PBT, in the alternative profit maximisation problem.
Using these definitions the cost minimisation problem is written as
s.t. T (y,x,z)  0. (10.1)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to each output and setting these equal to
zero results in optimal input demand functions, xi*(y, wi, z), conditional on the
available level of equity, z, and output vector produced, y. The minimum cost level
is then obtained by substituting the optimal input demand functions into the total
cost function given by equation (10.1) resulting in
(10.2)
To measure PE, we employ the alternative profit model introduced by
Humphrey and Pulley (1997). Their model possesses the interesting feature to
allow for market imperfections on the output side. If perfect competition prevails
in both input and output markets, optimal input demand from cost minimisation
is identical to input demand from profit maximisation (see, for example,
Mas-Colell et al., 1995). Banks would choose input and output quantities given
prevailing prices in order to maximise profits and, hence, the maximum profit
function would depend on input and output prices.
However, as noted by Berger and Mester (1997) banks might possess some
market power when selling their products. Under this assumption banks continue
to face perfect input markets and therefore choose input quantities at given prices.
But on the revenue side they are able to set prices subject to a pricing opportunity
set H(p, y, w, z), where p denotes output prices. The profit maximisation problem
can then be written as
( y,p,w)  m
p,x
ax (p*y  wi*xi)
s.t. T (y, x, z)  0, (10.3)
and H( p, y, wi, z)  0.
Solving the maximisation problem yields optimal input demand functions, x*i
(y, wi, z) and optimal prices y*(y, wi, z). Using these to obtain a maximum profit
function results in
(10.4)
Note, that this model of a profit frontier does not require the use of output
prices. Profits depend on exogenously determined input prices and available equity




C( y,wi)  min (wi*xi)
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to produce a given output. Because output prices are, if available at all, frequently
subject to substantial measurement problems – this is another appealing feature of
the alternative profit model. When measuring alternative PE we are able to evalu-
ate not only banks’ performance to convert inputs as cost efficient as possible into
outputs, but also their success in realising opportunities in their output markets.
10.3.2 Empirical specification
To estimate reduced forms of equations (10.2) and (10.4) a variety of specifica-
tions have been put to use in the literature. For a review and comparison of some
of the most popular forms see Bauer et al. (1998) and Berger and Humphrey
(1997). As noted, we rely on established procedures to address our interest in
measuring the effects of mis-measured input prices as directly as possible. For the
cost model, we follow Lang and Welzel (1996) and employ a multi-output
translog function and amend time trend variables to capture technological change.
For a bank k this cost function takes on the form
(10.5)
As outlined previously, wi denotes input prices, ym denotes outputs and z
depicts the level of equity capital. As shown here, the model employs endogenous
input prices, that is each bank’s individual price. This specification is the baseline
case, which represents the approach followed most frequently in the literature. We
subsequently substitute wi’s from three respective market definitions introduced
in the following subsection to investigate the effects on efficiency and robustness
of estimation results.
For the alternative profit model the only change refers to the left-hand side
variable. Instead of cost we employ ln PBT as dependent variable. Note, however,
that this poses a problem when having banks with zero or negative profits. Two
approaches exist to curb this problem. One is to add the minimum profit plus one
to all banks’ profits. Alternatively, one might choose to simply exclude those
banks with negative profits. Both approaches bear the risk of leading to biased
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minimum value is an extreme outlier.7 We feel that the cost of reducing our
sample size by only a few observations is less compared to inflating all profits by
such an extreme value. We therefore opt to exclude banks with zero and negative
profits.
As noted in Coelli et al. (1998), certain restrictions have to be imposed before
estimation. These are depicted by
The first restrictions require linear homogeneity in input prices. An increase in
input prices should result in proportionally increased total cost. Put differently,
the input mix a bank chooses to produce its outputs is not altered if all prices are
inflated identically. Only relative price changes result in different input mixes. We
impose these restrictions by normalising all factor price variables and the depen-
dent variable by one factor price. Consequently, only two input price coefficients
are estimated and the third one can be recovered from the homogeneity condi-
tions. The second restriction stems from the use of duality when estimating a cost
function and refers to the symmetry of cross partial derivatives of the conditional
factor demand functions.
To measure inefficiency, SFA assumes a composed error term. The error term
‡k in equation (10.5) consists partly of random noise, vk, and partly of inefficiency,
uk. In the case of a cost frontier, inefficiency implies above frontier costs incurred.
Therefore, it enters the error term with a positive sign, leading to ‡k  vk  uk.
For the case of a profit frontier, inefficiency results in below frontier profits and
therefore it must be subtracted, leading to ‡k  vk  uk. Following Battese and
Coelli (1988) we assume the random error term vk to be i.i.d. with vk ~ N(0, 2v)
and independent of the explanatory variables. The inefficiency term is i.i.d. with
uk ~ |N(0, 2u)|.8 We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates as starting values
when maximising in a second step the maximum likelihood function derived by
Aigner et al. (1977). We employ their re-parameterisation of   u/v and 
22v  
2
u Consequently,  indicates the ratio of standard deviation attributable
to inefficiency relative to the standard deviation due to random noise. An insigni-
ficant estimate of  means that no inefficiency prevails. All of the error is due to
random noise and specification of a stochastic frontier model is inappropriate.
Next, we need a way to obtain firm-specific efficiency measures in the case of
a cost frontier. For firm-specific efficiency estimates Jondrow et al. (1982) found
that the conditional expectation of the uk given ‡k can be used. Following Battese
and Coelli (1988), a measure of CE is calculated as
CEk  [exp(uk)]
1.
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This measure takes a value between 0 and 1 where the latter indicates a fully
efficient bank. The value indicates which percentage of observed cost would have
been enough to produce the observed output if the bank was fully efficient. By
obtaining firm-specific efficiency estimates we are able to examine whether alter-
native input price specifications identify different banks as best or worst
performers, that is whether the ranking of firms is sensitive when correcting
for mis-measured prices. Similarly, a measure of PE is calculated as
This measure also ranges between 0 and 1 and indicates the percentage of
actual profits relative to what the bank could have realised given its input quan-
tity and output price mix. Specification of PE under imperfect output markets
allows us also to identify those banks, which are best practice performers on both
the cost and the revenue dimension of banking. We turn now to our benchmark
definition of input prices and three alternative market definitions, which we
employ to measure exogenous prices.
10.3.3 Input prices and markets
Specification errors in efficiency analysis can arise from two major reasons. On
the one hand, they can result from the inappropriate use of a production model
based on perfect competition. If markets are deviating considerably from the most
important characteristics of perfect markets, alternative theoretical models such
as monopolistic competition or oligopoly models should serve as a point of
departure. On the other hand, specification errors can be the result of data con-
struction, which is only remotely suited to represent the desired variable from the
theoretical model. Consider as an example the frequent use of labour expenses
over total assets as a measure of the price of labour (see, for example, Altunbas
et al., 2001 or Lang and Welzel, 1996). An improved specification to measure the
cost of labour might rather use the contractual wage rate and/or distinguish
between different kinds of labour, for example high versus low skilled work.
To put our approach into perspective we begin with a motivation of our model
choice in Section 10.3.1, which is based on perfect competition. Second, we
straighten out which kind of adjustments we conduct to improve the specification
of efficient cost and profit frontiers. The first question is therefore whether one
is willing to assume that a production model based on the assumptions of perfect
competition is appropriate to describe German banking. Therefore, we should be
confident that the most basic properties of perfect markets, namely an atomistic
market structure, no transaction cost and information transparency, hold to a
sufficient degree.
Bikker and Haaf (2001) provide a recent overview of the extensive literature on
bank market structure. While the evidence remains mixed, Bikker and Haaf
(2002) note that on the basis of concentration measures Germany is among the
most atomistic markets compared to other industrialised economies. Regarding
PEk  [exp(  uk)].
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transaction cost and the degree of accessibility of information the ECB (2002)
notes that both the use of automated services like ATMs and Internet banking and
the increasing availability of low-cost and high-quality information continues to
spur competition in EU banking markets. In sum, we cannot rule out market
imperfections based on results in the literature. But as noted in Hempell (2004)
the available evidence leads us to accept that a theoretical model from the realm
of perfect competition is superior to imperfect market models in the German case.
We are therefore confident that the approach taken in the efficiency literature to
build upon models along the lines suggested in Section 10.3.1 is appropriate.
Consequently, we focus on measurement errors arising from deficiencies of the
employed data to represent model variables. This approach also enables us to
compare results from our approach with those from data usually applied and we
can assess the importance of this measurement error.
Let us therefore turn now to the clarification of the measurement error we
address. In both the cost and alternative profit model the factor prices for inputs,
wi, are exogenous variables. They are assumed to be determined in their respec-
tive factor markets and enter the production model in Section 10.3.1 as given. But
the input prices employed in most studies are calculated for each bank individu-
ally and can thus be regarded as endogenous. Consider as an illustration the pro-
duction factor of fixed assets (FA). The traditional way to arrive at a price for the
input FA relates to the expenses on FA, that is rent, depreciation or other expenses
on FA, to the employed quantity of that factor, that is the average value of FA
used. This way we arrive at an average price of FA for each bank.
In our empirical investigation we define this specification of input prices as our
benchmark model. We refer to it for the cost frontier as model 1.1 and in the alter-
native profit case we label it as model 2.1, respectively. But under perfect
competition we expect the equilibrium price of FA to be determined, for example,
in real estate markets.9 In a simple market model this input price is identical for
all banks – the very notion of price taking.
We regard the approach to use individual bank prices versus the use of one
identical price for each input across all banks as two polar cases. The former
allows each bank to possess extensive pricing power within a model of perfect
competition as opposed to the assumption that no bank can influence prices what-
soever. While the shortcoming of the former approach to appropriately reflect the
underlying theoretical model is obvious, we also regard the latter approach as sub-
optimal for two reasons. On a more empirical note the use of one single price for
each production factor would prohibit estimation of cross-sectional data com-
pletely and reduce all variation in panel estimations to be the result of changes
over time. An argument related to theory concerns the evidence presented in
Section 10.2.2. A number of bank market studies highlight the existence and
importance of different markets within certain geographical regions. The crucial
question is then how to define a market.
Studies on German banking suggest that efficiency differences persist between
banks of different sector, region and size. The notion of separate markets on the
basis of sectors is supported by Edwards and Fischer (1993). They note that
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regulators and the government continue to favour the ‘three-pillar-system’.10
According to Hempell (2004) the existence of different markets between different
sectors is further illustrated by strict demarcation between private and public
banks. Most recent tendencies to allow commercial banks to buy savings banks
still face massive opposition by the respective lobbies (see, for example, Krosta
and Schmid, 2003) and therefore changes cannot be expected soon, if at all. The
existence of regional markets within the sector of public banks is underlined by the
fact that distinct separation of regional activities for each cooperative and savings
bank are enforced.11 With regard to size as a distinguishing argument, it appears
that only bigger institutes, both commercial and public, operate federally. The
majority of small and medium sized banks concentrate on certain states, too.12
Therefore, we assume that markets can be defined by states and size classes.
The price a bank faces to purchase inputs is determined in these markets. For each
bank, k, this price is the average of prices paid by all other banks in that market
excluding the bank’s own price. We start with the benchmark model x.1 intro-
duced earlier. We calculate each bank’s own price. It is calculated by taking
expenditure over inputs employed to arrive at a price for each input for each bank,
wik, where k  1, . . ., K indexes a bank and K is the total number of banks in a
market m. This step is illustrated in the example given in Table 10.1 under the
heading ‘Benchmark model’.
In the benchmark model each bank is treated as if it operated in its own mar-
ket m. To specify exogenous input prices we start by defining different markets
distinguished first by state and second within each state by size classes. The last
three columns under the heading ‘Market model’ illustrate that, first, banks
within state 1 are considered and, second, are further distinguished into size
classes 1 and 2, respectively. Hence we have two markets m in state 1 as indicated
by the last column in Table 10.1 containing three banks, respectively. For a bank
k in market m the price it faces is then . To illustrate thiswil  Kk1;lkwik	(K  1)
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Table 10.1 Illustration of input price calculation
Bank k State Size Benchmark model Market model
Calculation wik (%) m Calculation wik (%) m
1 100 20 1 1 20/100 20.0 1 (0.2  0.12)/(3–1) 16.0 1
2 1,000 250 1 2 250/1,000 25.0 2 7.5 2
3 2,000 400 1 1 400/2,000 20.0 3 (0.2  0.12)/(3–1) 16.0 1
4 500 25 1 2 25/500 5.0 4 17.5 2
5 250 30 1 1 30/250 12.0 5 (0.2  0.2)/(3–1) 20.0 1
6 750 75 1 2 75/750 10.0 6 15.0 2
7 1,600 120 2 1 120/1,600 7.5 7 15.0 3
8 900 203 2 2 202.5/900 22.5 8 12.5 4
9 300 53 2 1 52.5/300 17.5 9 10.0 3
10 1,200 180 2 2 180/1,200 15.0 10 16.3 4
11 800 100 2 1 100/1,800 12.5 11 12.5 3
12 400 40 2 2 40/400 10.0 12 18.8 4
Mean 14.8 14.8
SD 6.28 3.59
Input i  FA
level expenses
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procedure for one market consider the three rightmost columns under the
heading, ‘Market model’. Within market m  1, the first bank, k  1, faces an
input price equal to the average input prices paid by the remaining banks in the
market, that is, banks k  3, 5.
Note, that this procedure leaves the average input price paid by all banks unaf-
fected. However, the variation of input prices is reduced as can be seen from the
last row in the example discussed earlier. Intuitively, the closer the market resem-
bles perfect competition, the lower the variation, because price differences ulti-
mately approach zero until a single market-clearing price prevails. Additionally,
those banks that paid, say, the highest price within their market are now modelled
to face substantially lower prices (and vice versa). Put differently, extreme values
for input prices are levelled out. This implies that we explain in a specification
utilising exogenous input prices actual operating cost on the left-hand side with
prices prevailing in the market on the right-hand side. If these exogenous prices
are better suited to explain costs and profits the total error ‡k in equation (10.5)
becomes smaller. Consequently, the level of efficiency would also decrease.
However, we do not know a priori which specification is, in an empirical sense,
superior as measured by a smaller total error. In addition, we expect that the
levelling out of extreme input prices leads to a change in the distribution of
efficiency scores and, hence, relative rankings. To measure the distortions of
efficiency measures due to the outlined specification error is thus one major goal
of this chapter.
Summing up, the specification of exogenous input prices should not only affect
the level of efficiency but also the distribution of efficiency scores. The decisive
question of what defines a market is obviously a critical one. As an alternative to
the benchmark model (model x.1) we therefore suggest in this chapter three addi-
tional approaches how to define a market as a mean to measure input prices
(models x.2 through x.4). We start with comparisons of cost frontiers (models 1.y)
and continue with profit frontiers (models 2.y). Let us turn now to these three
alternative ways on how to determine input prices.
Throughout, we classify banks with more than €50 billion in total assets as
large.13 We start with market definition x.2. In this model we assume that large
banks constitute a market of their own across state borders. Hence, small banks
face the prices set by the competition in markets defined according to size classes
within their states. In contrast, large banks compete for labour, funds and fixed
capital on a federal market and face the prices set by other large banks in this
geographically bigger market. In a first step, the price each large bank faces is cal-
culated as the average price of all other large banks. In a second step, the proce-
dure is repeated for small banks within their states and size class. The rationale of
this specification is for example illustrated by choice of an office building. Small
banks are constrained to choose administration offices in the region of their bank-
ing activities. They compete with other banks and perhaps even other firms of
similar size for, say, buildings of approximately similar capacity. In contrast, large
banks are able to choose between one large office complex anywhere in the repub-
lic or splitting up operations into several administrations in different locations.
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In our third market definition, model x.3, we allow large banks to possess
market power in input markets. We utilise exogenous prices for small banks and
employ endogenous prices for banks in the federal market. The motivation of this
specification is that large banks might have some power to set for example wages
when recruiting employees. This market power could result from the fact that only
a few banks can offer a high diversity of tasks, quality of work and strong brand
image. On the labour supply side they can draw recruitees from a larger pool of
persons willing to move to the location of an interesting employer. In contrast,
smaller banks which act only on a regional level might be less attractive for
mobile employees and are therefore restricted to recruit from a smaller labour
pool around their area of activity.
Our final market definition, model x.4, relaxes the assumption of large banks
competing on a federal market. Instead, we assume here that large banks are part
of regional state markets and represent merely (part of) one of many size classes
within their state. The absence of federal competition could be justified when not-
ing the highly fragmented market structure for Germany as a whole. While con-
centration ratios for other European countries, for example, the Netherlands, are
in the region of 80 per cent for the three biggest institutes, the entire commercial
sector accounts for just 23 per cent of total assets in Germany. Thus, a conceiv-
able argument is to assume that large banks are simply not large enough to set
prices and do therefore not exert market power.
To illustrate the four different approaches we employ once more the example
introduced in Table 10.1. Table 10.2 compares the input prices of our four differ-
ent models.
At this point we like to point out two potential pitfalls. The first concern is that
it would be more desirable to define markets strictly on a geographical basis, as
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Table 10.2 Comparison of alternative input prices
Bank k State Size Model x.1 Model x.2 Model x.3 Model x.4
wik (%) m wik (%) m wik (%) m wik (%) m
1 100 20 1 1 20.0 1 16.0 2 16.0 7 16.0 1
2 1,000 250 1 2 25.0 2 12.5 1 25.0 1 7.5 2
3 2,000 400 1 1 20.0 3 16.0 2 16.0 7 16.0 1
4 500 25 1 2 5.0 4 16.5 1 5.0 2 17.5 2
5 250 30 1 1 12.0 5 20.0 2 20.0 7 20.0 1
6 750 75 1 2 10.0 6 15.5 1 10.0 3 15.0 2
7 1,600 120 2 1 7.5 7 15.0 3 15.0 8 15.0 3
8 900 203 2 2 22.5 8 13.0 1 22.5 4 12.5 4
9 300 53 2 1 17.5 9 10.0 3 10.0 8 10.0 3
10 1,200 180 2 2 15.0 10 14.5 1 15.0 5 16.3 4
11 800 100 2 1 12.5 11 12.5 3 12.5 8 12.5 3
12 400 40 2 2 10.0 12 15.5 1 10.0 6 18.8 4
Mean 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.8
SD 6.28 2.54 5.75 3.59
Note
Size class 2 depicts large banks in this example.
Input i  FA
level expenses
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is done for example in Berger and Mester (2003) who employ data on a county
level for US banks. However, market characteristics and data availability are dif-
ferent in the German case. First, no information on bank activity is readily avail-
able on a more detailed level than per state. Second, market barriers are to a
substantial degree due to demarcation between and within banking sectors. As
banks of the three sectors differ considerably in terms of average total assets we
believe that size classes are a good approximation to define bank markets where
firms compete for inputs. The second concern is that it would be most desirable
to use prices resulting from explicit models of input markets. A superior approach
might, for example, use information on different kinds of labour employed in a
banking firm and apply a labour market model to determine equilibrium wages.
However, the available data do not allow for such an approach. We therefore
consider our methodology as a fruitful start to learn about the relevance of this
specification problem. We continue in the following subsection by introducing
the data employed in our empirical work.
10.4 Data
In this section we start by discussing the data source, definition of variables and
peculiarities of the data generation process. Next, we provide descriptive statis-
tics. In accordance with the previously employed determinants of markets,
namely region and size, we also present some information from these two angles,
respectively. This sequence will also serve as guideline along which we will
discuss later on results from our empirical work.
10.4.1 Data sources and processing
The data used in this study is obtained from the Fitch-IBCD ‘Bankscope’ data-
base. This database serves as source to the majority of European bank efficiency
studies. As laid out in Section 10.3.1 we define next to equity capital, z, three
inputs and three outputs. As in Altunbas et al. (2001) we measure the cost of
funds, w1, by total interest expense over total borrowed funds. Cost of labour, w2,
is measured by total labour expense over total assets and the cost of physical
assets, w3, is measured by the sum of expenses for premises and depreciation over
total fixed assets. All level variables are denoted in deflated millions of euro and
all price variables are denoted in percentages. Despite frequent use, Bhattacharya
(2003) notes that the Bankscope database also suffers from some substantial defi-
ciencies. For German bank data we note that three caveats deserve particular
attention.
First, a substantial share of banks do not provide a detailed split-up of their
assets. The problem can be curbed to a certain extent by defining outputs more
broadly. Still, we had to make some concessions and exclude some banks on
grounds of missing observations for one or more of our variables.
The second caveat refers to a considerable amount of specialised banks.
Balance sheet and profit and loss account data for these banks are sometimes
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differently listed in Bankscope compared to commercial banks. This could be a
reason why many studies report observations with ‘implausible’ values, for example,
funding cost beyond 100 per cent. We correct for potentially resulting wrong
input prices by taking into account bank sector specific accounting procedures.
A third and major problem is the use of up to three different accounting rules
applied by single banking firms.14 Also, the high number of cross-holdings in
German banking frequently poses a problem when selecting a sample of banking
firms, which are assumed to be independently operating units pursuing their
objectives. In order to ensure a sample of comparable banks we carefully screened
our data for double entries of banks due to more than one accounting rule
included in Bankscope. Where applicable, we used unconsolidated statements of
banks and excluded the according consolidated statement of the parent institute.
We only selected those statements reporting data according to the German
commercial code (Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB).
10.4.2 Full sample
This process left us with 13,923 observations from all sectors during the period
between 1994 and 2001.15 Table 10.3 provides descriptive statistics of all vari-
ables employed in SFA and total assets with their mean values in the period
1994–2001.
Table 10.3 illustrates that the most important line of activity in German banking
is credit business as exhibited by the substantially higher amount of loans
produced compared to OBS and securities. The growing importance of OBS activ-
ities for all banks is underlined by a compound annual growth rate of 5.3 per cent
for y2 as opposed to 2.5 per cent for y1 and 2.7 per cent for y3 during the eight
years of observation. The distribution of outputs, equity and total assets clearly
illustrates the heterogeneity of firms in our sample. While some banks only had
outstanding loans on the order of some thousand euro, the largest bank recorded
a position of outstanding loans worth €220 billion in a single year. The standard
deviation of input prices underlines two issues. First, substantial differences
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Table 10.3 Descriptive statistics between 1994 and 2001
Variable Mean SD Skew Kurt Minimum Maximum N
y1 1,603.70 9,062.04 12.98 211.73 0.1 220,177 13,923
y2 597.64 3,899.04 16.70 364.38 0.1 140,046 13,923
y3 425.73 3,956.45 17.08 342.57 0.1 114,277 13,923
w1 0.0384 0.0098 9.383 253.28 0.0036 0.4267 13,923
w2 0.0144 0.0064 8.765 181.69 0.0002 0.2009 13,923
w3 0.1661 0.1129 2.778 12.65 0.0120 0.9624 13,923
z 113.3 731.3 16.5 332.1 0.7 19,620 13,923
TA 3,096.5 19,097.2 13.8 241.9 10.8 566,509 13,923
TOC 47.2 299.8 24.1 808.9 0.4 13,851 13,923
PBT 12.6 96.1 51.4 4,058.6 937.6 8,289.4 13,923
Note
All level variables measured in millions of €.
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among banks and, second, potential measurement problems. The latter becomes
apparent from minimum and maximum values for wis. We therefore believe that
accounting for random error due to measurement error is an important feature of
our methodology.
As we intend to measure CE and PE with exogenous prices we calculate input
prices on the basis of geographically and size-wise determined markets. For
this reason we provide subsequently some descriptive statistics from these two
perspectives, respectively.
10.4.3 A regional angle
To capture the aspect of regional markets we created a new dataset. We used city
information of each bank provided by Bankscope and matched this with a dataset
from the federal bureau of statistics to allocate state codes to each bank.16
As one might suspect Table 10.4 underpins substantial differences in terms of
banking market coverage and mean size of banks across states.
Note, that differences in mean total assets are not limited to an ‘East’-effect.
Substantial differences exist also among western states. Some states exhibit a
local market structure with many, relatively small banks. Examples are Bavaria,
Baden-Wuerttemberg and to a lesser extent North Rhine-Westphalia. Other states
appear to home only few but large banks, for example Berlin and Hamburg.
Contrary to what one might expect, not all large banks concentrate around
Frankfurt in Hesse. Only 80 out of 171 large bank observations can be found there
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Table 10.4 Mean bank size and input prices per state
State TA w1 w2 w3 N
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1,698.6 0.039 0.014 0.140 2,830
Bavaria 2,550.5 0.039 0.015 0.153 2,962
Berlina 14,553.4 0.045 0.010 0.239 138
Brandenburga 1,176.9 0.029 0.013 0.268 169
Bremen 3,826.8 0.042 0.015 0.168 110
Hamburg 6,532.3 0.041 0.015 0.273 218
Hesse 10,267.8 0.042 0.014 0.210 1,405
Mecklenburg-Western 588.3 0.029 0.015 0.278 160
Pomeraniaa
Lower Saxony 2,086.1 0.037 0.016 0.149 1,184
North Rhine-Westphalia 2,587.0 0.039 0.015 0.153 2,576
Rhineland-Palatinate 1,261.4 0.038 0.015 0.156 856
Saarland 1,331.4 0.038 0.014 0.156 191
Saxony-Anhalta 687.6 0.028 0.013 0.251 204
Saxonya 1,644.5 0.031 0.013 0.219 325
Schleswig-Holstein 2,179.3 0.040 0.015 0.161 417
Thuringiaa 710.1 0.031 0.013 0.242 178
Federal average 3,096.5 0.038 0.014 0.166 13,923
Note
a Indicates states from the former German Democratic Republic. Total assets in millions of €.
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and it appears that some large banks are located elsewhere. This might indicate
that even for large banks certain regional boundaries exist as they focus on
markets where they are located.
Differences in input prices per state are also illustrated in Table 10.4. As one
might expect labour prices differ considerably between states. This is in line with
the frequently raised claim that the labour force is relatively immobile in
Germany. More surprisingly, the cost of borrowing and especially the cost of
fixed assets also differ substantially between regions. We therefore believe that
accounting for input prices determined differently per region is necessary when
evaluating CE and PE.
10.4.4 A size angle
To highlight the differences between banks of different size consider Table 10.5.
It depicts descriptive statistics for the three input prices according to our four
market definitions of large banks versus small banks.
The upper panel in Table 10.5 displays the three specified input prices for large
banks and the lower panel exhibits input prices for small banks. A comparison
illustrates the difference according to size. As the mean is identical across alter-
native market models it is shown only once for each group and input, respectively.
Large banks appear to pay a substantially higher average price for borrowed
funds, w1, and a somewhat higher average price for fixed assets, w3. In contrast,
mean cost of labour, w2, is substantially lower. While we do not inquire at this
stage into possible explanations we take these descriptive statistics as evidence
that large banks constitute a group of their own. Consequently, our market
definitions take the role of large banks rightfully into account.
In the spirit of the example exhibited in Table 10.2 we also display the differ-
ent standard deviations per bank group and model. In model x.2 the smoothing
effect of the data procedure becomes apparent. For banks of both sizes the stan-
dard deviation of all three input prices is reduced substantially. Note, however,
that this smoothing effect is largest for the group of large banks in model x.2,
where large banks are treated as part of a federal market. In this model, we
emphasise the difference between large and small banks by drawing regionally
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Table 10.5 Input prices across models
Variable Mean SD per model N
x.1 x.2 x.3 x.4
w1 0.050 0.0086 0.0029 0.0086 0.0070 171
w2 0.003 0.0032 0.0010 0.0032 0.0025 171
w3 0.195 0.1371 0.0188 0.1371 0.1041 171
w1 0.038 0.0097 0.0057 0.0057 0.0061 13,752
w2 0.015 0.0063 0.0036 0.0036 0.0039 13,752
w3 0.166 0.1125 0.0600 0.0600 0.0622 13,752
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different market boundaries. But within both groups, markets are assumed to be
perfect in as much as an individual bank’s price is determined by its competitors
prices. Hence, a lower variation in prices is in line with utilising data resembling
more closely the polar case of one single price for each bank.
In contrast, model x.3 allows for some additional market imperfections on
behalf of large banks. We allow large banks to set their own prices and therefore
the standard deviation of this group naturally resembles the variation already seen
in the benchmark case. For smaller banks we continue to assume operations on
nearly perfect markets defined by state and size classes. Thus, their standard
deviation equals the results for model x.2. This model displays the largest overall
variation of prices among all alternatives employing exogenous input prices
because the difference between large and small banks is most pronounced. We
expect it therefore to highlight especially efficiency differences between these
two groups.
Ultimately, we consider in model x.4 the case when large banks are just part of
their local markets. They constitute merely one of the size classes per state.
Therefore, the price variation in this model is in-between the ones found in
models x.3 and x.2, respectively. Regarding the former, variation of input prices
is smaller as the smoothing effect of averaging prices per market decreases the
influence of extreme values, which are included in model x.3. With respect to the
latter, the variation is higher compared to model x.2 because the number of banks
in the large bank size class is in most states very small per year. Hence, the
approach of taking averages of the remaining banks does not have such a
pronounced smoothing effect.
To see the differences in CE and PE estimates due to alternative input price
specifications we turn next to the discussion of our empirical results.
10.5 Empirical findings
We first compare estimation results across cost frontier models 1.1 through 1.4. CE
results from the benchmark model are compared with CE estimates according to the
three market definitions introduced in Section 10.3.3. Our main findings suggest
that, first, CE estimates are most sensitive to the market definition where large
banks possess market power. Second, the development over time is fairly stable but
efficiency differences across regions vary strongly, depending on the cost model
employed. Third, large banks suffer more from cost inefficiencies than small banks.
Next, we provide results from the alternative profit specification. In a nutshell,
mean alternative PE appears to be determined mostly by inefficient output mixes
and is therefore hardly affected by the specification of alternative input prices.
Furthermore, the time pattern exhibits much more volatility than in the cost case.
But geographically, results are less dispersed both between states and models. The
difference between large and small banks in terms of mean PE confirms the
findings from CE – large banks are less efficient.
Finally, we compare CE and PE results from the alternative market definitions
with each other. The most important take-away is that only very few banks
158 Michael Koetter
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manage to achieve simultaneous efficiency and we inspect our results as to identify
the characteristics of these top performers in terms of size, sector and region.
10.5.1 Cost frontier
In this subsection we start by discussing the estimation results, continue with an
inspection of regional and time differences of efficiency and close with a CE
comparison between banks of different size.
10.5.1.1 Estimation results and CE
Table 10.6 depicts parameter estimates for cost frontiers estimated with different
input price specifications, respectively. Model 1.1 depicts the specification with
endogenous prices for each single bank. It therefore represents the benchmark
model and resembles the approach usually employed in efficiency studies. The
results presented for model 1.2, in contrast, employ input prices determined on
several regional markets for small banks and on one federal market for large
banks. Model 1.3 only differs as large banks possess market power in input
markets. Finally, model 1.4 treats all banks as part of their regional market. Large
banks are thus part of one or more size classes within a regional market.
We have employed the cost of borrowed funds, w1, to impose homogeneity in
input prices.17 All specifications exhibit mostly significant parameter estimates at
conventional levels.18 Unfortunately, interpretation of single coefficients is
not straightforward due to interaction terms. We therefore abstain from any
conclusions of this kind and focus on the question whether our models
support the hypothesis that inefficiency explains indeed some of the deviations
from the frontier.
To this end consider the estimate of , the ratio of variation attributable to inef-
ficiency relative to random noise. With the exception of model 1.4 this parame-
ter is significant and different from zero. We therefore conclude that inefficiency
prevails if we assume that large banks constitute a federal market with or without
market power. While  is insignificant in model 1.4 the estimations of this model
are very sensitive to changes of the step lengths. Iterations are already high for a
fairly wide grid and quickly ran out of hand when tightening it. We therefore do
not have much faith that we reached a global maximum. More importantly, it is
not very conceivable from a theoretical viewpoint that no inefficiency prevails in
German banking. On these grounds we discard this specification and conclude
that large banks are not part of local markets and should be modelled to consti-
tute a market of their own across state borders.
Turning attention to the ratio of variation due to inefficiency relative to random
noise, , we note a substantial drop for model 1.2 compared to the traditional
specification with endogenous prices. At the same time total standard deviation,
, is virtually identical between the two models. This implies that the explanatory
power of our model specifying exogenous prices is as good as usually employed
endogenous prices. But a notable result is that fewer banks are deemed
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inefficient, as can be seen by the decline of . Apparently, specification of
endogenous prices overstates inefficiencies. To the extent that this reflects the exis-
tence of input prices determined in local markets this result is in line with studies
mentioned in Section 10.2.2, which find higher efficiency when accounting for
market characteristics.
The results for model 1.3 illustrate that allowing large banks to have some
market power in input markets alters results substantially. From a theoretical
viewpoint this model is interesting because a number of studies on market struc-
ture found monopolistic competition to prevail in Germany (Molyneux et al.,
1994; De Bandt and Davis, 2000; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Hempell, 2004). While
total variation measured by  deteriorates only slightly, the variance due to
inefficiency, , almost doubles. According to our results large banks seem to
contribute to a large extent to the inefficiency found in many studies. In line with
results from Altunbas et al. (2001) large German banks suffer stronger from
inefficiency compared to smaller competitors. Table 10.7 provides mean
efficiency estimates according to the three models under consideration.
The mean efficiency results obtained from our three models reflect the differ-
ences in error parameters discussed earlier. Estimates of CE according to model
1.1 are quite in line with the literature and identify potential savings on the order
of 19 per cent of actually incurred cost. The standard deviation and skew indicate
that many banks are located fairly close to the frontier. But the number of poor
performing banks, sometimes located as far as more than 50 per cent of forgone
cost savings below the efficient frontier, is still substantial. The diversity of per-
formance is further underlined by a difference between best- and worst-performing
banks of 51.6 per cent.
But this spread in efficiency might partly be due to misspecification rather than
identified poor performers. The benchmark frontier estimated with each bank’s
own input prices might be inappropriate. Instead, ‘true’ input prices determined
in local markets should be used to measure efficiency relative to a benchmark
considering local market prices. Accordingly, we expect efficiency estimates to
change.
This is confirmed by mean CE in model 1.2, which is 9 per cent higher. Note,
that the difference between best- and worst-performing banks declines only
moderately. This indicates that model 1.2 still identifies extreme performing
banks, which are of particular interest to regulators. But at the same time,




Table 10.7 Mean cost efficiency estimates, 1994–2001
Model Mean SD Skew Kurt Minimum Maximum N
CE model 1.1 0.817 0.095 1.629 5.978 0.463 0.979 13,923
CE model 1.2 0.907 0.027 4.586 44.057 0.523 0.978 13,923
CE model 1.3 0.730 0.138 0.879 3.401 0.366 0.973 13,923
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Put differently, employing exogenous input prices ‘smoothes’ performance and
highlights extreme performers, especially at the left tail of the CE distribution.
A reason could be that in perfect markets healthy banks gravitate to market
averages whereas those banks close to market exit stand out more clearly as poor
performers.
As noted earlier, other efficiency studies frequently report that large banks are
more inefficient than small banks. However, this result could again be due to
misspecification if large banks’ efficiency should be measured relative to a frontier,
which allows them to possess market power whereas the rest of the banks do not.
In model 1.3 we therefore allow this group explicitly to have market power in
German input markets. Interestingly, mean CE drops to a level of 73 per cent and
the efficiency scores are further dispersed. While most banks are still located close
to the frontier the extreme performers are situated very far away from it.
The results underline that the assumptions underlying the specification of input
prices affect mean efficiency considerably. But they also influence relative
efficiency as measured by the banks’ respective rankings. To learn more about the
changes in rankings when altering input price specifications we present in
Table 10.8 rank–order correlations measured by Spearman’s  for each year. We
are most interested in the changes of efficiency relative to the benchmark model.
Therefore, we provide only the comparison with results from model 1.1.
Note that both alternative measures are significantly and positively correlated
with CE rankings on the basis of model 1.1, that is when employing endogenous
input prices. However, as rankings are not perfectly correlated we conclude that
our measures of exogenous prices do not identify the same banks as best and worst
performers. This is in line with what we would expect from accounting for differ-
ent markets by employing respective markets’ prices. Some banks traditionally
identified as poor performers might be outliers due to misspecification. While our
measures of efficiency tend to yield by and large similar rankings they seem to
contain additional information, especially in the tail of the efficiency distribution.
Thus, regulators might find this approach useful when answering the question,
which banks deserve heightened attention in order to allocate their resources.
10.5.1.2 CE over time and across regions
To understand more of the dynamics of CE consider Table 10.9. It depicts the
differences of mean cost efficiencies for each model over time. In addition,
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Table 10.8 Spearman’s  for CE relative to model 1.1
Model 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CE model 1.2 0.519** 0.514** 0.556** 0.568** 0.611** 0.684** 0.636** 0.645**
CE model 1.3 0.447** 0.408** 0.450** 0.492** 0.527** 0.601** 0.581** 0.600**
Note
** Significant at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test).
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we provide a simple accounting-based cost performance measure, namely the
cost–income ratios (C–I ratios).
In contrast to the traditional key performance C–I ratios the development of CE
over time in Table 10.9 exhibits hardly any changes for models 1.1 and 1.2. This
indicates that accounting ratios could deliver an incomplete picture of perfor-
mance. If increasing competition squeezes interest margins for all banks in the
market, C–I ratios naturally rise. However, how well a single bank has been able
to convert inputs into outputs cannot be assessed. Our results suggest that the
ability of banks to perform this task changed little over time. In contrast, the C–I
ratio deteriorates overall and fluctuates considerably. This indicates to us that
additional information is contained in CE measures from all models.
Regarding geographical differences in CE, the ‘smoothing’ effect of employing
exogenous prices for all banks is clear from Table 10.10.
The difference between the best- and worst-performing states in model 1.2 is a
mere 5.5 per cent and only one state, namely Berlin, is out of line. This underlines
once more the feature of this model to identify extreme performers as outliers
while allowing most banks to be close to average efficiency. The more hetero-
geneous picture that emerges from CE scores according to model 1.1 is further
pronounced by CE results for model 1.3. This could imply that state performance
is largely driven by the number of large banks. Note, however, that a state with
many large banks is not per se deemed inefficient. For example the decline in
mean CE for Hesse, with almost half of all large banks, is far less than the decline
in Berlin, which hosts only few large banks.
Note also, that to a certain extent an ‘East’-effect can be identified. New states
are, with very few exceptions, below the federal average. This suggests that
structural deficiencies still have an impact and should be considered when
specifying a cost frontier. As we focus on the impact of input price specification,
we postpone investigation of this issue until further research. From a regional
perspective another interesting result is that so-called city states, for example
Hamburg, exhibit below average CE. Especially if the share of total assets com-
manded by large banks is high, as is the case for Berlin, this holds true. This might
reflect findings in the US efficiency literature that regional risk-diversification
improves the efficiency of banks.
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Table 10.9 Mean CE over time (%)
Year CE model 1.1 CE model 1.2 CE model 1.3 C–I ratio
1994 80.83 90.56 68.53 79.2
1995 82.55 90.93 72.50 76.8
1996 82.21 90.88 73.16 76.3
1997 81.47 90.70 73.90 77.2
1998 81.93 90.73 75.02 70.0
1999 82.61 90.83 75.55 80.4
2000 80.92 90.33 72.50 83.7
2001 81.11 90.31 71.18 88.2
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10.5.1.3 CE from the size perspective
When we inspect individual efficiency estimates more closely, we find that
bigger banks are still at the lower end of efficiency scores in German banking.
Let us therefore turn to some details of efficiency differences between banks of
different size. We also suggest a method to assess the implications for foregone
cost savings of measured inefficiencies.
Specifically, it appears that large banks contribute to a large extent to measured
cost inefficiencies. We therefore investigate the difference in means between
large and small banks in all of our three models in Table 10.11.19
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Table 10.10 Mean CE across states (%)
State CE model 1.1 CE model 1.2 CE model 1.3
Baden-Wuerttemberg 81.18 90.62 74.11
Bavaria 83.75 90.87 74.89
Berlina 68.56 85.83 56.29
Brandenburga 71.92 89.94 66.82
Bremen 82.01 91.41 73.07
Hamburg 78.54 90.57 67.81
Hesse 78.20 90.02 68.61
Mecklenburg-Western 77.05 90.66 75.74
Pomeraniaa
Lower Saxony 85.65 91.41 76.20
North Rhine-Westphalia 84.19 91.04 73.48
Rhineland-Palatinate 83.61 90.86 73.85
Saarland 81.93 90.80 72.82
Saxony-Anhalta 73.13 90.07 70.93
Saxonya 68.47 89.03 62.66
Schleswig-Holstein 83.11 90.88 72.98
Thuringiaa 73.58 89.76 68.45
Federal average 81.70 90.70 73.00
Note
a Indicates states from the former German Democratic Republic.
Table 10.11 Cost efficiency differences
Model Group Mean (%) SD N t-testa
1.1 Large banks 63.5 0.142 171 16.89**
1.1 Small banks 82.0 0.092 13,752
1.2 Large banks 83.9 0.092 171 9.82**
1.2 Small banks 90.8 0.024 13,752
1.3 Large banks 37.8 0.037 171 16.07**
1.3 Small banks 73.4 0.133 13,752
Notes
a Two-tailed.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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For all three models the difference in means is significantly different from zero.
In our model 1.1 most large banks are located far away from the frontier, while
for small banks the opposite holds – the majority is located fairly close to full
efficiency. By employing our firm-specific CE results we calculate average
potential savings per bank and year of €12 million and total average annual
savings of €20.7 billion for all banks in our sample.20 In line with the distribution
of efficiency almost half of these potential savings, namely €10.1 billion, accrue
among large banks, owing to below average CE of 63.5 per cent in model 1.1. It
follows that the marginal benefits to society are larger when regulators focus on
improving the efficiency of relatively few large banks.
However, these efficiency results might be biased due to the use of endogenous
prices and, as model 1.2 suggests, overstate the losses due to wasteful employ-
ment of inputs. In model 1.2 this difference between large and small banks’
performance still exists. But the gap between the two groups declines to 7 per cent
as opposed to 18.5 per cent in model 1.1. Consequently, annual average savings
per bank amount to only €6.7 million and the total of potential annual savings
drops to €11.7 billion. Nevertheless, the share of potential savings for the group
of large banks even increases as the total amounts to €6.7 billion and now
accounts for more than half of total potential savings. Results from this specifi-
cation therefore confirm the claim that efficiency estimates might be overstated.
But they also confirm the notion that the waste of inputs at large banks deserves
more attention both in terms of relative efficiency and in terms of absolute
amounts of money wasted.21
In model 1.3 the difference in CE between large and small banks is most
drastic, amounting to almost 40 per cent difference in means. More importantly,
many inefficient banks are large, so that foregone potential savings are highest.
Annual average savings are almost twice as high as in model 1.1, reaching the
order of €22.6 million. Accordingly, too much total costs spent compared to fully
efficient use of inputs sum to €39.4 billion. We note that out of 171 large bank
observations only 39 referred to large commercial banks while 83 banks are either
central cooperative or central savings banks.22 Thus, commercial large banks did
certainly not excel in terms of efficiency but the lion’s share of ‘wasteful’ bank-
ing business on the input side occurred with large public banks. This is in line
with conventional wisdom from press reports, for example on spectacular failings
of investments and fraud accusations at WestLB, Germany’s largest Landesbank.
This illustrates the need to account for the distribution of top and flop performers.
If, as in our sample, the majority of wasteful resource utilisation occurs at large
banks the social cost are substantially higher.
In sum, we conclude that specification of endogenous input prices affects CE
estimates. Large banks should be treated as operating on a federal market of their
own. The approach to treat this large bank market as perfectly competitive leads
to higher mean CE, which exhibits little fluctuation over both time and states. In
turn, the alternative to treat the large bank market as imperfect in the sense of
possessing pricing power amplifies existing differences between CE in different
years and states. We carefully note that some evidence from the literature on bank
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market structure suggests modelling large banks as having some pricing power.
However, a more conservative conclusion is that further theoretical work is
needed to make this choice. As opposed to this general result we conclude in all
cost model specifications that large banks suffer stronger from cost inefficiency.
In particular, the number of inefficient, large public banks is fairly high. Finally,
we note that the distribution of inefficiency across size groups drives the absolute
euro amount of foregone savings. It simply matters if some small cooperative is
wasting 30 per cent of its actual cost or if Deutsche Bank does.
But before we come to a final conclusions on the performance of German
banks, we note that the ability to manage costs efficiently is of course only one
perspective of evaluation. The second perspective refers to the revenue dimension
and we therefore turn now to our results from the specifications of alternative
profit models.
10.5.2 Alternative profit frontier
With the alternative profit approach we investigate banks’ abilities to use input
and output quantities as efficiently as possible in order to maximise profits. When
discussing the results we follow the order in previous sections. First, we provide
an overview of estimation results and overall efficiency. Second, we display
the dynamics over time and region. Finally, we provide a comparison of alternative
PE between banks of different size.
10.5.2.1 Estimation results and alternative PE
Analogous to the cost frontier analysis we specify four different models, model 2.1
through 2.4, to estimate alternative profit frontiers that reflect the market
definitions discussed in Section 10.3.3.
Alternative PE depicts the deviation from the efficient frontier due to sub-optimal
input quantity and output price choices and indicates the percentage of actually
realised profits relative to profits that could have been realised. Table 10.12 presents
parameter estimates according to our four models for the efficient frontier,
respectively.
While the number of insignificant parameters is higher compared to the cost
frontiers all four alternative profit models still yield an acceptable number of
parameter estimates significantly different from zero. The inclusion of time trend
variables describes our data well and the coefficients for t and t2 indicate that
technological improvement had a marginally decreasing positive effect on prof-
its.23 Note, however, that the total error is roughly three times larger compared to
the cost case. This indicates that our alternative profit model is less suited to
explain profits. At the same time, the estimated variation due to inefficiency
instead of random noise is substantially higher. This indicates that banks are less
successful to generate profits compared to their cost management skills. The
adequacy to formulate a frontier is confirmed by a significant estimate of .
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Therefore, an average response function given by OLS estimates is inferior to the
formulation of a stochastic frontier for our data.
A striking observation is the stability of results across all four models. Neither
total variance, , nor the ratio of inefficiency over random noise, , varies
tremendously. We observe only a minuscule improvement of  in our three exoge-
nous specifications 2.2 through 2.4 compared to the traditionally used approach,
indicating that the explanatory power benefits only marginally from our alterna-
tive approaches. This suggests that while inefficiencies measured on the input
side are rather sensitive to the measurement of input prices, alternative profit
inefficiencies appear to result mainly from poor skills in output markets, that is,
in taking advantage of the bank’s pricing opportunity set. To get a picture of
alternative inefficiency according to our models Table 10.13 presents some
descriptive statistics.
As already indicated by parameter estimates for the error term, alternative PE
is substantially higher than CE, averaging 42 per cent in all four specifications.
This implies that the average bank could have realised almost twice the actually
accrued profits if it had chosen optimal input and output mixes. These results
suggest that inefficiencies arising on the output side of a bank’s business out-
weigh those occurring on the input side alone. The distribution of inefficiency
differs in two respects markedly from that of cost inefficiencies. First of all, most
banks are no longer located close to the frontier. Instead, a substantial portion of
the entire population is far below best practice behaviour and tails are quite fat.
Second, the distribution of alternative PE across our four models does hardly
change. This indicates that variation of alternative PE is hardly affected by the
specification of exogenous input prices. Consequently, sub-optimal behaviour on
the input side is of lesser importance as most of the estimated inefficiencies arise
from sub-optimal output choices.
In addition we see that the differences of alternative PE between German banks
are much larger. Best- and worst-performing firms differ by as much as 70 per cent.
One might hypothesise that the larger difference between good and bad banks is
partly due to a higher volatility of earnings compared to the volatility of cost. To
illustrate this thought, consider two banks that choose to engage more heavily
in riskier production plans, for example, by investing in OBS. More specifically,
let the two banks speculate on foreign exchange appreciation and depreciation,
respectively. Depending on what ‘bet’ materialises this could lead to identifica-
tion of one very profit efficient and one strongly inefficient bank. In contrast, on
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Table 10.13 Alternative profit efficiency estimates, 1994–2001
Model Mean SD Skew Kurt Minimum Maximum N
PE model 2.1 0.574 0.194 0.225 1.916 0.257 0.964 13,388
PE model 2.2 0.584 0.193 0.266 1.979 0.257 0.964 13,388
PE model 2.3 0.583 0.194 0.263 1.982 0.256 0.964 13,388
PE model 2.4 0.583 0.193 0.246 1.965 0.260 0.964 13,388
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the expense side of the income statement interest rates, wages and rents are
specified in contracts and are therefore less volatile.
While the different nature of various output choices could potentially help to
explain larger spreads in profit compared to CE, we would at the same time
expect such “lucky draws” to average out over time. We therefore investigated our
results more closely to see if poor performers in one year tended to be good
performers in another. It turns out that this is not the case – banks exhibiting a
poor ability to realise their chances in output markets do so consistently over
time. We therefore infer that the fundamental ability of banks to realise profits is
more diverse compared to CE. But note also that, a part of this diversity could
represent varying degrees of market power. If market power depends partly on
size we would expect to identify small banks as more profit inefficient.
To discuss these thoughts further let us therefore turn to a closer investigation
of alternative PE from the perspectives of region and size, respectively.
10.5.2.2 Alternative PE over time and across regions
To examine the time pattern of our estimates consider Table 10.14. PE exhibits a
much more volatile development over time compared to mean CEs. The minuscule
differences between our four models become apparent as all three specifications
employing exogenous input prices result in an almost parallel shift of the frontier,
resulting in PE improvements of a mere 1 per cent. However, the steep increase
during the first three years and the following downward trend is in line with the
development of mean return on equity (ROE). Thus, alternative PE is generally in
line with accounting indicators.
Regarding the geographical pattern we refer to Table 10.15. Note, that alterna-
tive PE is more stable across specifications compared to the cost case. All states
are ranked identically under almost any model. In addition, the ‘East’-effect is
more pronounced. With the exception of Saxony-Anhalt all eastern states perform
poorest in Germany, albeit with lower deviation from the federal average com-
pared to the cost case. Apparently, the ability to generate profits has been lower
in these states even after 5–12 years after German unification in 1989. This could
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Table 10.14 Mean profit efficiency over time
PE model PE model PE model PE model ROE (%)
2.1 (%) 2.2 (%) 2.3 (%) 2.4 (%)
1994 53.60 54.02 54.08 54.07 11.63
1995 59.13 59.73 59.76 59.76 12.16
1996 60.79 61.32 61.42 61.40 12.49
1997 59.39 60.41 60.43 60.32 11.67
1998 56.46 57.57 57.49 57.45 16.79
1999 56.57 57.36 57.34 57.25 9.35
2000 56.97 58.18 58.03 58.04 8.58
2001 55.58 57.58 57.39 57.39 6.51
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reflect that the identification of successful investment opportunities, solvent
debtors and prospering business continues to be more difficult in the new states.24
The combination of little knowledge of local market conditions and less experience
and, hence, expertise in banking core competencies, such as risk assessment,
could then have been the reason for below average performance.
The observed poorer CE performance of banks located in city states does not
apply to alternative PE. With the exception of Berlin all other city states seem to
perform close to the federal average. This suggests that banks are less restricted
as to where to sell their products, thereby suffering from no apparent risk-
diversification loss, but incur some efficiency losses due to prevailing restrictions
on their input markets.
Let us now turn to the question if an ‘East’-effect can be detected. Table 10.16
clearly indicates that independent of the assumed market form the difference
between banks in East or West Germany is significant and amounts to
approximately 6 per cent.
Accounting for different input markets might capture local market conditions
to some degree. But we suspect that some of this efficiency gap is still attribut-
able to more adverse macroeconomic conditions in the new states. When exam-
ining the time trend of the efficiency gap, our data exhibits convergence between
‘new’ and ‘old’ states. For example in model 2.3 this gap amounts to 16 per cent
in 1994 and drops to 5 per cent in 2001. We interpret this decline of the East–West
gap as evidence that specifying exogenous input prices alone cannot explain all
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Table 10.15 Mean profit efficiency across states
State PE model PE model PE model PE model 
2.1 (%) 2.2 (%) 2.3 (%) 2.4 (%)
Baden-Wuerttemberg 55.00 56.28 56.28 56.02
Bavaria 55.89 56.93 56.87 56.85
Berlina 42.33 50.83 48.18 47.80
Brandenburga 54.80 55.94 56.00 55.90
Bremen 56.72 55.42 55.26 55.37
Hamburg 53.31 54.30 54.82 54.11
Hesse 55.13 55.71 55.66 55.41
Mecklenburg-Western 54.82 56.96 57.19 57.29
Pomeraniaa
Lower Saxony 62.72 63.20 63.25 63.26
North Rhine-Westphalia 62.79 63.07 63.10 63.46
Rhineland-Palatinate 59.68 60.12 60.10 59.96
Saarland 55.19 55.83 55.77 55.57
Saxony-Anhalta 59.80 61.40 61.55 61.64
Saxonya 42.61 44.01 43.94 43.88
Schleswig-Holstein 61.21 63.27 63.27 63.29
Thuringiaa 51.30 53.56 53.61 53.56
Federal average 57.44 58.37 58.34 58.31
Note
a Indicates states from the former German Democratic Republic.
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efficiency differences. It underlines once more the importance to improve ways
to account for regional difference, for example, with respect to macroeconomic
variables per region. Moreover, it underlines the importance to use also output
prices specified along alternative market definitions in order to test whether
market power on the output side of banking business is indeed an appropriate
assumption.
10.5.2.3 Alternative PE from the size perspective
We investigate differences in mean alternative PE between banks of different size
to examine if these differences in alternative PE can be attributed to large banks
possessing more market power. We do so for all of our models to see if any qual-
itative differences exist between different specifications, which has been absent
so far. To this end consider Table 10.17.
While the distributional properties depicted in Table 10.13 do not reveal any
particular difference between our models a closer look at alternative PE for large
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Table 10.16 Alternative profit efficiency – East versus West
Model Group Mean (%) SD N t-testa
2.1 West 58.1 0.189 12,310 10.76**
2.1 East 50.3 0.228 1,078
2.2 West 58.9 0.188 12,310 8.29**
2.2 East 52.8 0.234 1,078
2.3 West 58.8 0.189 12,310 8.64**
2.3 East 52.5 0.233 1,078
2.4 West 58.8 0.189 12,310 8.96**
2.4 East 52.5 0.232 1,078
Notes
a Two-tailed.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 10.17 Alternative profit efficiency of large versus small banks
Model Group Mean (%) SD N t-testa
2.1 Large banks 40.8 0.218 165 9.89**
2.1 Small banks 57.6 0.193 13,223
2.2 Large banks 59.0 0.269 165 0.29
2.2 Small banks 58.4 0.192 13,223
2.3 Large banks 64.1 0.311 165 2.42*
2.3 Small banks 58.3 0.191 13,223
2.4 Large banks 56.0 0.295 165 1.01
2.4 Small banks 58.3 0.192 13,223
Notes
a Two-tailed.
* Significant at the 5 percent level.
** Significant at the 1 percent level.
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versus small banks yields a slightly different picture. Note that, the benchmark
model 2.1 identifies large banks as suffering more from inefficiencies, in particular
a marked difference of 17 per cent between mean PE of small versus large banks.
While identical to the findings in Section 10.5.1 this result is counterintuitive.
Recall that our profit frontier models banks to exert market power on output
markets. We hypothesise that large banks enjoy more market power and that
smaller banks face a more restrictive pricing opportunity set. Therefore, one
would expect that in terms of alternative PE large banks should exhibit better
performance. As can be seen from our models utilising exogenous input
prices results the difference between large and small banks changes considerably.
While model 2.2, assuming perfect competition for all banks, already places
the two groups close to each other we cannot reject the hypothesis that
their means are equal. Thus, the difference of 0.6 per cent cannot be asserted.
However, model 2.3, which allows large banks to possess market power in input
markets as well, highlights a moderate and significant difference in performance
of 6 per cent. This implies that even if both overall mean efficiency estimates and
the distribution of efficiency are left fairly unaffected by specifying exogenous
input prices, some groups might still be identified wrongly as culprits or role
models.25
Let us for this reason examine the absolute waste of profits in model 2.1 and
model 2.3, respectively. Average annual profits a bank could have earned in
addition to actually realised profits amount to €17 million.26 Total annual savings
sum to €28.4 billion for all banks in the sample with profits above zero. When
summing potential additional profits for large banks only, our alternative PE
estimates yield an impressive €18.1 billion, thereby leading to a share of wasted
profits attributable to large banks of 63 per cent. This is considerably higher
compared to the cost case. However, when utilising efficiency estimates from our
model 2.3 the picture changes somewhat. Annual average profits per bank that
have been left on the road decline to €15.2 million and total annual average
savings are reduced to €25.3 billion.
We conclude that while mean industry efficiency, time and geographical
pattern do not seem to be strongly distorted, the use of endogenous input prices
still yield overstated losses due to sub-optimal output choices. But the observation
that the most substantial share of waste, approximately 60 per cent, lies with large
banks is still confirmed. Annual savings of this group alone still count for
€15.3 billion. Hence, while relative efficiency measures between the two groups
lead to a higher mean efficiency of bigger banks, the absolute waste of this group
still dominates foregone profits of smaller institutes.
Thus, the inference from CE estimates is confirmed that the public interest
should focus on large banks even if they enjoy higher relative efficiency. A final
note is rewarded when comparing absolute waste due to too high costs incurred
versus potential profits foregone. While the higher importance of alternative PE
is reflected also by absolutely higher savings it is important to realise that the
dramatic differences between relative efficiency scores are mitigated when exam-
ining absolute amounts of potential savings. To obtain a complete picture of
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performance we therefore note that it is important to examine not only relative
efficiency scores but also associated absolute savings.
10.5.3 Comparison of CE and alternative PE
To identify well-managed banking firms we are interested in those banks, which
handle their costs and profits simultaneously optimal. We therefore compare our
efficiency results in Table 10.18.
The low positive correlation implies that only the minority of banks is able to
reach optimal behaviour in both the profit and cost dimension at the same time.
It appears that initiatives which focus only on revenue generation, for example by
means of acquiring new business lines, or cost reductions, for example by laying
off employees, are not sufficient to become a successful player. Banks need to
adjust both levers in order to stay ahead of their competitors.
We examine some characteristics of those banks that are simultaneously cost
and profit efficient versus those that are both cost and profit inefficient. To this
end we construct a combined ranking.27
In terms of geographical pattern the distribution of best performers is quite
representative for the total sample. Notable exceptions are the two states
where the vast majority of cooperative banks are located, namely Bavaria
and Baden-Wuerttemberg. But at the same time these two states also only host
under-proportionally few worst-performing banks. Hence, we might say that
southern German banks do not excel but at the same time provide stable, average
banking services to their customers. The states facing a higher number of banks
performing badly compared to the federal average are Berlin and Hesse. For the
former it is especially the Berliner Bankgesellschaft which contributes to this
result. It follows that results from bank efficiency analysis with exogenous prices
could assist regulators to identify problem banks earlier and thereby reduce social
costs to society.
In terms of size, we find that average total assets for the top 10 per cent of
banks in this ranking are close to the sample average, namely €3.2 billion for the
former group versus €3.1 billion for the latter. In contrast, the group of simulta-
neous poor performers commands average total assets of €37.9 billion. Hence, it
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2.1 0.323 0.266 0.347
2.2 0.322 0.196 0.319
2.3 0.296 0.207 0.298
2.4 0.316 0.215 0.314
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appears once more that bigger banks face stronger problems to attain both
frontiers at the same time.
In terms of banking sector local public banks dominate the group of successful
performers in absolute terms – 94 out of 133 banks are either cooperative or
savings banks. But this is below the share of local public banks in the total sam-
ple, hence, this group is still under-represented. The sector identified as relatively
most successful to manage cost and profits are real estate banks, that is, building
societies and mortgage banks.28 Among the 10 per cent of lowest combined rank-
ings commercial banks are clearly over-represented compared to the sample.
While they account for 57 per cent of the low performance group they only
represent a mere 7.5 per cent of the total population. Hence, our results confirm
previous findings in bank efficiency research for Germany that this group
deserves particular attention. The second group of banks identified as loosing out
are public central banks. This finding provides evidence that the German system
of Landesbanks might not be desirable from the viewpoint of efficiency.
10.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we address a measurement error of input prices that leads to biased
bank efficiency analyses. We compare efficiency results from a traditional cost
and alternative profit frontier with efficiency results when utilising exogenous
input prices for German banks. We suggest three possible approaches to define
markets in order to determine exogenous input prices. We define markets
according to region and size and assume that banks face prices determined by
their competitors in respective markets.
Our results lead us to the primary conclusion that efficiency estimates are
affected by alternative input price specifications. Therefore, future efficiency
research needs to account for this potential misspecification error. However, the
influence on CE is markedly higher compared to the impact on alternative PE.
The measurement of inefficiencies relative to a cost frontier leads us to conclude
that large banks operate on a federal market when competing for inputs. The influ-
ence on CE depends on whether we allow large banks to possess market power or
not. If large banks face a competitive federal market average CE is slightly
enhanced. To a certain extent this is in line with findings in the literature that spec-
ification of the frontier, taking into account regional market characteristics, leads to
higher efficiency compared to benchmarking against a common frontier without
regional characteristics. However, we also model large banks to possess market
power in input markets as some studies suggest that bigger banks enjoy some price
setting opportunities. This approach leads to reduced average efficiency and we
conclude that more theoretical work is needed to determine which assumption is
appropriate. Independent from the model employed we identify large banks to
suffer stronger than small banks from inefficient input use. Within this group
central savings and cooperative banks account for the largest number of banks.
In addition, our results suggest that public local banks are superior cost man-
agers compared to commercial banks. From our regional information we are able
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to conclude that a weak ‘East’-effect prevails. New states host banks that are less
capable to produce outputs with optimal input usage. This result indicates that
specifying input prices on the basis of markets defined by size and region does
not capture all relevant information. Instead, specification of an efficient frontier
is presumably enhanced further when employing local market characteristics.
We also examine banks’ abilities to realise opportunities in their output markets
by employing the alternative profit approach. Banks are allowed to set output
prices subject to a pricing opportunity set and we find that inefficiencies on the
basis of foregone profits dominate those arising from sub-optimal input use. But
regarding the impact of different input price specifications we observe that mean
PE is hardly affected. We conclude that if banks have market power in output
markets, arising inefficiencies are predominantly due to sub-optimal use of the
bank’s pricing opportunity set rather than inefficient input usage. But while mean
PE appears to be largely unchanged at first sight we note that the composition of
top and worst performers is affected by the use of our alternative models. More
specifically, we find that large banks enjoy higher mean efficiency if measured
with exogenously determined input prices. This implies that bigger banks are
more efficient in utilising their pricing opportunity set. At the same time our
calculations of absolute savings, that is, inefficiency in terms of euro instead of
percentages, puts the seemingly drastic dominance of profit inefficiency over cost
inefficiency into perspective. While relative mean efficiency of the former type
equals 58 per cent for virtually all models, the according mean CE for our model
using traditional input prices amounts to 82 per cent. The dominance of the
former becomes less spectacular when comparing total average annual savings of
€28.4 billion in foregone profits with €20.7 billion of total average annual cost
savings. Thus, we point out the importance to examine absolute wastes implied
by estimated efficiency scores in order to obtain a complete picture where to
focus attention in the German banking landscape.
With respect to a comparison of CE and PE our results indicate that only a few
banks manage to be simultaneously cost and profit efficient. We identify espe-
cially banks of average size located in western states as successful. While local
public banks are represented in this top performer group in line with their sample
share, especially specialised banks can be found to be efficient in both
dimensions over-proportionately.
In sum, we find that our approach to compare alternatively specified input
prices complements findings of other German efficiency studies. Our estimations
suggest that regional information is an important ingredient in SFA. Further
research using additional and more detailed regional data is needed in order to
tighten the grid to identify those banking groups, which require heightened atten-
tion by scarce resources of regulatory authorities. A related area for future
research refers to the identification of the ‘best’ model. As the models we employ
are not nested we are unfortunately not able to statistically test for the ‘correct’
model, for example by means of a log–likelihood ratio test. Consequently, we
require more research on the market structure of both input and output markets to
foot our empirical investigation on theoretically more solid grounds.
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Here, we restrict ourselves to pointing out the differences from alternative
assumptions on underlying market structures and the effects of employing exoge-
nous input prices. Ideally, we can model input markets in the future explicitly in
order to estimate equilibrium prices and combine such results with efficiency
research.
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Notes
1 Recent applications include for example Akhigbe and McNulty (2003), focusing on
profit efficiency of small banks, DeYoung et al. (2001), incorporating risk into
efficiency measurement, or Berger and Mester (2003) who decompose erosion of US
banks performance into static and dynamic efficiency changes.
2 A review of the earlier efficiency literature for European banking markets can be found
in Molyneux et al. (1997). Recent country studies are for example focusing on
transitional or less developed banking systems (Canhoto and Dermine 2003, Hasan
and Marton 2003), particular types of banks such as universal (Rime and Stiroh, 2003)
or savings banks (Prior, 2003) or on the influence of new income sources on efficiency
(Tortosa-Ausina, 2003).
3 Dividing interest expenses by borrowed funds provides an example found in virtually
each study.
4 Due to the lack of factor market data we are not able to estimate equilibrium input
prices.
5 Their variables are: income per capita, salary per capita, population density, density of
demand, income per branch, deposit per branch, branches per capita, branch density,
equity over total assets and return over equity.
6 For an extensive discussion of possible models of bank production see Freixas and
Rochet (1997).
7 This extreme outlier exists in all years and reflects the spectacular almost-failure of
Berliner Bankgesellschaft.
8 Greene (1993) surveys the majority of alternative distributions used in studies to model
inefficiency. In our application we also tested the half-normal model with truncation at
. We rejected the model as the estimate of  was not significantly different from zero
in all models.
9 Note, that we argue that all factor costs should be the result of such a market clearing
process, not only FA.
10 The three pillars are (private) commercial banks (mutual) cooperative banks and (state-
owned) savings banks.
11 In addition to this regulatory enforcement some recent studies addressed the existence
of regional markets by means of spatial competition models. For example Park and
Pennacchi (2004) present a theoretical model with different price finding mechanisms
in deposit and loan markets for large and small banks operating in one or more regional
markets. While their model cannot readily be used to derive exogenous prices more
rigorously, their findings provide further evidence that our approach to define markets
on the basis of size and region is a promising start to measure the impact of misspecified
input prices on bank efficiency.
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12 For private banks this includes especially the group of banks reported by the
Bundesbank as ‘Kreditbanken’ and includes also so-called ‘Privatbanken’, where
regional specialisation is voluntary. As mentioned, the regional demarcation of
activities of public banks is enforced.
13 This is approximately equal to the top 1 per cent of banks in terms of total assets.
14 Some banks prepare annual reports according to, first, international standards such as
GAAP or IAS, second, a report for tax authorities and third, a report on the basis of the
Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB for stakeholders.
15 For the alternative profit model the sample size is reduced to 13,388 observations with
non-negative profits.
16 Unfortunately, no data are available on a lower level, for example, municipality or county.
17 We tested whether our results are indeed insensitive to the choice of input price to
impose homogeneity restrictions. Therefore, we also estimated all models using w2 and
w3, respectively. In line with what one would expect results are virtually identical.
18 To test each specification’s sensitivity to changes in iteration intervals for the function,
slope and intercept when maximising the likelihood function we checked results by
starting with a step length of 0.01 and decreased the intervals incrementally until a step
length of 0.000001. With the exception of model 1.4 results did not change recognisably
in terms of significance and coefficients. We are therefore confident that we have
reached global maxima, respectively.
19 Due to the high share of public banks in Germany we also examined the differences
between central and local public banks versus commercial and specialised banks. It
turned out that public banks enjoyed significantly lower mean cost efficiency on the
order of 8 per cent.
20 Potential cost savings per bank are calculated according to TOCSavkt  [(1  CEkt) *
TOCkt].
21 Average operating costs for big banks amount to 1,603.7 while they are only around
27.9 for small banks. That is, a 10 basis point improvement in efficiency at an average
big bank would approximately require a 6 per cent improvement in efficiency for an
average small bank.
22 The remaining 49 observations were specialised institutes.
23 We conduct for all cost and alternative profit models log–likelihood ratio tests whether
a specification without time trend variables is more appropriate. In all cases the
reduced model is rejected at conventional significance levels.
24 Alternatively, our benchmark might be biased by fitting a frontier through banks
operating in both East and West. A remedy could be to include state specific variables
reflecting macroeconomic conditions. But as mentioned earlier we postpone this avenue
of research and focus for the moment on the effects of input price specification only.
25 Of course, a significant difference in means does not allow any conclusion about the
dominance of one model over the other per se. Because the alternative profit models
are not nested, likelihood ratio tests are inappropriate to identify the ‘correct’ model.
We therefore have to evaluate the theoretical assumptions underlying these models to
decide which one most appropriately describes the situation at hand.
26 We calculate average annual profits foregone according to the sum of optimal profits
for each bank less the sum of actually realised profits, divided by the number of all
banks in the sample, that is, [kt (PBTkt / PEkt  PBTkt)]/N.
27 The combined rank is calculated as the sum of the rank resulting from CE according
to model 1.3 and the rank resulting from PE according to model 2.3.
28 While this result could indicate that a higher degree of specialisation leads to improved
efficiency we like to caution before drawing such a strong conclusion. The reason is
that this performance could also emanate from fitting a frontier with some extreme
outliers like specialised banks. An alternative could be to estimate banking sector
specific frontiers and envelop these with a metafrontier as done by Bos and Schmiedel
(2003) for country specific frontiers.
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The Netherlands has one of the world’s most concentrated banking sectors. The
four largest banks together hold domestic market shares in various financial retail
markets between approximately 75% and 80%. Some policymakers and financial
analysts regularly point to the alleged detrimental effect of this high level of con-
centration on competition. It is sometimes also argued that this concentration
poses a threat to financial stability, because if one of these large banks were to
fail, the implications for the financial system would be disastrous.
In this chapter we seek to make the necessary differentiations to existing studies
and opinions on the relationship between concentration and competition in retail
banking. First, we feel that the theoretical foundation of the few empirical studies
on European banking has methodological shortcomings.
Second, the quality and the availability of the European banking data required
for testing the theoretical notions are rather poor. Apart from the questionable
theoretical underpinnings, the outcomes of empirical studies must consequently
be assessed with great caution. It is therefore unwise to formulate policy conclusions
or recommendations based on these questionable findings.
In light of these shortcomings and omissions in the existing literature on
European banking, this chapter proposes a much more pragmatic approach. The
key point is that the underlying dynamics in banking are neglected in many stud-
ies. Theoretical views and empirical studies must be supplemented with a con-
siderable amount of practical knowledge regarding the current state of affairs in
banking. While our proposed amendments to the existing literature will be placed
in the context of the Netherlands, the considerations we present are equally
applicable for other banking systems.
This chapter is structured in the following manner. Section 11.2 provides a
brief survey of the theoretical literature on concentration and competition.
Section 11.3 presents a critical assessment of the existing empirical research on
these topics for European banking industries and highlights the shortcomings of
the theoretical concepts and empirical studies. Section 11.4 looks at the practical
experience of bankers on these aspects. As will be discussed, existing theoretical
and empirical studies cannot take into account the complexity in the banking
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industry. For instance, banks compete in different retail markets at the same time
and it is important to distinguish between the front and back office of banks.
Scale in the production and processing is key for banks to afford the mounting
investments in information and communication technology (ICT) applications.
This is why banks follow strategies such as multi-distribution, insourcing,
outsourcing and co-sourcing. The result is an increasing market share and concentra-
tion ratio. Another key development is the breakdown of entry barriers over the last
decades. The emergence of many intermediaries and non-banks is a clear reflection
of this. Retail banks also aim to distinguish themselves from their competitors by
maintaining or creating a different image. Through this diverging behaviour they try
to attract different market and/or customer segments. However, if there was a lack of
competition, banks would not – be forced to – focus so intensively on strategic posi-
tioning issues. Finally, one cannot ignore the most important aspect: The assessment
of customers regarding the price and quality of financial services. Our practical
extensions also contain messages for policymakers. If competition authorities and
supervisors were to pursue policies based on rigid measures of concentration and
competition, they would undermine rather than support financial stability.
11.2 Theories and studies of competition and
concentration in European banking
The literature on the measurement of competition can be divided into two major
strands: (1) structural models (2) nonstructural models.
11.2.1 Structural models
The structural approach to modelling competition consists of the Structure–
Conduct–Performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis, as well as
a number of formal approaches that are rooted in Industrial Organisation theory.
These models have been frequently applied in empirical estimations, even though
they lack a formal theoretical derivation. The difference between the SCP and the
efficiency hypothesis is shown in Figure 11.1.
Formally, the difference between the SCP paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis
can be demonstrated by the following equation:
(11.1)
ij represents a measure of performance of company i in the j’s market. CRj is a
measure of concentration and MSij is the market share. Both CRj and MSij are
proxies for the market structure. Xi is a vector of control variables included to
account for company as well as market specific characteristics. The traditional
SCP relationship holds if 1  0 and 2  0. The efficiency hypothesis is
supported by the data when 1  0 and 2  0.
The SCP assumes a link between market structure, behaviour of banks and prof-
itability. A highly concentrated market is thought to lead to collusive behaviour
ij  0  1CRj  2MSij  i Xi
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among larger banks resulting in superior market performance (Goldberg and Rai,
1996). The line of reasoning is that large banks abuse their market power to
increase profits. The paradigm states that increased concentration fosters
collusion and anti-competitive practices.
This line of reasoning is challenged by two other theoretical strands. The
efficiency hypothesis (EH) postulates that efficient banks are able to increase their
market share due to their higher profitability. Consequently, the degree of con-
centration increases ‘automatically’. A bank with a higher degree of efficiency
than its competitors can adopt two different strategies. The first option is to max-
imise profits by maintaining the present levels of prices and company size. The
second alternative is to maximise profits by reducing prices and expanding the
size of the company. If the bank chooses the second option, the most efficient
banks will gain market share and bank efficiency will be the driving force behind
the process of market concentration without necessarily reducing the competi-
tiveness. The contestability theory stresses that a concentrated banking industry
can behave competitively if the hurdles for new entrants to the market are low
(Baumol, 1982). Only the threat of potential entry forces banks with large market
shares to price their product competitively under certain conditions. In a perfectly
contestable market, entry is absolutely free, exit is completely without cost and
the demands for industry outputs are highly price-elastic. Costless exit implies
that when a company is planning to enter a new market, it expects to recover fixed
costs if it later decides to exit. In fact, salient trends in banking such as deregula-
tion and IT innovations have considerably reduced the entry obstacles and fixed
costs for new providers of financial products.1
11.2.2 Non-structural models
These types of models include the Bresnahan model and the Panzar and Rosse
(PR) model2, as well as frameworks addressing the dominance in price setting
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Figure 11.1 Hypothesized relationships in the SCP and efficiency hypothesis.




behaviour in retail markets. These models belong to the New Empirical Industrial
Organisation approaches. They focus on the competitive conduct of banks without
employing explicit information about the structure of the market.
The Bresnahan model boils down to a simultaneous estimation of a market
demand or supply function and a price setting equation using industry aggregate
figures. From this exercise, a parameter indexing the oligopoly solution concept
() is identified by standard econometric methods. The comparative static factors
of equilibrium, such as price and quantity are moved by exogenous variables and
reveal the degree of market power. If  equals zero, perfect competition exists. If
  1, there is a perfect cartel. Intermediate ’s correspond to other oligopoly
solution concepts.
The PR model requires company-specific data. This approach leads to the
construction of a so-called H statistic to make a quantitative assessment of
the competitive nature of banking markets and the market power of banks. The
H statistic is calculated from reduced-form revenue equations and measures the
sum of elasticities of the bank’s total revenue with respect to the bank’s input
prices. The PR model shows that this statistic can reflect the structure and conduct
of the market in which the bank operates. The testable hypotheses are:
H  0: monopoly
0  H  1: monopolistic competition
H  1: perfect competition
The PR model treats banks as single-product companies, using deposits and other
funding costs as inputs to produce merely losans and other interest-earning assets.
This reflects the intermediation role of banks.
It should be noted that the optimum size, the size of the market and, on the
demand-side, the perception regarding the extent to which the products on offer
differ determine the number of viable banks and the natural level of concentra-
tion. A natural monopoly will eventually emerge if only one producer is able to
produce all products at minimum cost. If, however, there is space for more than
one producer, an oligopoly will obviously develop. Moreover, if the banking
market is characterised by increasing returns to scale, the optimum size of an
individual bank (in terms of an efficient operation) will constantly increase with
expanding demand. In this situation, consolidation is the result of a dynamic mar-
ket process.3 This natural tendency to concentrate activities would ultimately lead
to the survival of only one viable bank and a concentration ratio of one.4 On the
other hand, in the absence of economies of scale and scope for all products and
services, it would be possible for numerous banks to operate in a highly compet-
itive market under certain circumstances. There is also room in the market for
various banks if customers perceive the products and services offered to be
heterogeneous rather than homogeneous.
A third approach is to investigate the speed of adjustment in pricing behaviour
in retail markets in response to changes in interest rates (see Sterken, 2004). In
less competitive markets, it is assumed that banks adjust interest rates more
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quickly in response to cost increases than to cost decreases. These studies also
explore whether the same bank always sets an example for the others in order to
test the level of market dominance.
11.2.3 The concept of concentration
As argued, the concept of concentration plays an important role in structural
models.5 Despite the many different approaches to its measurement, there is
general agreement regarding the constituting parts of concentration ratios. These
are the number of companies (fewness) and the distribution of the company sizes
(inequality) in a given industry. However, no systematic classification or concen-
tration measures can be found in the literature. The concentration indices, CI, all
display the same general form:
(11.2)
with si being the market share of company i, wi is the weight that the index
attaches to the corresponding market share and n is the number of companies in
the market in question. The most commonly used measures are the Herfindahl
Index (HI) and the k-firm concentration ratio (CR), respectively.
(11.3)
(11.4)
The HI stresses the importance of larger companies by giving them a greater
weight than smaller companies.6 It also incorporates each firm separately and
differently in order to avoid arbitrary cut-offs and insensitivity to the share distribu-
tion. The k-company concentration ratio (CRk) gives equal weights to the K leading
companines, but neglects the many small companies in the market. However, this
measure is often referred to in studies and policy documents.
11.3 An assessment of the existing empirical research
The availability of the required banking data and the length of the series are often
limited for European countries.7 These data are also difficult to compare due to
inconsistencies in the definition of the underlying markets across countries. This
is why empirical investigations of competitive conditions and concentration in
EU banking industries are scarce. The consequence of the poor availability and
quality of data is, however, that the outcomes must be assessed with great caution.
It is unwise to use the findings for policy conclusions or recommendations. Apart
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shortcomings or omissions of existing studies on competition and concentration
in European banking.
11.3.1 Empirical applications of the SCP paradigm and EF
The application of the SCP in the banking literature has been criticised on various
occasions (Reid, 1987; Vesala, 1995). The criticism refers to the form of the
model rather than to the specification of the various variables. Much criticism is
related to the one-way causality from market structure to market performance of
the original model as it is still applied in many banking studies. In fact, most stud-
ies that apply the SCP framework neglect the – strategic – conduct of banks.
Banks attempt to distinguish themselves from competitors by following divergent
strategies and presenting different corporate images. Furthermore, the empirical
results of the scarce studies on the SCP paradigm for European banking markets
are equally ambiguous as those obtained from the US banking industry.
The scarcity of European data makes it virtually impossible to define a
meaningful and hence relevant market area. Reasonable measures of concentra-
tion are also very difficult to construct for universal banks and nation-wide bank-
ing conditions because banks operate in many different product markets as well
as geographical markets. In addition, national measures of concentration should
ideally be adjusted to the size of the market. When one looks at all EU countries,
it appears that larger countries generally exhibit lower concentration ratios than
smaller countries. This is very logical, because there is room for more viable
banks in countries with greater populations. Indeed, if it is assumed that banks
have the same optimum size and the same cost function, the number of viable
banks grows in tandem with the size of the country.
11.3.2 Studies based on the PR model
The scarce studies on the market structure are predominantly based on the
PR model. The findings generally point to monopolistic competition in banking
sectors.8 Interestingly, most European studies already found monopolistic
competition in the 1980s (Table 11.1).
It must be stressed that the unclear definition of the relevant market hampers a
straightforward interpretation of the estimation results based on the PR model.
First, the geographical dimension of banking markets is not adequately taken into
consideration. The competitive environment the bank faces abroad is not neces-
sarily identical to the competitive situation prevailing in the country where the
bank is located. This is particularly true for large universal banks with sizeable
foreign activities. These internationally active banks are obviously confronted
with other competitive forces than small regional banks. For countries with
relatively closed banking systems, the H statistic is thus more indicative of the
competitive situation in the domestic banking market. Unfortunately, the high and
increasing level of internationalisation has eroded the applicability of the
PR model. Although the size of cross-border deposits and loans is still very small,
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the cross-border participations in national banking sectors are considerable in
some countries (see Table 11.2). For example, large parts of the Finnish, Irish and
Belgian banking sectors are held in foreign hands. Luxemburg is of course a spe-
cial case. It also makes little sense to perform estimations for different banking
sizes to capture different geographic markets (see Bikker and Haaf, 2000). The
results of these estimations are not informative. Smaller, more nationally orien-
tated banks feel the competitive pressure from the larger, wealthier and more
internationally orientated banks in their country anyway.
Second, the PR approach cannot be applied to separate segments of markets
where banks operate. The observed H is an index of the overall competitive con-
ditions in the entire banking market, that is, across product and customer groups.
This aspect makes PR not very suitable for most European banking markets. Most
banks are part of a financial conglomerate, consisting of many different banking
and insurance activities. It is impossible to separate the revenues from these busi-
nesses. Besides, one cannot speak of the banking market. For instance, one can
distinguish between retail, private and corporate banking. All these markets have
completely different characteristics and comprise different segments. Regarding
retail markets, the savings market cannot be compared with the market for online
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Table 11.1 PR model results in empirical studies
Authors Period Countries Results
considered
Nathan and 1982–1984 Canada 1982: perfect competition
Neave (1989) 1983–1984: monopolistic
competition
Shaffer (1982) 1979 New York Monopolistic competition
Lloyd-Williams 1986–1988 Japan Monopoly
et al. (1991)
Molyneux et al. 1986–1989 France, Monopoly: Italy;
(1994) Germany, Italy, Monopolistic competition: 
Spain and UK France, Germany, Spain 
and United Kingdom
Vesala (1995) 1985–1992 Finland Monopolistic competition 
for all but two years
Molyneux et al. (1996) 1986–1988 Japan Monopoly
Coccorese (1998) 1988–1996 Italy Monopolistic competition
De Bandt and Davis 1992–1996 France, Monopolistic competition: 
(1999) Germany large banks in all countries;
and Italy monopolistic competition: 
small banks in Italy; 
monopoly: small banks in 
France and Germany
Rime (1999) 1987–1994 Switzerland Monopolistic competition
Bikker and Groeneveld 1989–1996 Fifteen EU Monopolistic competition
(2000) countries
Source: Bikker and Haaf (2000).
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brokerage. One should also discriminate between various customer segments.
Loans to private households demand different assessments from those to SMEs.
Third, the relevant market should embrace all suppliers of a certain banking
service, which are actual or potential competitors. It is already impossible to
include all actual banking competitors in a market in empirical studies, let alone
to capture the impact of potential new entrants on the market structure in the
underlying data. These – potential – newcomers can have a fundamental impact
on the competitive structure in banking, although their market shares are or will
remain fairly modest.
11.4 Competition and concentration:
practical experiences and extensions
We feel that the existing studies on competition and concentration in European
banking have considerable empirical and methodological shortcomings. They fail
to capture the dynamics in banking and cannot be used for policy-making pur-
poses. This is particularly true of studies on the possible link between proxies for
concentration and competition that are constructed in a questionable way (see
Jansen and De Haan, 2002). In this section we offer a counterweight to the exist-
ing literature on competition and concentration in banking. We will present other
tools and important considerations for competition authorities and banking super-
visors to assess the market structure and health of national banking sectors.
Although our discussion relates to the Netherlands in particular, we believe that
the necessary differentiations are equally relevant for banking systems in other
European countries.
11.4.1 Lower aggregation level of analysis
Studies traditionally focus on the degree of concentration on a macro level. They
usually take market shares as a percentage of balance sheet total or deposits as a
starting point for analysis. Most analyses are also limited to the banking industry,
even though other providers of financial services are also active in the market.
These are serious flaws for a number of reasons. The first problem is that
analyses at a macro level neglect the impact of smaller niche players. Smaller,
more focused financial players can have a major impact on market conditions in
their sub-market, even though they tend to be relatively small in terms of balance
sheet total. The second problem with traditional approaches is that several com-
panies are significant players in the financial services industry, even though bank-
ing is not their core business. Examples include insurance companies, which
compete directly with banks in the market for savings and investment products,
and supermarket chains that offer payments or savings products.
A first step toward improving the traditional analysis is to examine the degree
of concentration and the competition structure in individual sub-markets.
Table 11.3 presents calculations of the HI, including some non-banks. The dis-
tinction between various markets and the inclusion of two insurance companies
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already provide a different and more realistic picture. It appears that the degree of
concentration is lower for important market segments than the macro analysis
excluding insurance companies suggests.
The stories behind individual concentration measures also differ. The high
concentration ratio for current accounts is understandable because only a few
banks can afford the large investments to offer this service. Moreover, in some
sub-markets the HI is strongly influenced by the relatively large market share of
the category ‘other players’. Further refinement shows that the market for mort-
gage loans appears to have the lowest degree of concentration, as measured by the
HI. The ‘refined Herfindahl’ in Table 11.3 indicates that competition in this
important retail market is more intense than the macro figures suggest.
This conclusion is supported by Sterken (2004). Sterken tested the hypothesis
of market dominance in the Dutch market for mortgage loans by analysing price
setting behaviour in the market for mortgage loans by the four major banks.
While he finds evidence of market leadership, he concludes that there is no evi-
dence of market dominance. It appears that especially the market leader transmits
cost increases more quickly than cost decreases, but he also concludes that in the
longer run all banks appear to behave competitively.
11.4.2 Structural developments in the distribution of
financial services
The traditional analysis of competition in banking markets mostly ignores
fundamental changes in the distribution of financial services. The role of inde-
pendent intermediaries has grown impressively in recent decades. As early as the
1980s, more than 30% of mortgage loans were sold via these middlemen, who
have positioned themselves between the producers of mortgages and their clients.
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Table 11.3 Ranking major banking institutions and concentration ratios in the Netherlands
Current Savings Consumer Mortgage Investment Asset
accounts account credit loans funds management
ABN Amro 3 3 2 3 1 1
Rabobank 2 1 19 1 2 4
ING/Postbank 1 2 1 2 3 3
Fortis 5 5 4 4 4 2
SNS 4 4 3 5 5
C5-ratio 98 79 75 73 74 66





The calculation of the HI includes insurance companies Achmea and Aegon. The refined Herfindahl
is calculated by including the market shares of the thirteen most important players (cumulative market
share 97.5%).
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In 2002, their market share had risen to approximately 60% (Figure 11.2). The
success of intermediaries can be explained by the fact that they have increased the
market transparency for the borrower.
This development has undermined the market position of banks in many ways.
It means that they are faced with a loss of direct contacts with their customers
(Figure 11.3). Customers have become much more aware of differences in prices
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Figure 11.3 Structure of the market for mortgage loans.
Source: Rabobank.
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and other terms and conditions. The intermediary helps them to shop around
between suppliers of banking products and pick the best offer for each product.
Moreover, the presence of intermediaries has helped wealthy insurance companies
and pension funds to gain substantial market shares since they usually lack a retail
distribution network. This development has forced banks to end the practice of
cross-subsidising products, to stop offering loss-making products and to increase
their transparency. As a result, price competition has become much more intense
and customers have – indirectly – increased their number of banking relationships.
Apart from the increasing importance of intermediaries, technological
developments have changed the distribution of banking products. The popularity of
direct channels such as automatic teller machines (ATM), electronic funds transfer
at point of sale (EFTPOS), telephone banking and more recently Internet Banking
has brought about an unprecedentic change in the world of financial services. Today,
almost every straightforward banking transaction is conducted via one of these direct
channels. As a result, the branch outlet has declined in importance (see Figure 11.4).
Although the number of ‘contact moments’ between banks and clients has doubled
between 1985 and 2002, the number of visits to the branch offices has dropped by
95%. The branch office network has changed from a necessary outlet into an expen-
sive, but still essential way of contacting the customers. While average banking cus-
tomers only visit their local banking office less than once a year, they still expect the
bank to be located in the neighbourhood just in case they need it. All Dutch banks
have responded by reducing the number of branch outlets. They do, however,
acknowledge that an overly enthusiastic decrease in the number of branch offices
would place their market share under pressure. For example, ING recently re-opened
a number of branch offices after it experienced a strong decline in market share.
This trend has considerably altered the character of the banking branch office.
When a customer visits the local bank branch office, it is usually because he has

























Figure 11.4 Banks’ customer contacts.
Source: Rabobank.
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a problem (e.g. technical problems with one of the direct channels, incorrect
transactions) or a question about a complex product. The traditional bank office
is rapidly disappearing and replaced by modern ‘financial boutiques’ or ‘financial
advice centres’.
11.4.3 Distribution strategies and the role of 
(potential) new entrants
The rise of direct channels has opened the market for new – virtual and foreign –
competitors. Insurance companies and pension funds have entered the market for
banking services via the intermediary channel. We see non-traditional suppliers
entering financial retail markets. While the competitive pressures created by all
of these – potential – new entrants should not be underestimated, it is scarcely
included in empirical studies.
The threat of potential entrants ensures that, even in the case of a highly
concentrated sector, existing players act competitively. New players entering into
niche markets or focusing on specific client segments give rise to keen price com-
petition in retail markets. Although their market shares may remain modest, their
overall impact on competition could be substantial because they force incumbents
to respond by offering services at lower cost and/or higher quality (see Llewellyn,
1999). In the Dutch context, the classical example of this phenomenon is
provided by the Roparco savings account in the early 1980s. Even though its mar-
ket share peaked at just 10% some years ago, it has nonetheless fundamentally
redefined competition in the market for savings accounts. Today, Royal Bank of
Scotland is successfully selling mortgages via Internet with the EUBOS-label and
the Turkish Garantibank is offering virtual savings products in the Dutch market.
The emergence of non-traditional suppliers of banking services changes the
market structure by enhancing competitive pressures and the degree of contesta-
bility. The origin of non-banking lies in the United Kingdom, especially at super-
markets and department stores. Marks&Spencer started offering financial
services as far back as 1985 and even went on to establish its own bank. Non-
banking has gained a firm foothold in the Netherlands. For example, Vendex
KBB9 introduced BIJfinance to sell insurance products and mortgages. Even
trade unions are offering financial products to their union members, mostly
employment benefits and insurance services.
Finally, the Internet has boosted competition in banking. Newcomers are able
to enter the market for financial services at low costs by using modern technol-
ogy. Pure internet players can offer cut-rate prices because they do not have to
maintain expensive branch networks. They also do not offer the complete range
of financial services, but rather concentrate on attractive niches, leaving the less
attractive segments of the market to the incumbents. Their arrival challenges
incumbents, which usually have large sunk costs in the existing financial infra-
structure and cannot permit themselves to operate without a branch network in
their home market. Established players have responded by setting up their own
internet banking operations. Incumbents must accommodate customer demand by
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offering internet services at attractive interest rates. As a result even small internet
players can really shake up the banking industry by increasing competitive pres-
sures. A good example is Rabobank’s experience with launching an internet bank
in Belgium. Rabobank.be was able to offer attractive savings interest rates, but
within a few weeks the established players brought their interest tariffs in line
with those of Rabobank.be. The benefits were clearly passed on to the customers.
11.4.4 Developments on the production side
Economies of scale on the processing and production side are becoming increasingly
important in the banking sector. Especially in retail banking, where many prod-
ucts have become commodities and price competition is fierce, scale counts. Not
all players realise sufficient scale via their own distribution channels to cover
ever-increasing ICT investments or to invent innovative products and services.
This explains the emergence of insourcing, outsourcing and co-sourcing.10
A famous Dutch example is the Interpay payment system. All Dutch banks par-
ticipate in this system, both as users and as shareholders. It was established in the
1960s as the so-called ‘Bankgiro Centrale’ (BGC). In the 1990s it was linked with
the Postgirosystem into the National Payment Circuit. This system was estab-
lished under close supervision of the Dutch Central Bank. The system is techni-
cally speaking a monopoly, although participating banks are free to set the rates
they charge their customers. Given the fact that banking payments in the
Netherlands are the cheapest in Europe, if not the world, one can hardly speak
of abuse of monopoly power by the banks. If Interpay were to break up, it would
certainly lead to higher costs for banking customers. Nevertheless, the system
is being closely scrutinised by the competition authorities.
All over Europe, banks are forced to increase efficiency in their operations to
survive. In larger countries, such as France or Germany, there is still ample scope
for upscaling the back-office activities via consolidation without alarming the
competition authorities. In smaller countries, the competition and supervisory
authorities should not consider further domestic upscaling as a serious problem.
The absolute size of the merged institutions would still be dwarfed by players
such as Deutsche Bank or Credit Agricole. In some cases, it is time for competi-
tion authorities to abandon their national focus and look at competition and scale
issues at the European level. Otherwise, banks in smaller countries would be
placed at a disadvantage compared to their counterparts in larger countries, with
considerable welfare costs for customers.
11.4.5 Credit availability for SMEs
Some researchers assert that in highly concentrated banking sectors it is more dif-
ficult for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to obtain bank loans at ‘reasonable
prices’. In the past, several researchers have tried to investigate the financing of
SMEs in European countries, but these studies suffered from a lack of available
reliable data. Duffhues (2004) finds that Dutch SMEs usually do not encounter
problems in obtaining banking credits at reasonable conditions. There are
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of course exceptions to this rule, but these cases generally stem from the high-risk
profile of certain specific sectors. Problems identified by Duffhues are concentrated
in the financing of start-ups or young, fast-growing companies.
Similar problems exist in all European countries, irrespective of the degree of
concentration. Cogan and McDevitt (2003) have conducted an international study
that compares the financing of innovative companies in several European coun-
tries. They conclude that ‘The Netherlands . . . is a clear leader in the provision of
early-phase and growth-phase venture capital to business.’ The high degree of
concentration in the Dutch financial industry appears to have no negative impact
on the availability of credit for SMEs.
11.4.6 Customer satisfaction as an instrument of analysis
The examination of competition and concentration cannot be a purely academic
exercise. The preceding sections reveal that traditional analyses, based on macro-
data and concentration indices, fail to capture many of the dynamic developments
in the markets for financial services. At the end of the day it simply comes down
to the price and quality of banking products. And customer perceptions of their
banks should be included as an important factor when assessing the competitive
standing in retail banking. Much more emphasis should be placed on practical
experiences and information obtained directly from these end users of banking
services. The level of customer satisfaction regarding banks is a key variable and
fairly easy to measure. If a highly concentrated banking sector with high entry
barriers would lead to non-competitive behaviour, customer satisfaction could be
rather low. Not only because the price for banking products could be too high, but
also because the quality of the service could be too low.
Recent research by KPMG (2004) indicates that most European banking cus-
tomers are relatively satisfied with their banks. The most important exception is
Italy, where only 56% of banking customers are satisfied with their bank. Apart
from Spain and France, all other countries score above 80%. It appears that Dutch
customers express the greatest satisfaction with their banks, despite or thanks to
the highest level of concentration measured as CK5 (see Figure 11.5). According
to a recent study by KPMG, 86% of Dutch customers are satisfied with their
bank. This result reveals that a highly concentrated banking sector is not by defi-
nition a bad thing. This finding supports our view that in smaller countries a
higher level of concentration is required in order to realise sufficient economies
of scale and a certain level of efficiency.
Dutch customers do not feel exploited, which would be visible in low satisfac-
tion levels. This does not come as a surprise given the average price of core bank-
ing services in the Netherlands. Figure 11.6 plots the CR5 against the average
annual price of core banking services for eight European countries. The price
fluctuates considerably across these countries, ranging from a low of only €31 a
year in the Netherlands to a high of €501 in Italy. A study by Cap Gemini Ernst
and Young (2004) argues that the impact of the competitive environment on
pricing practices in national markets is difficult to assess. It concludes that
countries with highly consolidated markets such as the Benelux or countries with
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Pleased with their bank: 
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CR5-share of the five largest credit institutions, 2002
Average annual price of core banking
services by country, 2003 ( )
Figure 11.6 Relationship between CR5 and average price of core banking products.
Source: Own calculations based on data from ECB (2002) and CGE&Y (2003–2004). CR5 represents
the market share of the five largest banks as % of total.
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many new entrants such as the United Kingdom offer the lowest prices. The first
conclusion is tentatively corroborated in Figure 11.6.
Although customers are generally loyal to their principal bank, most of them
also use other financial providers. A 67 percentage of the customers in the coun-
tries under review have a relationship with 2–4 providers (see Figure 11.7). In the
United Kingdom, 24% of the consumers have a relationship with over five
providers. These facts mirror the erosion of the so-called primary financial rela-
tionship. While in the past customers obtained most of their banking products
from just one provider, today the number of products bought from the main bank-
ing relationship has decreased. Due to technological developments and the rise of
intermediaries, customers are increasingly shopping for the best buy for each
product and service. Increasing transparency makes it rather difficult for banks to
cross-subsidise individual products, as any abuse of market power would be pun-
ished immediately by customers. They would vote with their feet and turn to dif-
ferent or new players for certain products or services. This is also true for the
Netherlands, with its highly concentrated banking sector.11
These data underscore the fact that ‘hard figures’ about customer satisfaction and
pricing are much more relevant than questionable proxies for competition and con-
centration. It is also important to view these analyses from an international perspec-
tive. It appears that Dutch banks do not charge high prices and have fairly satisfied
customers. The propensity to switch principal banks is one of the lowest in Europe.
11.4.7 Divergent strategies and core values of retail banks
A final point has to do with the changing face of competition and the role of
marketing. Banking has been and will always be a ‘people business’. Pricing is
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‘Including your main bank, how many financial service providers do you have a relationship 
with (thinking of current accounts, investments, mortgages, insurance etc.)?’
Figure 11.7 Number of relationships with providers of financial services.
Source: KPMG (2004).
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important, but there are other reasons why people select and stay with a particular
bank. Especially in transparent markets with a high level of price competitive-
ness, banks try to distinguish themselves by creating their own niches or images.
They articulate or emphasise divergent core values to attract certain customer
segments. For instance, they emphasise values such as ‘sound’, ‘reliable’, ‘inno-
vative’, ‘international’, ‘close’, ‘socially responsible’ and so on. Of course, these
aspects should be mirrored in their actual behaviour. Every bank also tries to
capitalise on its specific traditional strengths.
Once people feel attracted to a bank, price becomes less important. For exam-
ple, proximity is seen as very important by banking clients. They tend to stay with
the bank in their neighbourhood, even if they do not always get the best price at
the nearest bank. Table 11.4 is based on marketing research and shows the images
that the largest Dutch banks have created.
A great deal of effort is put into creating and maintaining these images.
Together with the accessibility of financial services, it is one of the most impor-
tant elements of competition in Dutch retail banking. All banks claim to have inti-
mate knowledge of – the business of – their customers. The intensity of marketing
campaigns reflects the fierce competition in the Dutch financial industry.
11.5 Summary and conclusions
We have argued in this chapter that most traditional studies of competition in
banking fail to capture the dynamics involved in retail banking. The degree of
concentration in a specific banking market is not a reliable proxy for the intensity
of competition. The arrival of new entrants, technological developments, the
increasing role played by intermediaries and the varying corporate strategies
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Table 11.4 Competition: profile of Dutch banks
ABN AMRO ING Bank Postbank Rabobank
(ING Group)
Status, Exclusive, more Mass market Cooperative bank 
up-market up-market ‘for everybody’
Arrogant Distant Convenience Social involvement
Trend-setting Investment Payments and savings Market leader 
in mortgages
Investment Emphasis on Simple products Proximity
larger SMEs
International No nonsense Sustainability
orientation Proximity Payment and savings
Large Internet banking Market leader in 
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pursued by the suppliers of financial services continuously change the
competitive environment of financial retail markets.
We also have argued that that the bottom line should be the opinion of the
customer. Customer opinions (measured as customer satisfaction) and behaviour
(loyalty) should form the dominant element in assessing the behaviour of banks,
together with more objective measures as credit availability and pricing.
Therefore, the opinion of competition authorities on the degree of competition in
financial services should to a large extent be based on an (international)
assessment of these practical issues, instead of theoretical constructions.
A final remark concerns the risk of increasing instability. We have asserted that
economies of scale are increasingly important in today’s banking markets. The
authorities should recognise that if banks are hindered to realise the necessary
scale, they will sooner or later encounter problems due to a lack of profitability.
Especially in small economies, the necessary scale automatically translates into a
high degree of concentration. In relation to these economies, competition
authorities should realise that a competition policy based on traditional analyses
could easily lead to the wrong conclusions. A fundamental weakening of the
domestic banking system and an increasing degree of financial instability would
be the highly undesirable result. The key issue in banking for the future has little
to do with ‘too big to fail’ but rather with ‘too small to survive’.
Acknowledgements
The views expressed in this chapter are personal and do not necessarily reflect
those of Rabobank Nederland. The authors thank their colleagues Wietske
Timmermans, Bouke de Vries and Joost Wagemakers for their support in preparing
this chapter.
Notes
1 Admittedly, entering banking markets demands considerable investments in terms of
sunk costs. Moreover, regulation poses a justifiable entry barrier from a financial sta-
bility perspective. However, in contrast to Canoy et al. (2001), we expect that the
potential negative consequences of a concentrated banking sector will be largely offset
by free entry. Incumbents offer a wide range of products and services via various chan-
nels at the same time whereas new financial players can easily focus on a particular
customer or product market with limited distribution channels. Supermarkets already
have a fairly extensive physical distribution network, whereas the entry hurdles for
pure internet players are fairly modest (take for instance ING Direct and Rabobank.be
in Belgium).
2 See Bresnahan (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1987).
3 This may provide an explanation as to why the consolidation trend in the banking
industry has, in fact, always been present and is likely to continue in the future.
4 Numerous studies have been devoted to this topic (e.g. Berger et al., 1993; Molyneux
et al., 1996).
5 See Bikker and Haaf (2000) for a detailed assessment of different measures of
concentration.
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6 The HI is a statutory measure to evaluate the concentration impact of a proposed
merger in the US banking industry.
7 A fairly extensive literature on competition in US banking exists. Lack of data does not
appear to be such a problem for US banks.
8 The Bresnahan approach is rarely applied in studies for European banking markets.
Bikker and Haaf (2000) tests the Bresnahan model for both the deposit and loan mar-
kets in nine European countries. This exercise yields similar results as the outcomes for
the markets for all banking activities obtained from most PR models. The hypothesis of
perfect competition on these markets cannot be rejected. The pitfalls of the Bresnahan
approach are similar to those of the more frequently applied PR model. We will
consequently limit ourselves to an evaluation of the PR methodology in the main text.
9 Vendex KBB is the largest Dutch non-food retail trader that operates fifteen shopping
formulas including Bijenkorf, V&D and Hema.
10 Due to insufficient scale, Friesland Bank, a relatively small regional bank, has
completely outsourced its back-office activities for securities transactions to
Rabobank.
11 In this context, it is important to note that the Netherlands is a country with a very high
population density. Almost all inhabitants have access to the branch network of several
banks within a radius of a few kilometres from their homes.
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Casual reading of banks’ annual reports reveals the importance of a series of
corporate financial goals, such as return on equity (ROE), risk-adjusted return
on capital (RAROC), economic profit (EP), growth in earnings-per-share (EPS), or
cost–income (C–I) ratio. As all the given measures of performances are based on
short-term results, one wonders about the importance of longer term financial goals.
Clearly, a balance has to be found between short- and long-term corporate goals.
Moreover, financial analysts seem to follow a pendulum, switching from praise
for focused institutions to compliment for diversified financial services groups.
One certainly remembers that Derek Wanless and the management of National
Westminster Bank were severely criticized for their efforts to venture into insur-
ance with the (failed) takeover attempt of Legal & General. Recently, both
Citigroup and BNP-Paribas have been praised for having a well diversified source
of revenue from commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance activities.
Focus versus diversification is a second strategic issue.
The purpose of this chapter is to argue for a “balanced view,” a need to define
both short- and long-term financial goals, and to ensure an acceptable degree of
diversification. As philosophers would say: in medio virtus.
The chapter is structured into two parts. In the first part, we review the
fundamental drivers of share price, economic profit and growth, and discuss the
case of the British bank Lloyds TSB over a twenty-year period, 1983–2004. It
highlights the need for a balanced approach between short-term performances
and long-term growth. In Section 12.2, we review the theoretical benefits of
diversification, and present some data on international credit risk diversification.
A conclusion follows.
12.1 ROE, RAROC, economic profit, efficiency ratio,
growth and value: the case of Lloyds TSB
Over the last twenty years, shareholder value-based management has acquired an
almost universal appeal. As the market for corporate control has facilitated
takeovers and as institutional shareholders exercise pressure on management, the
focus on value creation for the owners of the firm has increased considerably.
12 Strategic management in
banking, in medio virtus
Jean Dermine
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Relying on results from welfare economics, M. Jensen (2001) has argued
convincingly that, in a competitive economy, this single corporate objective
function will increase public welfare.1 Enlightened value maximization, identical
to enlightened stakeholder theory, specifies long-term value maximization as the
firm’s objective, while focusing attention on meeting demands of all important cor-
porate constituencies, such as employees, clients, suppliers, and local authorities.
12.1.1 Value-based metrics of bank performance
Shareholder-based measures of performance include the ROE, RAROC, growth
in EPS, and EP. According to mainstream finance and common sense, value is
created whenever the return on funds invested by shareholders exceeds the oppor-
tunity investment return available to them. The opportunity cost of equity is esti-
mated by the current risk-free bond rate plus a risk premium of around 4–5% for
commercial banks in OECD countries. To make this performance objective
operational, profit centers, now called value centers, are created. They include
business units, such as corporate banking or retail branches, large customer rela-
tions, or specific products. Profit and equity are allocated to each business unit,
so that a risk-adjusted return on capital, RAROC, can be calculated:
In essence, the effort is to divide a complex financial institution into a set of
small firms, each with its own Profit and Loss (P&L) and balance sheet. Value
creation can thus be evaluated at the level of each value center, by comparing the
RAROC of a department to the relevant cost of equity. Finally, since the RAROC
measure is a percentage measure, which does not take into account the size of
operations, a new measure is increasingly being used and reported in annual
reports, the EP. It is defined as the difference between the net income allocated to
a department and a cost of allocated equity.
Economic profit (EP)  allocated net income  (allocated equity
 cost of equity)
This measure, which uses the same information as RAROC (allocated income and
allocated equity) is a superior measure of performance, as it is an absolute measure
of value creation (millions of €, £, $) which takes into account the size of opera-
tions.2 Along with the above measure of shareholder value creation is the efficiency
or C–I ratio. This ratio attempts to focus on a specific source of value creation, the
control of operating expenses. Defined as operating expenses over gross income, it
has become a standard yardstick of cost control.3 However, if these performance
measures are useful indicators of value creation, one should be wary of not sacrific-
ing long-term growth to the benefit of short-term profitability, or, in other words,
RAROC  allocated net income
allocated equity
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surrendering to shortermism. Indeed, a simple dividend-based model of share prices
can show (see Appendix 12A.1) that the capitalized value of shares is equal to the
value of current equity plus the present value of future economic profits.
Market value of shares  equity  discounted value of future 
economic profits
Value-based management should thus achieve the maximization of both short-
term and long-term economic profits. A balance (in medio virtus) has to be found
between short- and long-term objectives. To illustrate the difficulty of finding a del-
icate balance, we focus on the case of the British bank, Lloyds TSB, long heralded
as the champion of value creation (McTaggart et al., 1994, pp. 37–39; Pitman, 2003).
12.1.2 The case of Lloyds TSB (1983–2004)
In 1983, Brian Pitman became Chief Executive of Lloyds Bank, Sir Jeremy Morse
being Chairman of the Board. At a board meeting held in 1983, the members went
into a philosophical discussion as to what the relevant corporate objective should
be. They finally agreed that the company had to earn a return in excess of the cost
of equity, and that the single objective would be: to double the share price every
three years (Bose and Morgan, 1998). At the time, the ROE was 12%, when the
interest rate on gilt securities was 10%. The ROE was clearly falling short of any
measure of the cost of equity, and it was no surprise that the shares of Lloyds TSB
were trading at below net asset value.
In the first annual report published under the leadership of Brian Pitman in
1983, appeared the following comments:
● We are committed to the idea that our function is to create shareholder value.
● The key issue for management is: What collection of divestments, acquisi-
tions, and reallocations of capital is necessary to change our return on equity,
market value, access to capital, and ability to sustain an appropriate growth?
● A bank’s strategy has to start with its customers. A company can only build
value for its shareholders if it can create value for its customers.
Although, shareholder value management is now common practice, in those
days, it was fairly new thinking, with recommendations of asset disposals, and
corporate objectives that seem to have been copied, word for word, from standard
corporate finance textbooks.
Many of the significant decisions taken by the management of Lloyds Bank
since 1983 are reported in Table 12.1. Comments will be offered on some of these
decisions. The first was, in fact, a decision of no-action. At the time of Big Bang
in 1985, the deregulation of the stock markets in London, Lloyds TSB decided
against buying a specialist broker-jobber house, on the ground that they were too
expensive. Lloyds Bank was among the very few not to join the herd of European
and American banks which paid very high prices to enter this market. To be fair,
the second action is a bit outside the strategy. In 1986, Lloyds TSB attempted to
206 Jean Dermine
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take over Standard Chartered Bank, an institution with significant market shares
in various countries of Asia and Africa.4 This failed, as the wealthy Singaporean
Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat, a white knight, came to the rescue of the bank, with the
purchase of a 37% equity stake. The following steps are in line with the strategy
announced in 1983. An early move into life insurance with the purchase of Abbey
Life in 1988, a move of retail headquarters from expensive London to Bristol in
1990, and a long series of divestments in Canada and USA, Portugal, Bahrain,
China, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan. In 1992, performance-related pay was
introduced in the bank. There then followed the start of a series of efforts to
acquire domestic financial institutions. A bid to take over the Midland Bank was
withdrawn for the fear that it would not be authorized by the British competition
authorities.5 A building society, C&G, was acquired in 1994, one year before the
successful merger with TSB (Salomon Brothers, 1995). So, after twelve years
under the new management team, had the objective of value creation been met?
Figure 12.1 reports the evolution of the share price of Lloyds vis-à-vis one of its
competitor, Barclays Bank. The figures reported are relative to the Footsie index.
Figure 12.1 is a textbook example of successful value-based management. From
1973 to 1983, one sees both Barclays and Lloyds severely underperforming the
index. A turnaround is evident with the arrival of Brian Pitman in 1983, and the
series of disposal of assets, domestic mergers, and cost cutting. Barclays continues
to underperform the index for a decade, while Lloyds stock performance is brilliant.
Table 12.1 Lloyds TSB strategy, 1983–2004
Year Significant decisions taken by Lloyds Bank
1985 (Big Bang) Did not buy a broker-jobber house in London
1986 Fail in attempt to takeover Standard Chartered
1988 Merge with Abbey Life to create Lloyds Abbey Life
1990 Move retail banking headquarter from London to Bristol
1984–1992 Withdraw from North America, Portugal, Bahrain, Far East (China,
Singapore, Korea, Taiwan)
1992 Change pay structure
1992 Conditional bid for Midland (withdrawn)
1994 Buy Cheltenham & Gloucester (C&G)
1995 Merge with TSB
1996 CEO: Peter Ellwood; Chairman: Brian Pitman; close New York 
treasury operations
1997 Sell Corporate Banking Paris to Crédit Agricole; sell SMH (Germany)
to UBS
1999 Buy Scottish Widows
2000 Buy Chartered Trust
2001 Brian Pitman retires
2002 Competition Commission rules out a merger with Abbey National
2003 CEO: Eric Daniels; sell Lloyds Brazil to HSBC and 
New Zealand operations to ANZ
2004 CFO Hampton resigns; discussion to sell the operations in 
Argentina




Foreign asset disposal continued over the years: Corporate Banking Paris to
Crédit Agricole in 1997, Lloyds Brazil to HSBC and New Zealand operations to
ANZ in 2003, and, in 2004, the start of negotiations to sell the last piece of a 
140-year presence in Latin America, the operations in Argentina. Domestic acqui-
sitions went into pension fund management with the acquisition of Scottish
Widows, and consumer finance with the purchase of Chartered Trust. Over a
twenty-year period, Lloyds TSB had refocused on the United Kingdom, trans-
forming itself into a dominant financial services firm. The massive exit from for-
eign operations in emerging markets (such as China and the countries of South
East Asia) could, of course, raise questions about the potential for future growth,
and whether or not short-term ROE targets and shortermism were not driving
factors. However, as indicated in Table 12.2, year after year, Lloyds TSB was
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Figure 12.1 Share price of Lloyds and Barclays (relative to index).
Source: Datastream.
Table 12.2 Lloyds TSB ROE, 1993–2003
ROE1993  21% ROE1996  33% ROE1999  29% ROE2002  23%
ROE1994  24% ROE1997  37% ROE2000  28.4% ROE2003  33%
ROE1995  25% ROE1998  31% ROE2001  29.1%
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In 1999, the share price of Lloyds TSB reached a peak of £10. The stated
single objective of “doubling the share price every three years” appears to have
been met. However, this seems to have been the end of the “golden” years.
Since 1999, the price has fallen back to £4.50, despite a series of impressive
ROEs. Although, the drop in share price could be due to the vagaries of stock
markets, one can tentatively explain the source of the decline. It all started when
the market became aware of the lack of an Internet strategy at the time of the “new
economy” wave. Then came the end of the stock market bubble and losses in
the pension business. Finally, and more significant, in light of the paper, was
the decision of the British Competition Commission to rule out any significant
merger for the four largest clearing banks, who had achieved a market share of
91% in liquidity management services to small and medium size enterprises,
the SMEs (Competition Commission, 2002). With the inability to realize more
cost-cutting driven domestic acquisitions, the market started to wonder about
the new sources of growth. If past earnings growth was driven largely by capi-
tal gains on asset sales, cost cutting, and efficiency gains, these had reached a
limit, and the market was getting anxious about the sources of future earnings
growth.
The tale of Lloyds Bank, which started as a fairy tale of value-based manage-
ment, is ending on a sour note as the market seems to be questioning the
sources of future growth. It should serve as an example of the need to balance

















Figure 12.2 Lloyds TSB share price and volume, 1993–2003.
Source: Lloyds TSB Group LON (02/26/1993–02/28/2003) – Datastream.
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12.1.3 Interest rate level and growth6
A technical note on the sources of growth in banking concerns the current
environment characterized by low inflation, low interest rates, and low profitabil-
ity on the payment business. Indeed, the interest rate margins on deposits over the
period 1980–2000 went down very significantly in most European countries. This
is reported in Table 12.3. In Spain, for example, margins on savings deposits fell
from 8.45% in 1980 to 2.37% in 2000. A similar pattern emerged in France, with
margins on savings deposits falling from 5.3% to 0.92% over the same period.
The evolution of margins on deposits did not arrive as a surprise. Indeed, it was
widely anticipated that the arrival of a common European currency and an inde-
pendent monetary policy, designed on the model of the German Bundesbank,
would bring down inflation expectations, interest rates, and margins on deposits.
The author, in an essay written two years before the arrival of the Euro, stated:
“One can safely conclude that an objective of monetary stability and low inflation
pursued by an independent European Central Bank will reduce the source of prof-
itability on the deposit funding business” (Dermine, 1997). The effect is mechan-
ical. Due to the drop in market rates, the inelasticity or “stickiness” of deposit
rates implies an automatic reduction in interest margins.7
However, if, as documented in Table 12.3, the impact of low inflation on the
margin on deposits is quite significant in a large number of countries, two addi-
tional effects of a low inflation environment might soften the impact of lower
margins on deposits.
First, a low interest rate environment usually leads to much higher margin on
personal loans because of the relative inelasticity of interest rates on personal loans.
In Spain, for instance, loan rate stickiness raised the margin on consumer loans
from 2.57% in 1980 to 4.67% in 2000. In Germany, margins on consumer
loans appear to have increased from 4.32% in 1990 to 6.84% in 2000. A second
positive impact of a low inflation environment is that the so-called “inflation tax”
will be much smaller (Fisher-Modigliani, 1978; Dermine, 1985). A simple
example will give the intuition beyond the inflation tax. Consider a case with no
inflation in which equity is invested in a 3% coupon bond. After a 30% corporate
tax rate is deducted, the revenue is 2.1% ((1  0.3)  3%). The full profit can
be paid as dividend as there is no need for retained earnings and higher capital
since there is no growth of assets. If because of a 10% inflation rate, the same
equity is invested in a 13% coupon bond, the profit after tax is only 9.1%
((1  0.3)  13%), a figure too small to finance a necessary equity growth of
10%. No dividend can be paid in this case, and equity holders have suffered from
an “inflation-tax.”
Therefore, the impact of a low inflation environment on the profitability of
banks will depend on the relative importance of reduced margins on deposits,
higher profit on personal loans, and on the significance of the “inflation-tax.”
In the next section, we review the strategy debate on focus versus
diversification.
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Table 12.3 Intermediation margin (%), 1980–2000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Belgium
Treasury-bill 14.4 10.7 10.4 5.36 3.34
Margin on savings deposits 9.4 5.7 4.9 0.72 0.75
Margin on consumer loans 6.92 3.63
Retail intermediation 7.64 4.38
margin
Margin on corporate loan 0.8 1.04 1.05 1.15 1.14
Netherlands
Treasury-bill 9.2 6.85 8.13 5.18 3.34
Margin on savings deposits 4.2 3.5 5.63 3.13 1.84
Margin on consumer loans 5.3 1.65 3.62 2.32 2.91
Retail intermediation 9.5 5.15 9.25 5.45 4.75
margin
Margin on corporate loan 3.05 0.6 1.12 0.18 0.41
Finland
Treasury-bill 13.8 12.8 16.05 5.85 3.34
Margin on savings deposits 9.55 7.55 11.55 3.85 1.84
Margin on consumer loans 3.64 1.1 0.45 4.09 2.75
Retail intermediation 5.91 6.45 11.1 7.94 4.59
margin
Margin on corporate loan 3.64 1.1 1.29 1.58 0.89
France
Treasury-bill 12.2 9.5 10 5 3.34
Margin on savings deposits 5.3 3 5.6 0.66 0.92
Margin on consumer loans 5.4 3.03 4.85
Retail intermediation 11 3.69 5.77
margin
Margin on corporate loan 3.83 1.19 2.28 1.75
Germany
Treasury-bill 8.86 5.87 8.3 5.16 3.34
Margin on savings deposits 2.08 1.37 1.31
Margin on consumer loans 4.32 8.18 6.84
Retail intermediation 6.4 9.55 8.15
margin
Margin on corporate loan 0.8 2.39 1.31 4.16 4.34
Spain
Treasury-bill 12.2 12 14 8.33 3.34
Margin on savings deposits 8.45 8.25 11.58 5.58 2.37
Margin on consumer loans 2.57 5.03 3.18 5.62 4.67
Retail intermediation 11.02 13.28 14.76 11.2 7.04
margin
Margin on corporate loan 3.64 1.1 1.29 1.58 0.89
Source: Dermine (2003).




12.2 Focus versus diversification
The second main issue addressed in this strategy chapter is the issue of focus
versus diversification. Traditional corporate finance theory states that no gains
are to be expected from diversification in a world with perfect information and
complete markets. Shareholders, holding a diversified portfolio of shares, can
achieve the same results, in essence, by mimicking a diversified firm. Under this
line of argument, cross-border mergers for reasons of diversification would have
no merit, as shareholders could buy the shares of banks from two countries.
Empirical evidence for the United States, consistent with this view, is that by
DeLong (2001). She attempts to distinguish between focused mergers (same
geography and activity) and non-focused mergers (different geography and/or
activity). She reports that focused mergers create, on average, a gain of 3% in
the combined value of the target and the bidder, while non-focused mergers
destroy value.
To justify the gains from financial diversification, one has to turn to some
types of market imperfections. Four motivations for corporate risk management
and diversification have been advanced in the literature (e.g. Santomero, 1995;
Froot and Stein, 1998; Dermine, 2004): managerial self-interest, non-linearity of
taxes, cost of financial distress, and capital market imperfections. These are
discussed briefly.
First, managerial self-interest refers to the fact that managers, having a signif-
icant fraction of their permanent income attached to the firm, cannot diversify
risks adequately. Managers’ risk aversion will lead to risk mitigation. Second, the
non-linearity of taxes means that losses may not be fully tax-deductible, or that
large profits could be taxed at a higher rate. In this case, a reduction of profit vari-
ance leads to a reduction of expected tax payments. Third, the cost of financial
distress refers to the loss of value due to a state of distress. In banking, this could
imply a loss of clientele or a loss of a profitable banking license (the “charter
value”). Fourth, costs may arise from capital market imperfections. Because of
asymmetric information, banks may find it costly to raise external funds. In such
a context, losses could lead to a lower equity level, and missed profitable invest-
ment opportunities. Stabilization of profit can reduce the call for expensive exter-
nal finance, and lead to the realization of profitable investments. An alternative
explanation for the resources spent on risk control is linked to reputational risk.
Because of opacity, investors cannot evaluate whether a reported loss is due to
bad luck or to inferior management quality. In this context, stabilization of profit
prevents a loss of value. So, even in the absence of bank regulation, there are sev-
eral economic motivations for the control of risks and diversification in a bank.
The mathematics of financial diversification have been well understood since
Markowitz (1959). An elegant expression of risk states that the standard deviation
of total income is equal to the sum of individual risk, each of them weighted by
the correlation between that risk and that of the entire firm.8 Consider a bank
present in three markets (say, three countries: Finland, Norway, and Sweden)
with respective assets A in Finland, B in Norway, and C in Sweden, with
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A  standard deviation of return RA on asset A (B, C), A,P being the correlation
between return on A (B, C) and the total bank, then the volatility, or riskiness, of
total income, P , is equal to:
P  [A  A  A,P]  [B  B  B,P]  [C  C  C,P]
The relationship indicates intuitively that, unless activities are highly correlated
with the entire bank (correlation close to one), the sum of the risks is going to
be less than the sum of individual risks. As a consequence, ceteris paribus,
engaging in activities that are not highly correlated can bring about a reduction of
volatility of income. Real economic benefits follow from stability of income
since, as discussed earlier, market imperfections and opacity can raise the cost of
external finance.
The expected gains from diversification across countries or activities will only
materialize if correlations across sources of income are not too high. This
becomes an empirical issue. Boyd and Runkle (1993) and Hughes et al. (1999)
report that large banks, able to diversify credit risks across many states, exhibit
a lower variance of profit in the United States. Other studies (Santomero and
Chung, 1992; Boyd et al., 1993), simulating a merger between banks and insur-
ance companies, come to similar conclusions (a quite obvious result, since low
correlation can only lead to more stable profits). Simulation results indicating the
benefits of diversification must be viewed with caution for two reasons. First,
there is an implicit assumption that the combined firm can be managed as effi-
ciently as the separate firms. Second, as emphasized in an empirical study by
Boyd and Runkle (1993), lower volatility of asset return is often combined with
a lower equity base (higher leverage) so that the probability of default of large
diversified institutions appears to be as high as that of smaller, less diversified but
less leveraged, firms. At the international level, Berger et al. (2000) report very
low correlations of the aggregate ROE of banking systems of the various
European countries. Dahl and Logan (2002) analyze the overdue international
claims of 28 UK-owned banks over the period 1987–2000. They report a signifi-
cant gain from international diversification of credit risk exposure. Acharya et al.
(2002), however, express caution in a detailed analysis of credit losses in Italy
over the period 1993–1999 that the benefits of diversification might be lost with
lack of expertise. Amihud et al. (2002) see no impact on the volatility of stock
returns either before or after a cross-border merger.
A word of caution should be expressed here, concerning studies that focus on
correlation and volatility of losses. As credit risk distribution is known to be
highly skewed (many states of the world with fairly few loan losses, and few
states of the world with periods of significant recession and substantial losses), it
might be better to analyze the impact of diversification at times of deep recession.
A standard approach in the management of trading risk is to simulate the impact
of a large shock (stress scenario) on a portfolio. In Table 12.4, we report the
provisions on loan losses (an imperfect estimate of loan losses) of the banking




systems of several countries over the recession period 1988–1992. To study the
potential benefits of diversification, we simulate the average loss on a GNP-
weighted diversified loan portfolio. In the case of the United Kingdom, which
experienced severe loan losses during that period (2.13% in 1992), one can
observe that an internationally diversified bank would, ceteris paribus, reduce the
loan losses by 37% (1.35% in 1992). Note that this is only a simulation. Part of
the diversification benefit could disappear if credit management quality were to
worsen in a large international organization.
12.2.1 Diversification at Lloyds TSB, the 1992 
stress test case
In the first section of the chapter, we presented the strategy of Lloyds Bank over
the period 1983–2000. Through a long series of sales of foreign assets, and
purchase of domestic financial institutions, Lloyds TSB has created an efficient
financial firm in the United Kingdom. In 1995, Sir Brian stated:
By concentrating on fewer markets, we can simplify our business and reduce
our overheads. Diversity carries with it complexity, and complexity creates
cost, slippage and delay. Today’s world is too competitive for us to handicap
our people with extra costs, extra procedures and slippage in communication
Table 12.4 International diversification of credit risk, a simulation exercise: loan loss
provisions as percentage (%) of total Loans
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Austria 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.54 0.76
Belgium 1.38 1.35 0.64 0.88 1.09
Denmark 2.2 1.69 2.38 2.66 3.2
Finland 0.64 0.54 0.47 0.45 3.2
France 0.46 0.33 0.3 0.49 0.74
Germany 0.4 0.82 0.83 0.6 0.69
Greece 1.09 1.28 1.4 2.5 1.24
Italy 0.46 1.23 1.21 1.12 1.12
Luxembourg 1.48 1.55 2.17 1.72 1.62
Netherlands 0.39 0.34 0.39 0.46 0.43
Portugal 3.44 4.25 4.02 4.45 4.52
Spain 1.27 0.7 0.65 1.1 1.34
Sweden 1.72 1.51 0.75 3.2 6
United Kingdom 0.51 2.57 1.53 2.16 2.13




a The diversified portfolio is a weighted-portfolio of loans of banks from each country, the weights
being the 2000 GNP.
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and execution. Even more important, today’s rate of change is too fast for us
to tolerate the delays in decision making caused by having excessively
complicated businesses. A sharper focus achieves better performance.
(Lloyds TSB Annual Report, 2005)
Given the prospects for demographics and economic growth in Western Europe,
however, questions were raised about the growth potential, in particular when the
Competition Commission will not allow additional mergers of significant size to
take place. In the context of the earlier discussion, a second question must be
raised about the strategy of Lloyds TSB, that of a lack of financial diversification,
when risks are concentrated in one market. Again, the year 1992 provides a useful
testing ground as it was the worst economic recession since the Second World War.
Comparative data for British banks are presented in Table 12.5. An analysis of the
profits of Lloyds TSB follows.
Table 12.5 indicates first that, due to asset disposals, the balance sheet of Lloyds
TSB, for the financial year 1992, has been reduced substantially, in relation to those
of its competitors. Also, while Barclays was severely affected by the recession, and
both Barclays and NatWest equity were trading below net asset value, Lloyds Bank
managed to have a market-to-book value ratio of 1.8, and an ROE of 16% during
that recession period. If, at first glance, one could suspect a superior ability to con-
trol credit risk, this can be ruled out, as provisions for bad debt at Lloyds are more
or less proportional to asset size. So, where was the profit coming from at a time of
the worst recession since the Second World War? A careful reading of the 1992
Annual Report reveals that, indeed, UK retail banking at Lloyds was severely
affected, making virtually no profit. Two main contributors to income were Lloyds
Abbey Life (£298 million) and Problem Country debt (£193 million). The income
on country debt came from a release of provisions, as the value of Brady bonds
(LDC debt converted into bonds collaterized by zero-coupon US Treasury securi-
ties) were trading at a value substantially higher than previously provisioned Latin
American loans. This is a perfect illustration of the benefits of diversification at
work! The sources of diversification came from life insurance and exposure to
country debt. We leave it to the reader to decide as to whether the exposure to LDC
debt was a strategic choice, or a pure historical legacy dating from the early 1980s
when Lloyds was an active lender to countries of South America.
Table 12.5 Profitability of Barclays, NatWest, and Lloyds in 1992
1992 Results (£m) Barclays NatWest Lloyds
Total Assets 149,118 143,216 61,004
PreTax Profit 242 405 801
MV/BVa 0.87 0.95 1.8
Provisions for 2,554 1,903 736
Bad Debt
Note
a MV/BV  market value of shares divided by equity book value.
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If focus may facilitate management attention and a better understanding of
risks, it appears again that diversification can bring benefits at times of severe
recession, and that a balanced firm must mix management focus with a healthy
degree of diversification of income, in medio virtus.
12.2.2 The choice of corporate structure: societas Europeae?
Finally, to reap fully the benefits of cross-border banking, banks should be able
to put in place an appropriate corporate structure. In theory, the European
legislation with a single banking license would allow banks to operate with one
corporate structure and branches in several countries. This would not only mini-
mize the regulatory costs of having to comply with various regulators, but it
would also avoid VAT payment on services provided by shared-services sub-
sidiaries. However, the reality is that most of the large cross-border banks, such
as the Scandinavian Nordea, the Dutch ING, and the German HypoVereinsbank
(HVB) operate abroad with subsidiaries (Dermine, 2003).
Interviews conducted at ING Group and Nordea AB help to understand the
choice of corporate structure.9 Both banks express the view that, in effect, a sin-
gle corporate entity would facilitate the exploitation of economies of scale. This
is why, at Nordea AB, for instance, the asset management and securities business
are put into cross-border structures with branches. The motivation to keep a sub-
sidiary structure for banks is driven by eight arguments. The first four are of a
temporary nature, likely to disappear overtime. The others are more permanent.
A first argument in favor of the subsidiary structure at the time of the merger
is to keep “business as usual” and not to change the brand. This has a short-term
timespan as both banking groups, Nordea and ING, are busy building their own
brands. A second argument is that of reassurance of the local management that
key functions will not be transferred. The reassurance of shareholders, in order to
get their approval, is the third argument. MeritaNordbanken started with a dual
listing in Stockholm and Helsinki. A dual structure reassures shareholders, as it
gives both flexibility and continuity. The fourth argument is that of the need to
reassure nations that they keep their bank. When acquiring the Norwegian
Christiania Bank, Nordea stated that it would continue to operate as a legal entity.
A fifth, and major argument concerns corporate tax. From an international cor-
porate tax point of view, a subsidiary structure is often more flexible than a
branch structure. That is, in case of future group restructuring, start-up losses are
more easily preserved and taxable capital gains are more easily avoided in a sub-
sidiary structure. Moreover, the conversion of a subsidiary into a branch could
create a corporate tax liability. The sixth (surprising) argument is deposit insur-
ance. One should be reminded that the deposit insurer of a subsidiary is the one
in the host country, just as the insurer of a branch is the one in the home state.
Moreover, in many countries, deposit insurance premiums are levied until the
deposit insurance funds reach a certain level. After that, the premium is much
reduced. If Nordea AB, based in Sweden, transformed its Norwegian subsidiary
into a branch of its Swedish bank, it would have to contribute extra deposit
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insurance premiums to the home country Swedish deposit insurance fund in
charge of protecting a larger pool of Swedish and Norwegian deposits. Apparently,
the bank would not be able to collect the premiums paid to the Norwegian insur-
ance fund. The seventh argument for a subsidiary structure is ring-fencing
(protection from risk-shifting) and the ability to do a separate listing. Finally, the
eighth, argument put forward in favor of a subsidiary structure is the ease with
which to sell a business unit.
Of the eight arguments advanced to explain the choice of a subsidiary struc-
ture, four appear temporary (protection of the original brand, management trust,
nationalistic feelings, and shareholder approval), two are due to the incomplete
process of European integration (corporate tax and deposit insurance), but the last
arguments are permanent features of business (asymmetric information and risk-
shifting, listing, and flexibility). Two conclusions come out of this analysis of the
factors governing the corporate structure. First, there are clear indications that
much more work needs to be done on the corporate tax side to facilitate the cre-
ation of a European tax group by way of a branch structure. Second, the analysis
indicates that the corporate structure of European banks is very unlikely to meet
the single entity with branches textbook case, but will involve a web of branches
and subsidiaries.
Nordea is an interesting test case. Nordea AB is the result of the merger of four
leading banks in Finland (Merita), Sweden (Nordbanken), Denmark
(Unidanmark), and Norway (Christiania Bank).10 The group holds significant
bank market shares in Nordic countries: 40% of banking assets in Finland, 25%
in Denmark, 20% in Sweden, and 15% in Norway. Until March 2004, a listed
holding company, Nordea AB, based in Stockholm, was the owner of banking
subsidiaries operating in Scandinavia.
Very recently, Nordea AB announced its plan to move to a single corporate
structure with the use of the Council Regulation on the Statute of a European
Company11 (Societas Europeae). The stated advantages are: regulation, book
keeping, transparency, legal transactions, relations with rating agencies. In March
2004, the holding company in Sweden had received a banking licence.
Progressively, the banking entities of the various countries will be housed into one
single corporate bank entity, incorporated in Sweden. However, the corporate
restructuring process is not easy. For instance, Finland has to change its law, as
the financial contribution from branches are not the same as those of subsidiaries
for the financing of bank supervision. Morever, as stated earlier, the deposit
insurance is proving difficult. Mr Schütze, member of the Group executive
Management, announced in June 2004:
Nordea will apply to Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein for a
“grandfather clause” for the 1994 Directive to exempt Ses formed by the
merger of existing banks in different countries from the home country
requirement for deposit guarantees and thereby simply continue in local
schemes.
(Nordea, 2004)
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It is not yet clear what the response of the EU Commissioner will be, but this
would take us back to the situation before the 1994 Deposit Guarantee Directive.
Its home country format was to ensure a matching of responsibility and account-
ability between bank supervisors and deposit insurers. If Swedish supervisors
have the home country control task of supervising the whole Scandinavian group
Nordea, while deposit insurers of various countries are in charge of insuring
local deposits, the matching of supervision and regulation would again be lost
(Baltensperger and Dermine, 1987).
12.3 Conclusions
The purpose of the chapter has been to discuss two issues in bank strategy: the
trade-off between short- and long-term value creation, and the issue of focus
versus diversification. The case of Lloyds TSB helps us to understand that value-
based management has been quite successful for a large number of years, but that
focus on cost-cutting and banking into one country can lead to problem of future
growth. A balance must be found between keeping growth opportunities and short
term profit. Second, we have reviewed the various arguments for control of risk
and diversification in banking. If focus can facilitate management attention and
speed of response, diversification of income can be particularly welcome, partic-
ularly at the time of a strong recession. A simulation of credit portfolios diversi-
fication during the deep recession of 1992 shows that international diversification
of credit risk across Europe would have helped banks from the United Kingdom
or Sweden. The case of Lloyds TSB in 1992 reveals that the bank was greatly
helped in 1992 by the holding of international Brady bonds, but also by domes-
tic diversification into non-bank activities, namely life insurance. Finally, a call is
made to European authorities to facilitate the creation of a single corporate entity,
the Societas Europeae. Whether one looks at the trade off between short- and
long-term corporate objectives, and focus versus diversification, the in medio
virtus rule is to be highly recommended.
12A.1 Appendix: value, economic profit, and growth
In this appendix, it is shown that the market value of equity is equal to the value
of equity plus the discounted value of future economic profits.
The market value of shares  present value of future dividends discounted at
the cost of equity, that is the opportunity return on shares (Rs)
Simple assumptions allow to visualize the key-drivers of the market value of equity.
Constant dividend–payout ratio, p  DIVIDEND/EARNINGS
Perpetual growth of dividends, g  (1p)  ROE
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It can be proved (see below) that the market value of equity is equal to equity plus
the discounted value of future economic profits.
Under these assumptions, the market-to-book value ratio is equal to,
Proof
12A.2 Appendix: diversification and marginal 
risk contribution
If we define xi as the assets invested in business (country) i, Ri as the return on
asset xi, then the total net income is equal to,
And the variance of total income, , is equal to,




















Total income  
i
Ri    xi
Market value of shares  E 
(ROE  Rs)  E
Rs  g
.
Market value of shares  E 
p  ROE  Equity
Rs  (1  p)  ROE
 E
Market value of shares 
p  ROE  Equity
Rs  (1  p)  ROE












MV  E 
(ROE  Rs)XE
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Notes
1 Market imperfections, such as a lack of competition or externalities, may demand
public interventions.
2 On value creation in banking, see Dermine and Bissada (2002). On pitfalls with value
centers in banking, see Dermine (2004).
3 The measure is not perfect as it includes both a cost and an income variable. Economic-
based measures of cost efficiency, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), are
superior measures of operational efficiency (Canhoto and Dermine, 2003).
4 In a meeting with the author, Sir Brian explained that the attempt to take over Standard
Chartered Bank was, in fact, aligned with the strategy of being one of the four leading
firms in any market which Lloyds Bank would choose to enter.
5 Midland was taken over by Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) in 1992.
6 This specific discussion addresses one of the issues allocated to Commission 2
“Competitive Strategies” of the SUERF Conference.
7 Inelasticity can be explained by oligopolistic equilibrium models of the banking
industry (Gual, 2004).
8 Proof available in Appendix 12A.2.
9 In both cases, we were able to meet the general counsel, the tax and compliance
directors, and executive directors in charge of the corporate structure.
10 Nordbanken and Merita merged in 1997 to create MeritaNordbanken. In March 2000,
this group merged with Unidanmark. In October 2000, the Norwegian Government
Bank Investment Fund decided to sell its shares in Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse to
MeritaNordbanken.
11 OJ 2001. The directive came into force late 2004.
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For the purpose of this chapter, primarily Internet banks are those that rely
heavily, although not exclusively (e.g. telephone, ATM) on Internet as a delivery
channel. For this reason, it is usual to refer to Internet banks as being ‘primarily’
Internet banks rather than Internet banks ‘only’. For the reminder of this chapter,
the terms ‘Internet bank’ and ‘primarily Internet bank’ will be used interchange-
ably. To date, Internet banks have been substantially less profitable than tradi-
tional banks worldwide and this seems mainly explained by their higher overhead
expenses.
The objective of this paper is to identify and estimate the magnitude of
technology-based scale and technology-based learning effects of European
Internet banks that heavily rely on this new technology to develop their business
model. These effects are considered additive to the general scale and experience
effects that occur at new banks that use the existing technology (i.e branches,
ATMs). To this end, we perform regression tests based on pooled annual data sets
of Internet and newly chartered traditional banks in Europe, using two financial
ratios as endogenous variables (return on assets (ROA) and non-interest expenses
over average assets). Our results indicate that Internet banks display significant
technology-based scale economies arising from their ability to control operational
expenses more efficiently than the new traditional banks. However, we do not
find evidence that Internet banks access experience effects as a result of the heavy
usage of the Internet technology.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 13.2 describes the
Internet banking landscape in Europe, paying special attention to the differences
and similarities in performance of Internet banks in the United States and Europe.
Section 13.3 defines the four performance processes whose magnitude is being
estimated: general and technology-based scale and experience economies.
Section 13.4 describes the data and the analytical framework adopted to test for
the existence of general and technology-based scale and experience economies
available for Internet banks. Finally, Section 13.5 summarizes the regression
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13.2 Stylized facts of Internet banks in Europe
Most of the European Internet banks started to operate in the late 1990s but some
institutions launched informational Web sites before and/or were using the tele-
phone as a delivery channel. Market shares of Internet banks vary significantly
per country. The differences across countries in Internet banking penetration
appear to be largely explained by the differences in the availability of access to
the Internet. According to an OECD study (2001), France, Spain and Portugal
followed by Italy, Germany and Belgium are among the group of countries with
a low rate of Internet penetration.1 The Scandinavian countries have the highest
penetration rates at over 50 per cent, comparable to that in the United States, and
also show the highest levels of Internet banking use.
The situation in Spain and Portugal compared to that of other countries appears
to be somewhat atypical as it shows a level of utilization of this distribution chan-
nel above that which would be expected from the level of Internet penetration. Thus,
in these two countries, despite the low Internet penetration rate, the take-up of
Internet banking is at levels above those in countries such as France, Germany or
Italy. Somewhat in contrast, the United States has a relatively low level of utilization
of this distribution channel for banking despite a high Internet penetration rate.
Technical and financial safety is seen as a crucial factor for the taking-up of Internet
banking in both sides of the Atlantic. As a result, many Internet banks have found
it necessary to have some form of physical presence and/or maintain other channels
such as the telephone, hence the term ‘primarily Internet’ bank.
Unlike the United States where most of the Internet banks were established as
independent start-ups, most European Internet banks are part of an existing
financial group. This fact is relevant when analyzing the financial performance of
Internet banks in both geographical areas. In Europe, the long-term viability of
Internet banks has to be contemplated in the context of the financial group often
assuming the specialization of the Internet bank in some market segments
(e.g. mutual funds).
The differences in Internet bank adoption rates in the United States and the
European Union are mainly explained by the continued reliance of United States’
households on paper cheques, which are less compatible with Internet banking
and require physical bank offices for the collection and clearing of cheques.
Moreover, the take-up of online brokerage, which is one of the main drivers used
for these banks for acquiring new customers, did not flow through to banks in the
United States, because they were restricted in the degree to which they could
engage in securities activities.2
The profitability measured as ROA of the European Internet banks was nega-
tive on average over the period 1994–2002, although about half of those institu-
tions included in this study were showing profits as of end 2001. This finding is
consistent with the fact that no matter what technology a new bank is relying on,
it is likely to perform worse than a mature bank for a number of years. A similar
trend is found when analysing the non-interest expenses of Internet banks on both
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sides of the Atlantic. Costs associated with Web site development (i.e. software
research and development expenses, amortization of purchased software, data
processing) and promotion (i.e. marketing) to gain name recognition are higher in
the case of primarily Internet banks, due to the fact that they are new banks, and
to the nature of the distribution channel itself.3
The Internet delivery channel potentially increases and modifies traditional
banking risks and influences their risk profile (see BIS, 1998, 2000; Ciciretti
et al., 2004). A major source of risk for banks is credit risk. However, there is
anecdotal evidence showing lower lending activity of Internet banks as compared
with mature traditional banks (see Delgado and Nieto (2004) for evidence in
Spain). In general, market risk and liquidity risk are greater when customers can
transfer their deposits from one institution to another rapidly to take advantage of
higher interest rates (see Delgado and Nieto, 2004 for evidence in Spain). At the
same time, strategic, legal and security risks, as well as reputational risks are
potentially greater and differ somewhat from those faced by traditional banks.
The regulatory approaches to deal with consumer protection in general and
technical and financial safety of Internet banking in particular are most relevant
since safety is seen as a crucial factor for the taking-up of Internet banking in
Europe. Nieto (2001) encourages regulators to deal with these concerns according
to the principle of neutrality with regard to the distribution channel. This principle
implies that rules on transparency of operations, data privacy, as well as account-
ability and, in general, on consumer protection should be neutral to the distribution
channel. By tackling consumers’ security concerns in this ‘technology neutral’
fashion, European authorities may encourage a larger number of consumers to
use this delivery channel on a long-term basis.
13.3 Definition of general and technology-based 
scale and experience effects
The objective of our study is to test for the existence of four distinct but simulta-
neous performance processes at primarily Internet banks in the European Union:
general scale and experience effects, which are common to all new chartered
banks, regardless of their business models, and technology-based scale and
experience effects which are specific to new banks that use primarily Internet as
delivery channel (see DeYoung, 2001, 2002, 2005).
General scale effects reflect the improvement in financial performance of
banks as their output grows (asset size is a proxy for output), mainly through
lower per unit costs. General experience effects refer to the improvement in
financial performance through learning-based developments in cost control, risk
management and investment diversification among others, as young banks
accumulate experience (age is being used as a proxy). However, at an empirical
level, because age and size are positively and significantly correlated at young
banks, it is not a trivial task to disentangle experience and scale effects.
Technology-based scale effects imply even better financial performance of pri-
marily Internet banks as size increases, because Internet technology is scalable
and certain banking activities become more scalable as they incorporate it
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(e.g. credit scoring models to evaluate credit risk of SMEs) (see DeYoung, 2001,
2002, 2005; Sato and Hawkins, 2001). Technology-based experience effects
explain better performance of Internet banks as they age and customers gain
experience in transacting over the Internet, while managers better understand the
new technology. Both technology-based scale and experience effects are additive
to the general scale and experience effects. If significant technology based scale
and experience effects do exist, then the financial performance of primarily
Internet banks will improve more quickly than that of the new traditional banks,
which can only rely on general experience and scale effects.
13.4 The empirical framework
Our empirical analysis on the learning and scale economies in European Internet
banks is based on annual audited public financial data from BankScope between
1994 and 2002.4 Our data corresponds to three samples of banks chartered in the
European Union: primarily Internet (13 banks), established traditional of
comparable size (335 banks) and newly chartered banks, a subset of the previous
sample (45 banks).
The primarily Internet banks are separately chartered individual (non-consolidated)
institutions (i.e neither a trade name – a non-separate entity that uses a commercial
name – nor a dedicated branch) that reported to the European Central Bank (ECB,
2001)5 to have business models heavily reliant on the Internet as the most impor-
tant delivery channel. All of these banks were active at the end of 2002 and fulfil
the following two conditions: (1) to offer mainly, although not exclusively,
basic banking services including taking deposits and granting credits and (2) to
be a new start-up or an existing bank that changed its business model in order
to operate primarily by Internet.6 According to the BankScope data base, they all
belong to some financial group. The average age of the Internet banks sample
is 5.0 years.
The established banks of comparable size are also separately chartered
individual (non-consolidated) institutions which fulfil the following conditions:
(1) their business models rely mainly, although not necessary exclusively, on
traditional delivery channels (2) they are also commercial banks and (3) their
asset size is in the same range as that of the primarily Internet banks (between
€20.8 billion and 74 million). Within the sample of established banks, a subset of
banks was created including those institutions that, in addition to these condi-
tions, were launched in or after 1990. This sample of newly chartered traditional
banks consists of forty-five entities and it is used as a performance benchmark.
As is the case for the Internet banks, most of the newly chartered traditional banks
belong to some financial group and their average age is 6.1 years.
The combined data set (primarily Internet banks plus newly chartered
traditional banks) is an unbalanced panel of 378 observations of 58 banks, over a
nine-year period starting in 1994. The banks’ age is in years and the first year of
operation has been considered entirely even if the bank has not been fully
operating for the whole year. To the degree that the newly chartered traditional
banks sample contains banks that use Internet to some extent as a delivery channel,
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it will be harder to find evidence in favour of the existence of technology-based
experience and scale effects at the primarily Internet banks.
Figure 13.1 shows the relation between asset size and the ratio of general
expenses over average assets for the Internet banks in 2000. This figure, making
use only of the cross-section dimension, suggests the existence of a negative rela-
tionship between asset size and the ratio of general expenses.7 This relationship
also holds when the two banks with extreme values of size and expenses are
removed from the sample.
This result represents evidence in favour of the existence of technology-based
effects. However, a regression analysis, controlling for the influence of other
variables, is needed for rigorously testing the existence of such effects. More pre-
cisely, the regression framework attempts to identify and discriminate between
the technology-based scale effects and the technology-based experience effects,
showing whether the underperformance of Internet banks disappears as Internet
banks grow larger and/or as they gain experience with the new business model.
Our empirical model consists of a reduced form equation allowing for the
simultaneous existence of both technology-based scale effects (INTERNET 
ln ASSETS) and technology-based experience effects (INTERNET  ln AGE).
PERFORMANCEit
where subscripts i and t represent index banks and time, respectively.
PERFORMANCE is alternatively ROA or non-interest expenses over average
assets, two ratios that summarize the financial performance of the sample banks.
INTERNET is a dummy variable that equals 1 (primarily Internet banks) or 0
(newly chartered traditional banks).
   INTERNETi  ln ASSETSi,t  i,t  εi,t
  ln ASSETSi,t    INTERNETi  ln AGEi,t
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Figure 13.1 Internet banks: size and efficiency.




The set of control variables (X) includes the real GDP growth and the inflation
rate to control for the effects of macroeconomic conditions over the sample period
(1994–2002) on the performance variables and country dummies to control for the
effect of banks nationality on the performance variables (e.g. different absolute
minimum capital requirements for licensing purposes across the European Union).
 indicates the different financial performance, at the means of the data,
between primarily Internet banks and newly chartered banks when there are no
significant technology-based effects. In the more general case, this performance
gap would take the following form:
where and denote the mean values of the corresponding
variables.
 and  indicate the importance of any technology-based scale or experience
effect, respectively.
 and 	 show the importance of general scale or experience effects, respectively.
As has been already mentioned, the colinearity between AGE and ASSETS
(expressed in real terms) makes very difficult empirically separating experience
and scale effects. For that reason, two alternative equations have been estimated,
considering technology-based scale and technology-based experience effects in
isolation, as a robustness test to investigate the potential effects of colinearity on
the parameter estimates.
The regressions performed in this study use pooled data sets that combine the
primarily Internet banks with the newly chartered traditional banks in Europe,
and are estimated using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized least
squares random-effects (GLS-RE) estimation techniques. The random-effects
approach includes, in addition to the usual random disturbance term, a bank-specific
random disturbance term that accounts for the unexplained variation in the
dependent variable that it is specific to bank i during the sample period.8 The
main results are in general robust to the estimation technique.
13.5 Main results and conclusions
Table 13.1 summarizes the most important results of the analysis that have tried
to identify and estimate the magnitude of technology-based scale and learning
economies of European Internet banks. The results indicate that, on the one hand,
newly chartered traditional banks show significant evidence of cost related
general scale economies. On the other hand, Internet banks show strong evidence
of scale economies in terms of ROA. Our results show that an increase in asset
size by 50 per cent results in a 1.85 percentage points increase in ROA. The primary
source of the technology-based scale effects seems to be the ability of primarily
Internet banks to control operational expenses even more efficiently than the new
traditional banks. On average, a 50 per cent increase in asset size is associated
with a 3.15 percentage points decrease in the ratio of non-interest expenses over
average assets at primarily Internet banks, compared to only a 0.33 percentage
ln ASSETSln AGE
   * ln AGEi,t    ln ASSETSi,t
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point decrease at newly chartered traditional banks. There is no conclusive
evidence that either new traditional banks or Internet banks enjoy experience
economies as they age.
The empirical analysis indicates that the success of the Internet bank model in
Europe depends on the ability of these banks to save on overhead costs from
technology-based scale economies and on whether these savings are sufficient to
close the remaining profitability gap with traditional banks. Nonetheless, a note
of caution must be introduced given the preliminary character of the findings of
this study, which are based on only thirteen European Internet banks over a rela-
tively short time horizon.
Finally, to the extent that Internet banks are struggling to prove themselves a
viable business model, banking regulators and supervisors are encouraged to
respond to the challenges posed by the incorporation of Internet in accordance
with the principle of neutrality with regard to the distribution channel. It is in the
realm of consumer protection in which, in order to protect consumers’ interests,
financial regulators are encouraged to specify for this distribution channel the
general rules on transparency of operations and customer protection. By tackling
consumers’ security concerns, authorities may favour the use of this delivery
channel by a higher share of the population, which would allow Internet banks to
capture more of the potential scale efficiencies implied in our estimations.
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Notes
1 Internet penetration is usually measured as the percentage of the total population using
the Internet in each country, while Internet banking penetration is the number of
customers expressed as a percentage of the total population.
2 See Barth et al. (2003) for comparisons of the permissible range of banking activities
across countries.
3 See Sullivan (2000), ECB (2001) and Delgado and Nieto (2004) for evidence in the
United States, the European Union and Spain, respectively.
Table 13.1 Impact (p.p.) of an increase in asset size by 50 per cent
Impact on Internet banks Newly chartered
traditional banks
ROA 1.59 —
Non-interest expenses 2.61 0.33
over average assets
Ballin-13.qxd  13/12/05  12:53 PM  Page 228 $ 
+ + 
$ 
European Internet banks 229
4 BankScope is a financial database covering 10,500 World Banks on CD-ROM with
financial analysis software. It offers subscribers data up to eight years of detailed
spreadsheet information, compiled by FITCHIBCA mostly from the balance sheet,
income statement and applicable notes found in audited annual reports. It also includes
data details on ownership, produced by Bureau Van Dijk, such as lists of shareholders
and lists of banking subsidiaries.
5 The ECB launched a survey on e-banking activity in the European Union in 2002. The
survey is not public. All thirteen primarily Internet banks (4 German, 3 Spanish, 2 Swedish,
2 Danish, 1 French and 1 British) reported to the ECB to operate mainly via Internet.
6 In the event of a change in business model (e.g. Patagon ), two different banks have been
considered: ‘before’ as a traditional bank and ‘after’ as an Internet bank.
7 A similar cross-sectional relationship between age and the ratio of general expenses to
average assets is found.
8 As explained by DeYoung (2005), a fixed effect estimation approach is not feasible here,
because the phenomena being tested for are themselves fixed effects. As a consequence,
much of the variation necessary to estimate the coefficients ,  and  in the equations
would disappear in a fixed effects model.
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Bank risks are inherently cyclical. As financial intermediaries, banks are exposed
to different types of risk such as credit and interest rate risk. Since the underlying
sources of these risks are closely connected to the business cycle, bank health is
related to the economic conditions in which they operate. Banking crises, or
significant deteriorations in overall bank health, typically occur in economic
downturns. For a large sample of developed and developing countries, Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999) show that banking crises occur as the economy enters into a
recession, often following a prolonged boom in economic activity fueled by
increased bank lending. However, while financial crises have often been preceded
by sharp fluctuations in the macroeconomy and in asset prices, it would be a mis-
take to seek their origin exclusively in macroeconomic instability. While macro-
economic conditions may often be the proximate cause, banking problems usually
emerge because of existing weaknesses in the banking system that have taken
some time to build up (Llewellyn, 2002). In Europe, the typical example is the
Scandinavian banking crisis in the early 1990s caused by a combination of impru-
dent lending and asset price collapses. An analysis of the time profile of bank risks
in the Scandinavian banking crisis reveals that risks were gradually building up in
the overlapping periods of financial liberalization, intensified competition, chang-
ing macroeconomic conditions, resulting in the ultimate banking crisis (Hyytinen,
2002). Moreover, while banking crises are often caused by an economic downturn,
they may also amplify the recession. In most cases, banking crises are associated
with a significant decline of real activity, sometimes caused by a credit crunch. As
the profitability of financial institutions declines and confidence wanes, financial
institutions tend to seek higher rewards for risk-taking or even withdraw from such
activity altogether. Rising risk aversion or a crisis of confidence can have
pronounced adverse effects on the real economy especially when the capital base
of financial institutions has been eroded. The propagation mechanism results in
falling bank loans and generates persistent declines in aggregate investment and
output (Chen, 2001).
This seemingly inevitable sequence was not observed in the recent downturn
over the period 2000–2003. Although economic growth in Europe, and especially
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in the large core countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU), declined
substantially, some analysts question whether this period can be characterized as
a recession (see the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the Centre for
Economic Policy Research). Nevertheless, the economic slowdown was accom-
panied by a series of events that are usually very harmful for bank health (see
BIS, 2004). The most important feature was the protracted stock market decline
from mid-2000 onward, amplified by the September 2001 attack, slack consumer
and business confidence, a relatively high number of corporate failures, and the
accounting scandals that erupted from mid-2002 onward (also in Europe, for
example, Ahold and Parmalat). Hence, there is every reason to assume that eco-
nomic conditions were harmful for the risk profile of European banks. Yet, the
banking system as a whole has proved to be very resilient. There were few, if any,
bank failures or systematic problems among European banks that have prompted
regulatory interventions or bailouts. Also, the number of actual rating down-
grades of major European banks by rating agencies over the 2000–2003 period
was very limited; from mid-2003 onwards some banks received a rating upgrade
(FitchRatings, 2003).
This raises a number of questions that are important for the banks them-
selves, and also for regulators and bank supervisors, who care about the
systemic stability of the financial system. Why was bank health less impaired
in the recent downturn? A number of hypotheses have already been forwarded.
Was it because the downturn was mild and commercial banks received
ample assistance from the central banks in the form of historically low short-term
interest rates? Was it because banks have become better at managing their risks
and could rely on new markets for risk mitigation? Was it because banks entered
the downturn with much healthier balance sheets than has been the case in previ-
ous recessions? Or have banks opted for corporate strategies that have enabled
them to sustain profits even in otherwise unfavorable market conditions? These
are the main explanations that have been forwarded by bank analysts and acade-
mic researchers (see, for example, Jordan and Rosengren, 2002).
Adequacy of absorption capacities of systemically important financial
institutions has been a key element explaining the banking systems’ initial
resilience to the recent downturn and several shocks such as corporate and sover-
eign defaults. Buffers have been built up in recent years in terms of capital
and profitability, the extent of those cushions differing from one banking system
to the other. Most major financial institutions appeared to have had relatively
favorable capital and liquidity positions prior to the slowdown. Increased use of
new and innovative risk management techniques during the 1990s may have
helped to avoid excessive risk exposures whereas the use of new financial instru-
ments allowed credit risk to be more widely spread. Other factors, it has been
argued, have also been important in explaining the resilience of financial institu-
tions. They include that the slowdown was relatively shallow, a commercial
property boom was absent and that much of the financing for the (technology)
boom was obtained through capital markets rather than banks. However, as a
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result of recent developments, the profitability cushions and surplus capital in the
financial sector have been eroded to some extent. As problems have continued
to accumulate, some institutions may have come closer to critical thresholds,
especially as the problems are not confined to a single area, but have been affect-
ing several areas at the same time. Downward revisions of expectations for
economic activity, trading losses due to stock market drops, a general decline in
revenues from capital market activities, and deteriorating loan portfolios and
record numbers of corporate defaults have all added to pressures on profitability
and capital.
We try to assess some of these commonly advanced explanations for bank
resilience on a broad sample of listed European banks in the 2000–2003 economic
downturn. We identify banks with different strategies and different characteristics
before the slowdown and investigate their risk profile before and during the
economic downturn with market-based measures of return and risk. Banks are
sorted in quintiles over the pre-downturn period 1996–2000 based on a number
of observable characteristics related to their geographic location, their institutional
type, or the initial balance sheet conditions with which they entered the downturn.
Subsequently we investigate their return/risk profile during the economic
slowdown of 2000–2003 using market-based measures such as the Q ratio, the
Sharpe ratio, and the volatility of stock returns.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 14.2, we explore the
link between bank return/risk and the business cycle. Section 14.3 subdivides the
banks in relevant groups based on different criteria. Section 14.4 explains
the empirical methodology and describes the sample of European banks.
Section 14.5 discusses the main empirical results and the final section concludes.
14.2 Banks and the business cycle
In their role as financial intermediaries, banks are inherently exposed to changes
in the overall economic conditions. From a theoretical point of view, banks are
commonly characterized as delegated monitors, because they issue illiquid claims
(loans) funded by short-term deposits with a relatively high degree of liquidity
(Diamond, 1984). In their lending business, banks are exposed to default risk,
caused by problems of asymmetric information, both ex ante (adverse selection)
and ex post (moral hazard). In their role as maturity transformers, banks are
exposed to interest rate risk because the average duration of their assets exceeds
that of their liabilities. However, these risks are themselves influenced or even
determined by business cycle conditions. In the literature, various channels have
been developed through which economic conditions may have an impact on bank
risk. First, there is an obvious association between the business cycle, the degree
of asymmetric information, and bank default risk. Second, the economic envi-
ronment may influence bank lending behavior and may alter the trade-offs
between risk and franchise value. The third channel builds on the role of bank
lending in the transmission of monetary policy. It should be kept in mind that
these economic effects do not occur in isolation but in a changing regulatory
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framework. In the EU, the single market program, the harmonization of bank
supervisory and capital adequacy rules, and the introduction of the euro can be
regarded as milestones (Berger, 2003).
First, theories of imperfect capital markets (see, for example, Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989 and Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) argue that asymmetric information
and agency costs are typically high during business cycle troughs and low during
booms. The banking sector is especially vulnerable to adverse selection and moral
hazard, both caused by asymmetric information. In an economic downturn, it
becomes more difficult for banks to assess the creditworthiness of corporate
borrowers. Since adverse economic conditions have a negative impact on the cash
flows of borrowers, banks may suffer losses because some of their outstanding
loans default. At the same time, the assessment of new loan applicants becomes
more subject to type I errors because the net present value of new corporate
investment becomes more uncertain. Moreover, the net worth of companies and
the value of their collateralizable assets decrease. Since the value of collateral is
likely to be procyclical, asymmetric information will be relatively high in
business cycle downturns and relatively low in booms. This implies that bank
intermediation becomes riskier during downturns through a reduction in the value
of collateral attached to outstanding loans and an increase in the degree of
asymmetric information.
Second, a shift in the risk profile of banks over the business cycle can also be
caused by changing incentives on the part of banks. Economic downturns may
produce the conditions in which banks have incentives to lower their lending
standards and, hence, increase their riskiness. Rajan (1994) argues that bank
managers with short horizons will set credit policies that are driven by demand
side conditions, which could amplify business cycle movements. Hellman et al.
(2000) show that banks have an incentive to gamble when their franchise value is
harmed. Since this effect will be stronger in economic downturns, bank riskiness
may behave asymmetrically. These risk incentives may cause lending cycles and
associated swings in the riskiness of banks (see, for example, Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997 and Asea and Blomberg, 1998). Repullo (2004) and Schoors
and Vander Vennet (2003) show that a gambling equilibrium may exist when the
degree of asymmetric information increases, which is typically associated with
recessions. However, they also show that this risky behavior is less likely to occur
when capital adequacy rules are binding.
Third, there is evidence of a bank lending channel in most developed
economies, although its importance vis-à-vis other monetary policy transmission
channels remains disputed (see, for example, Angeloni et al., 2002). Faced with
adverse business cycle conditions, banks may elect to ration credit. This happened
in a number of periods, both in the United States and in Europe. Peek and
Rosengren (1995) argue that the recession of 1990–1991 in New England was
reinforced by the reluctance of banks to lend. Also in the most recent business
cycle downturn (2000–2003), banks have been accused of being excessively
restrictive, both in the United States and in Europe (The Economist, 2002).1
However, banks will react differently to monetary policy actions, depending on
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their financial strength and their access to internally or externally generated
liquidity. Kashyap and Stein (1995) conclude that small banks seem more prone
than large banks to reduce their lending, with the effect greatest for small banks
with relatively low liquidity buffers. On the other hand, well-capitalized banks
should find it relatively easy to access the interbank or the securities markets to
raise funds in the face of a deposit shock. This implies that a restrictive monetary
policy will have less impact on the loan supply of well-capitalized banks.
Empirically, Kishan and Opiela (2000) show that the impact of monetary policy
actions is different for banks with different sizes and capital ratios in the United
States. Similar evidence is reported across the EMU banking systems in the 1990s
(Altunbas et al., 2002). Especially well-capitalized banks are expected to be less
sensitive to the effects of monetary policy changes.
Based on these arguments we expect that the economic slowdown in the
period 2000–2003 has a negative effect on the banks’ risk profile, although
differences may exist between different types of banks. Next to the negative risk
effect, the economic slowdown is also expected to have an adverse impact on
bank profits. The economic downturn is associated with increased realized loan
losses and higher loan loss provisions (see BIS, 2004). Low inflation and low
interest rates are typically associated with low interest margins (see Boyd et al.,
2001), a feature that is also caused by continuing deregulation and increased
competition. Next to lower interest margins, banks also suffered from lower fee
revenues due to the depressed stock market and the absence of merger and acqui-
sition deals. The lower fees and commission from financial market trading and
asset management were only partly compensated by revenues from bond market
activity. As a result, bank profits were negatively affected, causing at least a
temporary downward adjustment in bank market values. Consequently, the expec-
tation is that the market-based performance indicators of bank returns and risk
will be negatively affected by the economic slowdown. However, this does not
imply that all banks will exhibit a similar return/risk behavior on the stock
market. Banks can anticipate adverse shocks and can adapt their strategies
accordingly. Therefore we need to consider banks with different institutional and
strategic characteristics.
14.3 Types of banks
Since an aggregate deterioration of bank health may mask different performance
across various types of European banks, we need to construct useful subsamples.
In this section we subdivide banks into different groups based on observable
characteristics that are assumed to capture a relevant part of their exposure to
economic shocks. The subdivisions are based on economic theory and on frequently
used categories by bank analysts. Some of the criteria are passive in the sense that
the bank has little impact on that variable. An obvious example is geographic
location. Other criteria are strategic in nature and can be managed by the bank.
Examples are the degree of diversification, the level of capital adequacy, or the
operational efficiency of the bank.
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Banks will be differently affected according to the magnitude of the economic
downturn they are exposed to. Although the economic and monetary union has
been accompanied by a certain degree of macroeconomic convergence in Europe,
substantial differences in terms of business cycle conditions in different European
countries remain. The typical example is the prolonged gap between Germany,
the slowest growing country of the Eurozone (with even negative growth in a
number of quarters), and a number of peripherical countries (such as Ireland or
Spain) or non-EMU countries (such as the United Kingdom) that were much less
affected by the recent slowdown. When poor economic performance in a country
is caused by slack consumption and investment, local banks are assumed to suffer.
Hence, as far as banks in different countries are primarily exposed to local
business cycle conditions, country affiliation may be a useful criterion.
Of course, this is expected to be less the case for banks that have diversified inter-
nationally. Standard portfolio theory implies that internationally operating banks
will be less vulnerable to abrupt changes in local business cycle or credit market
conditions. The underlying rationale is that a geographic diversification of credit and
market risk exposures leads to more stable revenues, assuming a non-perfect corre-
lation of market movements and asymmetric business cycles across different coun-
tries or world regions. Banks from industrialized countries have indeed expanded
their involvement in international lending, including loans to emerging markets,
often in the form of syndicated lending. Part of this movement may be explained by
increased competition in their home markets, leading to eroding interest margins
and low domestic interest rates. Moreover, Western banks may also be induced to
lend internationally because they enjoy deposit insurance, lender-of-last-resort
services, and implicit guarantees, along with the expectation that international
institutions such as the IMF will organize bailouts when the borrowing countries are
hit by adverse macroeconomic events. However, since borrower information in
developing countries is more opaque, the net exposure of internationally operating
banks to moral hazard may actually increase, as was evidenced during some of the
financial crises in the 1990s (East Asia, Russia, etc.). Finally, the risk benefits of
geographical diversification rely on the assumption of low cross-border correla-
tions. When, on the other hand, adverse credit market conditions prevail across most
regions, as was the case in the recent downturn, banks may experience little risk
benefits. Amihud et al. (2002) find that neither the total nor the systematic risk of
banks engaged in cross-border bank mergers changes significantly relative to banks
in their home markets. Moreover, even banks with significant activities abroad often
remain dependent on economic conditions in their home market for the traditional
intermediation activities of lending and deposit-taking.
14.3.2 Diversification
Banks have been allowed to broaden the scope of their activities beyond their
traditional intermediation role of taking deposits and making loans. In Europe,
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the Second Banking Directive of 1989 allows banks to combine commercial
banking, investment banking, asset management, financial advisory activities,
and even insurance underwriting. All European countries allow universal banking
or the formation of financial conglomerates in which commercial banking,
insurance, and securities-related activities can be integrated, although different
organizational models of universal banking coexist. Typically, banks have tried to
lessen their dependence on interest income (from loans and securities) and have
increased the proportion of non-interest income. The economic rationale again
refers to standard portfolio theory. If the non-interest income sources are imper-
fectly correlated with the traditional revenues from intermediation, the bundled
income stream will be more stable. ECB (2000) reports an inverse correlation
between interest income and non-interest income in several EU bank markets,
suggesting a high potential for diversification benefits. The general conclusion
of merger studies among different financial services providers is that the
combination of banking and other activities, especially insurance, may have a
moderating impact on the overall riskiness of the conglomerate (Genetay and
Molyneux, 1998; Kwan and Landerman, 1999; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000;
Berger, 2003). DeLong (2001), however, finds higher abnormal returns for
focusing rather than diversifying US bank mergers. For US banks, Stiroh (2002)
finds that interest income and non-interest income have become more correlated
in recent years.
Based on a different argumentation, a number of studies have provided
evidence that universal banks could be less risky than their specialized peers. The
closer ties with corporate borrowers and repeated lending may give universal
banks access to private information which may improve the effectiveness of their
monitoring efforts. The biggest advantage of universal banks may be in the
ex post monitoring of firms facing financial distress because they can build up
renegotiation reputation (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). If universal banks are
better able to deal with financial distress, their cash flows will be less affected by
adverse economic conditions. Specialized banks, on the other hand, are expected
to be more vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Based on a large sample of
European banks, Vander Vennet (2002) finds that the market betas of universal
and specialized banks do not differ significantly in periods of economic expan-
sion. In times of economic contraction, however, the market beta of universal
banks is significantly lower than that of specialized banks. This finding is
consistent with the conjecture that universal banks are better monitors and, hence,
are less sensitive to shifts in the business cycle. The results are broadly in line
with those reported by Dewenter and Hess (1998) for portfolios of relationship
versus transactional banks in eight countries. Baele et al. (2004) use a regime-
switching model and find that diversified banks have a lower sensitivity to shocks
in credit market conditions in the recession state than specialized banks. Hence,
our prediction is that diversified (universal) banks will exhibit less sensitivity to
shifts in business cycle conditions than their specialized competitors.
The benefits of the formation of financial conglomerates depend on how
diverse the different activities combined under one roof are, although the net
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effect of diversity may be ambiguous. On the one hand, the greater the extent to
which activities differ within a financial group, the greater the revenue diversifi-
cation benefits should be. In particular, life insurance companies are estimated to
offer good prospects as matches for banks. The concept of ‘bancassurance’ has
been applied by a number of European financial groups. On the other hand, the
greater the heterogeneity of different activities within one group, the more
substantial could be the costs of integrating different institutions (Berger, 2003).
The recent difficult environment for financial institutions offers a good opportunity
to investigate how these financial conglomerates performed. The period 2000–
2003 was characterised by an economic downturn, a substantial stock market
correction, financial asset deterioration more generally, record corporate default
rates, the Argentina sovereign default, and several natural and man-made cata-
strophes, including most notably the September 11 attacks. One could argue that
it is particularly during such a difficult environment that financial institutions are
most in need of the benefits from diversified sources of earnings. On the other
hand, difficulties in the insurance sector can also be the cause of financial stress
in a financial conglomerate. Schick (2003) looks at developments, from the
beginning of 2000 to end 2003, in equity market valuations of financial groups
by comparing their share price developments with those of industry indices. The
results from this type of exercise are mixed. There are some instances in which
the financial-group index lies between the banking and insurance sector indices
but most of the time the financial-group index lies above both indices. The fact
that financial-group index always lies above at least one of the financial sector
indices suggests that financial groups on average have realised some diversification
benefits, as measured by equity market developments.
14.3.3 Capital adequacy
Another strategic option for a bank to signal financial strength is to maintain a
relatively high level of capital as a protection against possible losses in its loan or
securities portfolios. Banks in all European countries that are analyzed in this
paper are required to maintain minimum capital levels as a proportion of their
risky assets, calculated according to the current BIS standards. However, while
the supervisory authorities impose a risk-based capital ratio of 8 percent, banks
can signal their creditworthiness by holding levels of equity in excess of the
required minimum. The excess capital serves as an additional buffer to cover
unexpected future losses, thereby decreasing the risk of failure. In all standard
models of banking, high capital levels are associated with a lower bankruptcy
risk. Hence, the prediction is that banks with a relatively high degree of capital
coverage should be better able to alleviate adverse changes in the business cycle
and, consequently, will be judged by the financial markets to be less sensitive to
shifts in business cycle conditions. Next to this positive risk effect, well-capitalized
banks could also benefit from the potentially lower funding costs that this strategy
may imply. This element of market discipline is expected to apply especially to
the funds obtained in the professional and interbank markets, where competitive
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pricing based on perceived riskiness is standard practice. Berger (1995) documents
a positive relationship between capital and earnings for US banks, a finding
which he ascribes to the beneficial effect of capitalization on funding costs.
Goldberg and Hudgins (2002) and Park and Peristiani (1998) show that uninsured
deposits are exposed to market discipline. They find that riskier banks attract
smaller amounts of uninsured deposits and pay higher interest rates on this type
of funding than less risky competitors. For European banks, Sironi (2003) finds
that investors in bank subordinated debt are sensitive to bank risk and that this
effect has increased over the 1990s. This beneficial effect on bank profits may
strengthen the positive risk effect of higher capital levels and, hence, affect the
valuation of the bank by the stock market. Based on a regime-switching method-
ology applied to a sample of European listed banks, Baele et al. (2004) find that
the stock returns and the conditional volatility of well-capitalized banks are
significantly less sensitive to shocks in credit market conditions than those of
relatively less-capitalized banks. The empirical question is whether or not the
stock market judges banks with excess capital coverage to be less sensitive to the
adverse economic conditions of the 2000–2003 period.
14.3.4 Initial balance sheet and operating conditions
Next to the degree of diversification and the level of capital coverage, banks may
differ in other respects, related to the composition of their balance sheets or the
efficiency of their operations. These features are the result of managerial actions
and thus represent the dynamic initial conditions that banks have when entering
an economic downturn. First, banks have different interest margins. This may
partly be due to the legal and institutional environment, but primarily reflects the
types of assets and liabilities of the bank. Banks with high interest margins are
less vulnerable to profit shocks, hence we expect that their stock market perfor-
mance will be less adversely affected than that of banks with small and vulnera-
ble margins. However, it should be noted that interest margins in general have
tended to decline in most European countries, due to increased competition and
deregulation. Second, banks differ in terms of operational efficiency. Well-managed
banks should have relatively low cost-to-income C–I ratios and, consequently,
their profits should be better protected against unexpected bad times. Banking
firms across the industrialized world have continued to enhance their efficiency
through the rationalization of operations, consolidation and the adoption of new
technologies, but the cross-sectional dispersion across banks remains high. Hence,
the stock market may attach a different degree of confidence to banks with
different observable levels of efficiency. Third, we also consider the composition
of the balance sheet of the banks in the sample by ranking the banks according to
their loan-to-asset (LTA) ratio and their asset quality, proxied by the loan loss
provision ratio. The rationale is that banks with a solid presence in the lending
market should be able to withstand economic shocks relatively unscathed. The
LTA ratio may, however, also be a proxy for the degree of specialization of a bank
in the lending business. Loan loss provisions, on the other hand, are an indication
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of the riskiness of the loan portfolio, but also of the bank’s risk management and
ability to anticipate and provision accurately for expected losses. The effect on
bank stock returns of loan loss provisions has been shown to differ depending on
the type of assets being provisioned (Blose, 2001). Nevertheless, there is also
empirical evidence that many banks around the world delay provisioning for bad
loans until too late, when cyclical downturns have already set in, thereby
magnifying the impact of the economic cycle on banks’ income and capital
(Laeven and Majnoni, 2003).
14.3.5 Size, market power, and franchise value
Size or a dominant position in the loan and/or deposit market of the home country
may confer specific advantages to a bank. In theory, banks with market power
should have relatively high interest margins and this should operate as a protec-
tion against a profit shock caused by a recession. Large banks may also face
structurally lower funding costs in professional markets because of their lower
risk of default or implicit too-big-to-fail protection. Moreover, when banks are
perceived to have market power in the pricing of their financial services, they will
have a relatively high franchise value. A temporary economic slowdown should
not be expected to affect their revenue-generating capacity in a fundamental
way. Hence, their market valuation is expected to be relatively stable with less
sensitive stock prices. However, regulatory changes can gradually erode bank
market power and affect their franchise values negatively. Lower charter values,
in turn, may induce banks to change their risk profile in terms of capital adequacy
or lending risks, as Salas and Saurina (2003) show for the Spanish banking mar-
ket. De Nicolo (2001) shows that charter values decrease in size and insolvency
risk increases for most banks in twenty-one industrialized countries.
Nevertheless, there is still widespread evidence that the largest European banks
still enjoy some degree of market power, especially in the retail markets
(Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002).
14.3.6 Hedging activity
Banks know that shifts in credit market conditions, that is, a deterioration of
the creditworthiness of their borrowers, or shifts in asset market conditions may
be caused by reversals of the business cycle. Consequently, they will try to miti-
gate some of the associated risk, for example, by hedging certain positions with
credit or other types of derivatives. In recent years the deepening of securitization
and risk transfer markets, especially the market for credit risk derivatives, has
helped banks in Europe to spread strains across a larger and more diversified set
of players, strengthening their resilience to adverse shocks (BIS, 2003). The rapid
development of new risk transfer markets has enhanced the capacity of the finan-
cial system to absorb losses and supported its performance by helping to disperse
risk across institutions and investors. The growth of securitization markets for
bank-oriented credits was boosted by demand from institutional investors and
Bank risks and the business cycle 239
Ballin-14.qxd  13/12/05  12:53 PM  Page 239 $ 
+ + 
$ 
advances in financial and communications technologies. The secondary market
for syndicated loans has also grown substantially. Risk transfer techniques allow
banks to diversify their risks better, which should also enhance financial stability.
They contribute to a more sophisticated risk management by banks by allowing
them to focus on their risk exposures on a portfolio-wide basis. The possibility of
transferring risk, however, may also induce banks to take on additional risks and
even to worsen asymmetric information problems by inducing banks to reduce
their screening and monitoring efforts (Wagner and Marsh, 2004). Hence, while
the off-balance sheet (OBS) activities of commercial banks have increased
substantially over the last decade, it is not clear whether this trend has effectively
produced less risk. Even a careful hedging strategy may not constitute an effective
protection against unanticipated events (Peek and Rosengren, 1997; Froot and
Stein, 1998). From time to time, regulators and supervisors express their concern
about the ultimate distribution of risks attached to derivatives and similar
instruments (BIS, 2003).
From this overview it is clear that banks with different institutional and financial
characteristics may exhibit different sensitivities to changes in the business cycle,
both in terms of profitability and riskiness. Since listed European banks have
implemented different risk strategies, and we can use their stock returns to assess
the sensitivities of their return/risk profile to pervasive shifts in credit and asset
market conditions caused by the economic slowdown of 2000–2003.
14.4 Empirical methodology and sample
The sample consists of 280 listed European banks. We identify all European
banks with a stock exchange listing in December 2003 and download their
monthly stock market returns and market values from Datastream over the period
1996–2003. We require that the banks have at least 48 months of stock market
data available in order to report meaningful return and risk statistics. The
summary statistics of the number of banks per country and their average size and
market value are presented in Table 14.1. Since listed banks are usually relatively
large, the banks in the sample account for more than 80% of the total assets of the
European banking industry. In some countries the coverage is more than 90% of
domestic bank assets. To our knowledge, this sample is larger than the ones used
in previous analyses of listed European banks. However, in interpreting the
results, we have to account for the fact that the sample contains a considerable
number of local savings banks, next to the sample of large commercial banks that
is typically used in academic research and bank industry analyses. The bank
accounting data is retrieved from the annual accounts available in the Bankscope
database maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk.
We distinguish between different types of banks based on observed character-
istics. Two general categories are the country affiliation, that is, the country in
which the bank is headquartered, and the institutional type of the bank (commercial
bank, savings bank, investment bank, etc.). For the other subsamples, different
ratios are used to construct a typology of banks. For the degree of diversification
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we use the ratio of non-interest income in total revenues. Non-interest income
captures revenues from fee business, market trading, advisory activities, and
commissions received from affiliated insurance companies. This should be a
good proxy for the income derived from non-traditional banking activities such
as investment banking, insurance, or asset management. Hence the ratio proxies
for the degree of functional diversification of a bank. Capital adequacy is
calculated as total equity divided by total assets. For a subset of banks we can also
calculate the tier 1 ratio and use this as a robustness check. In terms of initial
conditions, we focus on the net interest margin (defined as interest revenues
minus interest expenses divided by earning assets), the C–I ratio (total interest
and operating costs divided by total interest and non-interest revenues), the LTA
ratio and the loan loss reserves – total loans ratio. These characteristics are
intended to reveal specific strengths or weaknesses of banks when they are con-
fronted with an economic slowdown. We also rank the banks by size (log of total
assets) to investigate any market power or size-related effects. Finally, to proxy
for hedging activities by banks we use the ratio of OBS exposure to total assets.
For each of the indicator variables, all the banks in the sample are ranked and
subdivided in quintiles. For the identical subsample of banks allocated in each
quintile, we report a number of statistics on the stock market returns and the
market values for two distinct periods. The first period covers from January 1996
to February 2000 and is considered to be the period of strong economic growth
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Table 14.1 Summary statisticsa
Number of banks Total assetsb Market valuec
Austria 9 34,772 755
Belgium 7 157,121 7,153
Denmark 43 5,819 328
Finland 4 17,311 1,031
France 29 73,243 3,197
Germany 24 187,903 6,196
Greece 17 9,187 1,289
Ireland 5 28,440 4,059
Italy 41 35,674 2,509
Luxembourg 3 22,050 1,976
Netherlands 6 165,235 12,534
Norway 23 5,243 359
Portugal 11 10,874 1,402
Spain 18 38,073 4,660
Sweden 4 123,721 8,525
Switzerland 21 45,487 4,202
UK 15 185,043 20,985
Total 280
Notes
a Values in million USD.
b Average over the period 1996–2003.
c Average over the period 1996–2003.
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and high bank profitability. The second period runs from March 2000 to March
2003 and is the period characterized by a significant slowdown of the economy,
weak asset markets, and a series of shocks (terrorist attack, accounting scandals).
The exact dating of the business cycle or asset market conditions is always
somewhat arbitrary. We opt for this period because (1) the signs of an economic
slowdown became apparent from mid-2000 onward, (2) equity and bond markets
anticipated the slowdown with market corrections starting early 2000, (3) a series
of (consumer and producer) confidence indicators started to decline from
mid-2000 onward, and (4) bank performance started to deteriorate from mid-2000
onward (FitchRatings, 2003). We situate the end of the downturn period for
banks in March 2003 because (1) the geo-political uncertainty and the associated
uncertain economic outlook for the US and European economies were partly
lifted by the outbreak of the Iraq war and (2) bank performance and its outlook
exhibited a turnaround from the second quarter of 2003 onward (FitchRatings,
2003). The variables we report are the average stock market return of the
banks in each quintile in the two periods, the volatility of the stock returns
(standard deviation) as a measure of risk, the Sharpe ratio (calculated as the
average returns divided by their standard deviation), and the Q ratio (calculated
as the market value of each bank’s equity divided by the book value of net
assets). The Q ratio is often used as a proxy for the franchise value of a bank,
that is, the discounted stream of its future net cash flows (Keeley, 1990). As
such, a Q ratio above one would indicate that the bank is expected to generate
profits over the longer term and is considered a good stock market investment
opportunity.
To gain further insight in the sources of volatility, we decompose the equity
returns of individual banks in three components: an equity market component, an
interest rate component, and a purely bank-specific part. The sensitivity of bank
stock returns to those on the broad equity market is a measure of systematic
market risk, and follows directly from the well-known Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). Flannery and James (1984), Dewenter and Hess (1998), and
Vander Vennet (2002) showed, however, that banks are not only exposed to mar-
ket risk, but also to interest rate risk. In the banking literature, the exposure of
bank stock returns to interest rate movements is mostly seen as being the result of
a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. More generally, however,
interest rate exposure of bank stock returns may be understood as the result of
intertemporal hedging demand (Merton, 1973). Investors require a premium for
stocks that are expected to do worse in business cycle downturns. As argued
before this is clearly the case for banks. Since the term structure of interest rates
is known to contain useful information on the future state of the economy (see for
example, Ang et al., 2005), interest rate variables are frequently used as proxies
for intertemporal risk.
Empirically, we estimate the following specification for each bank i:
ei,t  im,t  ib,t  i,t
ri,t  i  ei,t
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where ri,t represents the return on bank stock i at time t, i the bank-specific
intercept, and ei,t the unexpected shock to the bank’s stock price. m,t and b,t
represent the time t return surprises for respectively the broad equity and bond
market portfolio. The main parameters of interest are i and i, which respectively
measure the bank’s exposure to market and interest rate risk. Finally, i,t represents
the part of the return surprise not related to movements in the overall equity and
bond market. We use the broad European equity market index as a proxy for the
market return and an index of government bond returns as a proxy for the interest
rate factor.
14.5 Results and discussion
To investigate the impact of country affiliation on bank stock market performance,
we first consider the (equally weighted) average stock market return and risk
indicators for each country in two periods, one of favorable economic conditions
(1996–2000) and the period of economic downturn (2000–2003). The findings
are in Table 14.2. No distinction is made between different institutional bank
types. The first observation is that banks recorded robust average returns in the
expansion period, although there are considerable differences across countries. In
the downturn period, however, the returns are much lower and even negative in
some countries. This was notably the case in Belgium, the Netherlands and
Greece, whose banking systems had experienced the strongest increase in the
expansion period. Negative bank stock returns are also recorded in Germany,
consistent with the dismal performance of the German economy over the period.2
The pattern of relatively high returns in the first period and low or negative ones
in the second is consistent with their characterization as expansion versus
downturn periods. Since banks are exposed to the business cycle through various
channels, their stock market performance closely tracks the changing economic
environment. Another observation is that volatility is not systematically different
across both periods. While one would expect the volatility of bank stock prices to
increase in more uncertain times, this is not what happened on a cross-country
basis. As a result, the Sharpe ratios for the bank/country subdivision are signifi-
cantly higher in the expansion than in the downturn period. Finally, the average
Q ratio for the banks ranked according to country of origin has declined some-
what in the downturn period indicating that investing in bank stocks, in general,
was considered by stock market investors to be less valuable than in the boom
period. It remains to be seen whether this constitutes a structural downward shift
of European bank charter values.
Table 14.3 considers the stock market performance of banks subdivided by
institutional type. A similar pattern is apparent, bank stock returns are higher in
the expansion than in the downturn period. This is consistent with the theoretical
link between bank performance and conditions in the economy and the asset
markets. The return decline is especially noteworthy for commercial banks and
non-bank credit institutions, although their average returns remain positive in the
downturn period. Bank holding companies, real estate banks, and investment
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banks suffered the most significant decline in returns, with strongly negative
returns in the downturn period. For investment banks, declining asset prices and
very weak activity in the markets for underwriting and mergers and acquisitions
have undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon. Real estate banks were hit by
the depressed conditions on the housing and commercial property markets,
although real estate prices remained buoyant in some countries and interest rates
were relatively low. For bank holding companies with stakes in insurance, the
returns were negatively affected by the severe decline of insurance companies’ net
worth. The pattern of declining stock market returns is, however, not typical for
cooperative banks, medium- and long-term banks and, to a lesser extent, savings
banks. These banks succeed more or less in maintaining stock returns in the
second period that are, on average, not below those in the boom period, albeit at
a modest absolute level. This result is largely driven by a subsample of small,
locally operating banks that remain primarily engaged in traditional intermedia-
tion activity. Local retail banks were helped by sustained household spending and
mortgage refinancing, both spurred by relatively low interest rates. European
retail banks were able to expand consumer credit and household mortgages, activ-
ities that proved to be particularly profitable in certain countries. The volatility
indicator is again not systematically different across the two periods, although the
institutional bank types that experience negative returns in the downturn period
also saw the dispersion of their stock prices increase as a reflection of increased
risk. The consequence is that Sharpe ratios were healthy in the boom period, with
bank holdings, investment banks, and commercial banks leading the pack, while
the Sharpe ratios become low or negative in the second period. It is noteworthy
that the return volatility of savings banks, cooperative banks and medium-term
banks is lower than that of all other bank types and that, as a consequence of their
positive returns, these bank types exhibit positive, albeit rather low, Sharpe ratios.
Consistent with the country findings, Q ratios were revised downward in the
second period as a reflection of the worsened investment outlook in bank stocks
in general.
In the different panels of Table 14.4, we explore several bank characteristics
and their relationship with stock return performance over the expansion period
(January 1996–February 2000) and the downturn period (March 2000–March
2003). First we focus on capital adequacy. It has been argued that banks with a
relatively high degree of capital adequacy should be better shielded from adverse
economic or asset market shocks. Hence, we expect that banks with higher capital
ratios will be judged by stock market investors as less risky and better able to
make use of any remaining profitable lending opportunities. In panel A the banks
are ranked in quintiles based on the ratio equity – total assets. Capital adequacy
ranges from an average of 3.49% in the lowest quintile to 14.62% in the highest
quintile in the expansion period. Column 6 shows that the banks in the various
quintiles were able to maintain their relative ranking; the average ratio in the
second period ranges from 3.79% to 13.45% for the same sample of banks in each
quintile. In the expansion period, the average bank stock returns are almost
constant across the quintiles. This implies that banks with varying levels of capital
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adequacy perform similarly in good times. Nevertheless the standard deviation of
the returns is lower for the well-capitalized banks, probably as a reflection of their
lower risk. The resulting Sharpe ratios range from 0.40 to 0.66, indicating that
investors do not view banks with different levels of capital as fundamentally
different in economic benevolent times. In the downturn period, however, there is
a clear link between the banks’ return/risk profile and their capital adequacy. The
equity-to-asset ratio and stock returns exhibit a positive and almost monotonic
relationship. Obviously the stock returns in the second period are considerably
lower, as a reflection of the adverse economic environment. But the average
returns now range from 7.28% for the quintile with the lowest level of capital
coverage to 7.83% for the well-capitalized quintile. Moreover, the worst-capitalized
banks exhibit higher levels of return volatility, reflecting their higher riskiness.
The net result is Sharpe ratios, as indicators of the return/risk trade-off, ranging
from 21% to 34%. The Q ratio is highest for the quintile with the highest capital
adequacy, and that remains the case in the downturn period. These findings are
consistent with the hypothesis that well-capitalized banks are better able to
withstand negative economic shocks and are viewed by stock market investors as
less risky (see Dewenter and Hess, 1998; Vander Vennet, 2002; Sironi, 2003). The
well-capitalized banks are rewarded for their risk-averse strategy with higher and
less volatile returns. The findings based on the equity-to-total asset ratio as the
indicator of capital adequacy are corroborated by those using the tier 1 capital
ratio (see panel B). Together, these results also underscore the importance of
Basle-type capital adequacy rules to induce discipline in bank risk-taking and to
preserve stability in the banking system.
These results are largely confirmed in panel A of Table 14.5, which reports the
estimation results for the sensitivity of bank stock market returns to the market
and the interest rate risk factors. For each quintile, the table presents a market-
capitalization-weighted average of sensitivities to respectively the equity and
bond market portfolio. Both in the expansion and recession period, the exposure
to the market factor, or market beta, is much larger for relatively poorly capital-
ized banks. In both periods, the beta of the 20% best-capitalized banks is about
half the market beta of the 20% worst-capitalized banks. Interestingly, market
betas are not monotonically decreasing in relative capitalization: market betas are
similarly high for the first 3 quintiles, and are only significantly smaller for the
2 quintiles containing the 40% best-capitalized banks.
The second dimension we explore is the degree of diversification. The indica-
tor we use is the ratio of non-interest income to total revenues in order to capture
the relative weight of non-traditional banking activities in the banks’ portfolio.
Those banks with a relatively high ratio depend more on revenues from asset
management, financial market trading, investment banking, and insurance activ-
ities. The argument is that, if the cash flows generated by those activities were suf-
ficiently uncorrelated, the bundled revenues would be more stable and, hence, the
riskiness of financial conglomerates would be lower. The data for the first period
in panel C of Table 14.4 shows that a higher level of diversification is associated
with slightly higher average returns, with comparable volatility across the
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quintiles. However, contrary to expectations, diversified banks do not perform
better in the downturn period and the volatility of the returns in the respective
quintiles is relatively high. The quintile Sharpe ratios seem to exhibit an inverse
U-shape, which would suggest that there is an optimal level of diversification.
The Q ratios are highest for the higher quintiles in the second period, but they also
decline most in comparison with the first period. This leads to the conclusion that
investors do not consider diversified financial institutions, or financial conglom-
erates, to be more safe or to be better equipped to withstand an economic
downturn with more stable earnings. Somehow, this finding may be specific to
the period under investigation because it has been characterized by a notably bad
performance of insurance companies, primarily due to low investment returns and
a series of catastrophic events entailing substantial claims. Nevertheless, the
results indicate that the stock market does not view diversification as universally
better than focused banking. Apparently, the negative correlation needed to
absorb shocks in one activity did not materialize or was insufficient to make con-
glomerates safer investments. Although one period of economic downturn and
financial market turbulence is insufficient to make conclusive statements about
the relative merits of financial conglomeration, our evidence may be a useful part
of a broader assessment.
A growing number of financial groups have been formed during the last
decade. In Europe, many banks now own insurance companies, particularly life
insurance companies, given their role in the long-term savings market. However,
it may turn out that the synergy effects are not as high as previously thought.
Difficulties in merging different institutions and corporate cultures may already
250 Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet
Table 14.5 Bank sensitivity to market and interest rate risk
Period 1/1996–2/2000 Period 3/2000–3/2003
Ratio Market beta Interest risk Ratio Market beta Interest risk
Panel A: capital adequacy (capital/total assets)
Q1 3.44 1.23 0.03 3.76 1.26 0.43
Q2 5.52 1.24 0.13 5.77 1.02 0.60
Q3 7.05 1.49 0.08 6.89 1.13 0.20
Q4 9.51 0.76 0.53 9.80 0.48 0.18
Q5 14.61 0.66 0.20 13.41 0.65 0.18
Panel B: size (log of total assets)
Q1 5.17 0.21 0.04 5.39 0.40 0.37
Q2 7.34 0.61 0.24 7.62 0.58 0.20
Q3 8.58 0.43 0.05 8.77 0.41 0.10
Q4 9.95 0.81 0.11 10.12 0.49 0.08
Q5 12.25 1.34 0.04 12.52 1.25 0.46
Panel C: LTA ratio
Q1 36.28 1.30 0.17 42.43 1.27 0.70
Q2 51.49 1.32 0.25 56.13 1.08 0.13
Q3 60.13 1.10 0.02 64.40 1.20 0.61
Q4 71.02 1.24 0.18 71.10 1.08 0.13
Q5 85.31 0.18 0.12 85.08 0.17 0.04
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be substantial during bull markets, but could be greater during bear markets. For
those banks that have formed financial groups with insurers during the past few
years, this is the first time that they own insurance companies in anything other
than a bull market. Apparently, the level of correlation of the risk factors affecting
operations in the different financial sectors are higher during such periods than
many had predicted. Also, most European financial groups with investment
banking arms have seen their ratings negatively affected, even though this was
often also in response to the parent or subsidiary insurance company’s financial
difficulties. The insurance and reinsurance sector has been under particular
pressure over recent years as a result of a large number of natural disasters, the
terrorist attacks, falling equity prices, and the decline in investment income.
Pressures seem to be particularly pronounced in the European insurance industry,
reflected partly by the fact that European insurers have been much larger sellers
of credit protection than insurers in the United States. These developments
support the hypothesis that core banking activities provided more of a relief than
non-core business for financial groups during the recent downturn.
In the following panels we examine various structural characteristics of bank
balance sheets and the operational efficiency of banks. We first consider the net
interest margin. Relatively high interest margins may be the results of the access
to cheap sources of funding (e.g. savings accounts), better lending opportunities,
superior borrower screening technology, market power, or a combination of these
advantages. Presumably, banks with high margins should be better able to
withstand a temporary worsening of economic conditions. Similarly, banks with
a relatively high LTA ratio are supposed to have a high penetration in the local
lending market and, hence, to be able to tap profitable lending opportunities. The
ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is an indicator of the quality of the loan
portfolio. Low default provisioning should be reflecting good loan quality and be
associated with less losses caused by defaulting borrowers. On the other hand,
banks with a forward-looking provisioning strategy may benefit from accumulating
sufficient reserves to absorb any realized losses. Finally, the C–I ratio is widely
used as a proxy for the degree of operational efficiency of a bank. Banks with
lean operations and low operating costs should be able to get through a slowdown
without a fundamental deterioration of their profit-generating capacity and,
hence, their franchise value.
Panels D to I show the results. Only the bank quintile characterized by the high-
est interest margins appears to have a profit advantage, since they exhibit high
returns (14.7%) and a relatively low volatility in the downturn period, resulting in
a Sharpe ratio (0.75) well above the other groups. A high LTA ratio appears to
confer a distinct advantage on banks when times become more difficult; the
second-period returns of quintiles 4 and 5 are high with lower than average disper-
sion, resulting in clearly superior Sharpe ratios (0.46 and 0.28). Presumably these
banks benefit from established relationships with their borrowers, a feature which
enables them to renegotiate loans at favorable conditions or even to expand their
lending business profitably in periods of economic downturn. However, the LTA
ratio may also proxy for the relative specialization of banks in the lending business.
The interpretation would then be that banks with a focus on local lending were
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much less affected by the economic slowdown than more diversified banks. Panel
C of Table 14.5 shows that the market beta is lowest for the banks with high LTA
ratios. The reservation policy for anticipated loan losses seems to make little
difference. While high loan loss reserves are associated with lower returns in the
expansion period, there is no clear pattern in the downturn period. Hence, the stock
market seems to attach little importance to the banks’ loan loss provisioning
strategy. The two quintiles with the lowest and the quintile with the highest loan
loss reserves perform less badly, the first because of good loan quality, the latter
probably because they have accumulated sufficient reserves to absorb losses due to
defaulting borrowers. As far as operational efficiency is concerned, the evidence in
panel G shows that low C–I ratios confer a slight advantage in terms of returns, as
could be expected. However, no such effect is discernable in the downturn period,
although the group of least efficient banks Q5 has a negative return. Although bank
analysts keep stressing the continued focus on cost reductions as a tool to boost the
bank’s value, the effect of lean operations is not apparent in the second-period
returns nor in their volatility. Nevertheless, the average Q ratio of the first quintile
(banks with the lowest C–I ratio) is situated above those of the higher quintiles,
indicating the implied long-term profit potential of efficient banks.
Finally, hedging activity and size appear to offer little protection against
adverse economic shocks. As a proxy for hedging activity we look at the ratio of
OBS exposures to total assets. It would be preferable to focus on derivatives trans-
actions used by the banks to hedge certain exposures, but unfortunately this
detailed information is unavailable. Panel H of Table 14.4 shows that the bank
quintiles with relatively high OBS activity earn higher returns in the first period,
but they also seem to be more volatile. Hence, OBS commitments offer profit
opportunities in good times, but they are also considered to be more risky. In the
downturn period, no clear advantage can be detected. The Sharpe ratios are essen-
tially flat across the quintiles and the Q ratios are largely comparable. A similar
conclusion imposes itself for size. Big seems to be beautiful in good times; the
average returns for the two largest size deciles are relatively high, although the
associated volatility is also rather elevated. However, big is certainly not beautiful
in bad times. On the contrary, the smallest size quintile earns the highest returns
with the lowest dispersion and the large banks seem to possess no “Q”-advantage
over the longer term. Panel B of Table 14.5 shows that the market beta, or the sen-
sitivity to broad market shocks, is highest for the larger banks in both subperiods.
These findings should be interpreted carefully, however. Size turns out to be
correlated with, for example, the degree of diversification and OBS exposure.
Hence, the results may simply be a reflection of the relatively weak behavior of
the diversified banks in the downturn period, largely due to losses suffered in their
non-banking businesses.
14.6 Conclusions
Since the underlying sources of the risks that banks are exposed to are closely
connected with the business cycle, bank health is related to the economic
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conditions in which they operate. The recent economic downturn (2000–2003)
contained all the ingredients that usually provoke distress in the banking system:
a protracted stock market decline, slack consumer and business confidence, a
high number of corporate failures, accompanied by a series of man-made events
such as terrorist attacks and accounting scandals. Yet, the European banking
system as a whole has proved to be very resilient, with few, if any, bank failures
or systematic problems among European banks that have prompted regulatory
interventions or bailouts and a low number of actual rating downgrades. We
investigate the potential causes for bank resilience on a broad sample of listed
European banks in the 2000–2003 economic downturn. We identify banks
with different strategies and different characteristics before the slowdown and
investigate their risk profile before and during the economic downturn with
market-based measures of return and risk. Banks are sorted in quintiles over the
pre-downturn period 1996–2000 based on a number of observable characteristics
related to their geographic location, their institutional type, or the initial balance
sheet conditions with which they entered the downturn. Subsequently, we inves-
tigate their return/risk profile during the economic slowdown of 2000–2003 using
market-based measures such as the Q ratio, the Sharpe ratio, volatility of stock
returns and their sensitivity to broad equity market swings. Since an aggregate
deterioration of bank health may mask different performance across various types
of European banks, we need to construct useful subsamples. We subdivide banks
into different groups based on observable characteristics that are assumed to
capture a relevant part of their exposure to economic shocks.
We find that bank returns and risks differ across countries, consistent with the
observed variation of cross-country macroeconomic performance in Europe.
With respect to institutional type, we find that commercial banks and financial
conglomerates fare less well in the downturn than traditional intermediaries
active in retail banking. Also, banks with a focus on local lending and banks with
relatively high interest margins seem to have benefited from that focus, relative
to functionally and geographically diversified banks. The market-based return
and risk measures support the conjecture that diversified banks were hit much
harder in the 2000–2003 economic slowdown than their more specialized peers.
Our results indicate that the stock market does not view diversification as univer-
sally better than focused banking. Apparently, the negative correlation needed to
absorb shocks in one activity did not materialize or was insufficient to make
conglomerates safer investments. Although one period of economic downturn and
financial market turbulence is insufficient to make conclusive statements about
the relative merits of financial conglomeration, our evidence may be a useful part
of a broader assessment. Capital adequacy, on the other hand, clearly has a
positive effect on the risk profile of banks. Banks with higher levels of capital are
not only viewed as less risky, they also produce higher stock market returns
during the economic downturn. This underscores the importance of Basle-type
capital adequacy rules for the systemic stability of the banking system. Finally,
we find that neither size nor hedging offers a structural protection against adverse
economic conditions.
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Notes
1 There is discussion whether a bank-led credit supply shortage has effectively materialized
in the EU, the Eurozone or in specific countries. Based on the recently initiated Bank
Lending Survey by the ECB, no hard evidence for a credit crunch is available, partly due
to the offsetting effect of a more accommodative monetary policy stance.
2 The German banking landscape has traditionally been characterized by intense compet-
itiveness, resulting in a comparatively low level of profitability. Interest rate margins
have fallen and the average C–I ratios have remained excessively high. Accordingly,
return on equity is low. Another part of the profitability problem is cyclical. Banks are
suffering from the sluggish economy, which has caused the need for higher risk
provisioning. Nevertheless, financial institutions were able to build up and still maintain
considerable reserves, encouraged by tax regulations. Looking ahead, one of the most
important tasks for German banks is to control costs. The adjustment process has
started, manifesting itself in a least three ways. First, many banks have initiated
aggressive cost-cutting programs. Second, banks have generally been raising the risk
premiums in their loan business and, third, they have become more risk aware in their
lending, consistent with the spirit of the upcoming Basel II.
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This chapter explores the implications of housing bubbles and high household
debt for monetary policy and for bank profitability. The paper presents data for a
number of countries but focuses on the United Kingdom, where the rise in house
prices has been particularly rapid, and on the United States, where nationwide
house price growth has been more moderate but particular regions have shown
rapid rises.
Rising house prices have been associated with a rapid rise in mortgage lending,
both as borrowers gear up to afford higher house prices and as existing
homeowners withdraw equity through mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW). For
banks, this has brought a rapid growth in business, though competition is intense.
The value of mortgages outstanding has doubled since the end of 1996, implying
a 9.1% annual growth rate. In the 3 years to June 2004, the peak of the bubble
period, the annual rise has averaged 13.5% pa. For monetary policy-makers, high
MEW and relatively robust consumer confidence (both in general and about the
outlook for house prices) have contributed to relatively strong consumer spending
and low savings rates.
However, although heavy borrowing has taken household debt to a new high in
relation to incomes, net wealth has held up well in recent years (despite the fall
in stock markets since 2000), because of the rise in housing values. Moreover
interest rates are much lower than in the past, so interest service costs are not
necessarily onerous. Yet, if house prices were to fall significantly, household
balance sheets could be under stress.
The key assessments then are: first, whether house prices are in a bubble or
whether current elevated valuations are justified by changed fundamentals; and
second, if a bubble now exists, can it be deflated gradually and without too much
pain for borrowers, lenders, and the economy generally. The paper investigates
5 scenarios by looking at 5 possible paths for house prices and the house
price–income ratio.
1 You ain’t seen nothing yet There is more expansion to come and house
prices and debt can continue to rise faster than incomes. Few economists will be
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comfortable with this view because even those who have argued in the past that
house prices are not yet overvalued now seem to view prices as fully valued.1 If
house valuations move still higher, there is a greater risk of trouble later.
Nevertheless, this scenario cannot be ruled out for a period of time, raising the
question of whether policy should address ways of trying to avoid it.
2 A higher equilibrium The second view is that the last few years have seen
a move up to a higher equilibrium level for house price–income ratios and
associated higher debt/income due to lower interest rates and (in some cases)
inadequate new housing supply relative to growing demand. But, going forward,
the growth of house prices and household debt will revert to the rate of growth of
incomes (e.g. 4% or so). This view suggests there is nothing to worry about,
though for banks it does imply a slowdown in the growth of lending business.
3 Stability in nominal terms House prices and debt will stabilise now,
allowing the ratios to moderate over time as incomes grow. This is perhaps the
best scenario (for those who think the ratios are too high currently) because it
promises a gradual correction. The ‘bubble mentality’ will gradually dissipate
and, over time, valuations will come back to more reasonable levels. As for
Scenario 2 there is no crisis but lending business is weaker still.
4 Autonomous house price collapse On this view, house prices are at risk of
turning down sharply on their own, or with only an insignificant trigger, placing
severe stress on household balance sheets, raising banks’ bad loans and
potentially bringing a sharp economic slowdown.
5 House prices crash during the next economic downturn making it worse
On this view house prices are unlikely to turn down substantially on their own
but, given another trigger for an economic downturn (e.g. a monetary policy
mistake, a rebound of inflation requiring tight policy, or a shock to confidence)
an accompanying crash in house prices could seriously exacerbate the downturn.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 15.2 documents the rise in house
prices in major countries and the accompanying rise in household debt. Section
15.3 looks at the case of the United Kingdom in detail, to address the question of
whether the housing market is in a bubble or whether valuations are justified.
Section 15.4 looks at the US case. Section 15.5 looks at the dilemma for mone-
tary policy whereas Section 15.6 briefly outlines alternatives to monetary policy
to resist bubbles. Section 15.7 returns to the five scenarios outlined earlier,
analysing the implications for monetary policy and for banks. The concluding
section makes an assessment of the most likely outcome for different countries.
15.2 Rising house prices and debt
Rapid rises in house prices are a widespread phenomenon among the industrial
countries. In the eight years, 1995–2003, prices rose by a cumulative 193% in
Ireland, 146% in the United Kingdom, 122% in Spain and 110% in the
Netherlands and Australia (see Table 15.1). So far in 2004 prices have continued
to rise faster than incomes in the United Kingdom and Australia. In the United
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States the rise was 61%, rather more modest, though some areas, particularly on
the coasts, saw greater activity. For example the eight-year increase was 107% in
Massachusetts, 99% in California and 75% in New Jersey and New York. All
these increases were well ahead of the cumulative rise in the consumer price level,
ranging between 10% and 20%. The three major exceptions were Japan, still
mired in falling prices, and Germany and Switzerland, where prices have been
stagnant overall and down in real terms.
Rapid price inflation does not, in itself, point to a bubble. Prices were gener-
ally depressed in the early-to-mid-1990s, following a price bust in many countries
after the 1990 recession, so that some of the rise may be legitimate catch-up. But
measures of valuation, patchy as they are for housing in contrast to stocks, sug-
gest that prices have now become unusually high compared with historical levels,
in relation to both earnings and rents. One 2003 analysis, comparing house prices
in relation to earnings with the average ratio from 1975 to 2002, found prices
overvalued by 60% in Spain, around 50% in Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands,
28% in Australia and 14% in the United States (Capital Economics, 2003).
Another study based on rents found house prices–rents to be 20% above equi-
librium in Britain and Spain and 7% in the United States (Ayuso and Restoy,
2003). This study was based on 2002 values so, with rents relatively static and
prices up smartly since then, overvaluations relative to historical norms will have
grown significantly. Owner-occupiers have been actively trading up in many
countries and second homes have become more popular. Investors have also been
avid buyers as property has taken over from stocks as the ‘hot’ investment. In
Australia 1 household in 6 reportedly now owns an investment property.2
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Table 15.1 Residential property price gains, 1995–2003




United States 61 6.1 6.9 8.0
Japan 24 3.3 4.6 5.8
Germany 2 0.2 1.0 1.0
UK 146 11.9 23.9 10.0
France 60 6.1 6.7 16.4
Italy 42 4.5 10.0 10.7
Canada 42 4.5 10.3 11.3
Spain 122 10.5 17.4 17.3
Netherlands 110 10.2 4.5 3.6
Australia 110 10.2 18.5 18.9
Switzerland 3 0.4 4.9 2.8
Belgium 52 5.5 6.5 7.6
Sweden 82 7.8 9.2 6.1
Ireland 193 14.4 14.2 13.9
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2004, p. 138) and OECD (2004).
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Alongside the rise in house prices has been a rise in household debt over the same
period (Debelle, 2004). The fastest rises have been in Spain (190%), the
Netherlands (162%), Australia (153%), the United Kingdom (93%) and United
States (92%), see Table 15.2. Such a rapid expansion of lending business has
obviously brought great opportunities for banks, though competition has been
fierce. But although margins for mortgages are under pressure, banks like mortgage
business because it provides a good opportunity to cross-sell, particularly life insur-
ance, home insurance, current accounts and personal loans or top-up mortgages.
House price growth and debt growth are broadly correlated as we might expect
(Figure 15.1). As a result of the rapid rise in debt, the ratios of debt to income
have risen in all these countries. For example the OECD calculates that debt to
disposable income has risen to 139% in the United Kingdom and 118% in the
United States from 107% and 94%, respectively in 1995 (OECD, 2004).
However, net household wealth has risen in both countries over the same
period, reflecting increased holdings of both financial wealth overall and housing.
Net wealth was of course higher during the stock bubble years, but rising house
prices in recent years have to some extent offset the fall in stock prices. Overall
then, household balance sheets appear to be in good shape. But this depends on
house prices holding up. A significant fall in house prices, especially if combined
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Table 15.2 Household debt trends, 1995–2003
Household debta
Cumulative change (%) Nominal change (%)
1995–2002 p.a. 2003
United States 8.2 10.8
Japan 0.3 0.1
Germany 4.2 1.0














Source: Bank for International Settlements (2004, p. 138).
Notes
a Broad financial accounts concept where available, otherwise credit from banks; partly estimated.
b 1990–2002.




























































































































































































with a new decline in stocks prices, as might be expected in the event of a major
economic downturn, could bring major problems.
15.3 The case of the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has had one of the fastest rises in prices and now has unusu-
ally high valuations on any measure. The ratio of house prices to earnings in the
United Kingdom has risen to an historical high (see Figure 15.2). Since the early
1970s, it has risen above 4 times incomes on 3 occasions, only to fall back sharply
in subsequent downturns. In the early 1990s, after the pain of the 1990–1991
recession the ratio was unusually low so, the initial rise in prices in the mid-1990s
was, arguably, legitimate catch-up.
Some analysts (not just industry insiders) argue that a step up in valuations is
justified by a change in fundamentals (CEBR, 2004). The case rests mainly on a
combination of changes in the structure of supply and demand and the effect of
lower real and/or nominal interest rates. Common demand factors cited are
increasing immigration, particularly to London, and greater household formation
due to higher divorce rates or more young people moving away from home. On
the supply side, the United Kingdom has seen very little response to higher prices
due to the rigidity of planning controls which is particularly intense in Britain
(Barker, 2004). There is also an argument that the quality of housing is not
adequately captured in house price indices and so the ratios overstate the gain.
However not all the structural changes point to higher prices. For example, the
tax treatment of housing in the United Kingdom is less favourable than in the
262 John P. Calverley








Figure 15.2 UK: house prices/average earnings.
Source: Datastream.
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past, which would point to a lower equilibrium valuation. The Bank of England
has calculated that the effects of the elimination of tax relief on mortgage interest
should have reduced equilibrium house prices by 9% between 1990 and 2000
(Bank of England, 2000). Other tax changes since 1990, including increased
stamp duty and the replacement of Poll Tax with Council Tax (property tax),
would add to this reduction.
Further analysis of these specific factors is beyond the scope of this paper, but
it is also worth remembering another point. Even if the demand curve for housing
has shifted out as often claimed, is it correct to assume that the curve is highly
inelastic? A rise in real house prices of more than 100% should surely encourage
homeowners to reduce their demand for space. It should of course, but not
necessarily, if a bubble mentality has taken hold. In a bubble rising prices means
that demand is increased rather than reduced.
The argument that lower interest rates support a higher equilibrium house
price deserves careful analysis. Theoretically, a lower nominal interest rate
should have no effect if it is entirely due to lower inflation. There are, however,
signs that homeowners do not connect house price inflation with ordinary
inflation. For example, a 2002 survey from the United States of new homebuyers
in four areas, Orange County, San Francisco, Boston and Milwaukee, found
expectations for home price inflation over the next ten years to be 13.1% pa,
15.7% pa, 14.6% pa and 11.7% pa (Case et al., 2003). Not only were these
expectations well ahead of the historical record for these areas (5.6%, 7.1%, 8.3%
and 5.6% respectively from 1982 Q1 to 2003 Q1) but of course average consumer
price inflation and wage growth are likely to be considerably lower than in the
past period.
However, the high nominal interest rates of the past meant that mortgage pay-
ments were effectively front-loaded and this may have constrained borrowers’
appetite or lenders’ willingness to fund large mortgages. Anecdotally, it would
appear that many borrowers simply look at the initial monthly payment to see how
large a mortgage they can afford. Similarly, lenders often link their willingness
to lend to the ratio of the payment to after-tax income or equivalently, are willing
to lend a greater multiple of salary as interest rates fall.
One simple way to forecast the impact of this tendency is to look at the extra
mortgage that a fall in interest rates allows a given monthly payment to support.
Since the mid-1990s average mortgage rates in the United Kingdom have
dropped from about 7.5% pa to about 5.5% pa in 2002–2003 (and since back up
to 6%). In the mid-1990s a loan of £100,000 (standard repayment loan of
25 years) would have required a monthly payment of £739. At 5.5% rates, the
same monthly payment will secure a mortgage of approximately £120,000 or
20% more. The comparison is much more dramatic if we take a broader brush and
compare with the 1980s. In the 1980s mortgage rates averaged closer to 12% at
which this monthly payment would have supported a loan of only £70,000.
However, if real interest rates are not different, the burden of the mortgage will
last for much longer, rather than rapidly dwindling relative to salary as was the
case during past higher inflation periods. Similarly, for lenders it means that the
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period of potential strain for the borrower, where mortgage payments are a high
proportion of income, will also last much longer.
More broadly, by paying much more for houses, whether knowingly or not,
households are committing themselves to paying a much higher percentage of
their income for housing services (over the life of the mortgage) than before. The
effect is to create a one-off step up in housing valuations, though unless interest
rates fall further, house prices should then slow down to move in line with
earnings growth (Scenario 2).
Nevertheless, relying on the argument that it is the fall in nominal interest rates
that has encouraged higher demand for housing services must imply either irra-
tionality among households (not realising the extra cost), or that high interest
rates imposed an artificial constraint in the past. While both are possible, most
analyses of the impact of interest rates on house prices focus on real interest rates,
where we are on sounder ground.
A study using an asset pricing model to explain the rise in British house prices
found that the approximately 1.5% decline in real long-term interest rates from
1996 to 2003 could account for a rise in real house prices of a little under 40%
(Bank of England, 2004). This is a substantial rise, though less than one-third of
the actual rise in real house prices over the same period. The study attributes the
remaining two-thirds mostly to a fall in the housing risk premium, that is, a more
positive view of the outlook for housing.
However, looked at purely in terms of an investment, the decline in real long-
term interest rates everywhere is at least partly due to a fall in the inflation risk
premium. Yet, one of housing’s greatest attributes as an investment is that it is a
fairly reliable inflation hedge against unexpected inflation (more so than stocks
for example). Hence, theoretically at least, it is not clear that all of the fall in real
interest rates should automatically feed through into higher house prices.
Are there good reasons for a fall in the housing risk premium or is this another
way of saying that there is a bubble? In the mid-1990s, the risk premium was nat-
urally high in the United Kingdom, given the significant falls in house prices at
the beginning of the 1990s. So the rise in house prices during the mid-1990s from
particularly depressed valuations could fairly be linked to this. Further it could be
argued that the good performance of the British economy over the last ten years,
the avoidance of a major economic downturn, the significant fall in unemploy-
ment (from 10% in 1993 to 5% currently), the granting of full independence to
the Bank of England as well as the maintenance of a floating exchange rate all
further reduce the risk premium.
However there is a risk that the good performance of the economy cannot be
indefinitely maintained (Scenario 5). It is now over 13 years since the last reces-
sion, the longest upturn for more than 100 years. Moreover the decline in the risk
premium may also be due to the development of a bubble mentality. Accounts of
bubbles through history have shown that, while they are of course characterised
by rapid rises in prices and high valuations, they are also usually accompanied by
various other factors, ranging from unusually low interest rates, through lending
innovations to large-scale media interest (Calverley, 2004). All these elements
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seem to be present to a greater or lesser degree in the United Kingdom (see
Table 15.3).
The existence of the first four items in the checklist has already been
documented. The fifth item – that bubbles typically arise several years into an
upswing – is clearly supported in the United Kingdom. Unemployment has
trended down since 1991 with virtually no interruption. In 2001–2003, when
most economies suffered a recession, the lowest year-on-year GDP growth rate in
the United Kingdom was 1.5% and unemployment merely stabilised for a few
months.
The underlying reasons for higher prices (item 6) may be the fall in interest
rates, while higher immigration could be regarded as an underlying reason or
perhaps a ‘new element’. The subjective ‘paradigm shift’ could be that ‘housing
is the best pension’, a view now widely held. And the drawing in of new investors
is very clearly seen in the United Kingdom where ‘buy-to-let’ investment has
become a major phenomenon. New entrepreneurs have emerged in the form of
companies offering instant property portfolios or (expensive) courses on how to
build a portfolio.
Popular and media interest is intense with numerous new TV programmes,
with titles such as ‘Location, location, location’ and ‘Property Millionaire’. The
rise in mortgage lending has already been documented, and the household
debt–income ratio has risen from 106% in 1995 to 139% in 2003 (OECD, 2004).
New lending policies can clearly be seen in the easing of terms on investment
properties. In the mid-1990s mortgages for investment property typically carried
spreads well above owner-occupier mortgages alongside conservative lending
criteria (whether linked to the borrower’s income or the rental income). Now,
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Table 15.3 Checklist: typical characteristics of a bubble
Rapidly rising prices
High expectations for continuing rapid rises
Overvaluation compared to historical averages
Overvaluation compared to reasonable levels
Several years into an economic upswing
Some underlying reason or reasons for higher prices
A ‘new’ element – e.g. technology for stocks or immigration for housing
Subjective ‘paradigm shift’
New investors drawn in
New entrepreneurs in the area
Considerable popular and media interest
Major rise in lending
Increase in indebtedness
New lenders or lending policies
Consumer price inflation often subdued (so central banks relaxed)
Relaxed monetary policy
Falling household savings rate
Source: Calverley, 2004 (partly based on ‘Bubble Trouble’ HSBC Economics and
Investment Strategy, July 1999).
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100% mortgages for ‘buy-to-let’ properties are advertised and rates are similar to
owner-occupier mortgages.
A key factor in bubbles, to which we will return later, is that consumer price
inflation is typically well-behaved so that monetary policy is relaxed. If consumer
price inflation becomes a problem of course central banks raise interest rates to
restrictive levels, which is usually enough to suppress a bubble and may cause it
to collapse, particularly if the economy turns down too. This was the fate of the
1980s housing bubble when CPI inflation accelerated at the end of the decade.
The fall in the household savings rate, typically seen during a bubble, reflects
both confidence that the rise in wealth is permanent and the high level of bor-
rowing. It should be noted however that the fall in the UK household savings rate
mostly occurred between 1997 and 1999, when London house prices rose rapidly
but before nationwide house prices really took off so it is hard to argue that the
house price bubble is the cause of a fall in the savings rate or robust consumer
spending. It can however be argued that the improvement in household balance
sheets combined with lower unemployment has allowed the savings rate to remain
at low levels.
Bubbles are also often associated with strong exchange rates and this is
supported in the United Kingdom. The real exchange rate has been strong since
the mid-1990s and the current account balance has weakened since then. The high
real exchange rate suppresses inflation, helping to keep interest rates lower.
The presence of all these factors in the United Kingdom now suggests that it
would be unwise to rely on analyses suggesting that high house prices are fully
justified by fundamentals. It is much more likely that at least part of the rise in
prices constitutes a bubble.
15.4 Is there a US bubble?
The nationwide index for US home prices has marched upwards over the last
25 years, with prices never falling for more than a few months. Prices in certain
areas, particularly on the coasts, have been much more volatile and have seen
periodic bubbles and busts. Texas prices crashed after the fall in world oil prices
in 1986 whereas California and New England prices fell sharply after the 1990
recession, with California impacted strongly by the defence cut-backs following
the fall of the Berlin Wall.
However, just as in the United Kingdom prior to 1990, nationwide house prices
did not fall because of the underpinning from ongoing consumer price inflation.
Between Q1 1990 and Q1 1995 the nominal house price index climbed 7.6%. But
with cumulative consumer price inflation of 17.9%, real house prices fell approx-
imately 10%. In California, the nominal price decline of about 10% over the same
period translates to a 24% decline in real terms.
After the price correction of the early 1990s the US market picked up gradually
in the mid-1990s and then took off from the late 1990s. The 61% increase over
the last eight years is a smaller increase than in many other countries but is well
ahead of inflation of 20%. And many analyses now suggest that, on a nationwide
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basis, prices look high compared with past trends. One study based on rental
yields found an overvaluation relative to past averages of 11%, as of Q3 2002
(Krainer, 2003). This estimate is similar to the estimate from the Bank of Spain
mentioned earlier (Ayuso and Restoy, 2003). But, given house price and rent
trends since then, I estimate this overvaluation rose to over 20% by mid-2004.
A comparison of prices to rents and prices to the median income also shows
valuations to be historically high (Figure 15.3). Both ratios have been through cycles
before, but are currently 10–15% higher than past cycle peaks and 20–25% above
their averages. In prior housing market downturns in the 1980s and early 1990s these
ratios fell about 10% over a 3–5-year period to cyclical lows. From current much
higher levels, to return to past cyclical lows would require a fall of 25–30%. In past
episodes, both incomes and rents were rising with general inflation and cushioned
the blow. But in recent years, median incomes and rents have been rising only very
slowly so this would imply a nominal house price fall of perhaps 15–20%.
However, some analysts question the idea of a bubble. One important point to
note is that the OFHEO index of house prices looks at repeat sales of the same
property but makes no allowances for any improvements or extensions in the
property. Hence it probably systematically overstates the rise in house prices.
Others argue that higher valuations are justified by improved fundamentals. For
example, a report to Congress in 2003 argued that the case for a national bubble
was unproven, though it did point to regional bubbles (Labonte, 2003). As for the
United Kingdom, the focus is on the impact of low interest rates in justifying
higher house prices, though as I have argued earlier, this is a questionable








































































Figure 15.3 US: house price ratios.
Source: Goldman Sachs.
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justification for high valuations except insofar as real interest rates are lower. In
the United States, real interest rates on long-term bonds have been 1–1.5% lower
since the beginning of 2000 than the average for the 1990s, which could account
for part of the rise in prices (though part of this is presumably the reduction in the
inflation risk premium as in the United Kingdom).
A run through the checklist of typical elements of a bubble, shows that many
of them apply in the United States too, though the picture is somewhat more
mixed than in the United Kingdom. For example, the United States is not several
years into an economic upswing, as is common for a bubble. The current upswing
only started in late 2001 and only became strong in 2003. Nevertheless, the
survey of expectations described earlier suggests that confidence in house price
inflation is well-entrenched after ten years of buoyant increases. And the 2001
recession was the mildest on record.
There has certainly been a major rise in lending, with mortgage debt up from
$4523 billion at the end of 1999 to $6820 billion at end 2003. Of course, part of
this increase reflects refinancing and mortgage equity withdrawal, but part will
have fuelled house price increases. Higher borrowing is linked to lower mortgage
rates but it is also true that, as in Britain, mortgages are more easily obtainable
than ever before.
An important change in the last decade or so is the increased importance of the
secondary market for mortgages. In the United States, it is now the norm for
banks to originate mortgages and then sell them on to Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac. In 2003, the agencies’ share of conventional mortgage debt stood at about
70%, more than double their share at the end of the 1980s.
Of course, to be eligible for purchase these mortgages have to meet strict
‘conforming’ criteria. Moreover the agencies themselves, which are privately
owned, as well as investors in the mortgage-backed securities would suffer if there
was a serious rise in defaults. Nevertheless it is hard to avoid the suspicion that
loans are being made more easily now than in the past and this means more
money chasing houses.
A 2003 survey of appraisers is revealing in this respect (Harney, 2003). Nearly
3 out of 4 randomly selected licensed appraisers told researchers that they had
been pressured over the past year by a mortgage broker or loan officer to ‘hit a
certain value’. And if they ignored the pressure they faced the risk of a loss of
business. One common tactic is ‘pre-comping’, where a loan officer asks in
advance whether the appraiser thinks he or she can come up with comparable
sales for a property to justify a specific target range for the mortgage. If the
appraiser expresses doubts, the loan officer goes to another appraiser. Of the
appraisers who reported pressure, 48% said the overvaluations demanded were
1–10% above the true value of the property while 43% said they were 11–30%
above market value.
Returning to the checklist, in the United States, just as in the United Kingdom,
there has been much talk of structural changes in demand for housing, related to
immigration and faster household growth. There has also been a shift to invest-
ment in housing as an alternative to stocks. The household savings rate of course
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is low. It was already down to 2% at the end of the stock market boom and,
contrary to expectations, has stayed low. Meanwhile consumer price inflation is
subdued and monetary policy is strongly stimulative. Indeed it may be argued that
the Federal Reserve has deliberately stimulated a housing boom to counter the
depressive effects of the collapse of the stock bubble. US mortgage rates averaged
7–8% for much of the 1990s but fell below 6% in 2002–2004. Perhaps even more
so than in Britain (because lower rates can be locked-in in the United States),
there is a tendency to look at the monthly payment on a mortgage as the cost of
buying a house, rather than making allowance for the fact that, with interest
rates lower because of lower inflation, the potential upside for housing values is
correspondingly lower.
US homebuyers of course enjoy tax relief on mortgage interest, though with
lower interest rates and lower marginal tax rates this relief is worth less than in
the past (which should imply lower valuations).
Overall the case for a US bubble is not as clear-cut as in Britain and is much
more a regional phenomenon. However the principal states involved – California,
Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York – account for 30% of the
population and much of the higher-priced property in the United States. They also
tend to be where the main ‘opinion formers’ in the United States live. So a slump
in prices in these states, even if everywhere else showed stability, could have a
considerable impact. But one very real possibility for the United States is that it
is still in Scenario 1, where house prices and debt will continue to rise faster than
incomes. The latest OFHEO price index data show a 9.36% gain for Q2 2004 over
a year earlier.
15.5 Bubbles and monetary policy
Whether monetary policy-makers should react to bubbles has become a major
subject of debate in recent years. Some policy-makers argue that it is impossible
to be sure that a bubble is indeed a bubble and so asset pricing should simply be
left to the markets. For others, it may be possible at times to identify a bubble, but
usually only late in the day when deliberately pricking it would be dangerous and
probably bring on the collapse that is feared.
Even if a bubble can be identified early, monetary policy, armed with only the
interest rate instrument, cannot reliably hit two targets. The dilemma is illustrated
in Table 15.4, showing a matrix of possible monetary policy responses. When the
standard Taylor Rule (based on growth and inflation trends) suggests tightening
while asset prices are perceived as bubbling as given in item 1 there is no dilemma
and the bubble may well clarify the need for a rise in rates amidst the usual fog
of uncertainty. However there is a question of whether interest rates need to be
raised more than in the case of item 2 (where asset prices are calm). The Bank of
England and the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) found themselves here in late
2003/early 2004. The Fed might have perceived itself here in 1999 in relation to
the stock market but apparently did not. The view of the Fed then was that trying
to restrain bubbles should not be a basis for policy.
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The opposite situation, where the Taylor Rule suggests loosening and asset
prices are falling also presents no dilemma as given in item 9. Clearly there is a
need to loosen and, again, the confluence of the two factors suggests rapid and
aggressive easing. The Fed apparently did agree with the latter point in
2001–2003, leaving them open to the criticism that policy is asymmetrical and
therefore tends to over-encourage bubbles.4 If the British and/or Australian
economies reach this position at some point we may imagine that they too will cut
rates aggressively. Both countries would likely see a significant fall in the
currency if they did so, helping to offset the economic slowdown.
The dilemmas really come to the fore in item 3 and item 7. A weak economy
but with asset prices bubbling was the problem for the Bank of England in
2002–2003. The Taylor Rule (as well as geopolitical concerns) suggested loosen-
ing but house prices began to rise rapidly. The dilemma in item 3 has not been
seen recently, but it could emerge in coming years if CPI inflation moves above
target. However if economic growth is strong it is by no means clear that asset
prices would fall (see below for more on this item). The situation in item 6 is per-
haps more likely, where the Taylor Rule suggests policy at neutral but falling asset
prices imply easing.
Overall, the rise in household debt burdens suggests that consumers may be more
sensitive to higher interest rates than in the past, even though rates are low. Typical
tightening cycles are likely to involve a smaller rise in rates than before. However
one very important difference between Britain and the United States is that, in
Britain more than two-thirds of mortgages are at floating rates whereas in the
United States more than two-thirds are at long-term fixed rates. When interest rates
are trending down, as for the last twenty years, the difference may not be so great
because US consumers have been able to refinance at lower rates. But, on the way
up, US mortgage holders are unaffected by rising rates, in contrast to the United
Kingdom where higher short term rates quickly impact on mortgage payments.
Hence tightening cycles in the United Kingdom impact both on the cost of new
loans and therefore potentially house prices, and the disposable income of
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Table 15.4 Monetary policy dilemmas with two targets
House prices House prices House prices falling
bubbling neutral
Taylor Rule 1 Tighten, and 2 Tighten 3 Dilemma. Tighten, but
suggests perhaps faster or perhaps cautiously?
tightening more than strict 
Taylor Rule
Taylor Rule 4 Not clear. Tighten 5 Neutral 6 Not clear. Loosen a
suggests neutral a little? Or do little? Or do nothing
nothing
Taylor Rule suggests 7 Dilemma. 8 Loosen 9 Loosen, and perhaps
loosening Loosen, but less faster or more than
than otherwise? strict Taylor Rule
Source: The author.
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existing homeowners (though there is some offset from higher deposit rates). In
contrast, tightening cycles in the United States impact only on new borrowers.
However, another difference between the two countries is that US home-building
plays a larger role in the economy and is much more sensitive to interest rates. We
will return to these issues later. First, we consider whether there are alternatives
to monetary policy in restraining bubbles in the first place.
15.6 Alternatives to monetary policy
One possibility would be to use tax changes to lean against bubbles. However, not
only would this be unpopular, but it might well not be effective. As noted
previously, in the United Kingdom the tax burden has been raised on property in
recent years (following the well-established fiscal formula of taxing whatever is
buoyant), but this has not prevented prices rising rapidly.
Another approach sometimes proposed is to impose limits on loan-to-value
ratios (LTVs). However, quite apart from the unattractiveness of restrictions of
this sort, the evidence from Hong Kong is that it does not work. As early as 1991,
the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) reduced its guideline LTV limit
from 90% to 70%. In fact banks were generally more cautious than this and as of
September 1997, approximately the peak of the boom, actual LTVs were only at
52% (OECD, 2002). The HKMA also issued a guideline in 1994 that banks
should limit their property exposure to 40% of loans. These measures probably
did help to largely protect the banking system despite the subsequent 65% fall in
house prices. Individuals lost much of their equity in housing but the default rate
on loans was relatively low.
However this policy did not prevent a major bubble because there were enough
new lenders entering the market to ensure that mortgages were easily available.
Moreover buyers were often so keen to purchase that they took out personal loans
at high interest rates to cover the down-payment. Perhaps, without the LTV limit
the bubble would have inflated even further, but the Hong Kong experience
strongly suggests that an LTV limit, on its own, is not enough.
A more attractive approach might be to try to restrain mortgage lending during
booms. For example, countercyclical capital standards could be introduced,
requiring banks to have higher capital ratios when asset prices are expensive and
allowing lower ratios when they are inexpensive. In practice, banks tend to have
pro-cyclical capital ratios, that is, lower capital ratios during booms and bubbles
and higher ones during recessions and busts. And even if their official capital
ratios are not pro-cyclical, risk assessment often becomes more relaxed while
off-balance sheet (OBS) activity such as guarantees and derivatives may be
stepped up, which comes to the same thing.
A similar result might be achieved by introducing stabilising provisioning rules
requiring banks to make larger provisions when times are good and smaller ones
when the economy is weak. Such a system was introduced in Spain in 2000 and
has been avidly studied by regulators (Mann and Michael, 2002). However, this
would require flexibility from accounting standards setters. Moreover, in most
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countries the tax authorities are reluctant to make such provisions tax deductible,
because of fears that banks would use them as a tax avoidance measure. Spain
has a complex system but it does allow banks to influence how much extra
provisioning they make in the good times.
An approach which might satisfy the tax authorities, would be for the supervisors
to determine the extra provisioning, based on the mix of lending and the
behaviour of asset prices. For example, if house prices are seen as high, banks
could be required to hold larger reserves against new mortgages. Such an
approach needs to be mechanistic rather than discretionary, but then runs the risk
of being inflexible.
The arguments here are separate from the issue of banking soundness. Of
course bank supervisors might welcome either of these approaches because they
would improve the incentives for bank soundness during the economic cycle. But
it is easy to posit a situation where banks decide to relax their lending criteria in
a way that adds fuel to a housing boom yet both banking management and
supervisors regard the risk as acceptable from an individual bank’s point of view.
Losses on mortgage portfolios, at least for owner-occupiers, have historically
been modest. This is true even during the recent experience in Hong Kong where
home prices fell 65% from the peak in 1997 to the trough in 2003.
Moreover banks may find other ways to spread the risk. In the late 1980s, in
the United Kingdom, insurance companies often insured the excess (at the
mortgagee’s expense) when LTVs pushed above a certain level (typically 80%).
Many insurance companies took substantial losses on these portfolios in the early
1990s but it did not undermine their soundness. This underlines a typical feature
of bubbles which is that new lenders come in to the market.
Many mortgages are now securitised so the risk is pushed back to investors
including mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies. Again, bank
supervisors have no reason to discourage such business. Indeed quite the reverse.
But investors in securitised mortgages may have a different level of risk aversion
to that of banks, encouraging greater lending. Of course, higher risk loans do
attract higher spreads, though there is a danger during bubble periods that
investors are prepared to buy whatever the cost.
15.7 Five possible scenarios for housing,
debt and the economy
1 You ain’t seen nothing yet The first scenario is where house prices and debt
ratios continue to expand faster than incomes, providing support for consumer
spending and the economy. MEW would also stay high, though it should be noted
that if MEW and the savings rate are unchanged at a particular level, there is no
new stimulus from this source. Consumer spending will expand at a percentage
rate equal to income growth. In this scenario balance sheets expand but net wealth
continues to grow. Banks can continue to make good profits from consumer busi-
ness as the value of loans expands rapidly, and defaults should be limited since
the economy too will be expanding while unemployment is stable or declining.
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The bubble (if indeed it is one) gets bigger. Or in some cases, if a bubble has
not yet developed, it starts now. Some other countries which have had smaller
increases in prices and do not yet appear to be overvalued, for example Italy or
Canada, might begin to enter a bubble. In part this might be due to the same
conditions prevailing as in the existing bubble countries, particularly low interest
rates and an increasingly competitive lending sector. But there may also be a
degree of contagion as buyers from the United Kingdom and other bubble
countries buy holiday homes or investment properties.
This is the scenario of the last several years but, while we would not expect it
to continue indefinitely the limits for higher prices are not clear. Experience
suggests that we should not expect a tightening of lending criteria to be the sole
driving force for bringing it to an end, though it might perhaps play a role.
However, with static lending criteria, potential borrowers would eventually reach
their limit, especially first time buyers. Or, it could be that a rising trend for
interest rates or a weakening in the economy leads to a scaling back of borrow-
ing. Experience with bubbles in the past appears to show that, once a bubble
mentality takes hold, with people speculating on a big scale, it comes to an end
either because of a new external event or because the market reaches such an
outrageously high level that greed gives way to fear.
2 A higher equilibrium The second scenario is that, after a step higher in
valuations, house prices and debt then revert to a growth rate equal to incomes.
As already noted, one of the consequences of this is that households will find
their debt burden remaining relatively high for an extended period, only gradually
eroding under the influence of inflation. But with the value of property rising (in
line with incomes), housing as an investment still makes a positive return, though
arguably not enough to justify the risk.5 And the returns would seem very slow
compared to the experience of recent years. For banks this scenario is less satis-
factory than the first since the market is growing more slowly, only in line with
earnings. Still, there would be no systemic problem with household credit.
One of the key questions is whether this is a stable scenario for the medium
term. In practice markets never follow smooth equilibrium paths, so another way
to test the stability of this scenario is to ask what would happen if house prices
fell 5% or 10% in one year relative to earnings. Would they then pick up again,
to stay in touch with the equilibrium track or is there a risk that the slide contin-
ues? The answer to this seems to depend on whether existing owners (occupiers
or investors) would panic, whether potential buyers would expect a continued fall
as ‘bubble greed’ gives way to fear, whether banks would sharply tighten lending
criteria and whether a central bank response in the form of lower interest rates
might be able to restore confidence if required. If the path is not stable then it
slides into Scenario 4 or 5.
3 Stability in nominal terms The third scenario is perhaps the most benign
from the point of view of central banks (at least those that worry about a bubble).
It is that house prices and levels of debt stay broadly unchanged in nominal terms
for a prolonged period allowing earnings to catch up and the overvaluation to be
worked through. One argument in favour of this scenario is that even if the
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willingness to buy houses turns down, homeowners and investors may simply stay
put (though in the UK the latter would be making very poor returns – only the net
rental yield of perhaps 2–3% pa). So the housing market may see a marked slow-
down in turnover with little change in prices.
However, if house prices need a 30% fall to come back to reasonable
valuations, this would imply a period of 7–8 years of stable prices. Moreover it
must be questioned whether the housing market is likely to behave in this way.
After major rises in prices, especially with signs of a bubble mentality, there
must be a significant chance of a fall in prices. Still, this scenario is possible
and perhaps most likely if some of the forces pointing to a fall in prices are
offset by declining interest rates. For banks it would mean still weaker growth
in consumer business, given lower housing turnover and a slowdown in
MEW over time. Presumably delinquencies and defaults would tick up but not to
a great degree.
The critical question for central banks is whether this stabilisation of prices
would require an easing of policy to keep the overall economy on track. In the
case of the United Kingdom, as noted above, the savings ratio has been quite sta-
ble in recent years so the bubble does not appear to have added to consumer
spending. But, if house prices stabilise, a savings rate of 6% is likely to mean net
wealth falls in relation to incomes.6 Moreover, MEW would presumably fall over
time and we might also wonder whether there would be disappointment of
consumer expectations of ever-higher house prices. In short, the savings rate
would be expected to move up, though it is not clear how rapidly.
The Bank of England would probably welcome this, as would the RBA and
probably the Fed. They would need to follow a looser monetary policy than
otherwise and, overall, the economy would be likely to adjust in the direction of
a lower real exchange rate, higher private savings and a smaller current account
deficit. As long as the lower exchange rate did not trigger an inflation problem the
outcome would be benign. However, in the case of the United States, we might
wonder whether the rest of the world would be ready for the United States to start
to grow its real net exports again.
4 Autonomous house price collapse In this scenario house prices fall entirely
of their own accord or with an insignificant trigger. The experience of past
bubbles suggests this can often be the case. Accounts of bubbles sometimes refer
to a period of eerie calm as the period of frenetic buying comes to an end, and
then selling begins, gradually accelerating as panic sets in (Kindleberger, 1978).
Critical state theory appears to provide a theoretical basis for this scenario,
showing how bubbles can collapse without a major trigger (Sornette, 2003).
However, whether housing is likely to respond in this way can be questioned.
Panic sales by owner-occupiers seem unlikely since people need somewhere to
live. We might imagine that there could be a sudden rush to downsize if the
bubble starts to burst. But, if prices fall by a moderate amount (10%?) people may
give up trying to sell and stay put. The phenomenon of ‘anchoring’, identified in
behavioural finance, is likely to be particularly prevalent in housing. Moreover
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past experiences of housing crashes usually have involved a major trigger, often
the combination of higher interest rates and a recession.
However, the increased prevalence of investment in housing now could mean
that there is a greater risk of panic selling, particularly in the United Kingdom and
Australia where widespread investment in housing is a newer phenomenon than
in the United States. There is also perhaps a greater risk, in the event of a major
price correction, of repossessions as investors walk away or go bankrupt. In the
United Kingdom the easing of bankruptcy rules in April 2004 might be a concern
for banks. The risk of this scenario may also be greater in a low inflation
environment, because the potential for nominal prices to fall is that much greater,
leaving mortgage loans exposed.
Nevertheless, in the event of a significant fall in house prices, we would expect
interest rates to be cut because of the risk of an economic slowdown. Lower
interest rates would make it easier for investors to hold on by improving the
running return from their investment (even if they face a capital loss). It should
therefore mitigate the price fall as well as rebalance the economy in the way
described in the previous scenario. But again, knowing how much to cut interest
rates may be difficult.
Once house prices turn down (autonomously in this scenario) there begins a
dynamic process as three forces interact: the downward psychology of a bursting
bubble, the depressing effects on the economy of lower house prices and finally
the stimulatory forces of easier monetary policy both for house prices and the
economy. If the downward momentum of house prices from the bursting bubble
is strong, cuts in interest rates may be unable to prevent house prices correcting
substantially, but nevertheless may be able to keep economic growth near to trend.
This benign outcome is most likely if the impact on the economy of falling house
prices turns out to be modest and if other sources of demand in the economy
(presumably exports and investment, since there is no room for increased fiscal
deficits in the United Kingdom or United States) can take up the slack. As in the
prior scenario, the authorities in the United Kingdom and Australia would proba-
bly welcome this outcome, with the bubble defused, the currency weaker and
exports and investment stronger. However there is also the risk that the fall in
house prices takes the economy down with it, most likely because the central bank
responds too slowly. This scenario is more likely to bring a bumpy landing than
the previous scenario.
For banks, the benign scenario of a correction in house prices without a slump
in the economy would doubtless be less profitable than the previous scenarios.
The consumer mortgage and lending business would contract and, at the
margin, bad loans would go up. However, lower interest rates (which normally
help banks’ profits) would help as might improved returns on lending to business.
Obviously the worst outcome is where both house prices and the economy slump
together.
5 House prices crash during the next economic downturn making it worse In
this final scenario the economy turns down, for one reason or another, and the
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bubble in the housing market collapses leading to a potentially much more
difficult economic downturn. This appears to be what happened in Japan and the
United Kingdom in the early 1990s and threatened to be the case in the United
States in 2001 with the stocks bubble. The Japanese authorities failed to respond
to the problem fast enough and, of course, faced simultaneous bubbles in stocks,
commercial property and residential property. The United Kingdom was unable
to respond fast enough because of its 1990 entry into the Exchange Rate
Mechanism. The United States, in contrast, responded very rapidly in 2001–2002
and, anyway, only had a stock bubble bursting.
An important issue is whether an economic downturn with housing collapsing
would also see a major stock slump. It is reassuring that stocks have already fallen
from their 2000 valuations and are now close to, or just above, mid-range histor-
ically (e.g. price–earnings ratios of 15–17 times). However, in the event of a
simultaneous decline in the economy and in housing prices we could be sure that
stock prices would also fall, perhaps down to the low end of the range (PE of
10–12). This would imply a new fall of 30% or more and would doubtless trigger
wealth and confidence effects in itself. It would also seriously exacerbate the
already existing problem of under-funded pensions, as well as, possibly, once
again requiring many insurance companies to seek increased capital. Many
pessimists on the US stock bubble are still waiting for this ‘other shoe to drop’.
Commercial property prices do not appear to be wildly exposed at present though
they have been rising in some countries. Nevertheless they could fall too since
a recession would quickly upset the supply–demand balance.
Overall, then the next economic downturn runs the risk of being particularly
difficult if current high house price valuations have not been corrected before
then (by Scenario 3 or 4). Central banks will need to stand ready to cut interest
rates significantly and perhaps take other measures, such as quantitative
monetary easing and direct purchase of government bonds and other assets, on
the lines of the Bank of Japan’s policy measures since 2001.
For banks this scenario is obviously the least attractive. The consumer lending
business would contract sharply and delinquencies and default might be consid-
erable. A large fall in bond yields and a substantial spread between short and long
rates would help offset the problems, though, if deflation were to ensue and short
rates go down to zero, the gap between short rates and bond yields would be
unlikely to be as large as the 300–400 basis points seen in the United States in
recent years. Consumer lending would, for sure, be a much less attractive busi-
ness. One defining characteristic of this scenario would likely be a tightening of
lending criteria, of course helping to make the situation worse.
15.8 Conclusion: what can we expect?
This paper has argued that a housing bubble exists in the United Kingdom and
one is developing too in the United States. While we cannot completely rule
out the argument that higher values can be justified by the low interest rate
environment, other indications suggest that a bubble is present. How these
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bubbles will be resolved will play a major role in monetary policy and the course
of the economy in coming years. The issue is already at the forefront in the United
Kingdom and Australia. It is likely to become increasingly important in the
United States. In the Eurozone, I would speculate that the difference between
house price behaviour in Germany on the one hand, and in much of the rest of the
region on the other hand, may become increasingly problematic.
For banks, it is rampant competition combined with the high profitability of
mortgage (and related) business that has helped drive mortgage lending growth
and house prices. But it seems certain that rapid consumer lending growth must
come to an end at some point and some scenarios could also bring significant
losses on consumer credit. The slowdown in growth is likely to be a reflection
both of consumers being unable or unwilling to borrow further and banks
tightening credit criteria for prudential reasons or under pressure from regulators.
The limits to further rises in house prices and debt (Scenario 1) are set by the
interaction between the strength of the bubble mentality, up against the
constraints of high valuations on buying together with the path of interest rates,
and the economy. Further rises in house prices are perhaps most likely if interest
rates stay low for a prolonged period while the economy continues to expand. At
present, markets are expecting interest rates to rise in the remainder of 2004
and/or 2005 almost everywhere but if these expectations are scaled back, house
prices could continue to rise faster than expected. A lower path for interest rates
is most likely if inflation continues to come in below target or if there are periodic
scares over the strength of the economic upturn.
In the United Kingdom and Australia interest rates have already moved up
significantly, there are signs of a weakening of house prices and also housing
valuations are particularly high. The potential for house prices and debt to continue
rising rapidly therefore looks limited and so a continuation of Scenario 1 looks very
unlikely. In the United States, interest rates have so far moved up rather less from
their low point and valuations are not so extreme, except in certain locations,
which suggests there is more risk of Scenario 1 continuing for a while (rises in
prices faster than wages). Indeed this would be my expectation based on the view
that US economic growth will remain close to, or just above, trend (3–3.5%) over
the next 1–2 years, allowing the output gap to close only gradually and the Fed to
normalise interest rates slowly while inflation remains quiescent. Later in 2005
and into 2006, if the output gap has closed, interest rates are likely to move higher,
probably suppressing further rises in house prices.
In Spain, valuations do look particularly stretched. But interest rates are likely
to move up the least over the next year, suggesting the risk of further house
price rises. Overall then, the bubbles look more-or-less fully inflated in the
United Kingdom and Australia but may have further to go in the United States
and perhaps Spain. However this assessment has to be treated with caution: one
of the characteristics of bubbles is that they often go on inflating far longer than
analysts expect.
Taking the second and third scenarios together, stable ratios or stable levels,
there is a good chance of one of these outcomes in the United Kingdom and
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Australia. The Bank of England and RBA are focusing very carefully on housing
and appear ready to respond to any significant fall in house prices with lower
interest rates. In Australia in early 2004 and in the United Kingdom over the
Summer of 2004, the central banks responded to very tentative signs of a housing
slowdown by signalling a cautious approach to raising rates further.
However, there must also be a chance of the more negative scenarios develop-
ing at some point and in the case of the United Kingdom I would put the risk
at 50% or perhaps more. Whether house prices will turn down completely
autonomously on a large scale may be questioned though I believe this cannot
be ruled out. More likely perhaps is the final scenario, where a downturn for
other reasons becomes seriously exacerbated by a collapsing housing bubble.
The usual reasons for an economic downturn are either higher interest rates
in response to an inflation problem (Taylor rule tightening) or a slump in
investment spending after a boom or in response to a shock. Neither appears
imminent but the risks will increase over time, particularly for higher inflation.
Output gaps are expected to disappear in the United States, United Kingdom and
Spain in 2005 (OECD, 2004), though the Eurozone as a whole will still have
a large output gap.
For central banks, the risks from house price bubbles will be increasing during
2005–2006, either from an autonomous decline or because an economic
downturn emerges, which would be exacerbated by a large fall in house prices.
High levels of debt as well as the key role of house prices mean that consumer
demand may be especially sensitive to interest rates this time, particularly where
much of the debt is at floating rates (e.g. the United Kingdom). Hence ‘neutral’
rates of interest may be lower than sometimes thought, for example nearer to 3%
in the United States than 4% and nearer to 4.5% in the United Kingdom than
5–5.5%. And, if interest rates need to go above neutral to restrain the economy,
the amount of tightening required might be quite modest.
For banks, the ideal consumer environment of strong borrowing, rising house
prices, a growing economy and low interest rates looks set to come to an end
soon. Hence the winning strategies of recent years are likely to be less successful
in coming years. With luck there will just be a slowdown in business. But if a
major recession occurs the environment could turn ugly. The outlook is for
conditions to turn down first in the United Kingdom and Australia and only later
in the United States and Spain.
The case of Spain is not comprehensively examined in this paper but a couple
of comments follow from the scenario analysis. First, monetary policy in
the Eurozone may well remain highly supportive for Spanish house prices,
despite the already high valuations. Spain (like Ireland) resembles the Hong Kong
case where the bubble was driven by negative real interest rates caused by the
fixed currency peg, though the scale of new building is much more substantial
than in Hong Kong. Second, Spain does not have control over its own interest
rates, so in the event of Scenario 4 monetary policy would not be responsive (also
Hong Kong’s problem in 1998–2003). The Spanish authorities might therefore be
wise to try to find non-monetary ways of limiting the bubble and also consider
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ways to limit the downside in house prices in case an autonomous bear market
does begin at some stage.
Notes
1 In the United Kingdom, Douglas McWilliams of the Centre for Business and Economics
Research has been one of the foremost (non-industry) proponents of the view that house
prices can be at higher valuations than before and has consistently argued that the
United Kingdom is not in a bubble and that prices would rise further. But CEBR’s
most recent analysis, published in August 2004, concluded that UK house prices are 3%
overvalued, that is, about right. See www.cebr.co.uk
2 The Economist, 20 March 2004, p. 85.
3 For a discussion see Schwartz (2002).
4 The case for the defence rests partly on the fact that a substantial fall in a market
is clearly likely to depress the economy to some degree whereas a rise in a market
cannot be conclusively defined as a bubble and might be justified by changed
fundamentals.
5 To take the UK example, if we posit 4% earnings growth (in line with the Bank of
England’s known comfort zone) and a 5% gross rental income giving about 2% after
costs (maintenance, depreciation, agents fees, etc.), the investor earns 6% pa, only
slightly above long-term bond yields.
6 In the United Kingdom, net wealth was 668% of incomes at end 2002 (OECD, 2004)
with housing accounting for a little under half. A savings rate of 6% of incomes
would not be enough to keep the ratio at 668% unless the stock market performed
extremely well.
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Capital market development and financial integration are of paramount
importance for the European economy. For example, at the 2000 Lisbon Council
they were included in the agenda intended to make the European Union (EU) the
most competitive economy by 2010 (EC, 2000). The links between the size of the
financial system and the level of economic development are well-documented
(King and Levine, 1993). Moreover, increased financial integration, by reducing
the cost of capital, will allow for a better allocation of resources. This may
ultimately lead to increased economic performance. A study for the European
Commission (EC), for example, estimates the potential impact of financial
integration to be a 1% increase in EU GDP growth (Giannetti et al., 2002).
Finally, the transformation of the financial system can have an impact on the
stability of the system itself, with possible consequences on the whole economy
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2003).
It should therefore come as no surprise that European political and monetary
authorities have a strong interest in capital markets and financial integration.
European institutions have taken several initiatives to foster integration and devel-
opment of the euro area capital markets. The most well-known of such initiatives
is certainly the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). The EC launched the
FSAP in 1999 with the explicit objective of actively promoting (and eventually
achieving) the full integration of European financial markets, by providing homo-
geneous infrastructures and ensuring a level playing field for financial operators.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has also taken a proactive stance in this
matter. The ECB is interested in the transformation of the European financial
system for several reasons. First, capital markets represent one of the main
channels through which monetary policy is transmitted. Second, payment and
settlement systems play an important role in evolving financial systems. Third,
structural changes in financial markets may in the transition be associated with
risks to financial stability.
It is against this background that in 2002 the ECB and the Center for Financial
Studies (CFS) established the ECB-CFS research network on ‘Capital Markets
and Financial Integration in Europe’. The network aims at stimulating top-level
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and policy-relevant research on the structure and integration of the European
financial system and its linkages with the United States and Japan. It was
launched in an effort to better understand the main processes under way in the
transition from many different financial systems into a single one, to assess
the quality with which the financial sector fulfils its functions, to analyse the
relationships between these developments and those taking place in other major
financial systems and to examine the implications of all these factors for the
economy as a whole. While both empirical and theoretical research was envisaged,
relevance for policy debates constituted another parameter for the work this
initiative wanted to promote. The network was first established for a period of two
years, which expired in April 2004. It has now been renewed for another three
years, until end of 2007.
Within a relatively short period of time the network formed a coherent and
growing group of researchers interested in the integration and development of
European financial markets. Active contributors to this group have regularly
presented the results of their research in the events organised and sponsored by the
network.1 Academic researchers, researchers from the main policy institutions and
policy-makers participated actively in the workshops, either by presenting research
results or through speeches and in policy panels. The network also stimulated a
new research field on securities settlement systems, an area of high policy rele-
vance that had not attracted much interest in the research community beforehand.
This paper brings together the main findings of the work done under the network
and illustrates the issues to be tackled in the forthcoming years. It is structured as
follows. The next section will describe in greater detail the organisation and the
structure of the ECB-CFS research network. Section 16.2 will highlight the most
interesting results and policy-relevant conclusions from the research papers
presented under the auspices of the network. Section 16.3 presents the research
agenda for the next phase of the network by discussing three new priority areas.
Section 16.4 concludes.
16.2 Purpose of the network and main priority areas
In 1999, the EC presented a framework for action in the financial services
industry to help achieve the benefits of the Single Market in financial services.
The formulated objectives of this FSAP are to ensure a single EU market for
wholesale financial services, guarantee open and secure retail markets and modern
prudential rules and supervision. The Commission proposed forty-two measures
and a timetable for their adoption with deadline 2005. In 2002, the date of
creation of the ECB-CFS research network, the Commission reported that,
Recent progress in the Council and the European Parliament on a number of
proposals demonstrate that the political commitment to implement the FSAP
on time is beginning to be translated into firm political agreements . . . Even
if not all barriers have been removed, significant and irreversible progress
towards a strong integrated European financial sector by 2005 is achievable – it
is a prize that is now within our grasp.
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Against the background of the FSAP, the ECB-CFS research network was
intended to stimulate research in all areas relevant for the functioning of the
European financial system. The work can be decomposed in three distinct, but
related, broad areas of research: (1) European financial integration, (2) financial
system structures in Europe and (3) financial linkages between the euro area/EU,
the United States and Japan. A detailed description of key research areas was
developed and made publicly available in the network ‘roadmap’.2
To concentrate research resources and ensure policy focus, a limited number of
areas within the three main broad research fields were initially given top priority
for the first two years: (1) bank competition and the geographical scope of bank-
ing; (2) European bond markets; (3) European securities settlement systems;
(4) the emergence and evolution of new markets in Europe (in particular start-up
financing markets) and (5) international portfolio choices and asset market
linkages between Europe, the United States and Japan.
Work on bank competition and the geographical scope of banking has been
given priority because – despite the adoption of the ‘single passport’ principle –
the euro area is still experiencing relatively few cross-border mergers compared
with domestic consolidation and relatively limited cross-border corporate
lending. Also supervisory structures and regulatory approaches pertaining to the
banking sector underwent profound reforms whose effects should be analysed.
European bond markets have undergone rapid changes in the past few years,
including the development of euro area-wide secondary market trading platforms,
as well as the development of a more significant corporate bond market. These
changes are so recent that their main sources and their wider implications are not
widely understood. They may have important practical consequences, not least
because bond markets constitute one key market for the conduct of monetary
policy by central banks.
Despite the importance of securities settlement systems for financial markets,
research was only at an embryonic stage when the network was set up. Moreover,
the fragmentation of the European securities settlement industry, resulting in high
cross-border securities trading costs, may well constitute the single most important
obstacle to further securities market integration (see Giovannini Group, 2001,
2003). The rapid structural change in the European securities settlement industry
and the very limited research available on these topics when the network was created
made work in this area particularly important and relevant to policy-makers.
The area of new markets also received a very high priority. In 1998, the
Commission (EC, 1998) reckoned that ‘fewer technology-based enterprises
are created in Europe and their prospects for growth are inhibited. Also, venture
capital is underdeveloped in many European countries compared with the USA,
in particular in the field of seed and early stage finance’. This highlighted the
importance of the availability of a wide range of funding and investment
possibilities for innovations and risk sharing – and hence ultimately for growth
and welfare.
Priority was also given to international portfolio choices and asset market
linkages between Europe, the United States and Japan, as the past few decades
have brought an enormous expansion of international capital flows. As a
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consequence, global financial linkages have strengthened. While their impact on
economies is far larger than traditional trade linkages, for example, knowledge
about the driving factors behind international financial flows is still relatively
limited.
16.3 Results of the network
This section reviews a selection of the main policy-relevant results of the work
done in the context of the network, going through its five priority areas, as for-
mulated in the network ‘roadmap’. We start each of the following sub-sections
with a paragraph summarising the key findings. We then elaborate on these
findings in more detail.
16.3.1 Bank competition and the geographical 
scope of banking
Results reveal that, first, integration is not very advanced in many retail-banking
markets. Second, some of the inherent characteristics of traditional loan and
deposit business constrain the cross-border expansion of commercial banking,
even in a common currency area. Hence, the implementation of some policies to
foster cross-border integration of retail banking may be ineffective. Third, bank
competition does not need to cause instability, but is likely to spur growth in
developed countries, as more competition in the banking sector induces finan-
cially dependent firms to grow more. Fourth, theoretical research suggests that
supervisory structures may not be neutral towards further European banking
integration. Finally, a stronger role of area-wide competition policies could be
beneficial for further banking integration.
As shown by Baele et al. (2004), the degree of integration varies in the differ-
ent segments of the retail-banking markets. In the corporate lending market,
following significant convergence in the run-up to European Monetary Union
(EMU), short-term and medium- and long-term lending markets are still seg-
mented, even more so for short-term lending (see Figure 16.1). Households
mortgage loan rates seem to have become more uniform across countries, while
the consumer credit segment remains highly fragmented (see Figure 16.2).
This price-based evidence is confirmed by quantity measures of cross-border
activities within the euro area. Cross-border lending is still very limited in the
retail-banking segment, as shown in Figure 16.3 and Hartmann et al. (2003).
The persistence in home biases in lending and borrowing to non-financial cor-
porations and households is confirmed by evidence from Berger et al. (2002) that
large multinational corporations still prefer small local institutions to global
financial institutions for their local cash management – that is, short-term
banking needs, including short-term lending, liquidity management, etc. To the
contrary, one would expect multinational corporations to be the first beneficiaries
of the services offered by global banks.3 The disappearance of domestic banking
business as a consequence of advancing financial integration therefore does not
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Figure 16.1 Cross-sectional standard deviation of interest rates on short-term and
medium- and long-term loans to enterprises.
Source: ECB.
Figure 16.2 Cross-sectional standard deviation of interest rates on consumer and











































































































seem to be a likely development, at least not in the short run. In complementary
work, Guiso et al. (2004) find evidence that even if financial markets become
increasingly integrated, domestic financial institutions do not become redundant.
Results suggest that local financial development – and therefore local banking –
is an important determinant of the economic success of an area, even in an
environment where there are no frictions impeding capital movements. All in all,
we can conclude that traditional loan and deposit business appears to solve
economic frictions in a way that is difficult to reconcile with very extensive
cross-border expansions.
The other side of the coin is that domestic banks, potentially equipped with
substantial local market power, constitute a break on greater financial integration.
Some see cross-border mergers and acquisitions as a possibility to solve this
problem. An active use of European competition policy, for example, taking an
accommodative stance towards competition enhancing cross-border mergers
could be a straightforward way to create room for such consolidation.
Degryse and Ongena (2004) suggest that bank relationships and industry
specialisation are affected by competition. Bank branches facing stiff local
competition engage relatively more in relationship-based lending. The effect of
competition on industry specialisation is much less pronounced. A diversification
effect seems to follow competition, as bank branches engage somewhat fewer
borrowers in the same industry if local market concentration decreases.
As diversification tends to be associated with less risk, this result suggests a
positive relationship between bank competition and financial stability. Carletti
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Figure 16.3 Cross-border loans (as a percent of domestic loans).
Source: ECB.
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and Hartmann (2003) survey more systematically the literature on competition
and stability and, indeed, conclude that the idea that competition is something
dangerous in banking, since it generally causes instability, can be dismissed.
Competition in banking should therefore be re-examined. The paper by Kaas
(2003), for example, suggests that policies favouring competition from foreign
banks would improve welfare, if local incumbent banks were less efficient. In
related empirical work, Claessens and Laeven (2003) examine whether competi-
tion in the banking sector is beneficial for economic growth. The result depends
on the degree of financial development. In less developed countries, sectors that
are financially dependent grow slower when the banking system is more compet-
itive, while in developed countries more competition is associated with higher
growth. More precisely, financially dependent firms will grow by 1.5% more per
annum if the country’s banking sector is more competitive. These findings
support the view that sufficient competition in European banking systems is an
important ingredient for the financial system to play a stimulating role for overall
economic performance.
In line with this conclusion, Carletti and Hartmann (2003) also argue that there
should be well-defined arrangements about the relative roles of competition and
supervisory authorities. Supervisory authorities often have some role in bank merger
reviews, and those countries that have given only a weak role to competition
authorities may be advised to ensure that competition concerns are not neglected.
More generally, the regulatory and supervisory framework seems to have
implications for retail credit markets. First of all, Buch and DeLong (2003) find
that regulation is a driving factor behind international mergers: banks operating
in a more regulated environment are less likely to be the target of international
bank mergers. Hence, some regulatory barriers can be impediments to further
mergers and acquisitions. Second, Huizinga and Nicodeme (2003) find that inter-
national non-bank depositors appear to favour banking systems covered by
explicit deposit insurance. Systems with co-insurance, a private administration
and a low deposit insurance premium attract them. The sensitivity of non-bank
deposits to deposit insurance policies opens up the possibility of international
regulatory arbitrage. Third, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez’ (2003) theoretical paper
shows that a centralised regulator could increase efficiency at the cost of flexi-
bility in applying different regulations to countries with heterogeneous financial
systems. The benefits of a single regulatory framework therefore heavily depend
on the symmetry in the financial systems of the relevant countries.
The dependence of the European financial system on banks only increases the
importance of these issues. Contrary to the United States, whose system still relies
more heavily on market finance, we can conclude that enough banking competition
is important in European banking in order to support economic growth.
16.3.2 European bond markets
While the government bond market has integrated rapidly with the EMU conver-
gence process, its full integration has not yet been achieved. The introduction of
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a common electronic trading platform reduced transaction costs substantially, but
yield spreads of long-term sovereign bonds of the euro area are still heteroge-
neous. This is largely explained by different sensitivities to an international risk
factor, whereas liquidity differentials only play a role in conjunction with this
latter factor. Somewhat surprisingly in this context, the dynamically developing
corporate bond market exhibits a relatively high level of integration. There is also
increasing evidence that the introduction of the euro has contributed to a reduc-
tion in the cost of capital in the euro area, in particular through the reduction of
corporate bond underwriting fees. As a result, firms may wish to increase bond
financing relative to equity financing. The development of a larger corporate
bond market is also important for monetary policy. For example, US evidence
suggests that the rating of corporate bonds may contribute to the persistence of
recessions, as rating agencies’ policies affect firms asymmetrically in their access
to the bond market over the business cycle. US evidence also suggests that
liquidity conditions in stock and bond markets tend to be positively correlated.
As documented by Blanco (2002), the government bond market integrated
significantly with the EMU convergence process and with some efforts to
harmonise issuing procedures and conventions. However, full integration of the
government bond market has not yet been achieved. For example, while the level
of convergence in yields is impressive, yields of government bonds with similar,
or in some cases identical, credit risk and maturity have not entirely converged.
Typically, as shown in Table 16.1, yields on 10-year euro area government bonds
may differ by around 15–20 basis points between different countries. Differences
in liquidity as well as in the availability of developed derivatives markets tied
to the various individual bond markets have been mentioned as possible
explanations for these spreads.
To explain observed yield differentials between long-term sovereign bonds in
the euro area, Favero et al. (2004) resort to an international risk factor (measured
as the differential between high-risk US corporate bonds and US government
bonds). There is a strong co-movement among European countries’ yield differ-
entials with Germany. As shown in Figure 16.4, this common trend appears to be
highly correlated with this international risk factor. Somewhat surprisingly, they
argue that liquidity differentials do not explain much of the yield differentials.
Rather, the differentials are largely explained by varying sensitivities of local
yields to the international risk factor. Liquidity only plays a role when interacting
with the international risk factor.
Most European government bonds are now traded on MTS, the single interna-
tional platform. Cheung et al. (2004) conduct a microstructure study of trading in
MTS, showing that national order imbalances appear to be diversifiable across all
market participants. More precisely none of the national order imbalances in
the government bond markets of Germany, France, Italy or Belgium affect
benchmark (German) yield innovations.
Governments have also a lot to gain from integration and well-designed mar-
kets. The institutional design of markets is very important for their integration
and the prevailing prices. Specifically, differences in the microstructures and
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issuing procedures of European Treasury bill markets across countries and
changes of those features over time affect yields in treasury auctions, and thus the
cost of funding for governments. As shown in Biais et al. (2004), regularly issu-
ing bills significantly reduce yields. Also, when bills are traded on a centralised,
transparent electronic limit order book, such as MTS, their liquidity rises and the
yields decline significantly. Governments could therefore enhance liquidity and
reduce yields and the costs of their funding, by efficiently designing treasury
securities and issuing procedures as well as by promoting and accommodating
modern cross-country trading systems. According to the estimates provided by
Biais et al., governments could save up to €350.19 million by improving the
microstructure of the Treasury markets.
The corporate bond market in the euro area is surprisingly well-integrated, as
first documented by Baele et al. (2004). They show that in this rapidly expanding
market, the country where a bond is issued has only marginal explanatory power
for the cross-section of yield spreads, once a number of systematic risk factors is
accounted for. Quantity-based indicators also tend to support this conclusion.
Between 1998 and 2002, the share of bond market funds (both government and
corporate) with European-wide investment strategies increased dramatically from
below 20% to above 60%, indicating a drastic reduction in the home bias of bond
portfolios in the euro area. In contrast, home bias still seems to characterise cross-
Atlantic portfolios of corporate loans. Evidence from Carey and Nini (2004)
suggests that interest rates of syndicated corporate loans in Europe are on average
30 basis points lower than in the United States. The difference is both economi-
cally and statistically significant. Since systematic differences across the two











Figure 16.4 First principal component of euro-area government yield differentials and the
spread between the 10-year fixed interest rate on swaps and US government
bond yield.
Source: Favero et al. (2004).




markets in loan and borrower characteristics do not explain it, they describe this
pricing difference as a puzzle, encouraging further research that focuses on why
borrowers do not cross borders.
Another set of results presented at network events relates to the effects of the
euro on European corporate bond markets. In particular, there are more and more
evidences showing that the euro has contributed to reductions in the cost of
corporate bond financing, and therefore in the cost of capital more generally. For
example, Tsatsaronis and Santos (2003) show that the introduction of the euro led
to a reduction in the underwriting fees of international corporate bonds issued in
the new currency (see Table 16.2). This reduction was largely due to greater
contestability of the investment banking business in the post-EMU European
market. There is a global downward trend in fees over the 1994–2001 period, with
value-weighted average fees for 2001 standing 86 basis points below their 1994
levels. This 37% reduction is largely attributable to a sharp drop in the euro-
denominated segment. As a result, underwriting fees for euro-denominated
corporate bonds are now at the same level as in the dollar segment of this market.
Bris et al. (2003) show that the introduction of the euro has lowered firms’ cost
of capital, by further increasing capital markets integration in Europe and by
eliminating currency risks among the countries that joined EMU. More precisely,
they show that firm valuations for large firms in the euro area (as measured by
Tobin’s Q between 1998 and 2000) have increased by 7.9% per year relative to
firms in non-EMU countries, after controlling for firm, country and time specific
effects. These developments point to further growth of European corporate
bond markets.
Capital markets and financial integration 291
Table 16.2 Average fees by nationality of borrower and currency of denomination,
1994–2001
Currency of denomination




US 1.715 1.750 1.168 1.350 1.351
Euro-area 1.945 1.504 1.103 1.304 1.295 1.492
Other 1.786 2.000 1.160 1.168 1.227
Total 1.780 1.504 1.602 1.139 1.199 1.291
After the euro
US 0.886 0.669 0.644 0.706
Euro-area 0.779 0.804 0.808 0.791
Other 0.597 0.757 0.653 0.652
Total 0.772 0.686 0.694 0.716
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Corporate bond markets are also tied to the business cycle. According to Santos
(2003), rating agencies’ policies affect firms asymmetrically in their access to the
bond market over the business cycle. The idea is that the ‘quality’ of the signal
produced by the rating agencies varies with the firms’ creditworthiness. Since
rating agencies are more likely to produce split ratings on bonds of mid-credit
quality issuers, the impact of recessions is not uniform across firms: it increases
the cost of capital, most for mid-credit quality firms. As ratings become increasingly
uncertain in recessions, the information becomes more asymmetric. Uncertainty
related to the quality of firms then raises the cost of access to capital.
16.3.3 European securities settlement systems
European securities settlement infrastructures are highly fragmented and further
integration and/or consolidation would exploit economies of scale that could
greatly benefit investors. It is not clear, however, whether direct public interven-
tion in favour of consolidation would lead to the highest level of efficiency, for
example, because of the existence of strong vertical integration between trading
and securities platforms (‘silos’). In contrast, promoting open access to clearing
and settlement systems could lead to consolidation and the highest level of effi-
ciency. Finally, regarding concerns about unfair practices by Central Securities
Depositories (CSDs) towards custodian banks, regulatory interventions favouring
custodian banks should be discouraged, as long as CSDs are not allowed to price
discriminate between custodian banks and investor banks.
The two Giovannini reports (2001, 2003) stressed the need to progress with
securities settlement infrastructures, especially regarding cross-border settlement.
Legal and technical barriers to further integration were highlighted. Given the
already very comprehensive practical work of the Giovannini group in analysing
barriers to consolidation, the network focused on somewhat different issues. Two
points were particularly addressed. First, there is a lot to gain in Europe from
further consolidation of securities settlement systems. Second, in addition to the
barriers highlighted in the Giovannini reports, there may be intrinsic features of
the securities trading and settlement industry that prevent consolidation.
Settlement in Europe is 33% more costly than in the United States, as the aver-
age cost per settled transaction is $3.86 in Europe and only $2.90 in the United
States. This difference is partly explained by the segmentation in the European
market, as the average cost for operating an international CSD in Europe is
$40.54 relative to $3.11 for a domestic one, while it is only $2.90 in the
United States (see Schmiedel et al., 2002). Hence, looking at the exploitation of
economies of scale in Europe and the United States, the latter is operating at a
much more efficient level.
European settlement infrastructures show a strong potential for cost saving, as
illustrated by Table 16.3. Costs will rise by a factor of only 0.68 when the number
of instructions increases by 1, while the same measure for the United States is
0.94. Hence, Europe has much more to gain from further consolidation. However,
given the level of complexity in EU international securities settlement systems,
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the effectiveness of settlement industry infrastructures may benefit from the
simplification of the procedures for cross-border settlement, as for instance
advocated in the second Giovannini report (2002).
Koeppl and Monnet (2004) argue, however, that lifting all legal and technical
barriers to consolidate may not suffice to insure that the best forms of consolida-
tion will take place. They analyse theoretically the role of vertical ‘silos’ in secu-
rities market organisation for efficient horizontal consolidation between
components of the silo, that is, exchanges and back-office operations such as
clearing and settlement. An efficient merger is characterised by the lowest cost of
clearing and settlement. They show that it is impossible to achieve such a merger
when silos are in place. The reason is that lack of information on the cost structure
of the competitor raises the cost to achieve an efficient merger. These additional
costs can never be covered with the revenues of the merger, as they increase with
the revenues. However, competition can be used to achieve efficient consolida-
tion. The authors show that exchanges can achieve an efficient merger by each
outsourcing its own settlement operations, as long as each settlement system
competes for settling all trades of the merged exchange. Hence, they argue that
fostering competition and open access to securities settlement systems may be an
adequate policy.
Regarding the efficient design of the structure of securities settlement systems,
Holthausen and Tapking (2004) tackle pricing strategies of CSDs relative to
custodian banks. Both CSDs and custodian banks provide the same service, but
custodian banks often need to resort to CSDs. In an environment where CSDs do
not price discriminate custodian banks from usual investor banks, Holthausen and
Tapking show that CSDs can increase the cost of custodian banks by increasing
the variable part of their price schedule. However, although still sub-optimal, they
also show that the equilibrium market share of CSDs is closer to the optimal level
than in the case where there are no custodians. They conclude that regarding
concerns about unfair practices by CSDs towards custodian banks, regulatory
interventions favouring custodian banks should be discouraged, as long as CSDs
are not allowed to price discriminate between custodian banks and investor banks.
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Table 16.3 Cost scale elasticities for a









Loglinear model median 0.744
Source: Schmiedel et al. (2002).
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Iori (2004) looks at the efficiency and stability of alternative designs for
securities clearing and settlement infrastructures. Using the plausible assumption
that settlement takes place in batches throughout the day and that settlement can
be delayed, she finds that increasing the frequency of settlement (and therefore
approximating real-time settlement) increases the likelihood of failure but
reduces the systemic effects of a failure. As a consequence, the shorter the
interval between settlement batches, the more stable gross settlement systems are
compared with net settlement systems, and vice versa.
With these papers on securities settlement systems being presented in its
events, the network stimulated a new research field that is particularly important
for current policy concerns in relation to European financial integration. The
network will continue its efforts to promote further research in this area.
16.3.4 The emergence and evolution of new markets in Europe 
(in particular start-up financing markets)
Relative to the United States, European ‘new markets’ and start-up financing are
relatively little developed and integrated. However, new markets and venture
capitalists are the most important intermediaries for the financing of projects with
high risk and with potentially very high return. The analysis carried out within the
network reveals that European start-up financiers are mostly institutional investors,
while US venture capitalists are mostly rich individuals. Also, new equity markets
are essential for the development of start-up financing in Europe, as they provide
an exit strategy for start-up financiers, who can then sell new successful firms using
initial public offerings. The legal framework affects the development of venture
capital (VC) firms. For example, very strict personal bankruptcy laws constrain
early stage entrepreneurs, reducing demand for VC finance. More generally, firms
tend to be more valuable in the context of good corporate governance practices.
Therefore, the development of the single European market for financial services
should be promoted by good corporate governance.
Da Rin (2003) illustrated the key characteristics of the European VC industry.
Over the 1990s, the level of investment in the European VC industry was about
half of the one in the United States, showing the relative underdevelopment of this
industry in Europe. Also the characteristics of this industry differ across the two
continents. The European landscape of VC firms is highly captive (that is owned
by an industrial company or financial intermediary), as shown in Table 16.4.
Typically, these types of VC firms invest less in early stage and high-tech
projects, providing less soft support to private companies relative to individual
ones. There is also evidence that European VCs aim at selling their firms. As
shown by Da Rin et al. (2004), the creation of New Markets could therefore foster
the creation of VC firms, as additional exit opportunities create further incentives
for VCs to invest. However, Da Rin also reported findings that European VC
might actually not make a difference for sales growth of the companies they are
financing. Table 16.5 shows that when controlling for the ownership structure at
the time of an initial public offering (IPO) – by including a dummy variable
that takes on the value of one when different categories of shareholders are
294 Hartmann, Manganelli and Monnet
Ballin-16.qxd  13/12/05  12:55 PM  Page 294 $ 
+ + 
$ 
present – VC does not significantly affect sales growth rate. While VC-backed
companies raise more capital at IPOs, they do not tend to grow faster than others.
Tykvová and Walz (2003) bring additional evidence that firms backed by
bank-dependent and public VCs have significantly lower market value relative to
firms backed by independent VCs. In general, firms backed by independent VCs
perform better and display a lower return volatility than firms of other VCs or
non-venture-backed ones.
VC firms are investing very locally and with a very few exceptions have less
than 10% of foreign partners. Also, the cross-border investment of VC firms is
less than 2%. Finally, less than a third of funds originate from foreign investors.
Most foreign investors are from the United States and are concentrated in only a
small number of firms (Da Rin, 2003). This shows a low degree of integration in
this sector in Europe. As for the characteristics limiting integration in retail credit
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Table 16.4 Fund level survey data: European VC industry is highly
captive
Investor type Average holding Proportion of VC funds in which








Source: Da Rin (2003).
Table 16.5 Robust regression-dependent variable sales growth rate
Independent variable Coefficient Std. error
Germany 0.5408 *** (0.1341)
Foreign sales 0.0629 (0.1218)
Age 0.0012 *** (0.0004)
Leverage 0.1001 *** (0.0273)
Capital raised 0.0019 *** (0.0004)
Founders 0.2280 * (0.1308)
Managers 0.4152 ** (0.2031)
Venture capital 0.1099 (0.1479)
Corporate venture capital 0.6610 ** (0.3762)
Constant 0.3641 *** (0.3101)
Number of observations 355
F (14; 340) 5.32
p-value 0.000
Source: Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002).
Notes
*, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels for the significance tests of
the parameters in the table.
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markets, the nature of the VC industry, which is quite different from that of other
financial intermediaries, may provide an explanation. VC makes localised and
undiversified investments; VC is based on human rather than financial capital
and VC has a small number of investors. However, financial integration could
indirectly restructure the VC industry through its effect on the allocation of funds
and the changes in the EU economic structure, notably on the listing ability of
new firms. In this regard, financial integration may improve exit channels for VC
and reallocate talent and human capital.
Corporate governance of new firms and the legal framework surrounding early
finance can also greatly affect the VC industry and the development of New
Markets. Cumming and Armour (2003) find that severe personal bankruptcy laws
discourage early stage entrepreneurs and therefore significantly reduce the
demand for VC finance. Also, according to Giannetti and Simonov (2003)
investors are more likely to buy stocks of a firm when the ratio of control to cash
flow rights of the principal shareholder – expected to be positively correlated with
the extraction of private benefits in a firm, and therefore used as a proxy for bad
governance – is lower. Improved corporate governance has a stronger effect on
sophisticated investors, like financial institutions and foreign investors, while
large domestic investors and individuals that are board members, do not base their
investment decisions on corporate governance grounds. Finally, Desai et al.
(2003) stress the importance of the institutional framework for entrepreneurial
activity in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The authors identify a particular
sensitivity of entrepreneurial activity to institutional factors (corruption/fairness,
protection of property rights, well-functioning legal system) for countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, less corruption and better protection of
property rights increase entry and reduce exit of firms. This supports the view
that well-designed institutions foster entrepreneurial activity partly through the
positive impact on relaxing capital constraints. Corporate governance is therefore
an important factor for understanding portfolio choice across countries.
There is one feature of European governance structure that seems to be better
than its counterpart in the United States. The dual board system often adopted in
Europe separates the monitoring and the advising roles of the board of directors.
Adams and Ferreira (2004) argue that revealing information and getting advice
enables the manager to make better decisions, but this might increase his chances
of getting fired when this information changes the board’s opinion about his
ability. This trade-off provides a rationale for the board to reduce its monitoring
activity up-front whenever it is not too costly to induce the manager to reveal his
information. The authors show further that the first-best level of monitoring can
nevertheless be attained when a dual board system is used.
16.3.5 International portfolio choices and asset market linkages
between Europe, the United States and Japan
At a global scale, asset market linkages have increased recently. For example,
major economies such as the United States and the euro area have become more
financially interdependent. This phenomenon can be observed in stock and bond
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markets as well as in money markets, where the main direction of spillovers has
recently been from the United States to the euro area. Country-specific shocks
play now a smaller role in explaining stock return variations of firms whose sales
are internationally diversified. Increases in firm-by-firm market linkages are a
global phenomenon, but they are stronger within the euro area than in the rest of
the world. Various other phenomena also increase market linkages and therefore
the likelihood that financial shocks spread across countries. One example is the
use of global bonds. Finally, nowadays more direct access of unsophisticated
investors to financial markets may increase volatility.
Brooks and Del Negro (2003) reported in the Launching workshop that the degree
of co-movement across national stock markets has increased dramatically in recent
years. They find that the ability of country-specific effects to explain international
variation in asset and sales growth and return fell significantly during the late 1990s,
while the explanatory power of global industry effects increased and in some cases
surpassed that of country effects, as shown in Figure 16.5. Yet, this question is not
settled. Although there is some ground to believe that international linkages are
becoming stronger, country effects are still large. Where firms are located seems to
still matter more than what they actually produce, although there is evidence that at
the European level, industry effects are gaining further importance.
Stronger international linkages may be explained by growing cross-listings.
Halling et al. (2004) reported that more companies are listing their shares, not
only in their domestic stock exchange, but also on foreign exchanges. They
find that cross-listing initially raises trading volume in foreign markets, but a
declining trend then follows (Figure 16.6).











1997 1998 1999 2000
Figure 16.5 The relative importance of country and industry effects in global asset
growth. (Mean average deviations are measured in per cent per year and
based on annual US Dollar total asset growth.) Mean average deviations for
country (MADC) and industry (MADI) effects.
Source: Brooks and Del Negro (2002).




Although this would suggest a return to the dominance of the domestic market,
the decline in foreign trading is quite slow for certain companies. Foreign trading
volume turns out to be higher for export-oriented companies and for companies
which cross-list into foreign exchanges with lower trading costs and better insider
trading protection. Also small, high-growth and high-tech firms tend to have
relatively higher foreign trading activity.
Investors, as firms, are seeking ways to exploit financing capacities of all
markets by creating new instruments, such as global bonds, that can be simulta-
neously traded in multiple markets. Miller and Puthenpurackal (2003) reported
that global bonds are likely to be an expanding form of finance, as this instrument
reduces the cost of debt capital. According to their study, borrowing costs for
globally tradable bonds are 15 basis points lower than on comparable US domes-
tic bonds. Moreover, issuing costs of global bonds are 13 basis points lower than
those of US domestic bonds. Making these types of instruments more attractive
will undoubtedly bring additional linkages between Europe, the United States and
Japan, thus increasing the risk of volatility spillovers among the different markets.
Examining the effects of monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic
news on interest rates in the money markets, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004)
already found evidence that the spill-over effects are stronger from the
United States to the euro area than vice versa. They also find that since the intro-
duction of the euro the cross-Atlantic interdependence of money markets has
steadily increased over time, as shown in Figure 16.7. In a similar vein, Fleming
and Lopez (1999) examine whether information from other trading centres affect



















Months elapsed since cross-listing
36 48 60
Figure 16.6 Monthly ratio of foreign to domestic volume in the five years after cross-
listing, median values.
Source: Halling et al. (2004).
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intra-market variances for US treasury bonds in London, New York and Tokyo.
They find strong evidence that volatility spills over from New York to London and
Tokyo but not the reverse.
Increased volatility spillovers may become worrisome with the ‘democratisa-
tion’ of access to financial markets. Guiso et al. (2003) find evidence that lower
access costs bring less sophisticated investors in stock markets, with the potential
consequence of inducing greater volatility. For example, unsophisticated
investors can react excessively to market signals because of the limited ability
of small investors to withstand financial pressure. This suggests considering
policies that can reduce volatility, such as improving the flow of accurate financial
information.
Cross-border asset holdings are also encouraged by the harmonisation of secu-
rities regulation, as shown by Vlachos (2004). Institutional or cultural differences
have negative effects on bilateral asset holdings, but results for regulatory differ-
ences are robust even after taking these effects into account. Hence, with
increased cross-border asset holdings, local markets will be populated with
investors that have more diverse information and portfolios. The presence of
heterogeneous investors in stock markets has been analysed by Albuquerque et al.
(2004), who show that this investor heterogeneity is crucial for explaining
international portfolio choices. They propose a model of international portfolio
choice where investors are heterogeneous, both within a country and across
countries. Bringing the model to the data, their main finding is that domestic het-
erogeneity of investors is much more important than cross-country heterogeneity.
16.4 Future steps: continuation of the network
Despite the wealth of results reported in the previous section, there remain open
questions to be examined, some of which have only arisen recently. This section
briefly mentions some open questions and new developments to be addressed in
the continuation of the ECB-CFS network.
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Figure 16.7 Rolling window parameter estimates of the effects of a change in the United
States (German, left panel) money market rate on the German (US, left panel)
money market rate. Germany and US, January 1993–February 2003.
Source: Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004).
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So far an assessment of the impact of the FSAP could not be undertaken. While
most FSAP measures have passed at the European level on time (before the end
2004 deadline), their implementation at the national level is still pending
(deadline end 2005). The effects of the FSAP will only unfold in the coming
years, including its effects on central bank policies. Further work on capital
markets and financial integration in Europe should analyse those effects.
An area that is relatively little developed concerns the effects of financial
integration and the modernisation of financial systems on the real economy,
notably on economic growth. This dimension is particularly relevant in the
context of the Lisbon Agenda and the FSAP. It is the ambition of the network
organisers to also stimulate more research in this area. The same applies to the
implications of financial integration for financial stability in Europe.
Finally, an important recent development is the enlargement of the EU. New
issues arise with the integration of new member states and with their envisaged
future adoption of the euro. Their financial development is not identical to the
ones of many of the earlier member states and the process of financial integration
is likely to advance in a different fashion in those countries.
The ECB and the CFS concluded that further research is needed in those areas,
and that the network on ‘Capital Markets and Financial Integration in Europe’
provides a good structure within which to pursue this work. The two institutions
therefore agreed to continue the network for three further years. To cover, inter
alia, the issue mentioned earlier three additional areas will be added to the main
priorities of the network: (1) the relationship between financial integration
and financial stability; (2) EU accession, financial development and financial
integration and (3) financial system modernisation and economic growth
in Europe. The remainder of this section presents these three research areas in
more detail.
16.4.1 The relationship between financial integration and
financial stability
While an integrated area offers more opportunities to share risk and to allocate
capital, it may be less resilient to unexpected and uninsurable shocks, as they may
propagate wider and faster. Moreover, it is of interest to know whether greater
integration could increase the risk of cross-border contagion in a financial crisis.
With the integration of European financial markets going forward, it is important
to understand what type of integrated financial structure is the most resilient.
The ECB has an obvious interest in this. As in accordance with Article 105(5)
of the Treaty, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) shall ‘contribute to
the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the
financial system’.
Furthermore, a comprehensive review of the EU arrangements for financial
regulation, supervision and stability is currently underway (ECB, 2003). The
review, which should contribute to the further integration of the EU’s institutional
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financial architecture, was initially triggered by the report (2001) of the
Lamfalussy Committee on the regulation of European securities markets.
The work of the research network on the relationships between financial inte-
gration and financial stability will seek to bring additional elements in shaping a
view regarding what this new financial architecture should be. In particular,
important questions are the following: Are market-based or bank-based financial
structures more resilient to shocks? How can financial regulations be designed so
as to be conducive of integration while still ensuring financial stability? What is
the link between financial integration and contagion risk? What are the mecha-
nisms that can trigger contagion and financial fragility? How and to what extent
do financial crises impact on economic activity? Finally, how does competition
in the financial services industry affect the ability of the financial system to
withstand shocks?
16.4.2 EU accession, financial development and 
financial integration
As expressed by the President of the ECB,
Assessing the impact of EU enlargement on the European economy is a
complex question. Despite the considerable complexity surrounding this
issue, one thing that is clear is that EU enlargement will provide new oppor-
tunities to trade and investment flows. Many of these effects are visible
because of the high degree of economic integration already reached between
the present Member States and the acceding countries.
(ECB, 2004)
Further financial integration is likely to follow swiftly the political and economic
integration of these countries in the EU. There are many ways in which this finan-
cial integration can take place. One way, which currently seems to be a dominant
one, is that foreign financial institutions acquire financial institutions of new
member states.4 Another way would be the cross-border provision of financial
services. Clearly the first is likely to be faster than the second, and may develop
accession country financial systems faster as well. The example of the ‘old’ EU
member states suggests that there are many obstacles to the direct provision of
financial services abroad, in particular in retail markets. The heavy presence of
foreign financial institutions may, however, pose other challenges for the new
member countries, for example, in the area of financial stability and supervision.
All these developments will determine financial structures, development and
competition in financial services across the enlarged EU.
Important questions for further work within the network are therefore the
following: What factors explain differences in financial structures across new
and old EU member states? What role is financial integration taking in this devel-
opment? What is the relation between financial integration and financial
development? Who benefits from financial development in the process of
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integration? Are there any risks to financial stability during fast changes in
financial structures and institutional arrangements? How will financial integra-
tion among accession countries advance relative to integration between accession
countries and the previous EU countries?
16.4.3 Financial system modernisation and 
economic growth in Europe
The capacity of financial systems to promote economic growth depends not only
on their level of integration, but also on their quality and the efficiency with
which they channel savings into investment. In other words, when tackling the
issue of economic growth, it would be too narrow to place the focus entirely on
the level of integration. Although several financial systems can be very finan-
cially integrated, they may not be developed in such a way as to achieve a greater
volume or efficiency of financial intermediation, and therefore may not improve
the growth performance of the economy. Financial modernisation and financial
development, however, improve efficiency of financial intermediation, and are
processes influenced by many other factors than financial integration. As the
network has contributed to these issues on the link between finance and growth
only to a relatively limited degree so far, they have now been added as a separate
priority area.
Work could focus, in particular, on the following issues: How can one further
improve the structure of highly developed financial systems? How can one mea-
sure the performance with which the financial system performs its functions?
What are the costs and the benefits of modernising the financial system? What is
the best form of corporate governance? What are the implications of uniform
accounting standards? How to incorporate improvements in the structures of the
financial system? How to effectively enforce rules?
16.5 Conclusion
In response to the growing need of understanding the dynamics and implications
of the integration and development of the European financial system, the ECB
and the CFS launched a research network on ‘Capital Markets and Financial
Integration in Europe’. This paper described the scope, the findings and the future
initiatives of this network.
The ECB-CFS research network aims at stimulating top-level and policy-
relevant research on the structure and integration of the European financial
system and its linkages with the United States and Japan. By acting as a hub for
researchers working in these fields and by actively promoting research in specific
areas of interest, the network managed to bring together in a continuous fashion
a large number of researchers who shared their most recent results and to stimu-
late new research on these issues. After two years of activity, the work done under
the ECB-CFS research network helped to shed more light on the process of
European financial integration, on effects the euro had on the European financial
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system and on the role of financial linkages between the major economies. One
of the most tangible achievements of the network was the stimulation of new
research on securities settlement systems, an area of high policy relevance,
playing a key role in the process of financial integration. It had not attracted much
attention in the academic community beforehand.
Enlargement of the EU, the impact that financial integration may have on
financial stability and the relationship between financial system development and
economic growth are some key areas in which the network will concentrate its
efforts over the next three years. Many important questions remain on the agenda,
key policy issues need to be tackled and many challenges lie ahead. We hope that
this article also conveyed a sense of the research excitement that is growing
around European financial markets and that this may help the network to continue
stimulating new insights in this important area of research.
Notes
* Any views expressed in this paper are the authors’ only, and do not necessarily reflect
those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
1 Further information on the network and papers of past workshops can be downloaded
from the network web site, www.eu-financial-system.org
2 The roadmap is publicly available at www.eu-financial-system.org/roadmap.pdf
3 Degryse and Ongena (2004) also point to informational and political barriers that limit
mergers and acquisition in banking.
4 See ‘Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries’ (ed. Christian Thimann), ECB, 
2002.
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